Constructivism and human rights locating values in a divided approach by Hayman, Paul Alexander
Durham E-Theses
Constructivism and human rights locating values in
a divided approach
Hayman, Paul Alexander
How to cite:
Hayman, Paul Alexander (2008) Constructivism and human rights locating values in a divided approach,
Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2905/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
Constructivism and Human Rights 
Locating Values in a Divided Approach 
Paul Alexander Hayman 
Submitted for completion of PhD., International Relations 
December 2008 
School of Government and International Affairs 
Durham University 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author or the university to which it was 
submitted. No quotation from it, or 
information derived from it may be 
published without the prior written 
consent of the author or university, and 
any information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
2 9 SEP !DOl 
This thesis is the result of my own work. Material from the published or 
unpublished work of others which is used in the thesis is credited to the 
author in question in the text. 
Signed: fflLJ -- Date: o!? / o ~ I o 'i 
Abstract 
Constructivism is sociological, constitutive and manages to incorporate both positivist 
and post-positivist methods of analysing the international system, although how well it 
combines the two is much disputed. It has produced a large amount of theoretical and 
empirical work detailing the constitutive and procedural norms of this system, and it has 
(largely) done so by placing a premium on the lives, characteristics and contributions of 
humans within it. As such it is often regarded as the most fertile ground within 
International Relations (IR) theory for bringing together theory and practice into a 
coherent whole. 
But how normative should it be? 
Critical scholars, mindful perhaps of the Third Debate origins of constructivism, 
strongly suggest that it should be more normative in its outlook, and thus able to direct 
the flow of international theory and practice rather than simply report on it. It is adept at 
cataloguing and interpreting the institutions and standards which constitute the 
international system, and the procedures and behaviours that govern it, but not the values 
which many see as underpinning it. This thesis will test this claim. It will do so by using 
the currently most visible and even tangible expression of values in the international 
system- the Universal Declaration of Human Rights- to anchor an otherwise 
metaphysical concept. The capacity of constructivism to engage more consistently with 
human rights will be assessed by critically analysing three key expressions of the 
;..:'!,-_-, - ~~- r • 
approach- namely those of Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf and Andrew Linklater. 
This triangulation opens up a new intellectual space which enables an exploration of the 
broad range of constructivist positions, in order to appraise how they cohere and diverge 
on this subject. This in turn allows for the conclusions that constructivism does engage 
with values, but that it is not suited to furthering a purposive, moral agenda. Any attempt 
to push its boundaries towards a more critical formulation divest it of any meaning as a 
category of international theory. 
Contents 
Introduction 
The normative challenge 
A triangulated approach to the 'problem' of constructivism 
1. Constructivism in IR 
The origins of constructivism 
Divided they stand? 
Three sides of the same coin? 
Alexander Wendt 
Nicholas Onuf 
Andrew Linklater 
Conclusions 
2: Human Rights as value norms 
Making a distinction: value norms 
Human rights as a concern of IR 
Conducting (and constructing) normative research 
Moving towards values: constructivism, normative theory and ethics 
Universalism, human rights and the 'middle-ground' 
Conclusions 
3: A Conventional approach -Alexander Wendt 
I. Conventionalism and values 
Where does the Wendtian state get its values from? 
The state as a (good) person? 
Values versus structure: how change occurs in Wendt's world 
H. The limits of socialisation 
Universalism: the need to represent culture(s) 
Wendt and the conventionalists 
Conclusions 
4: Rules and Language -Nicholas Onuf 
I. An alternative construction of-modernity 
.· ,,W§ttffiting a '1~~~· of morality: t~e liberal state 
Hume 
Kant 
Bentham 
Underlying traditions of political thought 
1 
4 
8 
12 
19 
33 
41 
41 
51 
56 
68 
72 
76 
79 
83 
89 
94 
104 
107 
108 
115 
123 
128 
138 
138 
148 
151 
158 
160 
160 
160 <'>:: 
162 
163 
165 
II. Constructing values using Onuf's categories 
Human rights as (Onuf's) rules 
Onuf's theory and practice of rules and language 
Human rights as a regime in World of Our Making 
Values as part of a normative paradigm 
Onuf's epilogue: the persistence of exploitation 
III. What to make of this world? Language as a constructivist tool 
Conclusions 
5: Dialogue and communication - Andrew Linklater 
I. A critical construction of modernity 
Re-constituting the moral polity 
The state, citizenship and human rights 
H. The limits of dialogic community 
Dialogue and constructivism 
On turning to the Frankfurt School 
Linklater's historical referent for values: the concept ofharm 
Conclusions 
6: Synthesis? 
170 
170 
178 
184 
192 
197 
202 
213 
219 
221 
221 
234 
246 
246 
257 
274 
278 
283 
I. The problems of capturing values as theory becomes practice 288 
Making values possible: the relative importance ofKant, Marx and Weber 290 
Subjecting human rights norms to constructivist methods 304 
Onuf 306 
Linklater 311 
Wendt 316 
II. Constructivism as a critique of modernity 327 
Doing critical IR: Pre-theoretical praxis 328 
III. The limits of constructivism 338 
Human rights norms and values as 'change' in the international system 339 
Conclusions: Two Paradoxes? Constructivism 'succeeds', constructivism 'fails'346 
Conclusion 355 
Bibliography 369 
Introduction 
Constructivism is sociological, constitutive and manages to incorporate both positivist 
and post-positivist methods of analysing the international system, although how well 
it combines the two is much disputed. It has produced a large amount of theoretical 
and empirical work detailing the constitutive and procedural norms of this system, 
and it has (largely) done so by placing a premium on the lives, characteristics and 
contributions of humans within it. As such it is often regarded as the most fertile 
ground within International Relations (IR) theory for bringing together theory and 
practice into a coherent whole. 
But how normative should it be? 
Representing the broad middle ground in international theory, constructivism 
occupies a space between 'orthodox' and 'progressive' poles, loosely tying them 
together. As such, many claims are made of it by those who see its potential for 
pushing back the boundaries of how theory is done in IR whilst maintaining a foot in 
either camp. For many traditionalists, constructivism is an opportunity to experiment 
with what is 'social' about the stuff ofiR without compromising their epistemological 
position. Critically-inclined scholars, on the other hand, see constructivism as having 
the necessary sociological and empirical tools needed to substantiate their more 
abstract vision. In this case, construCtivism lacRsthe rype ofvalue-normativity 
expressed by other approaches, namely the English School. 
This critical perspective is the focus of this thesis. The main research question 
is in two parts: 
To what extent do key constructivist accounts engage with 
values, and what effect do values have on our understanding 
of' constructivism' as a category of international theory? 
In other words, to what extent is constructivism a value-led approach, and to what 
extent should it be? 
Is constructivism failing, somehow, to live up to expectations? The most 
straightforward answer to this question again comes in two parts, and these in tum 
create two interconnected strands of inquiry which together form the core analytic 
content of this thesis: all of this depends both on what constructivism is, and what is 
being expected of it. 
It is, almost by definition, a contested approach. Critical scholars, mindful 
perhaps of the Third Debate origins of constructivism, strongly suggest that it should 
be more normative in its outlook, and thus able to direct the flow of international 
theory and practice rather than simply report on it. It is adept at cataloguing and 
interpreting the institutions and standards which constitute the international system, 
and the procedures and behaviours that govern it, but not the values which many see 
as underpinning it. In other words, this would be a moral undertaking which goes 
beyond the normativity usually associated with constructivism. Values are the norms 
which constructivism lacks. It is not a purposive approach, and this identity is being 
tested here. 
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So how should constructivism be represented as a subject, and what is 'value 
normativity' as the term is employed here? Firstly, the fact that constructivism is a 
label for (sometimes loosely) associated approaches which all profess to offer a 
constitutive account of international relations by incorporating its many and various 
social aspects, and the way in which it does this- by ranging across the positivist-
postpositivist epistemological spectrum - has resulted in the emergence of several 
different constructivisms. They each focus their energies on different aspects of the 
'social' international, yet have still managed to persist throughout two decades of 
international theorising beneath a single umbrella term. 
Secondly, the normativity demanded of constructivism is value normativity as 
distinguished from constitutive or procedural normativity. The difference between 
these types is a difference of purpose, as mentioned above. Constructivism - as is 
usually agreed upon- has the stated purpose of delivering an ongoing constitutive 
account of how the world works. Alternatively, some suggest that it can be purposive 
and deliver this account as part of a moral agenda. It is this value normativity which 
tests constructivism, as otherwise it is generally considered to excel at the more 
traditional constitutive and behavioural or procedural matters of international relations 
- the norms of action, habit and convention. 
The way in which this thesis tests the value-normativity of constructivism is to 
frame the issue against a more substantive backdrop -human rights norms. This is 
done for several reasons. There is a need for this test to account for the more 
positivistic aspects of constructivism if it is to engage with this approach as 
holistically as possible. This requires a more concrete representation of values as they 
operate in and impact upon the international system. Without this, we are dealing with 
·: <!.' 
a concept- values - that can all too easily be detached from its ethical meaning and 
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become entirely metaphysical. To have this act as our sounding board for the 
normativity of constructivism is simply too critically-inclined as a starting point for 
the following analysis to incorporate a truly representative sample of constructivism 
as a whole. At best, having the test begin from a moral prescription rather than an 
ethical perspective is to assume that any meaningful outcome must stem from the 
critical wing of constructivism itself. At worst, it makes for a very confined and 
biased analysis. 
Instead, an ethical instrumental approach will be taken, as this is considered to 
be the best way of discussing the spectrum of constructivism together with the 'good' 
of values. Both constructivism and this thesis require a more concrete representation 
of values if either is to come to a satisfactory conclusion on the matter. That is, a 
conclusion not dominated by the abstractions of metatheory. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights allows us to point to these rights, to quote them even, 
which then allows us to be relatively happy that they do actually exist, and that they 
can therefore be accounted for by a constitutive approach. This codification of the 
liberal human rights agenda in 1948 encapsulates the moral challenge for 
constructivists, and will be referred to throughout the thesis for precisely this reason-
it substantiates the otherwise abstract issue of values in the international system. 
Division and ethics are two important themes for this thesis. Before detailing 
its running order, certain key areas require some elaboration. That is, the nature of the 
normative challenge and the constructivism(s) being brought to the table. 
The normative challenge 
International theory does not have a unitary response to values. Much of the analysis 
!- -"""· ·~ I,.. • ,_. .f. "> •• "> •'; • - " • • • "-"' •· • 
in this thesis will range across the positivist/postpositivist divide which persists not 
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only in international theory but within constructivism itself. Any review or analysis of 
constructivism demands that this epistemological split be given equal weighting. 
Indeed, it seems to be an essential and defining part of what constructivism is. Taking 
up a critical theory challenge involves testing a positivist belief against a 
postpositivist belief. Traditional or orthodox approaches do of course acknowledge 
that values play a role in how norms shape and reflect our world, but it remains a case 
of 'values do matter but are not essential' versus 'values are essential'. 
To engage with this divide is to make the key assumption that states matter 
and humans matter, and distinguishing between them in a hierarchical arrangement 
does not benefit our understanding of the international system. That, at least, is our 
premise. This premise is made more interesting by the fact that Wendt, Onuf and 
Linklater can appear to be irreconcilable, but they do in fact speak to each other on 
several key levels. 
A concern over constructivism's normative lack has circulated throughout this 
subfield of IR and has been voiced by critically-inclined theorists either implicitly or 
explicitly. As notable examples of the latter, Christian Reus-Smit and Richard 
Shapcott have asked a series of questions, and have made a number of statements, 
regarding the normative credentials of constructivism. One such prompt has 
constructivism as the poor relation where normativity is concerned: 'constructivism 
can be enriched by learning from the English School's normative reflections.' 1 That it 
can be 'enriched' presupposes a lack of moral fibre, and that by instituting this 
morality constructivism should somehow become more complete. 
There is a suspicion, essentially, that constructivism is not performing as it 
should. In more detail, 
1 Christian Reus-Smit, 'Imagining society: constructivism and the English School', British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, vol. 4 (3), (2002), p. 499 
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there is a certain coyness about much constructivist writing. 
Constructivists are united by their emphasis on the role of 
intersubjective values in constituting social actors and action, 
and much of their empirical research focuses on the 
development arid impact of cosmopolitan or liberal values, 
such as human rights, arms control, environmental 
protection, multilateralism and international law. Yet the fact 
that this explicit analytical interest in norms coexists with an 
implicit normative sympathy for, and commitment to, these 
'progressive' values is seldom admitted, let alone justified? 
This passage raises many of the themes which shall be investigated by this 
thesis: that, for example, 'intersubjective values' remain utterly metaphysical and 
have yet to be tested in any substantial way; that an approach bearing the label 
'constitutive' should be tied to this commitment, however ill-defined or even 
paradoxical it may be; that studies into the 'development and impact' of normative 
concerns fail to cohere unless, in the end, they confirm a liberalising agenda; and, 
most pertinently, that 'sympathy' for 'progressive values' is the proper focus of 
constructivism, given its critical heritage and leading contemporary expression. 
Certainly, constructivism, along with the English School and critical 
international theory, has been part of the movement to bring norms 'back in' to a 
more idea-receptive and humanist IR. But certain quarters of international theory are 
p~commg,incre~i!lgly dissatisfied with the level of inquiry offered by these schools 
. ·- · . ~ ,.,.· -.c.~~ ~ --{ ~~ '"if-" • L-.. . '· -~ . .: •.c>·· -~,.. ,,- ,. _ 
2 Ibid., pp. 499-500 
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and would like answers to their many worthy questions. They would like an outcome, 
a product, for all of the normative promise. 
In Shapcott's words, 'the constructivist account in particular has been central 
to the 'return' of normative concerns to IR.' As part of a group of approaches 
similarly placed in raising 'important normative questions, to date, none has 
demonstrated possession of the resources by which such questions can be answered. ' 3 
Looking for 'answers', of course, is a fundamentally metaphysical pursuit. It is not 
something that IRis particularly well set-up to do. In this respect, it mirrors much of 
social science. Branches of it do make normative statements, of course, but could 
constructivism be one of them? Constructivism addresses normative issues. But 
addressing issues normatively is not the same thing, however counter-intuitive that 
may seem. To begin with, 'norms' are such a broad and pervasive social concept that 
they apply to many human and institutional capacities: to act, to force, to persuade, to 
need, etc. Yet to address these aspects of the international system as if they are, a 
priori, unfinished projects, strongly suggests a particular political agenda. 
We have touched upon the challenge which has been laid down for 
constructivism, but how best to go about addressing it? That the international system 
should be governed more by the values people hold than by the material needs of 
states concerns an increasing number of IR scholars, just as it appears to concern an 
increasing number of states. The normative problem, if we can phrase it in this way, is 
to match a burgeoning academic perception of the 'needs' ofhumans with the actions 
of states. Which is no small task, not only because of the philosophy involved with 
this, but because of the variety and vagaries of international theory. This thesis is an 
analysis of the latter, rather than the former. 
'. "'"" . ' ,, 'J:. 
3 Richard Shapcott, 'Solidarism and After: Global Governance, International Society, and the 
Normative 'Tum' in International Relations', Pacifica Review, vol. 12 (2) (2000), p. 148 
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The 'ought to' element of normative enquiry is complicated by the 'does' of 
international theory- if we cannot pin down what each school or branch of 
international theory even does, let alone what we would like it to do, then where to 
begin with this task? We begin with certain assumptions. 
Firstly, that constructivism operates within the poles of positivism and 
postpositivism. This is a way of ordering the knowledge that international theory 
produces into categories based on generally agreed principles of its origin. Is it more 
or less scientific, and is its legitimacy affected by this? 
Secondly, the assumption that values are a legitimate area of concern for 
international theory. If this premise seems obvious, then that is its downfall. Why 
should values held by people cross the borders created by and for states? By what 
process of logic might these values then become embedded in states? Our assumption 
here, then, is that values do cross borders, and they do affect the activities of states. 
The extent to which this makes the world a different place is not necessarily our 
concern. 
These are the fields of our inquiry: that constructivism is a contested approach 
within international theory which may or may not be capable of answering the critical 
call, and that values are international phenomena which currently lack the sort of 
grounding which would cement their institutional and normative presence. Is 
constructivism up to the task? Should it be even thought of in this light? 
A triangulated approach to the 'problem ' of constructivism 
The constructivism to which this test of values is to be applied is clearly not a singular 
,entity. This ]?~ing so, !n order to extract as much analytical material from it as 
- "!" _- ,.,:- •• ~ 
possible within a thesis-length treatment, it will be divided into three different types. 
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The typologies literature is itself a sub-field of constructivist critique, and will be 
addressed in much greater detail in Chapter One. Briefly, Alexander Wendt, Nicholas 
Onuf and Andrew Linklater have been chosen here to represent not just simplistic 
'types' of constructivism, but also more subtle aspects of it: not just what it is, but 
what it might also be, or become; not just more common perceptions of a 
conglomerate of approaches, but what this 'whole' might look like when stretched 
towards either the positivist or postpositivist end of the spectrum of international 
theory. 
Chiefly, they have been selected because they are keystones in the 
development of the approach. This is not necessarily on merit, because the wider 
(predominantly Anglo-American) perception of what constructivism is has arguably 
contributed to the distortion of it by the crowning of key figures - most notably 
Alexander Wendt, but also to an extent Nicholas Onuf. Andrew Linklater is 
undoubtedly the most controversial inclusion in this 'constructivism' triumvirate, but 
that is precisely the point. The critical challenge is controversial. It demands that 
constructivism be pushed and pulled by competing interests until it might one day 
declare its own, settled, identity. This thesis is a somewhat sceptical appraisal of this 
possible end product. 
This 'keystone' philosophy towards constructivism is also manifest by having 
the key text of each scholar as the primary focus of the present inquiry. Social Theory 
of International Politics4, World ofOur Makinl and The Transformation of Political 
Communitl (hereafter referred to as Social Theory, World and Transformation 
4 Alexanaer Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambnage: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) 
5 Nkh~las Gr~~nwood Onuf, W~rld of Our Making: Rules a~'dRule in Social Theory and Internaiioital 
Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989) 
6 Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-
Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) 
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respectively) all loom large over the discipline and are all rich expositions ofhow the 
world ought to be viewed if we are to make sensible judgements regarding its past, 
present and possible futures. They are as self-contained and unitary as this branch of 
international theory gets, and as such are taken here as the most appropriate entry 
point for this debate. Of course, each contains threads of arguments and concepts 
which can be further traced to other key works of their respective authors. It would be 
remiss not to follow these leads when necessary. Nevertheless, each approach is 
measured by its most authoritative, singularly contained statement. 
Triangulating the three approaches in this way opens up an intellectual space. 
It is the breadth and dimensionality of this space which has the potential to provide a 
more accommodating framework to allow some movement forward on this issue of 
values. There can be no single answer, just as there is no single constructivism, nor is 
there any single claim to human rights. We might expect, though, to be able to 
pronounce with some authority upon the suitability of constructivism to take on this 
role preferred by those more committed to critical themes. 
The thesis will proceed in three stages. The first stage, which encompasses chapters 
One and Two, will establish in more detail the contested and frequently complex 
nature of constructivism and also the narrative of human rights in international theory. 
The primary purpose of these chapters is an exposition ofhow and why these 
concepts and ideas are relevant to this argument, and by the end of this stage we will 
have a much clearer picture of the complex parameters facing our key subjects. The 
second stage encompasses chapters Three, Four and Five, and comprises the main 
analytical drive of the thesis. Each component of our triangulation will be tested in 
turn to ascertain not only whether it should account for human rights norms, but 
10 
whether it even can in a sustainable and meaningful way. The third stage is contained 
in Chapter Six. Here, this 'intellectual space' will be tested by bringing together the 
three constructivisms to ascertain whether they can be said to 'synthesise', both as a 
whole and (either separately or in combination) with the issue of values. 
This final chapter will bring together the three most prominent analytical 
strands of the thesis and make concluding statements about them. Firstly, there will be 
an analysis of how these constructivisms cohere regarding the issues of values in 
theory and values in practice. Then the question of 'modernity' will be explicitly dealt 
with. That is, the extent to which each type of constructivism can (and wishes to) 
challenge the assumptions of modernity in a way that would bring critical approval. 
Thirdly, this stretching-to-fit of constructivism will be considered, with conclusions 
being drawn on where this critical challenge would leave it as a category of 
international theory. In other words, is a value-led constructivism still constructivism 
as this term is generally understood? 
11 
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1. Constructivism in IR 
There is no simple definition of constructivism. Any attempt to be parsimonious with 
this masks hidden depths and complications. We shall begin with one such example: 
Constructivism is about identity. For many traditionalists, this is about as far as it 
should be pursued. Having undertaken to write a thesis-length work on 
constructivism, though, it is probably best to push a little further with this. Why does 
identity matter? After all, identity is also the concern of postmodernists. It matters 
because, for constructivists, the world is not a finished product, and humans through 
their interactive existence can change it. Why should humans want to change the 
world? Because it is somehow flawed, and this has led to institutionalised inequity, 
injustice and suffering. Already, with this logic-by-numbers, we are beginning to 
create our own definition of constructivism to suit our purposes. 
Others have provided their own perspective. In Christian Reus-Smit's words, 
'constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as 
well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action and on 
the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures.' In addition to 
this, the approach 'challenge[s] the rationalism and positivism ofneo-realism and 
neoliberalism while simultaneously pushing critical theorists away from 
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metatheoretical critique to the empirical analysis of world politics.' 1 This appears to 
be a general description, but it too points to Reus-Smit's own convictions regarding 
what constructivism should be for. 
Having these comparisons as the parameters of this approach suggests that IR 
has traditionally been a narrowly conceived discipline, and that quantities rather than 
qualities have been its currency. Moreover, concerning the theory-practice nexus, 
constructivism is drawn as a righter of (theoretical and disciplinary) wrongs. Emanuel 
Adler adds more detail to this outline: 'Constructivism ... describes the dynamic, 
contingent and culturally based condition of the social world ... It stresses the 
reciprocal relationship between nature and human knowledge and suggests a view of 
the social sciences that is contingent, partly indeterminate, nominalist, and to some 
extent externally validated. '2 
There are two points of note here. Constructivism 'views' the social sciences, 
and not just IR, which is often considered the narrower province of realism, 
neorealism, neoliberalism, etc. This is due to its social theory origins, a field of 
inquiry inextricably woven into what constructivism is for, and how it should go 
about doing it. Secondly, as an approach, it strives to define very little, preferring to 
focus instead on how both subjects and understanding are amorphous and organic. 
This has one clear benefit and one clear disadvantage; respectively, it is an 
accommodating yet insufficiently delineated area of theoretical enterprise. It is 
descriptive, but is this the sum of constructivism? This thesis will test how 
constructivism describes values, and whether this compromises our understanding of 
its own boundaries. 
I christian R~us-Smit, 'Constructivism'' in S~ott Burchill, et al., Theories of International Relations 
(3nl ed.) (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 188 
2 Emanuel Adler, 'Constructivism and International Relations', in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and 
Beth A Simmons (eds.) Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 96 
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Constructivism's development over the last thirty years or so/ as the 
aggregation of various (mainly) socio-philosophical influences, has not simplified the 
task. Ronen Palan, for example, cites several examples of corresponding positions, 
stating that constructivism is 'an incredibly broad movement encompassing, among 
other schools of thought, Weberian interpretative sociology, Symbolic Interactionism, 
variants of Marxism, Veblenian institutionalism, post-structuralism(s) and 
hermeneutics. ' 4 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink manage to capture all of this 
confusing diversity in a statement which manages somehow to be once pithy, vague 
and insightful. Constructivism 'operates at a different level of abstraction. ' 5 It is 
certainly 'one step removed' from both positivist and postpositivist positions if we 
imagine them as epistemologically polar, but the key to having this 'difference' mean 
something when engaging with values is for practical considerations (i.e. real human 
lives and not metatheoretical texts) to come to the fore. 
All of these examples of what constructivism is come from either a textbook 
or a 'state of the discipline' review. They are necessarily broad because, as we shall 
see, constructivism is what we might call a transdisciplinary approach. In other words, 
it readily shares the frontiers of theory and knowledge with the other 'isms' of 
international theory, and is also itself frequently re-drawn by scholars interested in 
ideas, socialisation and shared beliefs (often labeled 'intersubjectivity'), but whom 
wish to attribute change and development within the international system to often 
contrasting genealogies and uses of these concepts. 
3 Nicholas Onuf first used the term just over twenty years ago, but of course it has deep and complex 
socio-political roots. See Onuf, 'Rules in Moral Development', Human Development voL 30 (-1987) 
4 Ronen·Palan. 'A world oftheir.making: an evaluation of the constructivist critjque in In,tem~tional 
Relations', Review of International Studies, vol. 26 (4) (2000), p. 576 
5 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics', Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 4 (2001), p. 
393 
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This sense of friction (expressed both implicitly and explicitly) amongst 
constructivists themselves is at the very root of this thesis. Being a contested 
approach, expectations or challenges are often laid at constructivism's door by 
scholars who would prefer it to take a particular path over another. This goes hand in 
hand with an additional, perhaps exemplary, feature of constructivism: It is not 
controversial to assert that it is not only contested but also a divided approach. 
Whether these disconnections are somehow terminal for constructivism dictates how 
this thesis will develop. First, though, the challenge which it is responding to shall be 
considered. 
According to Reus-Smit, 'exploring the development and impact of the 
normative and ideational foundations of international society is the constructivist 
stock in trade, and dialogue between constructivists and those engaged in the more 
philosophical project of normative critique and elaboration is the most likely path 
toward true praxeological knowledge. ' 6 Having constructivism fulfill this role stems 
largely from its critical theory roots- that it should have a purpose rather than exist as 
just another analytical tool. That is, it should have a moral purpose. 
By and large, constructivists have not taken this path, or if they have ventured 
upon it, they have not stayed with it as a means to a purposive end. One way of 
interpreting this is to consider it due to an unwillingness to commit to values: 'most 
constructivists remain backward about coming forward with their values. 
Constructivists have often worked at the hard edge ofhuman misery ... , showing how 
humanitarian norms can be constructed and produce real, valuable change. Yet the 
6 Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', p. 204 
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clear normative sympathies and purposes that lie behind this research are generally 
left unspoken.' 7 Unspoken or unnecessary? 
Much normative theorising in IRis compromised by asking questions that are 
'wrong' according to Reus-Smit, or at least questions which can only lead to an 
incomplete answer.8 They are empirical and not ethical questions. To what extent is 
the present thesis an example of this limited empiricism? Professedly, it starts and 
ends with constructivism. Its primary focus is to extract values from each of three 
different constructivist approaches. This being the case, it is leaning towards the 
empirical end of the normative spectrum.by asking 'how' questions regarding the 
incorporation of values. But does it completely lack an ethical dimension? It is, after 
all, concerned with a subject (human rights) usually considered to be either a moral or 
an ethical m~tter. This is indicative of the complexity of the moral/ethical question, 
which is particularly evident when applied to the international system. With an 
investigation of this type, is something moral or ethical being revealed? Or, from a 
different angle, is the subject being revealed in a moral or ethical way? 
To clarify, this thesis makes an explicit distinction between what is 'moral' 
and what is 'ethical'. The distinction can be framed in the most basic terms- morality 
is concerned with advancing or promoting the good, whereas ethics is about .finding 
the good. Morality has a preconceived notion of what is being aimed for- what the 
end product looks like. It is evidenced by much if not all of the liberalising project of 
modernity: the good in politics is manifest in liberal democracy, the good ofhuman 
rights is manifest in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It has a shape, a 
form, and international theory can be used for its development. 
7 Reus-Smit, 'Imagining society', p. 500 
8 See Christian Reus-S mit, 'In Dialogue on the Ethic of Consensus: A Reply to Shapcott', Pacifica 
Review, vol. 12 (3) (2000), p. 306 
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Ethics, on the other hand (as the distinction is made here), is about the process 
of politics. In other words, it is about how best to carry on, rather than the end purpose 
to carry on for. Engaging with human rights can be either an ethical or a moral 
pursuit. The point that Reus-Smit rightly makes is that many projects are not ethical 
enough (and we might suppose for a moment that the present thesis falls into this 
category). This is the problem of politics in IR, and it is arguably one which plagues 
the entire discipline - IR is not, by this token, ethical enough. The counter-argument 
to this is quite simple. Without a properly worked out epistemology, how can we 
avoid the sorts of prejudices and dominant agendas which dilute ethical meaning? Of 
course, we can be circuitous, and reverse this to ask how do we know what to look for 
in the first place? 
This is the critical challenge for constructivism. That it ought to have 
something to say about the morality of politics and, moreover, it ought to have its 
sociological toolkit somehow put to use by bringing together what is material and 
what is moral in international politics. And it is a clarification of the ethical and/or 
moral position of constructivism which is being sought in this thesis. These important 
issues will be expanded upon in Chapter Two. 
Concerning this categorization of normativity, the position of this thesis rests 
on the following: We know what the values are which we are looking for (or to be 
more accurate, we know what they look like) - human rights norms as decreed by the 
Universal Declaration in 1948, and further established by succeeding declarations 
and treaties. What we lack is a coherent constructivist epistemology and methodology 
of these norms. How is this lack manifest? By a failure to account for the values 
inherent in these norms, something compounded by an overriding focus on the two 
other aspects of the normative triad- constitutive and behavioural/procedural norms. 
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Constructivism deals with these latter two aspects well. It is not so explicitly attuned 
to values. Are values wholly different? Not in an instrumental sense, the analysis of 
which looks at their effects more than it does their origin. 
This is the way in which this thesis will approach the normative spectrum of 
'empiricism to ethics' as described by Reus-Smit- by analyzing certain constructivist 
positions with a view to extracting their understanding of values in the international 
system. The end product (as organic and amorphous as this may be) will take either a 
maximal or a minimal form: the former will be a coherent constructivist position on 
human rights, and the latter will at least have clarified key connections and 
disconnections on this matter with the aim of mapping out a clearer path forward. 
Achieving the former is not inconceivable, given the criteria and parameters which we 
are beginning to develop. A clear exposition of the origin and current place of human 
rights norms in IR, why they matter to constructivists, and how they fit 
constructivism's current normative approach empirically and as universals, will be the 
role of the next chapter. The task ofthis chapter is to draw the parameters of 
constructivism, primarily as a divided approach, and then to explain why the focus of 
the main body of the thesis will be on Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf and Andrew 
Linklater. 
It will proceed as follows. In order to set up the specifically constructivist 
problematic of the thesis, namely how and why it is a divided approach, and how this 
might best be developed into a more coherent plan for addressing the issue of human 
rights norms, the first part of section one will address the critical roots of 
constructivism. Rather than attempting to shoe-hom in the many and various 
intellectual and social histories that could conceivably be linked to constructivism, its 
status a an outgrowth of critical social theory- and therefore its origin within IR-
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will be focused on as having sowed the seeds of discontent which have led to the 
many-faceted approach we see today. This will be followed by an analysis of the 
typologies literature which underpins many attempts to bring some 'order' to 
ascertaining what constructivism is. This will then move on, finally, to a discussion of 
the specific divisions which form the basis of this thesis- the triangulation of Wendt, 
Onuf and Linklater, intended as a general introduction prior to the more specific 
assessment in Chapters Three, Four and Five. 
The origins of constructivism 
Before illustrating the pathways available to constructivism on the matter of human 
rights, and in order to properly set-up our triangulation as part of the typologies 
literature, the divided approach it is today must be traced back to its disciplinary roots. 
This is necessarily a discriminatory process. Any attempt to trace constructivism back 
to a single point, a theory, a seminal figure, would a meandering and ultimately 
fruitless exercise. Who, after all, is the father of philosophy? Does knowing this tell 
us what philosophy is today? Rather, it would be more productive to note how the 
several histories of constructivism have put in place certain ways of (or reasons for) 
thinking 'critically' and/or 'normatively' in order to give foundation to our concern 
with human rights. This brief summary will describe how the critique of Marxism, the 
'Third Debate', and the importance of 1989 have all enmeshed to produce 
constructivism. This is by no means exhaustive, and many other scholars provide 
excellent discrete and overlapping analyses of these issues, but instead they are 
included here to illustrate why we might expect constructivism to be more interested 
in humans as inteynational actors than it appears to be. 
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Without an orthodoxy or standard, there can be no criticism. 'Revolutionary' 
international theory is that which admits morality and justice to the judgement of 
international political standards.9 Kant is therefore revolutionary, as is Marx. 
Marxism's more direct link with critical theory suggests that, given the focus of this 
thesis, and certainly this chapter, is primarily on constructivism, we start with this as 
Kant will feature more in Chapter Two. 
The 'black and white' good and bad of the Others 'out there' has shaped a 
rationalist approach to international politics based on prior assumptions, which are in 
tum at best based on old histories. Kimberly Hutchings offers a clear exposition as to 
why Marxism has led to a critical-normative international theory, beginning with its 
reversal of the domineering discourse: 
Marxism does not premise its th'eory on specific assumptions 
about the goodness or badness, rationality or irrationality of 
human individuals. In particular Marxism rejects the dualistic 
metaphysic of idealism and tragic realism in which humans 
are caught between natural and ideal determination. In place 
of this Marxism presents an account ofhuman individuals, 
societies and states as the ever changing product of complex 
determination, essentially to be understood in terms of the 
struggle to produce and reproduce the means of human 
existence. 10 
. 
9'se~· Martin wight: I~te'mational in~ory: The Three Traditions (G~don:. Gic;~ter uni~e;sity Pr~;;;, 
1991), pp. 40-47 
10 Kimberly Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era (London: 
Sage Publications, 1999), p. 64 
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The assumption is that 'normativity (in the sense of values, ideals, principles 
of judgement and prescription) is not something absent from or qualitatively distinct 
from real material existence.' 11 Marx's own project, though, has been somewhat 
jettisoned in favour of a broader approach not necessarily dependent on the prevailing 
winds of capitalism. Social exclusion has long been the focus of approaches 
unsatisfied with the rationalisation of politics. Having class power as the fundamental 
form of this exclusion denies other forms of repression an equal voice in this working-
out of the potential of international politics. And this is, in its most basic form, the 
leap which critical international theory originally made. Other key differences of the 
approach, relevant to the foundations we are building for this thesis, include critical 
theory's 'historicist re-thinking of the relation between theory and its object.' 12 
Further, 'the claim that critical theory transcends idealism rests principally on its 
(critical theory's) proclaimed refusal to attribute universal significance to historically 
particular standards of judgement.' 13 
What then, of the localised (i.e. Western) production of standards such as 
emancipation or democracy (to which we add human rights here)? Have they not been 
proselytised outwards from a modem centre? In Hutchings's words, 'the response 
which critical theory makes to the charge that it repeats the idealist mistake of 
identifying historically particular standards of judgement with transcendentally 
universal ones is to redefine the concept of universality.' This redefinition means that 
'the kind of ideal universalism involved in critical theory is inclusive and procedural 
rather than the imperialist imposition ofWestern values on the world as a whole.' 14 
This reasoning utilised by critical theory is indeed problematic, as universalism will 
II Ibid., p. 64-65 
12 Ibid., p. 74 
13 1bid. 
141bid. 
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be, but it is the essence of the theory, and we can assume for our purposes that it 
holds, at least to the extent that it has set up an orthodoxy-challenging way of thinking 
about international politics, which in turn led to constructivism. 
How exactly did this 'lead' to constructivism? Having such a sustained critical 
reaction to rationalism within international theory culminated in the discipline's own 
'Third Debate' which mirrored the geist of the social sciences. 15 This positivist/post-
positivist clash seemed to demand of scholars an approach to international politics 
capable of doing critical theory, and not just thinking it. This required a critical 
theoretical eye capable of discerning ontological constants - sometimes tied to 
material reality, sometimes more metaphysical than this - which engaged with the 
stuff of rationalism whilst trying to add further dimensions to it. 
The Third Debate legitimised a theoretical shift in the hierarchical importance 
of hard data or 'facts'. Data still constitutes premises and outcomes, but not entirely-
not even overwhelmingly. Rather, 'perspectivism in the sense of a strong post-
positivist focus on thematic premises and assumptions has been internalized as a 
foremost characteristic of the third debate in international relations theory.' 16 For 
some, constructivism is the Third Debate. 17 Much, in fact, of what constitutes the 
Third Debate is intertwined in an ongoing socio-philosophical argument over the 
validity of different systems of knowledge production. Relating this to IR can either 
be itself a disarmingly simple process, or one which conveys apparently inscrutable 
complexity. 18 Perhaps the key to finding our own 'middle-ground' here (given the 
15 For an early identification of this within IR, see YosefLapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of 
IntemationaLThe_oryjn!! Post-Positivist Era',International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33 (3) (1989) 
16 Lapid, Ibid., p. 243 
· 
17 See Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 'Competing-Paradigms or. Birds of a Eeather? Con~Jtructivism ~d 
Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 44 (I) (2000), p. 113 
18 For discussions which focus on IR whilst doing justice to the complex epistemological origins of the 
debate, see Lapid, 'The Third Debate', K.J. Holsti, 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which are the Fairest 
Theories of All?', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33 (3) (1989) and Jim George, 'International 
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constraints of space and proper focus of this thesis) is to take this relatively 
straightforward notion that one particular narrative of the birth of IR constructivism 
has it emerging from a critical reaction to the mainstream, and thereafter staying 
within reach of the mainstream in order to shore up normative gaps without losing 
sight of 'reality'. 
As just mentioned, though, the Third Debate is a narrative, or even a long and 
drawn out argument. It is (or was) not an event or tipping point which set in motion 
newly-formed epistemologies. How singular the Debate is in having established 
normativity as the legitimate province of IR depends on how deep the roots of some 
of these arguments and concepts run. 
This idea of it being somehow a discrete shift of focus within the discipline is 
not without its discontents. Emanuel Navon, in evaluating the 'novelty and validity of 
constructivism,' 19 is keen to stress that the first and second debates are still with us 
and still have plenty to say regarding the development of knowledge. Indeed, they 
serve as a reminder that nothing much is new beyond tried and tested conceptual 
labels. Rather, the intention to challenge notions of how best to go about the business 
of IR is the key to stepping out of these epistemological shadows. The particular focus 
of the 'Second Debate', concerning the relative merits of scientifically versus 
historically derived knowledge, has something to say regarding the integrity of the 
radical aspect of non-positivist foundations. Referencing Burke's assessment of the 
French Revolution, Navon frames the ideological conflict thus; 'civil society endures 
thanks to the experience of generations and is constantly endangered by the 
R~l;tions and the Search for Thiclci~g Sp;~~: An~ther Vie~ of the Third D~b~te', I~t~~~ati~nal Studie~ 
Quarterly, vol. 33 (3) (1989) 
19 Emanuel Navon, 'The 'third debate' revisited,' Review of International Studies, vol. 27 (4) (2001) p. 
611 
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revolutionaries who 'despise experience as the wisdom ofunlettered men."2° Further, 
'the revolutionaries, by trying to redefine human nature through 'pure reason' and to 
reorganize society through abstract concepts, 'are so taken up with their theories 
about the rights of man, that they have totally forgot his nature. ' 21 
Navon's 'revolutionaries', in other words, have had the effect of diminishing, 
or even belittling, the role of consistency in social change. It seems that it has not, 
after all, been necessary to re-invent man in order to meet his basic needs. Fast-
forward two hundred years from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen and in the interim the natural state of man has not progressed beyond Hobbes' 
pithy denigration to the stage where a structural 'reigning-in' of natural tendencies has 
been diluted, contained or even overcome by the 'rationalist epistemological 
conceit'22 of 'scientific realism.' 
Given the synonymous vocabulary ofiR (and constructivism is as culpable of 
this as many other sub-disciplines), we are left with the situation where 
'positivism .. .is another word for rationalism, as it purports that reason can reach 
perfect knowledge and truth including within the realm of social sciences. ' 23 Navon's 
critique concludes no less scathingly; 'thus, the allegedly 'third debate' does oppose 
an outdated and discredited approach to the social sciences (positivism) to an 
academic fad (postmodernism) which combines aberrant assertions ('there are no 
facts') with valid claims that have already been convincingly made in the last 
century. '24 
The threads ofNavon's review do not, however, remain so convincingly tied 
when asserting that 'constructivists ... claim that facts are produced by human 
20 Ibid., p. 617 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., p. 619 
23 Ibid., p. 621 
24 Ibid., p. 624 
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consciousness, ' 25 (italics in original)- which is an apparently 'unacceptable' claim. 
This, however, comes soon after stating that 'it is not human consciousness that 
conceived our institutions or developed our civilization, but rather human 
consciousness and civilization which developed and evolved concurrently. '26 Drawing 
an indelible line between the two on which to base a criticism is simply not possible, 
especially given that the latter point ofNavon's is precisely the constructivist 
position. 
Navon is using a critical sledgehammer to crack a constructivist nut, and 
frequently conflates the latter with postrnodernism. This seems to be a result which 
flows quite naturally from the tendency to position postrnodernism so closely with 
constructivism, something which frequently occurs as evidenced in the review of the 
typologies literature below. 
Rather than follow this line, it is possible to assert that what constructivists 
have done for the past few decades (under the same or different disciplinary title) is to 
problernatise the current intellectual landscape by forcing the social issue against the 
conceit of a positivist world. It is a crude caricature, but nevertheless realism, 
divorced for a moment from the conciliatory tendencies of rationalism, is generally 
perceived as exactly the monocle-sporting world view that international politics is 
only and can only be the two-dimensional model as observed, categorised and filed by 
proxy. 
Navon, in keeping with the longer view of the 'debate' history, quotes 
Raymond Aron's thoughts on the intentions ofiR theorists; '(he) ... noticed that the 
desire of political scientists to produce a general theory of international relations and 
tQ irnjtate the goals and methods of economics and of the natural sciences 'has the 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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unfortunate effect of making it seem more important to do than to know what one is 
doing. '27 This cuts both ways. If critical theorists or practitioners of whatever ilk 'do', 
then the implication is that there is not the legitimate knowledge producing system in 
place beforehand, and that whatever is 'done' is hence meaningless. On the other 
hand, if traditional empiricists (or the 'neos' of rationalism, for that matter) also 'do', 
in much the same environment, then the claims for baseless imitation are more 
resonant, for the quasi-scientific accusations are much closer to home. 
What is clear is that the lack of a real consensus as to dividing lines between, 
most notably, constructivism and critical theory, but also between the former and 
moderate rationalism, has had the cumulative effect of widening the scope of a 
socially-inclined IR. It has also led to the challenge taken up by this thesis, which 
holds that dwelling on a 'lack of consensus' is misleading. There are clear differences, 
not least the willingness of these approaches to stake their claim to either moral or 
ethical knowledge, and there are, as yet, no clear gains to be made by imposing the 
need for a consensus on constructivism as a whole. 
Certainly, constructivism is usually set apart from critical social theory by its 
empirical aspirations - the socially informed substantive analysis that is applied IR. 
For these intentions to be realised, a foundational normative theory is essential to the 
constructivist agenda, but observers question the knowledge-generative capacity of 
the 'middle-way' on this point. Richard Wyn Jones cites Price and Reus-Smit's 
overview: 'they strongly imply that the role of critical theory in the "new phase" that 
they claim constructivism represents is to supply the normative orientation toward 
which constructivists, because of their ''underlying ontological and epistemological 
27 Ibid., p. 625 
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assumptions," are predisposed but are apparently unable to generate themselves. ' 28 In 
other words, constructivism can apply knowledge gathering techniques without 
knowing why. Put in these terms, it does seem to suggest that the approach possesses 
a base simplicity which requires outside help if it is to be overcome. Is this really the 
case? Or is this purely a critical position? 
Having a critical version of constructivism under investigation here allows us 
to define the spectrum of variants we are interested in. It also serves as a device to 
problematise an approach usually considered more mainstream than not. Applying the 
basic tenets of critical theory to constructivism would, hypothetically, result in an 
approach constantly mindful of how underlying power structures can distort any 
apparent gains made towards universal emancipation or community, whilst at the 
same time setting this as a legitimate goal, or at least as a legitimate source of 
knowledge for understanding 'human rights as change/progress' in the international 
system. 
In the words of Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, 
critical theory of the Third Debate focused on 
epistemological, methodological and normative critique, 
but neglected conceptual elaboration and sustained 
empirical analysis. Constructivists have taken up these 
neglected dimensions of the critical project, employing the 
ontological propositions, conceptual frameworks and 
methods of critical social theory to illuminate many aspects 
28 Richard Wyn Jones, 'Introduction: Locating Critical International Relations Theory,' in Richard 
Wyn Jones (ed.) Critical Theory and World Politics (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 13 
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of world politics, particularly those pertaining to the 
parameters and dynamics of moral community. 29 
The characterisation here is that of a proximate discipline constituted by a 
base theory that discriminates against (the negativities associated with) positivism. 
The differences between critical theory, constructivism and even post-modernism are 
observable but not definitive; all occupy a post-positivist space in which 
constructivism appears to be centrally situated, but objectives within each are 
primarily emancipatory- it has not yet been decided how to rank freedoms of 
method and knowledge production against claims to human rights. What separates 
constructivism from more radically inclined positions is a desire to manifest 
theoretical innovation in material reality in order to at least offer a facility for 
political change. 
Three ontological positions have been identified as 'critical' and 
'constructivist.' Firstly, the emphasis on the importance of normative or ideational 
structures as well as material structures. Secondly, the notion that identities constitute 
interests and actions. Thirdly, that agents and structures are mutually constituted. 30 
The 'reality' describing knowledge of ontology is perhaps the element that contributes 
most to the blurring of the lines between each post-positivist strand. General 
consensus is reachable on the issues of relative importance, but whereas 
constructivism is bound to a mid- and long-term horizon of outcomes,31 critical theory 
is often unable to see any relevance beyond emancipatory theory as an end achievable 
without recourse to any substantial engagement with (or, in extremis, recognition of) 
29 Richard Price and Christian Reus-S mit, 'Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and 
Constructivism', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 4 (3} (1998}, p. 264 
30 See Price and Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons', pp. 266-7 
31 some observers take issue with this point (see below) 
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material factors. There are of course key exceptions, and the prominent existence of 
such constructive critical theoretical thinkers (for example, Andrew Linklater) 
underscores the design of this thesis. 
What this has left the discipline with is a critical school of thought that has 
many facets and only limited consensus. What has enabled it to progress so (arguably) 
successfully is its motivational foundation, set apart from issues of epistemology, 
which provided a legitimating and enabling social context. This notion of context as a 
defining, or at least identifying, feature of constructivism is a complex issue. It will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. Here, though, it is a useful entry point into 
the third of our points regarding the histories of constructivism - the importance of 
1989. 
It is no coincidence that constructivist thought was labelled as such and came 
to prominence on its own terms at the end of the seemingly great theoretical 
petrifaction that was the Cold War. Factors other than competing military capabilities 
undermined the foundations of the realpolitik stand off. Scholars with what was then 
termed a 'radical' inclination, unconvinced by the abstraction of post-structuralism in 
the preceding decade or so, could now point to actual shifts in geopolitical tectonics 
that signified socially contingent change, which, further, 'rests on an irreducibly 
intersubjective dimension of human action. ' 32 This coming together of history (was it 
an event? A process? Who or what caused it?) with a vast diffusion of techniques and 
subjects, and the quantity of imported extra-disciplinary knowledge into IR, indelibly 
etched onto political theory the meta-theoretical complexities of social theory, 
linguistics and other more 'mainstream' philosophical insights. 
32 John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist challenge', International Organization, vol. 52 (4) (1998) p. 855 
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Is it the tools or the practical application of such that is preventing 
constructivism from a fuller 'critical' realisation? Academic obituaries for the Cold 
War, and the analysis thereof, has been one way of contextualising the struggle for 
theories and their progeny. Margarita Petrova's review summarises the theme of 
many: 'most of the accusations of theoretical inadequacy in IR were levelled against 
realism, and neorealism in particular, though no other approach in the field fared 
better at predicting the changes'33 (italics added). Equally, the point might be made 
that the birth of constructivism wasn't registered until 1989, but it is likely that the 
relevance of this would be questioned by the scholars themselves who worked within 
much the same parameters but without the label well before this date. 
Petrova contends that, as the theoretical landscape at the time was focused 
more (but not entirely) on stability and key constituent elements (how many 
'dissident' theorists explicitly predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union?), that there 
was a lack of searching for 'sources of change. Accordingly, there was no anticipation 
ofhow the Cold War might end because such a question was not asked in the first 
place. ' 34 
In retrospect, a complex interplay of ideational, domestic and international 
factors, with the emphasis firmly on the social genes of all three, is the most attractive 
proposition for theorists looking beyond reductivist method. But man has not yet 
devised a method for observing the horizon in hindsight. This still resonant event and 
its fallout provides a good example of the division bell that still chimes in 
constructivism, empirical or otherwise, calling for the opinions of 'for' or 'against' in 
the internal debate over whether a systemic level of analysis is sufficient. Because 
" 
33 Margarita H. Petrova, 'The End of the Cold War: A Battle or Bridging Ground Between Rationalist 
and Ideational Approaches in International Relations?', European Journal of International Relations, 
vol. 9 (1) (2003), p. 116 
34 Ibid., p. 117 
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there is no outcome, or 'End of Theory', and because constructivism sits uneasily 
between the poles of utter diffusion and 'scientific' positivism, the accumulation of 
empirical research has not yet built a recognisable edifice. 35 
1989 was also a key date within constructivist circles. In this year, World of 
Our Making and Rules, Norms and Decisions were published by Nicholas Onuf and 
Friedrich Kratochwil respectively. The relative importance of this is sometimes 
dismissed: 'another common narrative, which, though it gives due credit to some 
pioneers of constructivism, is narrow and suffers from a short memory, is that in the 
beginning there was Onuf ... , who coined the concept of constructivism in IR; then 
there was Wendt. .. - and the rest is history.' 36 In these bare terms, it is a truly 
simplistic and linear view of constructivism. However (and this is a key contention of 
this thesis), Onufs contribution to constructivism has been, if not lost, then 
misapplied by succeeding scholars keen to utilise a linguistic approach, but not so 
explicitly keen to integrate World of Our Making's philosophical rigour, historicism 
and overall grasp of the intrarnundane in IR. How much Onuf can contribute to our 
study of human rights norms will be discussed in due course, but to dismiss his 
approach as purely 'meta-theoretical' 37, and therefore without any meaningful 
grounding, is surely premature, as his approach has rarely been given the space it 
arguably deserves. 
These very brief histories have at least illustrated how they have left the 
critical and constructivist incarnations ofiR (as firmly distinguished from positivist 
IR theory), with a paradox. Many new platforms from which to view the world and its 
structure and inhabitants were (and are) resting on foundations that lack the solidity 
that apparently ~xists elsewhere, both within but especially outside of the discipline. 
35 See below for a further discussion of these points. 
36 Adler, 'Constructivism and International Relations', p. 99 
37 See Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', p. 195 
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From a wider perspective, 'books, articles, and conference papers explaining the 
world at the tum of the millennium are a Tower of Babel, ' 38 -a tower of disparate 
language and one that has the effect of walling off scholarly exchange from external 
recognition. Authority on world politics is no more the exclusive domain of IR than it 
is of politicians, journalists, geographers or social historians. Even more apparent is 
that the public relations of world politics (the PR ofiR?) belongs more to these other 
disciplines. The result has left IR as a discipline in the unenviable academic position 
ofhaving 'accumulated a huge intellectual balance of trade deficit.' 39 This lack is no 
doubt in part due to certain branches ofiR theory (to include constructivism) failing 
to establish a consistent voice on matters of importance to humans in the international 
system. States, yes. But humans and states? Arguably not. This may be a side issue, 
but it does point to the need for an approach to have an identifiable and meaningful 
stance if it is to persist in anything other than a closed disciplinary context. The ethics 
versus morals tension which this thesis investigates, and the suggested resolution of it, 
supports this view. 
As an intellectual structure IR arguably suffers from its own peculiar 
'greenhouse effect' as much as a 'Babel Syndrome'- any amount of extra-
disciplinary influence permeates inwardly, but there is little if any consistent 
reciprocation from within in terms of contribution to and standing in general world 
affairs. Vendulka Kubalkova et al describe this imbalance as a symptom of a deeper, 
linguistic cause- the transience of key terms including positivist and critical have led 
to the promotion of a proposed 'middle-way' ,40 one that remains inhibited by over-
reliance on the 'post' prefix to explain difference, wherein post-positivism becomes 
3~Vendulka·Kubalkova;"'Nicholas .Onuf,and .. Paul Kowert,. 'Constructing Constructivi~m· in Y~ll.~ulka 
Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (eds.) International Relations in a Constructed World 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 3 
39 Ibid., p. 5 
40 See Ibid., p. 8 
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semantically conflated with post-modem and its attendant brand of anti-
foundationalism. 
These histories (and many others not recounted here) have left the historians 
of constructivism with an abundance of theoretical and conceptual threads that are 
unfinished, interwoven, and generally unkempt. That there are several 
'constructivisms' should not be so surprising, as there are many variants of 
positivistic approaches in IR, and, after all, these are the original gatekeepers of 
'material reality' within the discipline with which constructivism also wishes to 
engage. These typologies are the focus of the next section. 
Divided they stand? 
As we have seen, as a school of thought within IR, constructivism occupies an ill-
defined space. As such, it both intemalises and produces disparate contributions to the 
field. One reason for this may be that there are a growing number of scholars who 
collectively prefer the philosophy and tools offered by constructivism (or who can be 
identified as doing so), but who actually draw upon sometimes strikingly different 
sources and lineages for inspiration and legitimation, as we have seen. Firstly, what 
are these types, and secondly, where do they come from? 
Typologies, classifications, categories or just plain lists of different 'types' or 
'aspects' or 'variants' of constructivism dominate general reviews of the approach. 
Depending on who is counting, there could be up to five different approaches all 
vying to exert a constructivist influence on how we do IR. Emanuel Adler details four 
types: 41 modernist, modernist linguistic, critical and radical. According to Adler, 
41 Adler, 'Constructivism and International Relations', pp. 97-98 
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modernist constructivism(' John Ruggie calls it 'neo-classical"42) includes the work 
of Alexander Wendt (who Adler situates most notably alongside Jeffrey Checkel, 
Peter Katzenstein and Thomas Risse-Kappen), and aims to 'uncover the causal social 
mechanisms and constitutive social relations that make IR more intelligible. ' 43 
Modernist linguistic constructivism includes Nicholas Onuf (amongst others such as 
Friedrich Kratochwil, Neta Crawford and Jutta Weldes) and 'results from the 
combination of subjective hermeneutics with a 'conservative' cognitive interest in 
explaining and understanding social reality. '44 
Radical constructivism includes the work of Richard Ashley, James Der 
Derian, David Campbell and R.B.J. Walker and, according to Adler, 'results from a 
radical tum to language (and thus to subjective hermeneutics) with a dissident 
emancipatory or deconstructionist attitude toward knowledge in general. '45 It is, for 
many, too extreme and too postmodern (in fact, it is essentially postmodemism) for it 
to be usefully considered part <;>fthe constructivist extended family. We shall come 
back to this presently. A not-so-black sheep is critical constructivism, which includes 
Andrew Linklater (as a key figure alongside Robert Cox) and 'results from the 
combination of objective hermeneutics (mainly the approach ofHabermas and his 
followers) with a dissident interest in the emancipatory effects of knowledge. ' 46 
For the purposes of this thesis, the most useful reading of the split in these 
terms is two-fold. First, modernist linguistic, critical and radical constructivism stand 
apart from modernist constructivism primarily on the grounds of knowledge 
production. Secondly, and more specifically, modernist constructivism (personified, 
perhaps unsatisfactorily, by Alexander Wendt) has come to be identified by its 
42 Ibid.; p. 97 
43 Ibid., p. 98 
44 1bid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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reliance upon an explicitly empirical base on which ideas flourish. Modernist 
linguistic, critical and radical constructivism are all much keener to push back 
knowledge boundaries with the device of a post-positivist methodology running 
alongside implied dissidence. 
Ruggie casts a wide net to cover a discipline-spanning range of contributors, 
but does so as a way of illustrating how his resultant categories are populated. 'There 
are sociological variants, feminist variants, jurisprudential approaches, genealogical 
approaches, an emancipatory constructivism and a more strictly interpretive kind. '47 
These broad swathes are reduced to three more contained types: (1 ). Neo-classical. 
For Ruggie, this indicates an approach which 'remains rooted in the classical 
tradition. '48 On this basis, Adler's claim to an affiliation with his own 'modernist' 
variant seems to be fair. However, it is Ruggie's fleshing-out of this category which 
demonstrates very clearly the incongruity present in both the content of these lists, 
and the very act of categorising itself. Modernism, which stresses conservatism based 
on objective hermeneutics, is correlated with 
an epistemological affinity with pragmatism; a set of 
analytical tools necessary to make sense of intersubjective 
meanings, be it speech act theory, the theory of 
communicative action, their generalization as in the work of 
Searle, or evolutionary epistemology; and a commitment to 
the idea of social science - albeit one more plural and more 
47 Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together?', p. 880 
48 Ibid.' p. 881 
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social than that espoused in the mainstream theories, while 
recognizing that its insights will be temporary and unstable.49 
'Temporary and unstable' insights, as we shall see, would not appear to describe 
Onufs rendering of the underlying history of exclusion in modernity. 
And having Ruggie, 'Ernst and Peter Haas, Kratochwil, Onuf, Emanuel Adler, 
Finnemore, recently Katzenstein, as well as some feminist scholars, such as Jean 
Elshtain' 50 all stewing in the same pot asks a question which might not be 
immediately obvious, but which has stayed with constructivism. Why bother with 
such broad generalisations? And, moreover, if this is done for the benefit of 
constructivism, some consistency must surely be aimed for. Knowing why Onuf and 
Wendt should or should not be thought of as the same ilk does have repercussions for 
the way in which constructivists do theory, which is an underpinning tension of this 
thesis. Whether it is differences or connections which ultimately benefit a subject 
such as, say, human rights norms, does matter if we are to be able to judge between 
competing claims to knowledge. 
(2). Postmodernist. Marked by 'a decisive epistemic break with the precepts 
and practices ofmodernism,' 51 this category is most similar in terms of its 
constituency to Adler's radical type- Campbell, DerDerian and Walker are again 
present, this time alongside Spike Peterson. This break with orthodoxy is achieved by 
focusing on linguistic construction (as a part of discursive practices), and casting 
doubt on both the legitimacy of social science and causality in general. This is too 
close to the diverting paradoxes which characterise the moral questions in IR. The 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
36 
limits of constructivism (discussed in more detail in Chapter Six) are barely 
recognisable here. 
These first two categories are polar opposites (as far as we can sensibly speak 
of such a thing in the context of knowledge gathering). The middle ground is (3). 
Naturalistic. Ruggie's description of this variant is a good example of why these 
categories matter for constructivism, and for this thesis. The notion of a 'middle-
ground' approach is emblematic of constructivism. Its frontiers overlap with both 
positivist and post-positivist epistemic camps, and so having it somehow in the 
middle of each provides the researcher, teacher or student with a clearer ordering of 
approaches which can then be mapped on to problems or issue areas. So the centre of 
this centre, it is often assumed, must be constructivism for all intents and purposes -
that is, its essential form. How far is this the case? 
Alexander Wendt and David Dessler are key figures here, and both follow 
Roy Bhaskar's interpretation of scientific realism. 52 The result is a more naturalistic 
approach. On the basis of scientific realism, 
52 Ibid. 
it is no longer necessary to choose between "insider" and 
"outsider'' accounts of social action and social order- not 
because social science is made to emulate the natural 
sciences, as it was under the old naturalistic monism, but 
because there is little difference in their respective ontologies 
to begin with. Scientific inquiry of both material and social 
worlds deals largely in nonobservables, be they quarks or 
international structures, and much of the time even the 
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intersubjective aspects of social life exists independently of 
the mental states of most individuals that constitute it. 53 
There will be a more indepth analysis of Wendt's position, how it fits into a 
wider conventionalist context and what we can take from this, in Chapter Three. 
What is striking, though, not least in terms of the ordering of types of constructivism 
in this thesis, is that this epistemological splitting of naturalism is a considerable 
burden for Wendt to shoulder. How well he does this, and, indeed, how reasonable an 
expectation this is, has implications for constructivism generally as other types in turn 
can be analytically framed as a reaction against or complimentary addition to this 
focus. 
Mindful of the risk of overdoing this 'typology' thread, one more key 
contribution to the literature needs to be considered. Ted Hopf distinguishes between 
just two types- conventional and critical. Hopfhimself clearly inclines towards the 
possibilities offered by a more conventional view. 54 The outcome of this centre-right 
positioning is that conventionalism is thought to 'resolve[ ... ] some issues by adopting 
defensible rules of thumb, or conventions, rather than following critical theory all the 
way up the postrnodem critical path. ' 55 He is quick to point out that this view is not 
the 'natural' theoretical progression one might expect considering its critical theory 
source, 56 but is unclear in his text as to how 'critical constructivism' is at all possible. 
Conventionalism, as the name suggests, is focused upon continuity rather than 
change, and so incorporates an element of prediction based on patterns of social 
construction: 'conventional constructivism, while expecting to uncover differences, 
-
53 1bi~~.,PP,:"8_8h8.~J .. -'~ ., ' . ' . 
54 For a discussion of the problems associated with this, see Chapter Six, below. 
55 Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', International 
Security, vol. 23 (91) (1998), p. 181 
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identities, and multiple understandings, still assumes that it can specify a set of 
conditions under which one can expect to see one identity or another. ' 57 Critical 
theory 'rejects either the possibility or the desirability of a minimal or contingent 
foundationalism. ' 58 It also asserts that 'constructivism can offer an understanding of 
social reality but cannot criticize the boundaries of its own understanding, and this is 
precisely what critical theory is all about. ' 59 
Where is critical constructivism in this critique? Hopf seems repeatedly to 
present conventionalism, only to have this followed by classic critical theory 
rebuttals. There is a consistent blurring of the terms of reference. 'Whereas 
conventional constructivists accommodate a cognitive account for identity, or offer 
no account at all, critical constructivists are more likely to see some form of 
alienation driving the need for identity. ' 60 This, certainly, seems to be characteristic 
of constructivism,61 and touches upon how tension between cognitivism, sociology 
and historicism has the dual effect of developing distinctive epistemologies whilst 
also providing the basis for a 'productive/praxeological' element which sets (critical) 
constructivism apart in th~ post-positivist world. 
Almost immediately, though, Hopfreturns to 'critical theory' as his reference 
point. Despite hinting at how clearly we might distinguish between approaches, and 
therefore, crucially, how we might begin to systematically compare them and even, 
perhaps, draw them together on a specific subject, Hopfs categories fail to reference 
each other satisfactorily. We are left with two poles which we can see, or sense, are 
clashing, but within which we cannot place down any markers as to how things might 
n,,fuid~, p. 183 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., p. 184 
61 See Onuf's 'exploitation' and Linklater's 'harm' in chapters Four and Five below. 
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be approached differently. What is missing is further discrimination, of the type 
offered by both Adler and (to a lesser extent) Ruggie. 
In other words, constructivists might be conventional, and this might explain 
some things, e.g. why states do what they do having assumed a given identity. They 
might be critical, and this also might explain some things, e.g. why identities are 
historical, and why this matters as a justification for pursuing a line of enquiry. Do 
the two currently meet, neatly, in the middle? We have the 'inside' of the state, and 
we have the 'outside' of the state, and can therefore pair them up to produce a theory? 
No. Not when the subject matter is normative- in this case the norms of human 
rights. This strongly suggests the need for a more clearly demarcated ethical approach 
for constructivists interested in engaging with values, something which is missing 
from the current literature. 
Conventional constructivism, for many, sets up what constructivism is about-
what its focus is and what its capabilities are for meeting its (state-focused) goals. 
Critical constructivism, on the other hand, refutes this. Instead, it points towards a 
purposive goal- emancipation, and it also points towards a means of getting there 
through the adaptation of critical philosophies and techniques. What are we to make 
of the resultant gaps in knowledge and theory? We cannot hope to 'answer' or solve 
them, but we can step outside of this dualism and offer a third clear reference point. 
This will provide a way of triangulating an intellectual space which surrounds the 
subject whilst simultaneously unsettling each 'type' of constructivism we are 
applying to the issue. This is the primary reason for grouping conventionalism and 
critical constructivism in this thesis with a more discretely drawn linguistic approach 
which acts, on one level at least, as somethin~ of a bridge between the two. 
40 
Positivism versus post-positivism is utterly representative of dichotomous IR. 
Not for a moment is it being suggested that here, present in this thesis, is a new 
epistemology for the discipline. What is being asserted, however, is that there are two 
things which constructivism needs, and which it presently lacks, if it is to talk to the 
mainstream of statism whilst listening to compromised and suffering humans. Why 
human rights norms matter for the international system (and more importantly for this 
thesis, why they matter from a constructivist perspective) requires clarity of terms and 
purpose, and a broader notion of why and how constructivism should address the 
issue. With this pressing need in mind, the next section will clarify the triangulated 
intellectual space which will drive the analytical engine ofthis thesis. 
In broad terms, we shall be setting up a triangulation which moves from one 
end to the other across the positivist/post-positivist spectrum, hopefully allowing for 
the complexities, nuances and overlaps between the three. What is intended here is a 
brief and general summary of their positions in order to set them up as three 
ostensibly distinct approaches. They are; modernist/conventionalist, linguistic and 
critical, and each is represented by the work of a leading scholar, primarily focusing 
on their respective 'key' texts within the discipline. How each treats human rights 
norms as values affecting the international system (either implicitly or explicitly) will 
be subjected to more rigorous analysis in Chapters Three, Four and Five. How they 
do or don't complement each other on this issue will be the focus of Chapter Six. 
Three sides of the same coin? 
Alexander Wendt 
W~ndtdefi11es a 'constructed order' as one_in which 'the parameters of social order 
are intended rather than unintended; freedom rather than determinism drives 
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evolution; agency rather than structure is what counts. ' 62 The 'intention' here is on the 
part of the individual as an actor within the state as opposed to any other, 
cosmopolitan, personification. 
Although his development of the state is a signal feature ofhis theory, 
Wendt's project is, arguably more so than any contemporary constructivist account, 
characterised by one key notion- the via media - the development of a middle-way 
between rationalist and reflectivist theory. The term is used here to describe the 
mechanism that might construct a bridge between the polarisation that continues to 
distort, fracture and prevent a 'whole' IR. The end product is an idealist/holist 
ontology which is set-up to sidestep the epistemology/ontology problem which 
bedevils communication between polar opposites. 
For Wendt the positivist/post-positivist debate about what the relative merits 
of a social approach are and what they can do for IR is fundamentally flawed. It 
simply misses the point; there cannot be a theory of knowledge of that which does not 
exist. This begs the question then; what of that which does exist but cannot be 
observed? Wendt's own brand of moderate constructivism is thus revealed. He sides 
firmly with positivists on the epistemology question, preferring the 'reality' of an 
empirical starting point. Ontologically, the substance of the social world is ideas, and 
for IR to properly account for this world, it must necessarily extricate itself from a 
stifling, purely science-driven mode. From here, Wendt takes a step into the post-
positivist camp in engaging the stuff of IR, the deeper social structures which 
themselves constitute agents; 'interpretivists and postmodemists are tacit common-
sense realists, but ... reject scientific realism because they reject the reality of 
62 Alexander Wendt, 'What is International Relations for? Notes Toward a Postcritical View', in 
Richard Wyn Jones (ed.) Critical Theory and World Politics (2001), p. 209 
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unobservables. ' 63 This compatibility between science and society suggests a way of 
conceiving how human rights norms can be at once codified and intangible, yet 
meaningful. But is Wendt's theory sophisticated enough to satisfactorily describe 
what seems to be only an intuitive link between these elements? 
Wendt frequently makes reference to the duality of theory and theorist, 
wherein the two often fail to recognise that what we can know and how we can know 
it are both the product of merging fact and ideas into a single logical process. The 
concept of a 'rump materialism '64 is the base unit of the international system which 
acts as the manifestation of a necessary and enabling scientific-realist epistemology. 
Without this material foundation there is nothing upon which to introduce the ideas 
which shape higher interaction. 
Referring to Waltz's earlier impact on IR, and the (neo)realist and (neo)liberal 
projects thereafter, for Wendt the concept of a materially influencing 'interest' should 
instead actually be understood as an 'idea', and the security of actors is to be found in 
the shelter of a collective identity. 65 We can therefore know the product and meaning 
of ideational forces as they stem from and so become reality themselves. But how far 
do concepts such as 'security' and 'collective identity' (as comprehensively theorised 
as they are in Wendt's work) go towards furthering our understanding ofhuman rights 
norms? 
By relying on self-knowledge of ideational forces, Wendt's vision might be 
conceived as a re-configuration of the elements of rationalism to incorporate the 
nature of contemporary change. He makes a useful point on what it means to act 
rationally in the international system (as opposed to being a 'rational actor' by the 
traditional formulation): 
63 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 52 
64 1bid., p. 96 
65 See Ibid., pp. 104-6 
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through this process of interacting with reality, states have 
learned a great deal about each other, and today can often 
assign reasonably confident probabilities to inferences 
about what others want. Would it be rational for states to 
forego this knowledge because it is merely probabilistic, 
and instead make judgements based solely on worst-case, 
possibilistic reasoning? ... Not in my view.66 
Assuming a central position- and, moreover, one that describes 'reality' - enables 
positivist logic to be removed from its association with such 'scientific' premises as 
the binary outcomes of game-theoretical reasoning and action. The 'real world' 
beckons. We must decide whether Wendt's preferred level of analysis is sufficiently 
explanatory. 
Wendt is keen to re-iterate the purpose of IR as understanding beyond 
explanation and sees the social kind in question, the international 'culture' of states, 
as having both constitutive and causal, active and reactive, effects. Thus, with 
reference to his explicitly stated project, 'holism is not a focus on the macro-level, but 
on constitutive more than causal effects. If such effects are present, then there is at 
least some sense in which the relationship between agency and structure is not one of 
"interaction" but of "mutual constitution" instead. ' 67 Wendt follows the constitutive 
line with an explanation ofhow 'causal' matters individually; 'the individualist 
66 1bid., p. 109 
67 Ibid., p. 171 
44 
intuition (is) that mental states have an independent explanatory status (a "rump" 
individualism), and therefore that culture has causal effects on agents. ' 68 
The argument is that a radical formulation of holism versus individualism is 
self-defeating, that culture cannot constitute nor cause agency if one cancels the other 
out in entirety- constitution cannot solely explain the 'why' of interaction (it 
logically correlates with intention but not behaviour) and interaction cannot in itself 
explain the 'how' of its source or cause. This formulation sees constitutive effects 
linked in some way to causal effects. Criticisms of Wendt's extension of scientific 
realism often cite this as an example of failing to provide a properly theorised 
alternative for social theory- a simplistic 'best of both worlds' scenario, perhaps.69 
One of the roles of the extended analysis in Chapter Three is to test the explanatory 
power of this approach. A thesis more interested in the ethics of value-norms than 
their moral fibre does suggest that Wendt's less than radical holism has a role to play 
in the investigation of human rights. 
Wendt accounts for this duality theme that runs through the essential elements 
in the relationship between structure and agency (and therefore culture) by 
distinguishing between individuality and its social terms: 'two kinds of properties are 
involved in constituting agents, self-organizing properties and social properties."70 
The happy medium exists via moderation - again, a radical ontology for either 
precludes any further meaningful discourse. 
Regarding the practicalities of how this social theory works in international 
politics, Wendt frames his discussion again with rationalism firmly in mind, but with 
a view to extending the relevant ontological vocabulary: 'the social process consists 
68- - . -
Ibid., p. 178 
69 See Steve Smith, 'Wendt's world', Review of International Studies, vol. 26 (1) (2000), esp. p. 152 
onwards 
70 Wendt, Social Theory, pp. 183-4 
45 
of interlocking actions seeking to satisfy identities and interests by adjusting 
behaviour to changing incentives in the environment.' 71 Behaviour can still 
legitimately be a rational product, 'but the assumption is made that more is actually 
going on in those choices than just the squaring of means to ends: actors are also 
instantiating and reproducing identities, narratives of who they are, which in turn 
constitute the interests on the basis of which they make behavioural choices.' 72 This is 
a good example of the holism that characterises Wendt's entire approach. Until now, 
theoretically, the ontology of post-positivist factors has been enabled by an 
epistemology of positivist origin. Now, in the field, behavioural choices that might 
well, on the face of it, be interpreted as purely rationally motivated, are supported 
(formed or legitimated, even) by the logic of constructed interaction. 
Wendt actively accommodates and encourages the bringing together of the 
dominant theories of IR to explain all behaviour. It is simply a mistake to discount 
what each can offer in any given situation. Thus; 'rational models would be most 
useful when it is plausible to expect that identities and interests will not change over 
the course of an interaction, and constructivist models would be most useful when we 
have reason to think they will change.'73 Further, 'since change is more likely the 
longer the time frame, this suggests a temporal division of labor: rationalism for today 
and tomorrow, constructivism for the long duree.' 14 
There is something here which is confusing, regarding the question of 
observer bias. If actors, active or passive, are engaging in and assessing the qualities 
of a situation, they are conscious of it and are then projecting their expectations onto 
it. At what point does an actor's reasoning discriminate between dynamic and static 
71- -
Ibid., p. 366 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., p. 367 
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interaction? In order to 'know' this moment their (positivist) epistemology must be 
much more contemporaneously active throughout their (post-positivist) ontological 
experience of it. If so, Wendt's bifurcation is dominated by positivism (scientific-
realism in this case) to the detriment of any socially conceived elements or reasoning 
of constitution and behaviour. Or, from another angle, when does tomorrow become 
the long dunJe, and with this reasoning, could it ever? 
Friedrich Kratochwil also notes this point, and questions the logic of a 
protracted timeline. 'Since rationalist models- through their simplifying assumptions 
concerning interests and identities - can be shown to be a special case of 
constructivist models, their relationship is not one that can be described in terms of 
their fitness for short versus long-term types of analysis.' 75 Also, taking the broader 
view of how human/social factors fare as the span of ages forms memory and history, 
'anyone familiar with Fernand Braudel's work will realise that the longue duree is the 
domain for structural explanations precisely because identities and interests do not 
matter because they 'wash out' over long periods.' 76 Which is a particularly valid 
point given Wendt's emphasis on process. 
Wendt's response might be a shift of emphasis, which would affect outcome 
and meaning; 'the distinction between Explanation and Understanding is not one 
between explanation and description, but between explanations that answer different 
kinds of question, causal and constitutive. ' 77 It is the assumption underlying this point 
that brings Wendt into the realm of traditional philosophical problems, and face to 
face with all the consternation and exercised opinion which that entails. The issue is 
75 Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social Theory oflntemational 
Politics~and the Constructivist Challenge' ,Millennium: .fOI.JrJJql of Internatjonal Studie~, vol. 29 (1) 
(2000), p. 87 
761bid. 
77 Alexander Wendt, 'On constitution and causation in International Relations', Review of International 
Studies, vol. 24 (1998), p. 104 
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encapsulated by the question, 'Can reasons be causes?'78 For Wendt, the answer is 
yes. This is largely due to his 'extemalist' rather than 'intemalist' reasoning. 
Attitudes, opinions and ultimately intentional behaviour are all the products of a 
socially affected actor existing in an exogenic world where meaning is (and can only 
be) communal. 
For transposing this to IR theory, Wendt uses the example ofhegemonic 
intervention to assess the nature of the constitutive effects of culture upon behaviour 
and identities/interests. Actual 'hegemonic' intervening behaviour will be construed 
only by reference to intersubjective context, 79 and meaning would be constituted as 
either 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate.' Accordingly, constitution in terms of 
identity/interest is not based on belief, but on the existence of Other to give meaning 
to Self. Wendt takes this holist view as a rejection of traditional individualism's 
inability to account for behaviour any further than as a manifestation of personal 
belief without the need for recognition by others. The radical holism advocated by 
post -structuralist and 'post-Wittgensteinian' theorists goes too far in pre-supposing no 
'meaning' in being an individual to the point of removing any notion of a relationship 
between agent and culture. 
Wendt's via media thus constructs a synthesis of individualism and holism. 
This is done by formulating a moderate holism which is the sum of base individual 
qualities linked to an enabling social whole. Subjective meaning as a pre-condition of 
action can and does override the purely social contexts of discourse and shared 
knowledge. Properties of agency can be material or cognitive; genetically constituted 
bodies do not depend on each other for their existence, and individual thought 
78 See Smith, 'Wendt's world', p. 158 
79 See Wendt, Social Theory, p. 176 
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prevails regardless of direct external influence. 80 The philosophical argument is 
relatively straightforward and based on semantics- 'individuality' cannot exist in the 
singular; 'the terms of individuality refer to those properties of an agent's constitution 
that are intrinsically dependent on culture, on the generalized Other. ' 81 There simply 
is not One without the Other. It is difficult to disagree with this reasoning. Related 
criticism seems to often come in the form of objection to the terminology Wendt uses 
(idealism as opposed to materialism in this case) to enable a central, moderate 
position. 82 
'Moderate constructivism' is not so palatable for some as it is for others, such 
as Robert Keohane: 'My own view is that most of Wendt's argument is sensible, but I 
am not sure who the opponents are.' 83 Further, 
it should be clear that Wendt's dichotomy between 'material' 
and 'idealistic' arguments is exaggerated and misleading. 
Neither classical realism nor institutional theory is materialistic 
in the sense in which Wendt defines the term. Both theories 
take for granted that foreign policy derives from a combination 
of material capabilities and interests, on the one hand, and 
ideas and values, on the other. Selecting which of these is 
'fundamental' would not be a sensible enterprise. 84 
80 See Ibid., p. 181 
§I ,Jbid.,~p;-'! 82~- · - -
82 See Smith, 'Wendt's World', pp. 158-60 
83 Robert 0. Keohane, 'Ideas part-way down', Review of International Studies, vol. 26 (1) (2000), p. 
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84 Ibid., pp. 128-9 
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It remains that Wendt's work inspires contradiction: '[It] is important because 
it provides a coherent, philosophically grounded way to understand world politics in a 
socially constructivist way' 85 (emphasis added). One particular example of the realist 
response to Wendt is, perhaps unsurprisingly, quietly supportive if not overtly 
approving: 'He puts to rest the notion that constructivism is necessarily 
postmodern,' 86 but 'Wendt's argument, however, is unsupported by empirical data 
and confounded by the thinness of norms in the international environment.' 87 
This is the very same 'thinness' to which constructivism otherwise seems to 
respond most readily. Is this a paradox, then, or perhaps a pre-determined failure on 
the part of Wendt's theory? There are two possible answers to this. The first is 
metaphysical, and so will not detain us here: if the subject matter under investigation, 
i.e. values, is moral, and therefore absolute, it is based on a foregone conclusion and 
not an ongoing investigation. Constructivism, in the main, deals with the latter and not 
the former. The second is much more informative for this thesis: Wendt's insight is 
into how states work in the international system. The 'thinness' of norms such as 
human rights depends on how well they attach to states - the extent to which they 
become the business of states. Whether Wendt's states admit the sort of values we are 
dealing with here (see Chapter Two) depends on the depth to which they are theorised 
(see Chapter Three). This may indeed have consequences for whether constructivism 
'succeeds' or 'fails' in answering the critical challenge (see Chapter Six). 
Wendt responds to this charge of Keohane and others largely by reiterating 
certain key points. This serves as a useful indicator as to the essential points that he 
deems worthy of explicitly supporting. He is keen to remove the philosophical 
85 Ibid., p. 130 
86 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Wars, hotel fires, and plane crashes', Review of International Studies, vol. 26 
(1 )(2000), p. 131 
87 Ibid. 
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barriers that stand between a theory that not only incorporates but merges ideational 
and scientific-realist elements.88 Therefore, '[t]he antidote to this tendency (to 
'fetishize' materialism) is to focus on the ways in which social relations constitute 
material forces with particular meanings, to strip out or leach the ideational content 
from seemingly 'material' arguments.' 89 
The ontological aspect ofWendt's constructivism is essential. Disagreement 
with Robert Keohane's belief that there is no meaningful choice to be made between 
materialism and idealism is postulated thus: 'first, international politics can only be 
observed with the aid of a very substantial conceptual and theoretical apparatus that 
tells us what kinds of objects there are in this world and how they are related ... [a]nd, 
second, there is the question of theoretical coherence and progress.' 90 In other words, 
(ironically) there can be no middle-way or under theorised notion of how materialism 
and idealism fit in the case of determining what is potential or actual 'knowledge.' 
Meaning must have a fully theorised and coherent apparatus to be realised. Does 
Wendt's conceptual and theoretical apparatus admit values to the satisfaction of either 
critical theory or constructivism, particularly as it is triangulated here? 
Nicholas Onuf 
The linguistic tum in constructivism has a strong heritage. From the early work in the 
mid to late 1980s through to Andrew Linklater and beyond,91 it has in various guises 
(e.g. rules/language in use and discourse/dialogue) challenged the boundaries ofboth 
what we can know and how we can know it. Yet somewhere along the way the 
88 See Alexander Wendt, 'On the Via Media: a response to the critics', Review of International Studies, 
- vol.26(+H2000),p.J38 
89 Ibid., p. 169 
90 Ibid., pp. 169-70 
91 See, for example, the many attempts to bring in Jiirgen Habermas and the work of the Frankfurt 
School. 
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journey to a fully-theorised linguistics-based system of social knowledge came to a 
fork in the road, separating the old from the new. This has since been the sole 
occupation of many scholars who have (curiously within such a professedly open and 
inclusive strand of IR) taken to supporting one or another theorist. This is particularly 
the case with the legacy ofNicholas Onufwho (along with Friedrich Kratochwil92) 
was at the late 1980s vanguard of constructivism as it is now known, and achieved 
this position with a methodical system that both cleared the ground for socially 
motivated factors and was also philosophically systematic and rigorous, in a way that 
has arguably not been surpassed since. 
Onuflays down an early marker for scholars following his lead, one which 
decries the practice ofunder-theorised work which blights traditionalists, particularly 
realists, as much as it does progressivist schools. Social theorists with constructivist 
inclinations 'do not start early enough.'93 Onufs construction ofiR is through a 
discussion of rules, the starting point being that 
the discipline of international relations constituted itself on 
the belief that it corresponds to an operative paradigm. This 
is exactly the meaning of claims that international relations 
make up a bounded and distinctive social reality. Such claims 
have some plausibility, if they are taken to refer to the 
ensemble of activities engaged in by a bounded and slowly 
- - _.l:_ 
92 See Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the conditions of practical and legal 
reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989) 
93 Onuf, World of Our Making, p. 53 
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changing set of entities conveniently denominated by the 
term "states".94 
Paradigms are susceptible to the post-positivist charge of being 
epistemologically binding. Indeed, 'paradigmatism ... asserts that meta-scientific 
constructs come and go in complete packages.' 95 Conceiving the realm ofiR as 
operative, though, provides opportunities for analysis and re-definition worked out by 
using tools which problematise any assumptions attached to specific temporal 
existence. This sets up an interesting interplay between the idea of human rights as 
change and the manifestation of human rights in the Universal Declaration. Whether 
Onufs preferred operative approach to international relations can adequately account 
for how these two elements interact and result in the ethical instrumentality of human 
rights will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
How humans (and therefore states) generate and develop rules which govern 
social and political activity forms the basis ofOnufs account. Ofkey importance is 
Onufs departure from what he labels the 'time-honored distinction' 96 that assigns 
'rules' different roles or capabilities, and instead opts for the theoretically fluid and 
more ergonomic formulation wherein 'rules' can be and are simultaneously 
constitutive and regulative. Conceptualising rules as multi-functional in this way 
offers a contribution to the epistemology issue by virtue of, rather than despite, their 
social utility. 
Even so, Onuf reaches this point without any suggestion of radicalism and, 
with reference to Roy Bhaskar, signals that his particular formulation of a constructed 
world has a material base; 
~ -- --
94 1bid., p. 16 
95 Lapid, 'The Third Debate', p. 240 
96 Onuf, World of Our Making, p. 51 
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the sentence ... quoted from Bhaskar reads: "it [referring to 'a 
rule'] does not normally tell us how to carry on." This is 
exactly wrong. Rules do indeed tell us how to carry 
on ... (However) (t)hey do not tell us everything we would 
like to know as we carry on. No human creation could do 
that. In other words, rules cannot provide closure for the 
purposes of carrying on because rules are not the sufficient 
agency whereby intentions become equivalent to causes.97 
Onuf is not as explicit as Alexander Wendt in using a positivist base for 
ideational factors. Still, though, this base exists in some form primitive to any post-
positive imaginings. That is to say, 'the fact [is] that all rules in a socially constrUcted 
reality are related to practice'98 (emphasis in original). This suggests an inherent 
dynamism to the empirical baseline which seems to complement both positivism and 
post-positivism alike. More explicitly, 'rules are the social component, resources the 
material component in all human endeavour ... resources are nothing until mobilized 
through rules, rules are nothing until matched to resources to effectuate rule. ' 99 In 
these terms, it is difficult to see past what is generally labelled 'positivist' 
epistemology. This maybe so, but it nevertheless remains that whatever is 'material' 
only exists in any meaningful sense of the word if it is employed in social endeavour. 
A picture is beginning to emerge of how rules and language seem able to provide the 
general categories required by constructivism if it is to account for and engage with 
the human rights discourse. 
97 Ibid., p. 51 
98 Ibid., p. 52 
99 Ibid., p. 64 
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In investigating the genealogy of realist/positivist morality, Onufs natural 
progression is to utilitarianism, which essentially 'permits a plurality of moral 
possibilities- a moral relativism its critics equate with the denial of morality.' 100 In 
other words, a plural manifestation compartmentalises morality leading to its eventual 
loss by dissipation as something capable of being meaningful or relevant beyond its 
original locale. He goes on: 'To think that moral considerations and social rules can 
never be more than the facts they are suggests an ontological shift as much as a shift 
in epistemology and ethics.' 101 In other words, where did morality go? Its apparent 
elusiveness might suggest the possibility of only a 'collaboration' or rapprochement 
between discrete entities on the moral question which is uneasy at best. 
Onufs elaboration on the source of rules- 'although social rules necessarily 
have authors and histories, neither need to be known for rules to work as such' 102 -
seems a curious conclusjon to make given the convention of contemporary 
constructivism that suggests that such qualitative social knowledge is paramount in 
the search for a sound methodology. Onuf, though, is using the basic logic of gains 
(similar, perhaps, to the effects ofBraudel's longue duree?) which dispenses of the 
need for historical pre-occupation to be replaced with a rather more desirable and 
progressive awareness of what has gone before. 
Onufuses this materialist epistemology to bring in certain features of 
linguistic communication that shed light on wider interaction - introducing to IR 
socio-linguistic categories which explain, amongst other things, how ideas are 
disseminated and hierarchies maintained. Types of speech act relevant to social 
motivation are those which have 'illocutionary force', that is, 'the part of speech 
100 Ibid., p. 68 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., p. 80 
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constituting an action of social consequence,' 103 and (taken from Jiirgen Habermas) 
'perlocutionary acts' wherein the speaker 'brings about something in the world.' 104 
These speech acts are not emitted into a vacuum. 'It is not true that all 
sentences endowed with illocutionary force are rules. At best we can say they are 
rule-candidates. Whether such rule-candidates become rules depends on their 
reception.' 105 This in turn suggests an element of complementary discourse, or 
conversation as a method of producing actual gains. At this point Onuf goes further to 
explain the means by which speech acts affect norms and behaviour, and this will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
This particular example of the explicit history of constructivism (labelled as 
such) offers an interesting and fruitful precursor to disciplinary developments. Onufs 
work, containing elements of both modernist and modernist linguistic constructivism 
(in Adler's terms), provides us with a foundation for discussing these strands that are 
now perceived as dichotomous. Whether or not Onufs explicit focus on the 
recognition of human suffering as a historical constant tells us enough about 'values' 
as defined here (or, moreover, whether Onufs categories satisfy the critical challenge 
to constructivism), will shape this discussion. 
Andrew Linklater 
As was noted above, the linguistic turn in IR, and more specifically in the 
constructivist approach, took two directions from its place of origin. Onufs rules-
•. 
based system describes a structured environment in which language is utilised in an 
active-passive relationship between adherents to the system itself, and understandings 
103 1bid., p. 81 
104 Ibid., p. 83 
105 Ibid., p. 84 
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environment wherein mutual gain is the aim, where there is no struggle for a 
'definitive' end, but rather where participant aims are achievable through the process 
itself, which might well be indefinite. The difference is that Onuf works within the 
confines of modernity whereas, as we shall see, Linklater seeks to break out of this by 
facilitating new political forms for otherwise oppressed people. The impact which this 
difference has not only on constructivism's ability to engage with values, but on the 
identity of constructivism itself, will go some way to framing a constructivist answer 
to the critical challenge. 
As the principal example ofLinklater's work on dialogue-led theory, The 
Transformation of Political Community is an investigation of modem ideas about 
citizenship, their limits and what a new political form might look like. 106 Specifically, 
it is a reassertion of the role of morality within the discipline and how universalised 
ethics can be imagined therein. How this normative balance is struck is crucial for this 
thesis. This task is undertaken with the aim of 'creating social relations which are 
more universalistic, less unequal and more sensitive to cultural differences,' 107 and 
these are 'the three dimensions of the project oftransformation.' 108 
This three-dimensional starting point of Transformation is not in accord with 
the strong discretionary impulse of realists. That is to say, for the project to work, 
'one must naively assume ... that there is an underlying global harmony of interests 
from which a consensus can be forged on important political and social issues.' 109 
Perhaps so, but Linklater's foray is expressly into the possibilities of linguistic 
engagement- an enquiry into a social theoretical position, albeit one that has designs 
on practice. Staying for a moment with a realist critique (and a particularly hard-line 
- -
106 Linklater, Transformation, p. 6 
107 Ibid, p. 7 
1081bid. 
109 Randall L. Schweller, 'Fantasy theory', Review of International Studies, vol. 25 (I) (1999), p. 147 
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example at that), 'unless one desperately wants to believe in this alternative future 
world, Linklater's book will appear as little more than an intellectual exercise in 
historical speculation and theoretical wishful thinking along familiar liberal lines.' uo 
Which would leave the exercise apparently languishing in the realm of Utopian 
science-fiction, or what might in the literary world be more accurately termed 'magic 
realism.' This, arguably, says less about constructivism itself than about its 
relationship with sceptical realists, although more cogent critical observations are 
noted below. 
Transformation's critical approach is two-tiered: 
Reconstructing the modem state and the international system 
to permit the development of higher levels of universality is 
one dimension of an alternative practice to state-formation 
and nation-building. Transforming exclusionary political 
communities so that higher levels of respect for cultural 
differences can evolve is a second element of the practice of 
superseding the totalising project. 111 
Linklater's imagining of the 'totalising project' is important for its 
epistemological and ontological ramifications. Schweller marks this as the 
representation of 'an insidious, centuries-long conspiracy' which was effected in 
conjunction with policy-makers as 'the final culmination of the grand realist plot to 
enslave and divide the human race by means of the state's monopoly power.' 112 
Although this may not be Linklater's intention, even the hint of conspiracy will taint 
110 Ibid., p.148 
111 Linklater, Transfonnation, p. 16 
112 Schweller, 'Fantasy theory', p. 148 
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the empirical potential of a theory in the eyes of the more 'scientific' IR community. 
Even from the other side of theIR spectrum, a similar criticism is made (this time, 
though, regarding the project as a whole). R.B.J. Walker found himself 'left more 
with an impression of how the central argument is supposed to work than with any 
clear sense of either its logical or empirical force. Many of its key theoretical 
engagements remain elusive and difficult to evaluate.' 113 This certainly seems to be 
the case, and so we are left to gauge how far possibility and potential can take us 
down the road towards a value-led constructivism. Taken out of specific context, 
might these doubts apply to the dialogue/discourse project as a whole? 
In Transformation, first the state and then the collaboration of states are re-
imagined in order to set up systematic transformation. The essence ofLinklater's 
project is the 'communication community' in and across which ethical universals are 
disseminated and adhered to. What realism has done (or does, even) is promote stasis 
'by converting humanly produced circumstances into a quasi-natural condition,' so 
that 'accounts of the immutability of political orders contribute to the formation of 
subjects who succumb to the belief that the relations between independent political 
communities must remain as they are.' 114 Now, there exists the agenda and motivation 
to 'develop more complex analyses ofthe prospects for, and character of, new forms 
of political communication.' 115 Transformation's theme is that this fracturing of 
'traditional' statehood has had the inevitable result of opening up previously disabled 
channels for dialogue. 
The philosophical roots of this line of enquiry- dealing with the processes of 
change- are Kant and Marx. Theirs, collectively, is 'an insightful account of bounded 
113 R.B.J. Walker, 'The hierarcb.icalization of political community', Review of Intematil:mal Studies, 
vol. 25 (1) (1999), p. 151 
114 Linklater, Transformation, p. 21 
115 Ibid., p. 23 
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communities which unite ... normative, sociological and praxeological inquiry.' 116 
From Kant, Linklater reads that his 'praxeology offered a vision of future possibilities 
in the expectation that theory can play a transformative role by delegitimating 
existing structures and by steering human action to new political objectives' 117 - that 
is to say, 'the gradual transformation of oppressive structures.' 118 But the clarity of 
this assertion is obscured by the fact that '[Kant's] belief in immutable and universal 
laws of reason clashes with modem sensibilities which emphasise the social 
construction of knowledge and the diverse, and changing, cultural conceptions of 
moral truth.' 119 This point seems to counter the one immediately preceding it if 
Kant's 'immutable and universal' reasoning is the same as that employed in 
delegitimating structures. Linklater's use of Kant is questioned much more adeptly by 
Walker, specifically his failure to engage fully with Kant's interest in situating 
universality in particularity. 120 
The following key criticism has implications not only for Linklater, but for the 
'philosophy' of the constructivist cause as a whole, and as such is quoted at length; 
-
116 Ibid.,p. 35 
117 1bid., p. 37 
1181bid. 
119 1bid., p. 39 
The extent to which Kant struggled with the paradoxes and 
contradictions of modem subjectivity- with a relation 
between unity and diversity in a modem subjectivity of 
freedom and autonomy and not simply with some moral 
impetus towards universality- is kept rather quiet in 
Linklater's analysis. This has significant implications for 
the way in which Linklater's entire argument proceeds. It is 
120 Walker, 'The hierarchica1ization ofpo1itica1 community', p. 151 
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especially helpful in enabling him to evade any serious 
engagement with the problems of modern subjectivity. 121 
At its most basic level, selective incorporation and interpretation carries with it 
the risk, at the very least, of providing critical ammunition for the defenders of varied 
epistemological faiths, which includes constructivism of course, which is generally 
considered to be well equipped to deal with subjectivity. In other words, Linklater 
does not dig out the best foundations for his building blocks. Further, Linklater might 
preferably have engaged 'more rigorously with the key texts that he believes can 
sustain us on the road to universality.' 122 'Key texts', of course, may or may not 
contain answers, or the formulations thereof, to newly contextualised questions. This 
depends on how they are interpreted. Linklater responds to the Kantian issue with an 
interpretive shrug of the shoulders; 'none ofthe post-Kantians succeed in salvaging 
universalism from the withering criticisms ofthe Nietzcheans.' 123 
As for Linklater's reading of Marx, 'the critics have argued that historical 
materialism consolidated a binary division between progressive Western civilisation 
and retarded non-Western humanity', 124 and that Marxism 'underestimate[ d] the 
tenacity of nationalism and the state.' 125 Kant and Marx together, however, 'sought to 
identify immanent forces which ran counter to the state's to tali sing project.' 126 Theirs 
was the seminal work in this area. 
Linklater also re-interprets the agenda of apparently countervailing schools of 
thought to demonstrate a convergence of methods: 
121 Ibid., p. 152 
122 Ibid:, p. 154 
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postmodern critiques of Western forms of cultural superiority 
and feminist challenges to universalist ethics implicitly draw 
from the reservoir of moral universalism while criticising its 
untenable and politically dangerous formulations. Although 
this is not their central intention, postmodern writings on 
responsibility to otherness and their related approaches to 
dialogue and difference contribute to the development of a 
radically improved universalism. 127 
Universalism is radically improved by this various theorising to the end that a thin 
rendering (it will therefore have no fixed vision) is better than a thick 
cosmopolitanism (it will therefore not be tied to a singular conception). 
For Linklater, post-Kantian Hegel is also influential, particularly in theorising 
the social nature of morality. Hegel 'rejected the conception of the moral self which 
underpinned Kant's political thought.' 128 He 'believed that the modem state was the 
only political community which could ensure that individuals enjoyed the institutions 
which realised their potential for leading free lives,' 129 and that 'freedom must be 
sought out and won within each society.' 130 So cosmopolitanism is theoretically sound 
as an earned right within a recognised structure. 
Regarding existence outside the recognised structure: 'The key claim is not 
that a concern for the whole of humanity should displace all other attachments but that 
political communities have a fundamental moral duty to assess the impact of their 
-
127
-Ibid., p. 48 __ _ 
128 Ibid., p. 52 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., p. 53 
62 
actions upon outsiders and to avoid causing them unnecessary harm.' 131 This suggests 
a rational element to his cosmopolitanism which in tum implies choice - the choice 
whether or not to act positively in discharging a 'duty' and not a natural impulse. 
Linklater's concept of the 'fundamental moral duty' is galvanised by a 
discussion of the difficulties regarding the nature of essential truth. Kantian 
perspectives correlate human progress with the contingent development of a 'natural' 
ethical truth. Richard Rorty places the 'truths' we speak of as particular to twentieth-
century liberals. 132 Linklater, perhaps unsurprisingly given the general tone of 
Transformation, draws out the positive implications: 
This quasi-Hegelian aversion to having to choose between 
fixed moral absolutes and incommensurable social realities 
abandons the grand metanarrative in which the lower cultures 
fall by the wayside as reason unfolds in history. What is 
substituted is a thinner notion of progress that refers to the 
expanding circle of human sympathy which ought to be the aim 
of those who identify with the liberal community. 133 
There is, then, a 'middle way' that allows legitimate progress which is the essence of 
universalism- something justifiable by virtue of its nature as a reflection ofhow 
human social/political progress happens: It evolves. Whether this particular 
conception of the 'middle way' (and certainly a conception of progress rather than 
process) is constructivist, is something which must be addressed in more detail. 
131 Ibid., p. 57 
132 See Ibid., p. 76 
133 Ibid. 
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The excision of culture from a morally absolute 'truth' is surely a step towards 
a clearer statement ofhow peoples come together, even when that meeting is reliant 
upon values, as when human rights norms are the issue at hand. Truth is neither 
mono- nor omni-cultural. Indeed, 'anti-foundationalism argues that there is no 
transcultural standpoint, no view from nowhere, which allows the knowing subject to 
establish moral principles which are transculturally valid.' 134 The problem with this is 
that there must at least be a thread of common meaning that can be held to resonate 
across cultural thresholds. For Linklater, the path forward lies with dialogic 
communities. 
The underlining principle is that 'most communities rest on special ties and 
harmonies of social disposition but they are always vulnerable to the claim that they 
unjustly exclude those who do not share the dominant identity. The goal of dialogic 
relations with the members of systematically excluded groups therefore emerges as a 
normative ideal.' 135 The dialogic community as described by Linklater is a way of 
cutting through the affecting accumulations of history. These are the same 
accumulations that Onufis more overtly critical of, but ofwhich Wendt stays largely 
silent. 
However, it is invariably the case that, when (meta)theoretical exercises stray 
close to the empirical world, practicalities emerge. Indeed, it may be the case that 'the 
biggest problem with Linklater's analysis overall (is that) it is nearly impossible to 
discern what this international dialogue is going to be about.' 136 What is 'really 
happening' is of paramount concern to Jean Bethke Elshtain, who maintains a steady 
eye on the international political focus of constructivist work, urging like-minded 
134 Ibid., p. 77 
135 Ibid., p. 85 
136 Jean Bethke Elshtain, 'Really existing communities', Review of International Studies, vol. 25 (1) 
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theorists to 'get real'. 'There are millions of people in the world, unnoticed by 
Linklater, who have already widened 'the moral boundaries of political communities' 
in light of the universalistic communities in and through which they were formed.' 137 
This critique of just what it is that Linklater is providing over and above what already 
exists in practice- and the further implications this has for our questions regarding 
critical theory and constructivism - are questions which needs answering, and which 
shall be addressed in Chapters Five and Six. 
In terms of theory, Linklater brings in Jiirgen Habermas to discuss the nature 
of universalism via dialogue. For Habermas, it involves recognising a kind of personal 
humility which enables the perpetuation of discussion, and it is through the actual 
process of dialogue that moral universalism can be legitimated. Linklater draws Kant 
and Habermas together but notes a key difference: 'Kant believed that separate moral 
agents had a duty to ask if it was possible to universalise the maxim underlying any 
action. Judgements concerning universalisability involved a process of private 
ratiocination for individuals rather than any dialogic encounter with others', whereas 
for Habermas, the test of 'universalisability is found not in private reason but in 
associating with others in wider communities dedicated to open and unconstrained 
dialogue.' 138 The division is between personal and shared experience. 
Dialogic communities seem to offer something conceptually different to the 
universals debate: 'Wider universalities of discourse which increase the range of 
permissible disagreements would represent a significant shift beyond the Westphalian 
era of classical sovereign states and their totalising projects.' 139 Dialogic communities 
are effectively chaotic in the sense that they are ungovernable. In Linklater's 
termin,ology, 'no cunning qf reason oversees the development of dialogic 
--- ---- -- -- ---· _:,_,~-- - -- - --- - . 
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communities; no teleology has steered them to this point.' 140 This is quickly followed 
by a prescription for their longevity; 'critical theories which are sensitive to these 
issues need to develop philosophical, sociological and praxeological inquiries into 
how some human beings are included in, while others are excluded from, 
. . fd" ,141 commumttes o 1scourse. 
Norman Geras raises the salient point that 'going into that dialogue, a certain 
ethical position is already presupposed before it occurs; it is not an outcome of the 
dialogue itself.' 142 This ends up, it would seem, as being the 'fact [that] vitiates the 
strict argument for discourse ethics, since the objection that can be made against a 
non-discourse-ethical position can be made also against the principle undergirding 
discourse ethics.' 143 The implication for an ethical solution is that it requires an ethical 
foundation which has to be generated from somewhere. 
Modernity in conjunction with the meaning of morality is fundamental to 
Linklater's entire exercise. How it has been formulated and what it is capable of 
engendering is central to Transformation and the constructivist project. Linklater 
describes this in the following passage, 
modernity has been the site for movement along three separate 
axes: first; the moral relevance of many social differences has 
been questioned and frequently been found to be wanting; 
second, the value of creating the same rights for all members of 
society without ensuring that they have the resources to 
exercise these rights has been called into question; and, third, 
140 Ibid., p. 110-
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the practice of treating all citizens as if they were identical (as 
if they did not have different cultures and rights to cultural 
. . ) h b b gh . d" 144 mtegnty as een rou t mto tsrepute. 
The modern political community has problematised certain key conceptions of 
what morality is and how it affects the order of things. Linklater suggests that there 
exists interplay between the characteristics of (Westemised) modem statehood-
geopolitics, capitalism, industrialisation etc. - 'and the process of moral-practical 
learning which includes the development of principles of social coordination and the 
evolution of more complex moral assessments of the legitimacy of systems of 
exclusion.' 145 The inference here is that there must be all of these factors present, 
together, to enable the moral element to be realised. Westernisation enables the social 
coordination that Linklater speaks of and the attendant complexity. All flows from the 
West to the other, which, on the face of it, is not necessarily problematic for 
emancipation - an(y) origin is arguably sufficient for that aim, without the need for 
specifics in terms of geographical or ideological situation- but it is epistemologically 
flawed if 'universality' is the key point. There is much talk of morals here. This alone 
does not endanger Linklater' s place in our triangulation, but in many ways is the 
reason for it, not least that Transformation is a very prominent statement of 
normativity in the international system delivered in the language of critical theory. 
How this translates to constructivism, or more specifically the 'goals' or 'aims' of 
constructivism is particularly instructive. 
This 'bilingualism' across approaches seems to be characteristic ofLinklater's 
underlying theme- that the separation and division of key constitutive elements that 
144 Ibid., p. 144 
145 Ibid., p. 150 
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make up the modem state in the globalised post-Westphalian world are continually 
demonstrating a viability over time to 'provide a more effective means of reconciling 
the claims of universality and difference.' 146 The newly configured states that make 
up the current international system 'represent ... progress in institutionalising a thicker 
version of transnational citizenship because the members of different societies possess 
concrete rights and duties as citizens of a wider political community.' 147 What is 
missing, conversely, is a wider sense of international, or even fraternal, coherence that 
can only be gained from the relevant element of statehood (i.e. citizenship) and the 
moral imperative being not only fully theorised, but completely experienced also. 
Indeed, Linklater ends with the following: 'by unfolding their distinctive 
moral potentials, modem societies may yet prove capable of creating dialogic 
arrangements which are unique in the history of world political organisation. 
Realising the promise of the post-Westphalian era is the essence of the unfinished 
project of modernity.' 148 He clearly believes that this widening of experience and, 
crucially, its legitimation and utilisation, is the key to transformation in world politics, 
but does it involve the advancement of 'constructivist ideals', or is this a contradiction 
in terms? 
Conclusions 
Thus we have our triangulation, explicated in general terms, and several key points 
have been developed to take forward into the following chapters. This is the 
culmination of a review of constructivism that has focused on how and why it is a 
divided approach. That it is so divided that each strand cannot mutually bridge 
epistemological and ontological gaps is not a foregone conclusion at this stage. We 
146 Ibid., p. 203 
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have at hand a subject- human rights no,rms as representative of values in the 
international system - designed to test this. 
What does each of these three brief reviews put in place for Chapters Three, 
Four and Five, and of course the thesis as a whole? Wendt offers a theory of the state. 
In its baldest terms, many critically-inclined scholars, to include constructivists, are 
unhappy with this representing the sum of constructivism and the sum of what matters 
in the international system. Yet Wendt's theory of state socialisation is richer than 
this. It contains a complex working out ofhow 'we' learn as international animals. 
The 'we' in this sense is of course referring to the personhood of states. How far this 
can be stretched to account for how values are learned and transmitted, and exactly 
the depths to which Wendt's approach can be mined for the socio-cultural relevancies 
of human rights norms is up for discussion. Is there anything here we can use as a 
launching pad for a better understanding of how domestic and international features 
interact under the auspices of 'humans' and 'human rights norms', or must we look 
elsewhere? 
Onufs approach in World seems almost tailor-made to fill in these gaps in our 
knowledge of what can be said to constitute the international, and why human 
experience is integral to this. Which begs the question, why or how are these two 
approaches understood as 'constructivist' within IR theory? What links them? 
Epistemological and ontological puzzles tend not to work like jigsaws, and so they 
don't offer neat interlocking solutions which we can arrive at just by matching up 
concepts. In this sense, Onuf does appear to be very different from Wendt, which fits 
the hypothesis that it is this divergence that constructivism actually requires in the 
first place ----: ~t _!leeds a broadly constituted tfiangulation in order to have a hope of 
accounting for the numerous complexities of human rights norms. Onuf is the best 
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representative of how constructivism can make this shift. So what is being brought to 
the table? 
With Onuf, it appears to be two key things. Firstly, his telling of the history of 
human experience, characterised by the consistency of exploitation, speaks to the 
critical theory staple of having a historical material referent to be critical about. The 
contained way in which he describes this (as vast as the parameters may be, this 
history is cyclical) mark this out as a constructivist endeavour- in other words, there 
is enough for us to contend with ethically, without making moral claims based in no 
recognisable reality. Whether or not the challenging nature of the Universal 
Declaration can be said to fit Onufs categories is ofkey importance. 
Secondly, how linguistic constructivists have gone about charting international 
interaction -how this is defined, the extent to which human rights have explicitly 
been addressed- is something of a gauge of how successful Onufs often extremely 
complex insights into what constructivism is have been in the past two decades. If 
they have not done this prolifically, or can be said to have failed in some way, is this a 
reflection on the groundwork done by Onuf? Or, alternatively, does Onuf provide 
something more in World than has been picked up on by his successors? 
The step to Linklater from Onuf can be interpreted as more or less a natural 
one. More, because he carries on the linguistic thread, and less because it is taken 
towards the critical frontiers of constructivism. In both senses it finds its justification 
for inclusion here. If human rights norms are a transformation of the international 
system, then constructivism needs to be able to theorise them as such. But is this still 
constructivism? This is a key question which will stay with us throughout this thesis. 
Whilst_}<eqJing t!lls in mind, _thfl'e ar~ other eleme~ts of_Lifl!dater's work which are 
particularly relevant. 
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As with Onuf, Link:later also tells a history of the 'totalising' project of 
modernity. Is this a point of comparison by which we can really tie the two 
approaches together? In Transformation, Link:later points out that modernity has 
skewed our collective moral compass, and that what is essentially human is made 
'natural' and so robbed of any meaning. The morality vividly rendered by Linklater is 
the reason for, and the aim of, the entire project of transformation. It almost seems 
that the work required of constructivism in accounting for values is done by Link:later. 
But this poses constructivism an interesting problem. Is there too much morality here? 
Is the naturally ethical framework of constructivism compromised by the necessary 
moral content of dialogic communities? Or is this the very constructivism of which 
critical theory observers speak when insisting upon a normative formulation? 
All of the points and questions raised in this summary are at the heart of this thesis, 
and will be worked out systematically through the course of Chapters Three, Four and 
Five, with a cumulative critique in Chapter Six. The focus will stay on constructivism, 
but is of course shared by human rights. It is to these complex normative entities we 
now turn, in order that we are more confident of the nature of the values spoken of 
throughout the main body of the thesis. Precisely how they are constituted, how 
values relate to constitutive and procedural norms, and how this (singular? Transient?) 
constitution is already a part of IR are contested issues. In order that our triangulation 
has parameters to work to that are specific (as much as a normative concept can be 
specific), we must clarify our terms. 
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2. Human rights as value norms 
The general aim of this chapter is to understand why value norms, as currently 
exemplified by human rights, should matter to constructivism. The contention is that 
constructivism's overwhelming normative focus has been on constitutive and 
procedural/behavioural norms, and that this amounts to an ongoing failure to fulfil the 
potential that many (mainly critically-oriented theorists) see in it. To do this with 
some coherence in a single chapter, the parameters of the issue must first be set out. 
We must first define in more detail what is meant by a 'value norm' as 
distinguished from any other norm. Then we must be selective about which features 
of the wider human rights discourse are not so relevant to this thesis. The interest for 
this thesis lies in how this triangulation of approaches might be more accomplished, 
and therefore more prolific, regarding their (singular and combined) output on values. 
To be more 'accomplished' is not to suggest any agenda or criteria against which they 
might be judged, but rather that they are more analytically coherent and therefore 
consistent. In order to do this, we must decide what the essential characteristics of 
human rights are that fit with the stated interests of constructivists. What this means is 
that human rights norms have two key aspects which help us distinguish what it is we 
might hope to achieve by applying any given international theoretical approach to 
them. These aspects are a). their morality and b). tlieir instn.iffi.entality. 
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Designing a research agenda around the question of why human rights matter 
is a different task from ascertaining what they essentially are. This latter exercise is 
deontological, whilst the former is ethical. Of course, that human rights norms are 
essentially the products of our moral imagination unavoidably forms the background 
field to any inquiry similar to this thesis. Attempting to answer deontological 
questions is not the task of constructivism, though. This thesis is starting from a 
critique of a critical challenge, and so must be sceptical about moral claims. Perhaps 
the pull of critical theory will change this. In the meantime, it certainly seems that 
sufficient complexity attends human rights norms without constructivists having the 
added burden of deciding between the merit of competing claims. 
To associate human rights norms with an approach such as constructivism-
namely, one which spans a fluctuating positivist/postpositivist spectrum- requires 
that these norms be manifest in a way more concrete than metaphysical. We can grasp 
at what values are, and what they might have been throughout history, but without a 
manifestation as a norm, we cannot confidently identify them, much less make 
educated judgements as to how they affect the international system. For example, 
emancipation in its various forms -the abolition of slavery, universal suffrage and 
market democracy, etc.- has stayed with us as a collective of humanist concepts, but 
these concepts have been institutionalised and therefore, to an extent, are observable 
and measurable. The exact nature of what reformers and progressivists were thinking 
when these international changes were decreed politically necessary is beyond us (or 
at least, it is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis). The specific rules, legislation 
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and doctrines that were set in motion are not. The way in which this thesis analyses 
human rights is in that sense which has been labelled 'theorising a social fact.' 1 
We have values which have been contemporarily enshrined- by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and its many succeeding and related documents - which 
require (or dictate? Or encourage?) international actors to behave in a certain fashion 
to uphold certain standards. The prevailing use of the Universal Declaration here is 
due to what the rights contained therein represent, and what they mean for the 
international system. The first point to acknowledge must surely be that the 
contemporary human rights regime, in development now for sixty years, is a 
somewhat complex (perhaps even contradictory) subject for postpositivist IR. This is 
the branch of international theory to which critical theory and much of constructivism 
belongs, as distinguished from the liberal agenda which gave particular form to a 
particular vision of humanness and virtue. That is, the critical challenge would have 
constructivism perform in a more explicitly normative fashion, which must include 
values, whilst simultaneously railing against the rational illusions of modernity. 
Having the two hypotheses sit together is problematic, and reference to the Universal 
Declaration is a very useful, concrete reminder of this. 
If this first point is metatheoretical, then the second is not. The Universal 
Declaration is effectively a constitution for the international system. It is becoming so 
emblematic of justice and fairness that it demands the full attention of any branch of 
international theory claiming to be constitutive and cognisant of humans and their 
(individual and collective) consciousness. It must be engaged with more consistently 
than it has been. This thesis is a preliminary contribution to constructivism's more 
explicit treatrrlent of this regime. As such, the Universal Declaration will be referred 
1 See Anthony Woodiwiss, Making Human Rights Work Globally (London: Glasshouse Press, 2003), 
pp. 11-20 
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to time and again as representative of human rights norms in the international system, 
but its actual statements will only be briefly touched upon. More sustained 
investigations of specific rights and their relationship with constructivism is for future 
projects. 
Even at the most basic and preliminary level of analysis, this codification of 
human rights norms adds an important dimension to the identities and interests of 
states and people(s) as constituents of the international system. It is this 
instrumentality which is commensurate with our general understanding of 
constructivism. The normative study of international relations, however, is usually 
assumed as being led by, or even embedded in, a moral approach, and so we must 
gauge what it is that distinguishes ethics from morals. Morality/instrumentality is a 
fine line which is sometimes blurred either in theory or in the interpretation of 
empirical results. It is our task here to clarify this and then move on from it. 
The second task is to assess how the constructivism-normativity nexus can 
accommodate these instrumental value norms empirically. This involves three steps 
which will flow organically from the first task. The first two will be discussions of 
empirical constructivism and normative theory- along which lines the two coalesce, 
and where there is any divergence. The third step is to engage with the universalism 
which attends, and effectively defines, human rights norms. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. As a brief precursor to the main 
analytical content of the chapter, the concept of a value norm will be clarified. The 
first main section will start this analysis by investigating how the human rights 
discourse has been interpreted as instrumental by IR scholars - how the jump is made 
from why we should to how we do. The discussion will then move inwards from this 
- -- -
more general review and start with a brief outline of the kinds of normativity 
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investigated by constructivists in their empirical work. This will be followed by a 
review of several examples of empirical work on human rights as value norms as a 
way of drawing out areas of ethical (as opposed to moral) significance to 
constructivists. 
Following this, the next section will consider universality- a key area of 
contestation and complexity in IR, but nevertheless one which constructivists must 
engage with given the subject of human rights. How we might 'work through' the 
universals debate is the purpose of this, again with the guiding notion of 
'instrumentality' in mind. 
The end result will be a clearer picture of why human rights matter for IR, 
how they complete the normativity which inspires constructivism, and how both of 
these things can be thought of in universal terms. 
Making a distinction: value norms 
Normativity in IR occupies the strange position of being a truly central concept, but 
one which is widely and consistently under theorised. This is the case on at least two 
counts. Approaches such as constructivism seem reluctant to commit to a moral 
position, and the term itself is very often left unclear in the sweeping, comprehensive 
way that it is used. The first of these issues is a problem explicitly under investigation 
in this thesis. It requires that some groundwork be done regarding the second point. 
In a sustained expression of discontent directed at the lack of understanding of 
how language use is integral to the dynamics of international politics (and the 
discipline ofiR), Neta Crawford offers an account of what might be called the 
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'forgotten' aspect of normativity? As this is central to this thesis, quoting her 
discussion at length will be a worthwhile exercise in clarifying some key premises 
and terminology. Essentially, 
international relations scholars frequently talk about "norms" 
but do so in ways that frustrate analysis by blurring the 
distinction between behavioural norms and normative beliefs. 
They also emphasize common knowledge properties of 
"norms" that are not unique to "norms;" Further, it is not 
uncommon for the "norms" literature to proceed as if the 
dominant practice were the same as normative belief.3 
Which is patently not the case. Confusion and conflation may arise because 
'behavioural norms and normative beliefs are both constitutive (meaning making) and 
regulative (constraining). ' 4 Furthermore, values are at play in international politics 
regardless of whether they are acknowledged by 'conservative' or positivistic scholars 
and policy-makers. Yet behavioural norms and normative beliefs can represent very 
different ways of thinking about and doing international politics. 
Human rights norms are frequently referred to here as 'value norms' because it 
is their ethical instrumentality which is being stressed, and it is also intended to reflect 
the otherwise generally unspecific treatment of values which is characteristic of IR 
theory. These are Crawford's 'normative beliefs', which are 'beliefs about what it is 
. . . .... ·~- - ·-·. . ...... __..... --· ._-,-- . . . .. . -- , __ -- - - •.. 
2Neta-t. Crawford, Argument a-ndChange TriWorld Poiit{cs: Ethics,Decolonzzation, and - __ >o~ 
Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
3 Ibid., p. 86 
4 Ibid., p. 88 
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right to do' 5 (emphasis in original). Ethical arguments, however, do permeate the full 
spectrum of approaches to IR, 6 and so we must be careful here not to overstate how 
'good' these normative beliefs or value norms are to an extent which risks 
impartiality. This might be to our advantage, though, in establishing that the critical 
challengers to constructivism must not overstate their own case on the grounds of 
originality. Crawford's own distinction is illustrated by a dissection of ethical 
arguments: 
Ethical arguments that we already believe thus support and 
reproduce a larger cognitive world order (because people 
believe the normative prescriptions and ethical arguments), 
and help maintain relations of power as people act in 
accordance with the prescriptions applied by the dominant 
normative beliefs ... much of the work done by ethical 
arguments occurs in the context of upholding existing or 
dominant practices and remains part of the background, taken 
for granted. 7 
We can take two things from this. There is a procedural point for this thesis as 
a whole regarding the potential richness of values as ethically affective rather than 
morally incumbent, and there is a theoretical point concerning the potential within 
constructivism to combine this 'whole' normativity. That is, it can 'do' behavioural 
normativity, so why not values as well? 
5 Ibid., p. 86 
6 See Ibid., p. 101: 'world politics is already based on ethical argument.' 
7 Ibid., p. 99 
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Human rights as a concern of IR 
It has been asserted that human rights are 'unquestionably the dominant and most 
broadly accepted language of morality in the international system. ' 8 Assuming that 
this is the case, how has the acceptance of this 'language of morality' been developed 
in IR? It has not been done systematically, and there is no consistent chronology of 
advancements since the Universal Declaration in 1948, but it has instead been led by 
scholars inclined to believe that IR theory is itself purposive. 
But how far would this disciplinary narrative set an agenda for constructivism 
if it were allowed to do so - an agenda which would appear to be the antithesis of its 
constitutive philosophy? R.J. Vincent, for example, a key contributor to the human 
rights literature in recent IR, puts forward a reasoning for 'priority' rights which 
effectively has international theory as a political act: 'as a project for international 
society, the provision for subsistence rights has a strong claim to priority over other 
human rights ... [because] the suffering of the starving and malnourished [is] the worst 
offence to human rights in contemporary world society. ' 9 
This is a bold and, indeed, purposive theme. Constructivism, though, would 
have difficulty endorsing its singular logic. To fulfil its guiding constitutive remit, 
constructivism must account for subsistence issues only as much as it should the 
entire spectrum of human rights. The notion of 'priority', as used here, serves to 
highlight how, for example, an idealist/holist constructivist epistemology might be 
problematic. How can one human right be more important than another, if we have 
- '. o, ~-""'"' _, •0 ..,. ', ' ''' ' ' •' ' -' ' >•: ~ :,, ' ·-·--~-:.•-.. 0 ' ' ' 0 ' -i T ' '•''' • ' - - ' 
8 Kate Schick, 'Beyond Rules: A Critiq~~-ofthe Liher;f Human Rights Regime', iniernational 
Relations, vol. 20 (3) (2006), p. 321 
9 R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), p. 2 
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not already somehow decided what the totality ofknowledge is, and what it is 'for'? If 
the priority in question is the specific norm itself, as Vincent suggests, then it would 
surely have a distorting effect on constructivism. Its (purposive) role would already be 
defined. It is unclear why discriminating between (and within) the wide variety of 
'types' 10 ofhuman right would be the best way forward for constructivism. 
Vincent, however, does provide a more rationalised view of how the morality 
of human rights can sit alongside frequently divergent approaches to international 
theory. The moral aspect is still present (perhaps due to Vincent's direct conflation of 
human rights with natural rights), but it is tempered somewhat: 
At least since the seventeenth century, human rights or 
natural rights have been a conventional liberal starting-place 
for political theory, so that in pursuing reason we would be 
following tradition. The difficulty with this is that it puts 
history in the ascendant when the point of natural rights: they 
fulfil the function once fulfilled by the theory of natural law 
in putting certain claims about how humans are to be treated 
beyond the whim of tyrants, but within realist estimates of 
the limits of the possible. 11 
The argument here is essentially for 'pursuing rights'- the notion that this is a 
legitimate thing for international theorists to be doing. This speaks more directly to 
10 That is, ;~ivil and political', 'economic and socia-l' and 'collective' types favoured, for example, by 
Vincent. Other~typologies .. distinguish.b~_tweenJb~J:igh_w_QfWOD1(11!. mi!lori!ie~_ i!J.9ig~_puspegple, 
children, refugees and migrant workers, etc., but this is for taxonomical rather than analytical purposes. 
See Rebecca Wallace and Kenneth Dale-Risk, International Human Rights Text and Materials 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) 
11 Vincent, Human Rights, pp. 111-112 
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the problematic of this thesis -the question of deciding between morals and ethics. 
Vincent goes on to develop an argument which characterises the international 
community we have constructed as one forcibly altered (by humanitarian 
intervention) in the name of the individual. 12 This is his own 'modification' of the 
wider 'morality of states' position adopted by many normative theorists. It is 
concerned with reorienting how international theory approaches human rights on the 
stage provided by the international community. We can sense, here, how the moral 
aspect of the human rights discourse pushes for development, or 'progress' in a 
certain fashion, or a certain direction. Vincent himself chooses to pursue the idea and 
practice of intervention, which is not our remit here. The notion of a 'morality of 
states' - a grand ought for the international system - does however seem to exist in 
the same encompassing normative sphere as the critical (and perhaps even the 
modernist) rendering of constructivism. This is philosophical, though, and does not 
take priority in constructivism over the theoretical aim of gathering knowledge about 
why human rights matter (i.e. how should constructivists do this? By focusing on a 
statist, linguistic or dialogic approach, for example?). 
Jack Donnelly, alternatively, theorises human rights as part of a structure of 
redress, and this seems to reveal (or begin to, at least) how they fit into generally 
accepted schema of governance- primarily when 'legality' fails as an avenue for 
restitution. If their status is conceptualised as part of a claims-hierarchy, then human 
rights can be comprehended in terms of identity: what measures must be taken to see 
that they are 'achieved'; how this affects social relationships; how this achievement 
ultimately affects the status of an individual. These points all speak of identity politics 
whi~h h_as come to be associated with constructivism. 
12 See Ibid., esp. Ch. 7 
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The 'place', and therefore the political parameters of human rights are 
characterised thus: 
What is striking is how far one can go before human rights 
arguments become necessary. For example, appeals may be 
made to moral human rights at "lower" levels in order to add 
moral force to the claim. Such appeals, or even their 
possibility, may have an impact on those who are in a 
position to respect or violate the right. But one typically has 
direct recourse to human rights claims only where legal or 
other remedies seem unlikely to work or have already failed. 
In fact, the special function of human rights virtually requires 
that they be claimed precisely when they are unenforceable 
by ordinary legal or political means. 13 
Can even these 'ordinary legal or political means' be equated to the 
understanding of rules expounded by Onuf? Are they somehow superseded by 
Linklater's universal communication community on the grounds that they do not 
properly represent the individuals concerned? The idea of a 'special function' for 
human rights is ultimately vague and speculative, but is there a challenge in here for 
the way in which Wendt describes the socialisation of states? 
According to Donnelly, what is being done politically (in terms of normative 
structure) by the claim to, and exercising of, a right? 'Systematically advanced human 
rights claims seek _to est~blish or bring about more effective enforcement of a parallel 
13 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (London: Cornell University Press, 
1989), p. 13 
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"lower" right - which will eliminate the need to claim that human right.' 14 Therefore, 
if a particular human rights claim is politically effective, the substance of it will no 
longer need to be claimed as a 'human right'. 'Human rights claims thus are 
essentially extralegal; their principal aim is to challenge or change existing 
institutions, practices, or norms, especially legal institutions.' 15 
This break with legality is problematic. Yes, there may be room for 
manoeuvre in how we formulate and uphold the rules which govern us, and even in 
how we therefore define 'rule'. But as Chapter Four will demonstrate, the narrative 
which Onuf relates is nothing if not complex, and disconnecting what is 'human' from 
what is 'legal' seems a paradoxical end for a universal and secular human institution-
the law. Moreover, it is through legal machinery that claims to human rights, 
ultimately, find redress. 
Perhaps a more fruitful line of enquiry for constructivism leads from this 
image of rights which has them challenging institutional orthodoxy as a natural part of 
the process ofbecoming enshrined within that orthodoxy. This contains much (if not 
all) of the groundwork to the answer of how it is that human rights become 
institutionalised. The process from contested values to institutionalised norms troubles 
what are usually perceived to be irreconcilable positions, and so fits the challenge 
which constructivism sets itself regarding the understanding of world politics. 
Conducting (and constructing) normative research 
So how does constructivism go about the business of 'doing' IR? So far in this thesis, 
the influence of critical theory has been pushed forward as the way in which 
_constructivisi!l_ mig!lt best de"eloi>itself along more emancipatory or humanist lines. 
14 Ibid., p. 14 
15 Ibid. 
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Certainly, this seems to be a natural path to take, considering that this area of social 
theory has provided the most probing question for constructivism to answer, the one 
which drives this project. But the implication is that empirical constructivism, as a 
body of work, currently lacks this 'human' element. To what extent is this the case? A 
quick appraisal of recent literature reveals a consistent flow of empirical constructivist 
work that goes beyond metaphysics and metatheory. Topics that would traditionally 
have been the preserve of 'positivist' paradigms now constitute the research interests 
of constructivists. But has the normative potential which Reus-Smit and others see in 
constructivism been tapped? 
Empirical constructivism includes the following examples amongst many 
others; intra-state relations in Sub-Saharan Africa in the context of the relationship 
between economic growth and armed conflict16; analysis of the 'almost' war between 
the US and India in 1971 17; the parallel process ofEU and NATO enlargement18; 
Southeast Asian security19; the characteristics of 'rogue' states as a contributory factor 
to interstate conflict behaviour0; theories of interaction in late colonial India21 ; 
analysis of'agreement' as opposed to a logic offorce in the context ofthe 
Iraq!UNSCOM crisis.22 
16 Margit Bussmann, Gerald Schneider and Nina Wiesehoneier, 'Foreign Economic Liberalization and 
Peace: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11 (4) 
(2005) 
17 Wesley W. Widmaier, 'The Democratic Peace is What States Make oflt: A Constructivist Analysis 
of the US-Indian 'Near-Miss' in the 1971 South Asian Crisis', European Journal of International 
Relations, vol. 11 (3) (2005) 
18 K.M. Fierke and A Wiener, 'Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement', 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6 (5) (1999) 
19 See Seng Tan, 'Rescuing constructivism from the constructivists: a critical reading of constructivist 
interventions in Southeast Asian security', The Pacific Review, vol. 19 (2) (2006) 
20 Mary Capnoli and Peter F~ Trumb-ore, 'ldenticymg 'Ro-gue' States and Testing their Interstate 
_ C2cn,tlict~e~vio,\lf' ,EurO£f!qn JoUrJ!fl/_!)fj~ternati(!fla/ Re]gtiom_, vol. ~~t(J} (2~Q3) _ -~-
21 Sanjoy Banetjee, 'Narratives and Interaction: A Constitutive Theory of Interaction and the Case of 
the All-India Muslim League', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 4 (2) ( 1998) 
22 K.M. Fierke, 'Logics of Force and Dialogue: The Iraq/UNSCOM Crisis as Social Interaction', 
European Journal of International Relations, vol. 6 (3) (2000) 
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These examples and the larger body of work they represent utilise a range of 
methodologies to add to knowledge and to further constructivist principles. According 
to Finnemore and Sikkink's review, 'constructivists have used a variety of tools to 
capture intersubjective meanings, including discourse analysis, process tracing, 
genealogy, structured focus comparisons, interviews, participant observation and 
content analysis. '23 This list has been further augmented by a textbook approach to 
best practice regarding ethnography, sequencing, selection/interpellation, 
categorisation/articulation, communicative action and language games.24 Issue areas 
usually considered the domain of security studies, area studies, political economy, 
historical reconstruction and democratic peace theory, amongst many more key areas 
ofiR, are becoming subsumed under the constructivist banner. 
The studies listed above provide a broad example of the evolution of practice 
in the debate about how best to carry on in constructivism. Some are explicitly 
discourse-led and some blur the lines between where this meets narrative and text 
analysis. Some are more recognisably 'scientific', employing quantifiable techniques 
that can characterise and measure. Further still, it is more common to find examples 
which blend this 'thick' empiricism with social observations to produce a 'thinner' 
method in going forward. The question for us is how broad is their normative scope? 
Are values at all present? 
As good an example as any (from those listed above) for providing an 
empirical, practical grounding for the meeting of theory and 'reality' is found in 
Southeast Asia studies- the field has embraced constructivist principles to the effect 
23 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'Taking Stock', p. 395 
24 See Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International 
Relations (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2007) 
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of establishing a 'constructivist orthodoxy. ' 25 Tellingly, by See Seng Tan's 
assessment, 'the concern ... has to do with the appeal by constructivists to a particular 
methodology that. .. reveals more about their specific metaphysical and ontological 
commitments, which at times contradict one another, than it actually does the lives, 
histories and customs of the localities under scrutiny. ' 26 Constructivist endeavours are 
beset by contradictory intentions: the empirical drive is tempered by certain 
epistemological and conceptual problems; an explicit stance is (or must) be adopted 
towards rationalism; and a unitary stance is desirable, which could conceivably end in 
'deconstructing the very foundations it seeks to establish. '27 
Tan explains the apparent contradiction thus: 'On the one hand, constructivism 
presupposes a voluntarist subject that socially constitutes identities and ideologies 
through instrumental actions ... On the other. .. constructivism also understands social 
production in terms of discourses and ideas that operate deterministically to constitute 
reality. ' 28 Tan's reading has constructivism personified as the 'Everyman' of IR 
theory, which lends itself to broad application coupled with a self-imposed limited 
'life-span' or effectiveness. The logic ofNicholas Onufs 'structuralist interpretation 
oflanguage-game theory, which emphasises the completeness oflanguage and sees 
meaning emerging out of relationships internal to linguistic systems'29 is a logic that 
can be discerned from Alexander Wendt's 'ideas all the way down' constructivism 
that 'presuppose(s) subjectivity.' 30 Do these approaches really tie together so readily? 
25 Nicholas K.hoo 'Deconstructing_the A~EAN security community: a review essay', International 
Relations of the Asia Pacifi,c vol. 4 (1) (2004), p. 45 
-
26 -Tan,~Rescuing construotivism',,p. 240 __ 
27 See Ibid., pp. 240-41 
28 Ibid., p. 241 
29 1bid., p. 242 
30 Ibid. 
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The issue facing 'constructivist empiricism' in the case of Southeast Asia 
studies is the constitution of subjectivity, which may occur 'either through state-
centrism or an ideational or normative determinism .. .in ways that mimic various 
naturalizing and delimiting practices that constructivism claims to avoid. '31 Which 
type of constructivism claims to avoid naturalising or delimiting practices? Not 
Wendt's, according to Ruggie. De-centring the state as a means to understanding the 
complexities of social motivation and social learning, and for moving towards a 
blurring ofboundaries through the (communal) cognitive construction of regions 
(moving from Wendt to Adler, for example), still leaves a neo-rationalist, 
epistemologically positivist rendering of the state as a 'voluntarist subject. ' 32 
The conclusion that Tan reaches, in view of subjectivity as a given, is that 
'Southeast Asia constructivism ultimately fails to deliver on its promise to take us 
beyond the shortcomings ofrationalism.' 33 This 'ultimate' failure suggests that the 
body of work is compelling but only up to a definitive point. There comes a moment 
when the factors of enquiry are no longer contemporaneously compatible for the 
advancement of knowledge- it seems that the state, ideas/norms and practice cannot 
all be simultaneously reified.34 It is worth remembering, though, before charting an 
inherently limiting, and somewhat pessimistic, course that (in Ruggie's words) 'what 
social constructivists reject. . .is the presumption or pretense (sic) that their study 
constitutes the totality or even the main part of the social scientific enterprise. ' 35 
David Dessler, in assessing empirical constructivism as a contribution to a 
positivist field, claims that it has 'emerged as a significant force in empirical 
31 1bid. 
32 See Ibid., p. 246 
33 Ibid., p. 254 
34 See ibid. 
35 Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together?', p. 856 
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research. ' 36 In his review article, those being reviewed (Gil Friedman and Harvey 
Starr/7 and Peter Katzenstein38 -the latter as editor of a collection) 'would very 
likely recognize and endorse the core beliefs of epistemological realism, ' 39 the first of 
which is that 'we inhabit a world whose nature and existence is neither logically or 
causally dependent on any mind. ' 40 There is, in effect, a perceived reconfiguration of 
stated constructivist principles taking place in order to facilitate positivist 'rules.' 
Dessler identifies two distinct research strategies that enable the explanatory 
logic of positivism - a generalising strategy and a particularizing one, where the 
former is normally preferred.41 The inductive reasoning utilised by 'generalising' is 
traditionally difficult to counter. The two 'neos'- realism and liberalism 'are firmly 
rooted in the generalizing approach' - the contrast is made between economic and 
sociological models which view action as instrumentally rational and value-rational 
. 1 42 respective y. 
What Dessler claims that is largely missing (most notably in the Katzenstein 
volume) is a 'value-rational covering-law account that might be tested against 
neorealist and neoliberal rivals. '43 But this is not insurmountable. Dessler redresses 
the balance somewhat by observing that the lack of a 'covering-law theory' is not a 
direct block to progress, and that 'it would be a mistake to interpret the preliminary 
steps toward theory these constructivists take as a failure to theorize- as if every leg 
of a long journey should be judged a failure simply because it does not take us all the 
36 David Dessler, 'Constructivism within a positivist social science', Review of International Studies, 
vol. 25 (I) (1999), p. 123 
37 Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr, Agency, Structure, and International Politics: From Ontology to 
Empirical Inquiry (London: Routledge, 1997) 
38 Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 
39 Dessler, ~Constructivism', p. 124 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 128-130 
42 See Ibid., p. 131 
43 Ibid., p. 134 
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way to our destination. ' 44 Is this incremental theoretical foundation, as described by 
Dessler, the most appropriate way of analysing that which concerns us here-
normativity, values, and human rights? It is arguably the case that the divisions within 
constructivism dictate that any steps in this direction be incremental. 
Returning to the question regarding normative potential posed at the beginning 
of this section, we are left with an equivocal answer: constructivists do norms. The 
purpose of the brief exercise above was to elucidate that a constitutive and procedural 
approach to norms can be utilised in a wide range of analytical subjects. What has 
become clearer, however, is that values are not something we can ascertain as an 
adjunct to these norms - as something somehow secondary or contingent. We cannot 
extract values from procedures. That is, we know what constitutive and procedural 
norms are in play in a given set of circumstances, so therefore values somehow fit 
nicely onto this. Values, certainly in their manifestation as human rights, are 
ontologically equal to other types of norms (maybe they are even ontologically prior, 
but this, as stated, is not the focus of this inquiry). 
Tan's assessment demonstrates how intricate the web which constructivism 
weaves can be, but that in the end it only somehow 'matches' rationalism. That is, it 
offers nothing qualitatively innovative. Dessler also has a similar conclusion, but it is 
ultimately that there is hope for the future of constructivism as a theory on the terms 
of rationalism. Constructivists have conducted research into human rights, and these 
empirical examples will be discussed in more depth as the thesis progresses, but again 
these forays are problematic. An implicit (and sometimes explicit) liberal agenda 
seems to prevail in many cases. The gaps which this thesis is interested in are 
44 Ibid., p. 135 
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becoming clearer. Instrumental values represent a challenge to IR theory which 
involves finding a path between rational and critical agendas. 
Moving towards values: constructivism, normative theory and ethics 
Norms and their recognition by way of a normative approach are either widespread 
and a natural part of IR, or trouble only its margins, depending on which world we 
see. In many senses, constructivism is normative theory, with its socially defined 
agenda. But talk of theory is premature, suffice it to say that many of this particular 
critical hue subscribe to the belief of Hugh Dyer that 'in providing a framework of 
political understanding that remains flexible in its foundations, while recognising the 
need for structured knowledge (viewed as a normative structure in this case), a 
normative approach offers a potential universal background theory for the study of 
international relations'45 (emphasis added). 
Precisely because of this it would be impossible to consider how human rights 
impacts upon constructivism without analysing the confluence from a normative 
theory perspective. To reduce this complex discourse to elements meaningful to this 
thesis, we will start from a working assumption that the intellectual space which 
constructivism populates is equally home to norms and their effects. This is a 
preliminary step in an attempt to answer the question, why should constructivism 
prioritise an ethical rather than a moral approach to human rights norms? 
The dualism involved is derived from the starting position that "ethics' and 
'morality' are not isomorphic and to conflate the two terms is to truncate the overall 
power of the normative theorist. '46 This is not to suggest that simply settling on a 
definition qf'moral' and 'ethical' will enlighten the constructivist agenda. Rather, the 
45 Hugh C. Dyer, Moral Order/ World Order (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997}, p. 5 
46 Deiniol Jones, 'The origins of the global city: ethics and morality in contemporary 
cosmopolitanism', British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 5 (1) (2003}, p. 51 
90 
question is, what is it about either a moral or ethical approach which facilitates the 
best development for constructivism if it is to have a more productive engagement 
with human rights norms in the international system? 
How much does the difference even matter? Hopefully by delineating the two 
it will become a little clearer. Deiniol Jones offers one interpretation of the split, as 
situated against a backdrop of IR theory which pays little attention to global 
processes;47 he defines "ethics' as the study of the powers, dispositions and 
capacities of the body, how they are formed, related and combined and ultimately, 
their 'expression'- i.e. their coherence, directedness and effects in relation to virtue. '48 
This is in opposition to 'the 'morality' of the 'deontological' inquiry that presently 
0 
dominates the normative analysis of international relations 'summarised as the study 
of the subject's universal duties and rights, plus the validity ofintersubjective social 
norms. '49 The clear implication is that morality is a hindering or stifling foundation 
too pre-occupied with metaphysics, best left to philosophers, whilst ethics offers the 
right set of intellectual tools for practical, political advancement. 
Chris Brown offers a perspective of this wider issue from the notion of 
identity, and the divisive competition for its proper foundation: 
47 See Ibid. 
481bid. 
491bid. 
Global solidarities clash with particularist loyalties in a 
number of different contexts, but at the heart of each such 
clash is a contest between differently based normative claims 
on the individual, often reaching to critical questions 
concerning his or her sense of identity. Ought women in 
countries where Islamic law is in force see themselves as 
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victims of discrimination- as the international women's 
movement would have it- or as participants in a living and 
sacred culture, as their co-religionists see the matter? How is 
a Brazilian environmentalist to reconcile within his or her 
own mind the claims of national development with the need 
to protect the common heritage ofhumanity?50 
The point is that starting from a differently conceived notion of the good leads 
to a different outcome. Not only that, the outcome is embedded and sustained by 
reification of the chosen, dominant mode. Historicising the value of our source for 
judging the best way forward- from 'within' or 'without'- has led to a dualism 
based on periods or trends. Mark Hoffinann describes four phases in the evolution of 
normative international theory, the latter two of which occupy contemporary ground. 
Alongside the 'great methodological debate' there developed a phase 'characterized 
by a concern with the effect values have on theoretical orientations,' 51 and 'these 
concerns were reinforced by developments in the philosophy of science and the return 
of 'grand theory' in social and political theory.' 52 Also, now, there is the post-Cold 
War post-positivism in IR (the 'post-' roots of which are at least a decade older) 
which has 'created the opening for radical forms oftheorizing which privilege 
5° Chris Brown, 'International Theory and the Idea of World Community', in Ken Booth and Steve 
Smith (eds.) International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 97 
51 Mark HJ>ffrn.@ll, 'Normativ~ iJ!ternational theory: approaches and issues', in A.J.R. Groom and 
Margot Light (eds.) Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to theory (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1994), p. 28 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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ontological concerns over epistemological problems and compel IR scholars to 
recognize its unavoidably normative content and orientation. ' 53 
Does this apparent rejection of a strictly moral grounding stem from the 
seemingly intractable nature of its arguments? Brown offers a brief summary of the 
positions, with the emphasis on associated philosophical movements. 'Kant and 
Kantians are 'deontologists'; they believe that moral behaviour is a matter of acting 
on the basis of moral principles and with moral motives -the only thing that is good 
itself is a good will, to paraphrase the opening of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals. Utilitarians are 'consequentialists'; they believe that the only factor 
determining whether an action is right or wrong is its consequences. ' 54 
As problematic as these touchstones of political theory are, for this to be a 
meaningful exchange, the motive and the act must be contextualised, and for that to 
be done, there must be a purpose. Brown himself has labelled this aim 'world 
community,' 55 the prospects for which depend on whether there are 'good reasons for 
thinking that the gradual, recently quite rapid, widening of the range and scope of 
contacts between individuals groups and peoples has been accompanied by some kind 
of corresponding recognition of common interests and a common identity?' 56 
Linklater, alternatively, would point to the development of a 'universal 
communication community,' and we shall discuss this apparent conflation of the 
moral and the ethical in more detail in Chapter Five. 
54 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992) 
55 See Brown, 'International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community' 
56 Ibid., p. 94 
57 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics', p. 896 
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There is a brief yet telling statement in Finnemore and Sikkink:'s work on the 
origin of the normative idea: 'Norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively 
built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their 
community.' 57 We might characterise this as the essential problem facing the 
ethical/moral debate on how best to pursue human rights within the international 
system. The moral aspect, certainly, remains with the theorist. Any critical inclination, 
even of the most minimal kind, demands this. Here, we must have this dimension 
inform this thesis, and in a metaphysical sense, oversee it. And this is the key- it can 
only be a metaphysical concern. Philosophers, social theorists, anthropologists, etc. 
have not yet found an uncontested way of anchoring the morality of human rights to 
the substance of daily lives. The instrumentality of human rights norms, on the other 
hand, starts from their 'existence' in the Universal Declaration. How and where they 
exist is the focus of the next section. 
Universalism, human rights and the 'middle-ground' 
With human rights, constructivism faces a challenge which is both sociological and 
geographical. That is, the need to make a clear distinction between 'top-down' and 
'bottom-up' notions of the origins of rights, if only to eventually disregard the 
inherent liberal morality of that distinction. The human rights literature within 
international relations (much of which is imported from other, related disciplines) 
tends to characterise the problem as stemming from the West. Specifically, it is a 
product of modernisation, which itself evolves from Enlightenment thought. This, 
according to the narrative, is not so much the source of rights, but the revealing of that 
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source as a truth. These are rights as matured in courtrooms or lecture theatres, and 
are deemed to be deeply and divisively unrepresentative because of this. 
The cultural argument, on the other hand, admits all on equal merit and is 
largely dismissive of international legal provisions for human rights. 58 There is a 
polarity here which too-easily becomes entrenched. Although the following section 
will analyse how this can (in theory) be overcome, the admittance of cultural 
perspectives is still required of constructivism, and this will be addressed in more 
detail in the following chapter. 
For constructivism to have designs on a more 'complete' notion ofnormativity 
described here, it must facilitate values predominantly conceived of as universal. But 
it must not offer or be part of a universalising doctrine. The positives and negatives 
which characterise universalism as a feature of the human rights discourse require 
some (if not definitive, then at least critical and probing) questions to be asked of the 
boundaries between what is useful and what is detrimental. 
That universalism is a problematic issue, and that it seems to inspire and 
nullify critique in equal measure, is a common perception. But what are human rights 
norms if they are not universal (at least as directed by the Universal Declaration)? 
What might there be within the universalism debate which can properly sustain a 
constructivist dialogue with human rights? 
It is arguably the case that it is the metaphysical aspect of the 'whole' of 
human rights - its deontological origin discussed above - which freezes its utility as 
little more than a metatheoretical distraction. It is this element which has a strong 
relationship with 'truth'- that there is something about human rights which is 
ultimately, and humanly, good, and that it _s~mply requires discovery or the correct 
58 For a discussion of this, see Richard Falk, 'Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of 
Human Rights', in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na•im (ed.) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A 
Quest for Consensus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) 
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formulation for a global epiphany. Truth itself is a useful philosophical analogy which 
enables us to contextualise this moral-ethical desideratum. 
It is of more than incidental interest that recent philosophical texts are 
mirroring this disciplinary turn towards the idea of a useful, workable universal based 
on the practical good. 'The philosophical debate on truth has taken a new and 
distinctive turn in contemporary philosophy: a normative turn. ' 59 This wider debate is 
useful here in providing a context for the inevitable questions and issues of an inter-
disciplinary nature. As is the case with the issue of human rights in IR theory, 'the 
[current philosophical] debate on truth covers questions concerning objectivity, 
reality, knowledge, communication, standards of correctness, identity, authenticity, 
freedom and creativity (among others).' 60 Furthermore, 'the philosophical discussion 
of truth can be a bridge between philosophical traditions and schools ofthought.' 61 
This notion of bridging intellectual gaps across often entrenched approaches is a key 
motivation of this thesis. 
We can make use of a further foundational insight from Medina and Wood. 
'The normativity of truth does not just mean that truth claims are simultaneously 
value judgements. It means that "truth" is a space with its own ends, ends that are 
inseparable from other ends such as freedom and justice. "Truth" designates a 
normative space, a constellation of desiderata or principles that regulate discourse and 
agency and what can be disclosed in and through them. ' 62 So how has IR accounted 
for the human rights nebula? How does universal become useful in this context? 
Circumnavigating the 'problems' of universals- often characterised by 
relativism, pluralism, even communalism- has largely centred on finding the type of 
59 Jose Medina and David Wood (eds.) Truth: Engagements Across Philosophical Traditions (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 1 
60 Ibid. 
61 1bid. 
62 Ibid., p. 3 
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the universal in question which best fits the criterion of transferability demanded by 
practical, political application. Is it thick or thin? Can a clear enough distinction be 
made between moral origin and ethical praxis when universalising human rights? 
Within the loosely-defined boundaries of approaches more critical than not, 
this process has tended towards describing a polar continuum, and then suggesting 
how to overcome the oppositional stance this implies. Jack Donnelly and Bhikhu 
Parekh provide two similarly conceived and yet ultimately contrasting types.63 
Donnelly describes three models of International Human Rights. Firstly, there is the 
traditional state-defined model, wherein statists 'insist that human rights remain 
primarily a matter of sovereign national jurisdiction and (ought to continue to be) a 
largely peripheral concern of international (interstate) relations. ' 64 Too easily 
characterised (that is to say, dismissed) by the critical corpus as a (neo )realist tenet, 
statism remains resolutely at the core of definitions of a range of constructivist 
approaches. Secondly, this faces the cosmopolitan model which sees states as the 
problem, moves away from their status as fact, and instead posits individuals, along 
with NGOs, as the challengers from 'below'.65 This model embraces intervention as 
the vehicle for an attainable future ethos of human equality. 
Cosmopolitanism and statism together form the poles of a human-state 
continuum upon which the middle-ground is occupied by the third model, 
intemationalism.66 This version or perspective throws a wider, inclusive arm around 
the society of states and the individuals, NGOs etc. which together constitute a 
community of active participants. Donnelly sees the formulation which constitutes the 
63 For a further example of~~ntin~um imagery, see Tom Hadden, 'The Pendulum Theory oflndividual, 
Communal and Minority Rights', in Simon Caney and Peter Jones {eds.), Human Rights and Global. 
Diversity (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 77-90 
64 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights (Boulder, Westview Press: 1998), p. 28 
65 See Ibid., p. 28-9 
66 1bid., p. 29 
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'third way' in terms of producing the most fruitful research agenda as 'some sort of 
internationalist model - or a very heavily hedged statism - [which] provides the most 
accurate description of the place of human rights in contemporary international 
relations.' 67 Importantly, though, this 'does not mean th&t internationalism is the best, 
or even a good way to treat human rights in international relations. ' 68 
Donnelly's decision to focus his attention and research resources on the 
possibilities of this essentially middle ground approach echoes the groundswell of 
(more pragmatic) critical theorists who tend towards the practical inclination of 
constructivists. By doing so, the implication is clear that extremes of primacy or 
priority for concerned parties is, on a dialecticaVtheoreticallevel, intellectually 
desirable yet it is, on a practical level, unworkable. Is it necessarily therefore a short-
term, and purely academic, solution? What at least is clear is that, as a formulation, it 
shares the common IR interpretation of a constructivist 'middle ground'. 
Bhikhu Parekh, on the other hand, touches upon the difficulties mentioned at 
the beginning of this section, and starts from a more recognisably philosophical 
position as a means to liberate universalism from its ethnocentric bias. That he does 
so by way of a continuum offers a very useful comparison with Donnelly's more 
recognisably international political terminology. 
Parekh's polar model consists of the extremes of relativism and monism 
intersected by the median ground of minimum universalism. Where universalism 
can't be 'done' or is unimaginable or obsolete is the space occupied conjointly by 
relativism and monism. Each has merit, and each forms the basis of the intellectual 
opportunities that inevitably arise when entrenched convictions clash. The key 
671bid. 
68 Ibid., p. 30 
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analytical step is the accommodation of difference without resorting to an all-
defeating relativism. 
Parekh's insights into the obscurantism which adjuncts relativism are therefore 
particularly useful. At length, 
Relativism contains an important truth, and hence it has 
continuing appeal. It rightly insists that no way of life is 
objectively the best or suits all, that the good life cannot be 
defined independently of the character of the individuals 
involved, and that moral beliefs and practices cannot be 
detached from the wider way oflife and abstractly judged 
and graded. While these are important insights, relativism 
exaggerates and offers a false account of them. As we have 
seen, it advances the following theses. First, individuals are 
determined, constituted or profoundly shaped by their culture 
or society, and as a result are unable to rise above its beliefs 
and modes of thought. Secondly, different societies entertain 
different bodies of beliefs and we have no means of judging 
these. Thirdly, the prevailing system ofbeliefs and practices 
best suits its members, who are therefore right to live by it. 
Each of these theses is wholly or partly true.69 
For Parekh, each theses, mainly perpetuated by the enduring human traits of 
acc~ptin,~ !}le existing order of ~ng;s and an. aversion to difference, is an illusory 
69 Bhikhu Parekh, 'Non-ethnocentric universalism', in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.) 
Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 133 
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fiction which on closer inspection barely holds water. Culture and even society itself 
are not self-regulating entities which dictate in a top-down fashion to passive 
members, and they are certainly not static or discretely measurable. 
The issue of judging the standards of others touches at the very heart of the 
universalism 'problem'. That judgement cannot be legitimately passed is a view 
which is 'deeplymistaken'.70 There is indeed an embedded 'broad consensus' on 
values which exists and thrives, albeit not always at the forefront of our personal or 
political consciousness, but which nevertheless is manifest in international politics.71 
'To be sure, many relativists acknowledge 'this but dismiss the consensus as mere 
coincidence. This is too lazy and superficial a response to be acceptable, especially 
when the consensus is deep and persistent.' 72 
Judgement in relativist terms is subjective and therefore not reproducible. But 
this misapprehends what judgement entails. Judgement is not the equivalent to an 
interrogation of the truth, but is rather a tool to ascertain value, at least in a 
reproducible, academic sense. It needs, therefore, to be removed from its ivory tower 
connotations of a 'pronouncement'. 
As for monism, by Parekh's assessment 
moral monism ... rightly argues that morality is a matter of 
rational reflection, that it presupposes some conception of 
human being, that at least some moral principles are 
universally valid and that ways of life can be critically 
evaluated. However, it misrepresents and draws wrong 
70 Ibid., p. 135 
71 See Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999) 
72 Parekh, 'Non-ethnocentric universalism', p. 135 
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conclusions from these insights. Although morality involves 
rational reflection, it is too complex a system ofbeliefs and 
practices to be excogitated by reason alone.73 
Monism is a bias which cannot explain difference, nor can it account for the 
variation in perceived experience. That is to say, good without a conceivable opposite 
(be it 'wrong' or 'unjustness') is also an illusory fiction. It is also an abstraction 
which constructivism can ill-afford. 'In short, every way of life, however good it 
might be, entails a loss. And since it is difficult to say which of these values is higher 
both in the abstract and specific contexts, the loss involved cannot be measured and 
compared, rendering unintelligible the idea of a particular way oflife representing the 
highest good.' 74 Still, though, by definition universal human rights must be of a 
standard to be recognised and, at some identifiable level, unifying. Perhaps this 
qualification of the monist trap suggests more of a floating standard of fuzzy 
parameters rather than a fixed level. This again, though, runs dangerously close to 
metatheorising in the abstract which is at best unhelpful for substantive, defendable 
theses. 
The middle ground which feeds off and defines itself by the less radical 
aspects of each pole is minimum universalism.75 It is at this point that the difference 
between how Donnelly and Parekh treat the range of possible outcomes offered by a 
continuum image of oppositional positions becomes clear. In Donnelly's more 
explicitly political rendering of universalism, human rights are 'achievable' in a 
compromised mix of the two polar opposites. 'If it is not one or the other then it must 
be both' is effectively the message. 
73 Ibid., p. 136 
74 Ibid., p. 137 
75 See Ibid., p. 138-9 
Minimum universalism, on the other hand, is not so much a way of imagining 
the social configuration ofpeople(s), but is rather a step back- a moral foundation for 
imagining existence itself. As such, with its proposed solutions of ideal types 
sustained by a thin baseline, it still falls foul of the most basic objections to 
universals, namely ethnocentrism and flawed consensus.76 What Parekh does is 
isolate the continuum as an ahistorical conceit, the categories of which should not 
bind theorists. Th~ key for Parekh in circumventing this is dialogue, specifically 
'uncoerced cross-cultural dialogue.' 77 
For our triangulation, dialogue is of key importance, so at first glance this 
would appear promising. The agenda for debate, however, is to be guided by core 
universal moral values, which sounds a note of caution, given the deontological 
misgivings expressed throughout this chapter. There are five of these values, and each 
serves to frame the whole that is the quality ofbeing 'human'; 'human unity, human 
dignity, human worth, promotion of human well-being or fundamental human 
interests, and equality.'78 It is worth briefly noting the substance of Parekh's 
categories for the implications they have for this thesis. At first glance it might be 
assumed that they fit the natural law tradition- that they are qualities somehow 
immanent to our humanity. If this was indeed the case, primacy must be assigned to 
the reasons for elevating these particular qualities, which in itself leads to the 
culturally specific origins and problematic transferability often associated with 
natural law. Instead Parekh stresses that 
the values are not chosen by us for that implies they exist 
independently of our choice; rather we have decided for good 
76 See Ibid. 
77 1bid., p. 139 
78 1bid., pp. 149-50 
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reasons to live by them and confer on them the status of 
values. They are not specific to a particular culture or society, 
for they grounded in an interculturally shared human identity 
and are capable of being defended by interculturally 
shareable good reasons. And they are not derived from a 
transcultural conception of human nature either for we do not 
abstract out the human capacities, desires, dispositions etc., 
that they presuppose and instantiate. 79 
With particularly the first and third reason for upholding these values, Parekh 
historicises the origin and continuing context of rights. By doing so, this conception 
ofwhy rights are valid and how they can work in a sustained fashion joins a wider 
groundswell of opinion that for rights to be properly theorised, or 'brought into' 
theory, then this anchor is indispensable. 80 
From a wider IR theory perspective, the need for a properly historicised 
account of concepts has long been recognised by the English School as a requirement 
not only for sound theory but the discipline itself.81 This is one methodological 
argument for the effective integration of human rights which for constructivism is 
convincing, perhaps even compelling. Put most simply, human rights are the 
manifestation ofthe emancipatory project. Currently, any alternative position is 
usually at best a critical response to this project, or is diametrically opposed to it by 
79 Ibid., p. 150 
80 See, for example, William J. Talbott, Which Rights Should be Universal? (New York: Oxford 
Un!yej"Sit)' Pre!JS, 200~). H~!e, the _l!lethods of social positivism draw out the importance and necessity 
of thinking in terms of millennia of accumulated expenel'lce. Also, Chrfs Brown describes passm£over 
history and concentrating•on -the. present as 'a mistake, and moreover a mistake with serious politi9al 
implications for intercultural relations', in 'Universal human rights: a critique' in Dunne and Wheeler 
(eds.) Human Rights, p. 103 
81 See Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 'Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual 
Project and What to do About it', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 30 (I) (2001) 
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sustaining a different view of what constitutes progress in international theory (and 
the 'facts' of international history also). For constructivism and human rights to co-
exist productively, then the debate must be allowed to move beyond this foundation 
tssue. 
If there is to be one problem, it is the same which persists in troubling the 
margins of similar (as yet) unproven projects. 82 That is, Parekh expends a great deal 
of time and effort extolling the virtues of dialogue without actually elucidating its 
practicalities. There is brief mention of the U.N., but otherwise the fora and structure 
of such important debates are far from settled criteria. 
But we can take from this a method possessing some degree of philosophical 
weight. We can also take Donnelly's political stance, but only if we wish this to be 
constructivism's own role. Whether the politicisation of constructivism is somehow a 
logical step forward for the approach is a key question which must be asked of its 
value-led normative configuration. We have at least begun to address how rights 
themselves are deeply moral and political, but how they can also be imagined as 
universally workable. 
Conclusions 
Both Donnelly's and Parekh's use of continuum imagery in locating the opposing 
interests embedded in human rights tells us much about the relationship between the 
framing of political and theoretical problems and their possible solutions. An 
embedded statism governs the possibilities of the traditional and political categories, 
whilst a historical context for rights opens the door to some form of dialogue. 
82 This is said with Linklater' s transformative thesis in mind. How fair this assessment is will be 
gauged in Chapters Five and Six. 
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The aim of this chapter has been to provide a brief introduction to the key 
concepts and themes within the contemporary human rights discourse which impact 
upon the ontology of constructivism. This has ranged from theoretical perceptions of 
human rights, to their presence (both potential and actual) within the empirical work 
of constructivists, and then on to the wider normative theory which it seemingly must 
engage. We have built up a picture of human rights as ethically instrumental norms 
which are best served by a minimally universalistic ontology if they are to be 
subsumed more effectively into constructivism. This is the theory. How the edifice(s) 
of constructivism can incorporate this type of normativity depends entirely on their 
existing constitutive features, and the extent to which they are actually, rather than 
simply assumed to be, malleable to change. 
What, specifically, can be taken forward to the following chapters? A key 
issue prevails: does the human rights narrative which threads throughout IR 
compromise the constitutive nature of constructivism? The discussions in this chapter 
and those that follow are framed by having aspects of constructivism come face-to-
face with value normativity. Values are contested in such a fundamental way that they 
cannot but open the door to a dialogue with constructivism. That they are manifest in 
the Universal Declaration supports this claim. That the Declaration is entering its 
sixth decade is testament to the practice-orientation of this (relative) concretisation of 
what is otherwise too-often dismissed as a purely, or even simply metaphysical notion. 
It offers a universalism which constructivists must engage with. 
Yet, and this is the point which sustains much of the debate often framed as 
either positivist/postpositivist or orthodox/critical: human rights continue to elude 
anything more than minimal codification in the political and legal apparatus of states. 
Donnelly picks up on this problem in the claiming of human rights. In describing the 
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'special function' of human rights which renders them virtually unenforceable- at 
least by 'ordinary legal or political means,' he questions the permanence of both the 
human right and the claim. In other words, the context moves on. He argues that 
human rights affect the machinery of international statehood by themselves affecting 
a less contentious right (i.e. a more established political or legal right). There is thus 
no need for the continuation of the human right. Its role is only one of instigation. 
Perhaps this is so. With more certainty, this is an aspect ofhow human rights 
'work' which constructivism must engage with but not necessarily be stifled by. It is 
part of the always present discourse regarding the questionability ofhuman rights-
that they are often un- or misrepresentative of a complexly universal world. The 
problem is most often characterised as stemming from the impious trinity of the West, 
modernity or the Enlightenment. Or, of course, from a collusion of all three. This 
dissatisfaction with the manufacturing of morality is a strong thread to be analysed in 
the main body of the thesis, and particularly throughout Chapters Four and Five. What 
Wendt does or does not do with modernity is an equally interesting counterpoint, if 
only less prominent in his approach. 
The one thread more fully developed in this chapter- which must be upheld 
for this thesis to hang together- is that the instrumentality, and therefore the more 
normatively observable effects of human rights, are to be found in their being framed 
primarily as ethical statements derived from the Universal Declaration rather than 
moral principles derived, possibly, from nature. It is against this that we can test the 
moral claims of critical theorists. It is to this more sustained appraisal which we now 
tum. 
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3. A conventional approach 
Alexander Wendt 
In order for this chapter to do the work we might hope for, in framing and analysing 
how a particular approach to constructivism accounts for human rights norms in the 
international system, certain assumptions must be made. There is a certain type of 
constructivism to which Wendt's approach can be said to belong. Differences between 
them exist, of course, but on the whole they speak the same conceptual language 
which is applied to the same or very similar world view. It is therefore assumed that it 
is an appropriate analytic device to have them share a critique. 
These familial approaches regard humans as relevant international actors, but 
vary as to how important they are. The assumption follows that both the conventional 
and the Wendtian approach must be discussed, but in order to take account of its 
impact on the landscape of international theory, we must lean towards Wendt's 
formulation as a more systematic and coherent representative of a certain 
constructivist way of thinking. 
This being the case, this chapter will be separated into two parts and will 
proceed as follows. The first section will begin with a discussion of conventionalism 
as a whole, and the place of value norms within it. It will then move on to critically 
analyse the specifics ofhow Wendt develops his socialisation thesis, always with a 
- . 
view to either drawing out or exposing the lack o{values therein. the second section 
will be a more sustained critique, calling into question both the image of the state we 
are left with, and whether human rights are subsumed or rejected by this 'person'. 
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I. Conventionalism and values 
Those constructivists Ted Hopfhas usefully labelled 'conventional' have an 
ontological vision which has its roots in a world-view more positivist than not. This 
branch of constructivism is by nature aligned with social scientific precedents, and 
follows an established structural blue-print, whilst also adding to this by forging 
newer ideational paths to knowledge. When normativity is the matter at hand, it too is 
unavoidably subject to these competing interests and perspectives, although 
conventional and behavioural norms have received more coverage than value norms. 
So what are the broadly identifiable characteristics of this conventional 
approach? Contra to rationalist empiricism, 'constructivism instead assumes that the 
selves, or identities, of states are a variable; they likely depend on historical, cultural, 
political, and social context.' 1 Conventionally speaking, 'states have more agency 
under constructivism, but that agency is not in any sense unconstrained. To the 
contrary, choices are rigorously constrained by the webs of understanding of the 
practices, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in particular historical 
contexts. '2 
Within this inclusive framework, constructivism offers a more explicit 
questioning of the relative merits of ideas and interests. But how big is an idea? How 
encompassing, or limited, might it be? Where do its roots lie? The source of values, as 
we have seen, is a much contested issue. These 'ideas' themselves bring into sharp 
focus philosophies, histories and narratives, outside of the limits ofliberalism, that 
conventionalism has had but a fleeting association with. 
1 Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism', p. 176 
2 Ibid., p. 177 
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The Westphalian state is the traditional anchor of constructivism as a whole, 
be it conventionalist or otherwise. What sets this approach apart is the legacy of this 
idea- the dominating role which the state plays. This has led to comparisons with (or 
even conflations with) neorealism, but there are key differences. Regarding the 
interests of the state, for example, 'constructivism and neorealism share the 
assumption that interests imply choices, but neorealism further assumes that states 
have the same a priori interests. Such a homogenizing assumption is possible only if 
one denies that interests are the products of the social practices that mutually 
constitute actors and structures. ' 3 States clearly have different views on human rights, 
but is this the same thing as having different interests because ofhuman rights? 
As we saw at the beginning of Chapter Two, normative clarity can be in short 
supply, and this is particularly the case with approaches that incline more towards the 
rational or positivist end of the IR spectrum. To a critical eye, the lack of clear 
intentions or subtlety of exposition in this respect effectively blunts what might 
otherwise be an incisive constructivist foray into this area. The extent to which 
conventional constructivists are guilty of this practice depends, of course, on whether 
they are addressing values at all. 
Broad conceptions of 'intersubjectivity' or 'common knowledge' make the 
exercise of deconstructing constructivist insights into human rights much more 
problematic than perhaps it ought to be. Human rights norms are issues of seismic 
political and cultural significance, and at what level they are considered theoretically 
useful varies to a degree within this approach. Wendt, as we shall see, focuses on a 
W altzian 'third image' analysis of anarchy. 4 Other conventionalists probe further 
'down' into second and first level analyses, but how effectively they do so is 
3 Ibid., p. 176 
4 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1954) 
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questionable. Put (all too) simply: Ideas matter; human rights are an idea; therefore 
human rights matter. This basic logic loses its way somehow in conventional 
approaches. That human rights do matter is not something that many conventionalists 
would disagree with. How they matter is an entirely different prospect. 
For example, according to Neta Crawford, 'Finnemore and Sikkink may be on 
the right track [with their 'life-cycle' image of normative incorporation], but 
normative content has faded from view with the emphasis on stages.' 5 We will come 
to these specific stages presently, but the overall impression we can take from this 
criticism is that theirs is a functional sterilisation of what should be an organic 
process. Finnemore and Sikkink certainly ask the sort of questions which interest us 
here, and, one might assume, Crawford also: 'How do we know a norm when we see 
one? How do we know norms make a difference in politics? Where do norms come 
from? How do they change?'6 These questions are being asked from firmly within the 
conventional camp: 'We address theoretical issues facing those of us interested in 
empirical research on social construction processes and norm influences in 
international politics.' 7 They also work from the assumption that the problem with 
constructivism is a problem with change, something that will be discussed late in this 
chapter 
In what way, then, is Finnemore and Sikkink's triadic norm 'life cycle' an 
insufficient explanation ofhow norms function within the international system? Is it 
because it lacks a clear statement on values or even human rights? Is a three stage 
process too parsimonious?8 Each of the stages, 'norm emergence', 'norm cascade' 
5 Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian 
Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 97 
6 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 
International Organization, vol. 52 (4), p. 888 
7 Ibid. 
8 See Ibid., pp. 895-909 
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and 'internalization' undoubtedly augment our knowledge of how norms 'work' (and 
of course, how humans function socially), and it is difficult to see how this logic 
could be refuted, but there is still a caveat. Even though Finnernore and Sikkink stress 
that there is significant room for conceptual manoeuvre within each stage, that this is 
enough for values- for human rights- remains unclear. 
For instance, 'the characteristic mechanism of the first stage ... is persuasion 
by norm entrepreneurs. ' 9 Immediately we are drawn into a simple yet fundamental 
assumption - that entrepreneurship of this kind is possible for those with the most 
pressing need. This appears to be a logic which privileges power (and the power of 
opportunity) over substance. Perhaps this is symptomatic of the norms on which 
Finnemore and Sikkink base their cycle. 'Women's suffrage' and the 'laws of war' 
are indeed situated somewhere around that threshold which both connects and 
differentiates between, in Crawford's terms, normative behaviour and normative 
belief. Yet to function- and to progress- they depend utterly on two key assumptions 
about the (political, social and cultural) structure within which they operate. Firstly, 
that it exists and is of a particular developed form, and secondly, that entrepreneurs 
are privy to the workings of it and therefore what is required for change. 
This is socio-structural 'engineering', but it lacks complexity and real breadth, 
something illustrated in part by the empirical scope of the project: Data focusing on 
the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia and Finland10 is not 
universally representative of women's rights struggles any more than Western mores 
are a microcosmic image of macro global concerns. Lacking here is a foundation 
which takes recognition and difference at anything more than a purely instrumental 
level; there is no reference made to an informing or 'background field' of morality 
9 Ibid, p. 895 
10 See Ibid., p. 896 
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against which decisions are made. By this stage, anything even thinly universalistic 
about 'value' motivations is lost, or at least clouded and compromised for it. 
What the life-cycle model does provide is a broader attempt (limited though 
this may actually be) to reconcile normative behaviour with state behaviour. Along 
with the 'spiral model', it also demonstrates that human rights, if constituted by 
recognisable criteria, can be and are incorporated, or 'naturalised', into policy in a 
meaningful and lasting fashion. That it is not done so without the need for formalised 
systems of incorporation, that it requires a minimum level of consciousness of a 
'problem' on the part of immediate observers and then a further campaign to raise 
wider awareness, perhaps jars with how constructivists conceive of objects as 
holistically and inclusively constituted. 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's 'spiral model' seems to offer a link between fixed 
ontology and unstable normativity, as it is explicitly focused on human rights -
specifically on the activities of 'transnational advocacy networks.' 11 In providing a 
much-needed analytical deepening of what might be perceived as the limits of a 
'conventional' ontological approach, there is promise here for a better understanding 
of the constitution of the state as a vessel for good, which would be a significant step 
towards engaging with values in the international system, albeit one limited by the 
ambitions of conventionalists. Is this promise realised? 
Within five pha.Ses, we have repression, the denial thereof, the awareness 
thereof indicated by tactical concession-making, acceptance of the true (value-
specific) nature ofthe issue, and finally compliant behaviour. 12 Certainly, regarding 
human rights norms, each of these stages is a more nuanced and relevant account than 
11 See Thomas Risse and,Kathryn Sikkink, 'The socialization of international humanrights norms into 
domestic practice: introduction' in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power 
of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 18 
12 See Ibid., pp. 22-35 
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that of the 'life-cycle', almost to the extent that it would appear to do the lions-share 
of the work of this thesis. There is one crucial element which prevents this from being 
the case. 
This spiral process is set up as a model for describing how normatively weak 
states (in terms of the values they hold and express) might best follow the road to 
becoming liberal democratic states. 13 If constructivism is to be the best placed 
approach for theorising the 'good state', there is nothing intrinsic to it (either 
constructivism or the state) which suggests that a particular vision of democracy is the 
political culture to be coveted. Indeed, having this type of organisational, structural 
and history-ending goal would not be in keeping with the constitutive potential of 
socialisation, and would instead only serve to confirm suspicions regarding its 
failings. Furthermore, it is a worldview utterly at odds with other constructivist 
approaches. 14 
By Martha Finnemore's assessment, constructivist accounts of structure are 
not sociologically deep enough: 'sociology's institutionalism provides a much richer 
and more detailed theoretical framework than has constructivism. Sociologists specify 
the substantive content of social structure. They do more than simply argue that social 
structure matters; they tell us what the social structure is' 15 (emphasis in original). 
Constructivism's lack of integration leaves many similarly constituted norms without 
any clear direction or purpose. The logical conclusion to draw is that 'without ... an 
argument about the content of a systemic social structure, constructivism cannot 
provide an alternative to systemic theories.' 16 
13 Ibid., p. 9 
14 See chapters Four and Five. 
15 Martha Finnemore, 'Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's institutionalism', 
International Organization, vol. 50 (2) (1996), p. 327 
161bid. 
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Is constructivism failing in some way to properly address the systemic issue, 
given the contrasting demands made of it from conventional and critical variants? 
This is not necessarily the case. Or, rather, it need not necessarily be the case, and for 
two reasons. Firstly, constructivism is beginning to ontologise the value norm as we 
have seen. This is qualified, and the systemic failure claim holds to an extent, because 
human rights norms are obdurately problematic, and a certain constant image of 
structure is still being reified by conventionalists. The second reason depends on what 
we deem the purpose of a constitutive international approach to be. Social structures 
can be described in rich and useful detail in terms of their internal features and their 
outward-facing relationships but, ultimately, what links the two? This is 
constructivism's remit. 
Human rights norms themselves currently work across the structure of the 
international system, but their engagement with international actors is not so 
immediately observable. Is this due to the under-theorising of the individual, or the 
over-theorising of the importance of the state? Conventional constructivism is an 
approach 'that treat[ s] states as actors [and has] little to say about individuals and 
provide[ s] no reason to expect that individuals would be able to make claims against 
states that in any way compromise state sovereignty or control over citizens.' 17 Is it 
utterly bereft of politics? We must take these concerns to what is considered by much 
of the academy to be the exemplar of modernist, conventional constructivism. 
17 Ibid., p. 338 
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Where does the Wendtian state get its values from? 
Wendtian constructivism is explicit regarding the state. It is an irreducible feature of 
the international system by which all else is measured. This modem approach18 
actively engages statehood as an integral part of explaining what is social about the 
international. In Social Theory, Wendt states the basic position thus; 'system change 
ultimately happens through states. In that sense states still are at the center of the 
international system.' 19 Furthermore, by historical analogy, it is a tributary system of 
the Sinic tradition- everything, including the qualities of individual and collective 
humanity, is drawn up into a statist product, regardless of how well it has been 
theorised. 
That such state-centrism should be practised in the name of constructivism to 
the extent, it seems, of reification, is a significant point of contention. Christian Reus-
Smit lobbies for a wider perspective: 'Recognizing that the identity of the state is 
grounded in a larger complex of values than simply the organizing principle of 
sovereignty is the first step in formulating a more satisfactory constructivist account 
of basic institutional practices.'20 This beingso, a singularly conceived and 
ontologically prior state must ultimately place a limit on the particular quality and 
eventually the scope of any possible further development of constructivism, and it is 
this feature of modernism which is of most interest here. Sovereignty, within both a 
domestic and systemic jurisdiction, must always be a tool for the use of man, and not 
18 The term 'modernist' here denotes an identifiable intellectual approach. Although Wendt himself 
lists others as being more representative of this label (namely John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil, 
see Wendt, Social Theory, p. 3), the ontological, epistemological and (to the extent they are developed) 
meilioClological approaches Wendt takes argiiaoly place him within this positivistic oracket. For this 
the§iJ!,Jhis )VQ:qld be ~t the. expense of I<.ratochwil, whose insights are better understood as part of a 
linguistic tradition (see Chapter Four). 
19 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 9 
2° Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: culture, social identity, and institutional 
rationality in international relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 30 
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vice versa. The strength of a more broadly-conceived constructivism, as contrasted 
with more traditional approaches, is its treatment of sovereignty as a variable?1 
The Wendtian analysis of the state is outwardly more complex than a realist or 
liberal explanation. It does not break entirely from them, but essentially supposes that 
there is more going on than has previously been considered. Upon closer inspection, 
though, it is arguably a simplistic approach, as is the case, many would equally argue, 
with its 'orthodox' kin. Wendt illustrates this connection with the following 
statement; 'Lots of things come under the heading of"IR." The states system is just 
one. ' 22 Realism and liberalism also include 'many things' in their traditions, but 
always maintain singular political outcomes. The states system is just one thing, but 
here it is fundamental, like having only one sun. 
The Wendtian state draws its characteristics from three strands of political 
thought: Weberian, Pluralist and Marxist.23 Wendt's summary of what a 'thin' 
combination of all three might look like recognises the embedded societal element of 
statism. 'Traditional' Weberian thinking is augmented to produce a state 
'conceptualized as an organizational actor that is internally related to the society it 
governs by a structure of political authority. '24 That a state can be 'Weberian' in this 
context- that it can ever be more than the sum of its parts - is disputed. 25 Wendt 
qualifies this further, expressing his concerns that 'a 'Weberian' state need not satisfy 
21 Ibid., p. 32 
22 Wendt, Social Theory, p.l94 
23 Elsewhere, a footnote of Wendt's hints at other types: See Alexander Wendt, 'The State as a Person 
in International Theory', Review oflnternationaiStudies, vol. 30, (2) (2004 ), p. 291, note 11. 
Unfortunately for us, Wendt does not elaborate further. 
24 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 201 
25 lver B. Neumann, 'Beware of organicism: the narrative self of the state', Review of International 
Studies, vol. 30 (2), p. 260 
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the more stringent requirement of a 'Hegelian' state, namely equal recognition of all 
. b ,26 Its mem ers. 
In order for the state to be theorised, Wendt assumes that it must conform to a 
'minimalist view ... stripped of its contingent forms. ,n This is a problematic exercise. 
The position Wendt takes is that a theoretical state cannot be historical and that a 
'common core' is needed to progress. Furthermore, 'the purpose is not to help us 
analyze real historical states.'28 For what material gain? The elegance of theory? 
Wendt acknowledges here that this is a very 'un'constructivist way of going about the 
business ofiR, and insists instead on the 'common core' of states as the best guide for 
empirical research. He reaches this point, not incidentally, by apparently equating 
social constructivists with anti-essentialists?9 But is such a broad sweep necessary? 
The Spain of Ferdinand II, the Habsburgs and Franco was at all times to the outside 
world a state recognisable just as we know 'Spain' to be presently, regardless of 
changing capabilities and intentions. It is also arguably the case that the cultures of 
the majority of states extant since the end of the First World War are by and large the 
same now (regardless of changes to boundaries and political systems). In other words, 
states can endure with culture or, indeed, despite it, across time. This of course 
depends on how we distinguish between anthropological culture and political culture 
when doing theory, which Wendt's approach does in a wholly unsatisfactorily way, 
by omission of the former. 30 
Wendt prefers to visualise the state as a 'fuzzy set, no element of which is 
essential but which tend to cohere in homeostatic clusters. The state does not seem 
26 Alexander Wendt, 'Why a W~rld State is Inevitable', European Journal of International Relations, 
vol.-9 (4)(2003), p. 504 
27 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 201 
28 Ibid., p. 201 
29 Ibid. 
30 See below. 
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particularly "fuzzy" as social kinds go, but it too has borderline cases, which indicate 
that our emphasis should be on the cluster of properties, not individual ones. ' 31 The 
'fuzziness' of states refers to their contradictory constitutions, but whether this admits 
sufficient complexity to provide useful information about a state's relationship with 
human rights norms is doubtful, and depends entirely on a full and inclusive definition 
of normativity. 
We must assume for our critique that this image of state constitution impacts 
upon the integrity of any model of state identity formation. Wendt's triadic 'cultures 
of anarchy'32 describe the identities of the Selves and Others which populate the 
international system. Enemies, rivals and friends operate as the projections of states 
following logics of interaction that are either 'Hobbesian', 'Lockean' or 'Kantian', 
respectively. On the face of it, we might assume that 'enemies' do not share a similar 
system of values which might be explicit and demonstrably manifest in an active 
commitment to human rights. 'Rivals' are a greyer proposition. This is, according to 
Wendt, most characteristic of the international system at present, having developed 
itselfbeyond pure militarism. Here, Wendt admits some degree of 'rights talk' but in 
a curiously statist context: 'Unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they 
recognize their sovereignty, their "life and liberty," as a right, and therefore not to try 
to conquer or dominate them'33 (emphasis in original). This is an assertion of 
sovereignty, and contains nothing that is hugely innovative. Life and liberty within the 
state is of no apparent concern, let alone how that might in tum affect the outward 
functioning of the state, or perceptions of it. 
31 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 202 
32 See Ibid., pp. 246-312 
33 Ibid., p, 279 
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Equally, Wendt's supposition that the future will be a place ofKantian 
:friendship34 satisfies only the idealist-constructivist merging that he himself has 
chosen. This unfortunate amalgam serves to guide constructivism towards an end-
state reminiscent of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's 'power' analysis in the name ofliberal 
democracy. Having such a limited amount of anarchical constituents utterly lacks the 
political and normative subtlety expressed by a human rights-observing state. Human 
rights norms themselves are failing to have the kind of conceptual impact we might 
expect if they were being addressed by a less positivistic approach to the question of 
states and their make-up. 
Continuing with Wendt's rendering of the state, 'much depends on how deeply 
states have internalized their shared culture. This can have three degrees, which 
generate three pathways by which cultures can be realized, coercion, self-interest and 
legitimacy. ' 35 It is the ways in which these shared cultures are internalized which 
offers something more than a hint at what goes on beyond the surface of the outward-
facing state, and perhaps will shed some light on how human rights norms affect the 
W endtian state. 
These three categories do require us to consider for a moment what it is that 
constructivists might hope to gain by a better incorporation of human rights norms 
into their worldview. Constructivism's oft-stated aim is to push back the boundaries 
put in place by rationalist approaches, but how should this be most efficiently 
achieved? To continue with Wendt; 'Cultural forms reproduced primarily by coercion 
tend to be the least stable, those by legitimacy the most. In IR scholarship today these 
pathways are associated with competing theories, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, and 
34 Wendt does qualify this 'direction of time' thesis, but still the emphasis remains on the likelihood of 
forward motion (i.e. progress) as opposed to regression (see Social Theory, p, 312) 
35 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 310 
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Idealism? (constructivism), but since it is an empirical question which pathway 
realizes a given cultural form, all three theories have something to tell us.' 36 
Aside from the awkward connection of idealism with constructivism already 
alluded to, we can perhaps at least take something from this regarding the relevance of 
human rights norms for states (inter)acting in the international system. If states are 
forced to internalise human rights norms, it is unlikely they will have any lasting 
effect or even immediate focus. Speaking in terms of 'legitimacy', however, suggests 
two possible avenues that states, and therefore human rights norms within them, 
might take. 
If the legitimacy in question is that which is conferred upon a state by other 
states, then human rights norms can be said to be working, as such, but only as 
detached instruments. In other words, they are not the end in themselves - the 
legitimate state is. Alternatively, if the legitimacy spoken of is attained via an 
ethically instrumental approach to human rights norms - one which has humans on an 
equal footing to states- then norms have a much better prospect of being elevated to 
an equal ontological status, and are not just existing as a stepping stone for an 
institution. It is not for constructivism to judge the merits of these legitimacy issues 
per se, but in terms of this thesis, it is clearly the case that the latter scenario offers a 
more fruitful engagement if its practitioners wish to account for the 'whole' of 
normativity. 
Ultimately, however, if they are the end result of a Wendtian socialisation 
process, then state values stem from and are forevermore tied to the values (needs, 
desires, etc.) of other states. This would be a defendable position if the international 
sys~em consisted entirely and purely of states, in simple anarchical abstraction. But 
361bid. 
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how and why states communicate is underpinned by structural and institutional rules 
and methods of best practice.37 Constructivism listens to and focuses on what we can 
learn from these bodies which Reus-Smit labels 'fundamental institutions' and defines 
as 'the elementary rules of practice that states formulate to solve the coordination and 
collaboration problems associated with coexistence under anarchy. ' 38 Where 
constructivism continues to fail is in its lack of a better understanding of the binding 
levels which exist and interplay beneath this more tangible institutionalism. 
Conventional limitations are characterised as 'oversimplifications': 'First, 
constructivists have failed to appreciate the full complexity of the deep constitutive 
values that define the social identity of the state, placing too much emphasis on the 
organizing principle of sovereignty. And, second, they have paid insufficient attention 
to the discursive mechanisms that link intersubjective ideas oflegitimate statehood 
and rightful state action to the constitution of fundamental institutions. ' 39 An 
illustration of these failings does not alone render an image of the good state before 
us, fully formed. But it does set us along the path towards a more norms-focused 
understanding of the state (in both its formative underpinnings and behaviour) which 
in turn should allow us to imagine a structure which is able to accommodate the 
ethical policies and practices of states. 
This deeper, 'conditioning', foundation is defined thus: 'Constitutional 
structures are coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms that 
perform two functions in ordering international societies: they define what constitutes 
a legitimate actor, entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they define 
37Which is something constructivists frequently (and unhelpfully) consider to be transcendent. See 
Christian Reus-S mit, 'Politics and International Legal Obligation', European Journal of International 
Relations, vol. 9 (4) (2003), p. 603, and further discussion in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
38 Reus-Smit, 'The Moral Purpose of the State', p. 14 
39 Ibid., p. 26 
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the basic parameters of rightful state action. ' 40 Again, though, this alone is still 
insufficient as an argument for the institution of a good state. However, Reus-Smit 
continues, 'constitutional structures can be said to incorporate three primary 
normative elements. These are ... a hegemonic belief about the moral purpose of 
centralized, autonomous political organization, an organizing principle of sovereignty, 
and a norm of pure procedural justice. ' 41 
This latter element, 'pure procedural justice', is 'good' in both a moral 
deontological and an ethical instrumental sense as it formalises requirements of 
equality and fairness. Thus, 'the moral purpose of the modem state lies in the 
augmentation of individuals' purposes and potentialities, in the cultivation of a social, 
economic and political order that enables individuals to engage in the self-directed 
pursuit of their "interests."'42 This is the state-as-facilitator, a morally-encompassing 
body which enables individual self-fulfilment. It is therefore a 'moral' state. 
But having fairness and equality 'enabled' in this way does not form the 
totality of the possible international outcomes of the human rights discourse. The 
origins of the 'value' norms which constitute human rights still lie with the contested 
claims of both domestic and 'state-less' individuals and groups whose lives are 
compromised daily. The extent to which the conventional state mirrors the ethics of 
its constituent human lives is a key question to be asking of Wendt, given the focus in 
social theory on states as 'people'. 
40 Ibid., p. 30 
41 Ibid., p. 31 
42 1bid., p, 123 
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The state as a (good) person? 
The substance ofWendtian states is that they are 'purposive actors with a sense of 
Self- "states are people too".' 43 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson asks whether this means 
that states are 'principal persons in world politics. ' 44 What concerns us here is 
whether states can be principled persons in world politics. Are the ways in which 
states react to and absorb the international human rights discourse the same ways that 
humans do? This, of course, is an exceptionally broad question. No thesis such as this 
could begin to answer in any specific detail. Rather, that the depth of personality 
exists in humans is the point. How deep is the state as a person, and is that person 
guided by moral absolutes or a more ethical sensibility? We might hope for the latter, 
but how much of a struggle will it be to find it in Wendt's description? 
This 'personification' enables observers of the state to discern a unitary actor 
at work. By Wendt's analysis, this results in a limited identity (which is either 
Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian). This has implications for the achievement of goals, 
the dissipation of fears, the choice of alliances, and so on. Taken to the extreme, it 
necessarily involves the suppression of discordant internal views and practices. As a 
point of clarification, 'to say that states are 'actors' or 'persons' is to attribute to them 
properties we associate first with human beings - rationality, identities, interests, 
beliefs, and so on. ' 45 
People have beliefs which are shaped and nurtured by their various life 
experiences, but they are always singularly expressed. Even at the communal level, 
group beliefs are only ever such as they are held by constituent members (and even 
· then one 'voice' is not a guarantee). One problem associated with 
43 Ibid. 
44 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Forum Introduction: Is the state a person? Why should we care?', Review 
of International Studies, vol. 30 (2) (2004), p. 258 
45 Alexander Wendt, 'The state as a person', p. 289 
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anthropomorphising the state is located in the intentionality of its working parts. Like 
the human body, it consists of innumerable elements which constitute the whole. 
Unlike the human body, however, each constituent part is not genetically 
programmed to work harmoniously, effectively blindly, and without individual 
consciOusness. 
Wendt prefers the view that the actions taken in the name of the state are not 
really those of powerful individuals.46 They are not reducible to identifiable humans. 
There is 'one' state, the invisible hand of which is the internal structure of corporate 
agency at work. To understand corporate agency, Wendt invokes an image of micro-
and macro-theorising. In order to place the structure of any given state in time, then a 
distinction has to be made between individuals and their office, which is what endures 
and gives meaning to our understanding of that which exists but cannot be observed. 
So how are values expressed, and by what standard? We might begin to 
answer this question by addressing something that can be recognised as a defining 
element of personhood: Identity. The Wendtian state, as we have seen, is a fluctuating 
combination of differing kinds of identity, all of which have something to say about 
appropriate behaviour and action. These identities move a step further from the 
relationship-dependent formulations discussed above, which might suggest some 
more depth from which human rights norms might benefit. They all start, though, 
from the same place: 'Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned 
first and foremost with preservation or "security" of the self. '47 Is this, therefore, an 
inward looking selfwhich Wendt describes? If it is, then it is a limited introspection: 
'the situation facing states as they encounter one another for the first time may be 
46 
'the aggregate of concrete individuals who instantiate a state at a given moment.' Wendt, Social 
Theory, p. 216 
47 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics', 
International Organization, vol. 46 (2) (1992), p. 399 
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such that only self-regarding conceptions of identity can survive; if so, even if these 
conceptions are socially constructed, neorealists may be right in holding identities and 
interests constant and thus in privileging one particular meaning or anarchic structure 
over process. ' 48 
Of the four identities described in Social Theory (personal or corporate, type, 
role and collective),49 it is 'type', 'role' and 'collective' identity which offer the most 
interesting avenues for discussion. Possession of a particular 'type' identity denotes 
membership of a social category with shared characteristics, which can include 
attitudes and values. Wendt borrows the term from Fearon, where it was first used to 
describe the group dynamics of individual personalities, which Wendt extrapolates 
from. Promisingly, they have a cultural dimension, but Wendt also notes that they are 
intrinsic, and not dependent upon wider recognition. That a quality or qualities may 
be inherent or self-generated lies at the heart of the 'natural' morality problem 
discussed above, and there is perhaps the potential for marginalisation when such a 
fundamental 'type' precludes observation at an instrumental level. 
Wendt employs examples of this 'simultaneously self-organizing and social 
quality' 5° as corresponding to types of state, 'like capitalist states, fascist states, 
monarchical states, and so on.' 51 Here, the discussion is of forms of state 'constituted 
by internal principles of political legitimacy' which 'may be caused by interaction 
with other states.' 52 The types of states mentioned here are symptomatic of Wendt's 
ontology and the models oflegitimacy which it admits. The reliance upon 'internal 
principles of political legitimacy' suggests a strong methodological association with 
the norms of democracy, non-intervention, sovereignty, etc. and is silent regarding 
48 Wendt;' Anarchy', p. 403 
49 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 224 
so Ibid., p. 226 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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human rights norms of association, self-determination, etc. which do not translate so 
well internationally as a uniform product or practice indicative of a 'type' of 
statehood. 
This institutionalised form of identity can be and is 'self-sufficient' and can 
be generated and exist automatically without any form of external prompt or reason. 
This would (paradoxically) obviate the spread of human rights norms unless those 
rights were only naturalistic and required no external referent to be meaningful. The 
normative element of the good state must require some form of communal agreement 
on terms. 
'Role' identities offer a way out of this introspective thinking, as they 'are not 
based on intrinsic properties and as such exist only in relation to Others. ' 53 It is the 
existence of opposite meaning which legitimises the type in question. 'One can have 
these identities only by occupying a position in a social structure and following 
behavioural norms towards Others possessing relevant counter-identities. ' 54 This 
makes sense inasmuch as a 'role' as a human function is a state of being which 
requires interaction at a level beyond that required by mere existence. Being process-
focused, it is potentially an ethical conception, too. 
Wendt notes that the application of role identity in IR has been limited largely 
to foreign policy analysis, and the social structuralism to which it seems to speak 
quite clearly has been neglected. This appears to rest on the definitional weakness 
inherent in socially derived concepts which cannot properly account for role 
expectations. 55 This expectation element suggests that roles are not only constituted 
by social interaction, but that there is a measure of control attached to their makeup 
whi~l101!ght be exploitedby the more powerful of the concerned parties. The 
53 Ibid., p. 227 
54 Ibid. 
55 See Ibid. 
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implications this has for addressing the good state and its adherence to human rights 
norms lies in its ability to resist such pressure to conform or change with the result of 
values being distorted by an alternative agenda. The power of human rights must, it 
seems, be sufficient to deter this diluting effect. 
Imagine the scenario where the good state faces pressure over the course of 
'appropriate' action: Ifthere is a state (of existence) that is good, then all (nation) 
states may possess it by default of their own existence. Based on the priority of 'right' 
over 'wrong', the argument for the inevitability of the good state falls short because 
we cannot recognise 'good' without the associate referent 'wrong' or 'bad'. There 
must, then, be a decision made regarding how to live (or how to function, in this 
case). Thinking in terms of the good state as role identity would seem to offer a way 
of perpetuating this alternative, value-normative basis, but only if the 'deep structure' 
of the international system is penetrated. 56 
With this in mind, Wendt's reading of 'collective identity' would appear to 
answer our questions regarding constitution and feasibility. Taking identification 
between Self and Other as its start point, and 'extending the boundaries of the Self to 
include the Other,' 57 the end point seems to suggest a considerateness which might 
transcend the impulses of selfishness. This seems too good to be true - a formulation 
for near-altruism which will enable the good state to flourish. This treatment of 
collective identity tells us what the predominant characteristics of an interacting, 
structural good state might look like, but we are left wondering how to achieve this 
identity in the first instance. Wendt's description of the state as a person does not go 
deep enough into the analogous psyche. The main cost of this is that we cannot decide 
whether Wendt's state/person is guided by moral absolutes or prefers to work with its 
56 See Ibid., p. 228 
57 Ibid., p. 229 
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peers on the issue of human rights norms in an ethically instrumental way. Perhaps 
there is more to be extracted from how Wendt conceives of change- i.e. how it 
happens and how it is directional. 
Values versus structure: how change occurs in Wendt's world 
Wendt's analysis allocates a roughly even hand to the roles of agents and structure in 
shaping the international system, which in turn would suggest a logic ofbalancing 
over time so there can be no dominance of one over the other. How do (or rather, how 
would) values affect this balancing? Much of Wendt's discussion ofhow things 
change is couched in the language of 'process' which, at the outset, suggests no 
particular commitment to the alteration of the status quo. 58 At its very root is the 
implication that this is the study of how things are done. We must make the 
preliminary assumption, then, that values are 'things' that are 'done'. Which doesn't 
appear to allow much room for complexity or even difference. 
For Wendt, 'process' is 'about how state agents and systemic cultures are 
sustained by foreign policy practices, and sometimes transformed. ' 59 These practices 
are phenomena which surely must involve some repetition, some reliability of form in 
order for general reproduction to occur, and have been characterised elsewhere as 
averse to universals.60 This does not affect, of course, the validity of what we can 
learn from case-specific variables. Indeed, 'practices are governed by preexisting 
structures and entered into by preexisting agents, but the possibility of referring to 
either as "preexisting" presupposes a social process stable enough to constitute them 
58 See Ibid., ch. 7 
59 Ibid, p. 313 
60 SeeR. B. 1. Walker, 'Realism, Change, and International Political Theory', International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 31 (3) (1987), p. 72 
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as relatively enduring objects. Agents and structures are themselves processes. ' 61 This 
'pre-existence' notion or criterion would seem to preclude anything (structurally or 
agentically) new, such as a norm ofhuman rights, from impinging upon process, 
particularly if this is confined only to foreign policy analysis. 
By using the term 'process' we can infer that Wendt is taking as his starting 
point the view that the international system is ordered and in a sense naturally 
evolving over the progression of time. The fundamental question which this position 
begs, given its emphasis on structural and positivist thinking, is what counts as 
change? Is a human rights norm (of association, against torture, to subsistence, to life, 
etc.) of such a character as to disturb 'the order ofthings' at a fundamental level? And 
how would this impact on the ability of the characteristic features of 'normative' 
constructivism to account for and understand values? 
Regarding systemic upheaval, the experience of change which Wendt sees is 
fundamentally a unifying one, so that 'with each change the international system has 
achieved a qualitatively higher capacity for collective action. ' 62 Does this include 
norms ofhuman rights? If it does, then process becomes political progress. This is a 
view of a unified approach as purposeful, developing and therefore historical. Both 
the instigation and product of change, by virtue of their cyclical and dependent 
growth, are social facts. Taken towards its logical conclusion, though, this line of 
thought arguably pursues the ultimate social fact, if indeed there is a start point and an 
end point to it, which fits the image of a grand theory.63 
Importantly, though, there is a caveat. 'Like other constructivists I think it is 
important to show how social facts are constituted by shared ideas because this may 
6IWendt, Social Theory, p. 313 
621bid. 
63 Which of course is not an uncontested good. Relating this critique to Wendt, see Andreas Behnke, 
'Grand Theory in the Age of its Responsibility: Contemplations on Alexander Wendt', Cooperation 
and Conflict, vol. 36 91) (2001) 
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reveal new possibilities for change, but I would also emphasize that these facts might 
not be malleable in some historical circumstances, '64 which strongly implies that 
structure holds the trump card. (Cultural) structure is entrenched, having 'natural 
homeostatic tendencies, ' 65 and it is not difficult to see how such an epochal human 
concept would be so. However, regarding our specific concerns, 'conflicting and 
incommensurable conceptions of the good' are a 'fundamental social fact.' 66 
The permanence of these 'social facts' is disputed.67 Wendt's own analysis of 
potential change rests on the reproducibility of agents, which are either exogenous or 
endogenous to the process. For the purposes of this thesis, we will concentrate on the 
latter, as this is Wendt's chosen direction. The former is too embedded in an abstract 
rationalist logic which demands that agent preference formation takes place one step 
removed from actual interaction, and so lacks complexity and recognition of 
contingent subtleties. How might a 'change from within' perspective impact upon our 
project? 
An endogenous view of the constitution and role of agents holds more 
potential for social theory and also, perhaps, normative constructivism. Referring 
back to an interactionist perspective; 
the ... constructivist approach to process, exemplified I think 
by symbolic interactionism, assumes that more is "going on" 
in interaction than the adjustment of behaviour to price. The 
reproduction of agents, their identities and interests, is also at 
stake. In interaction states are not only trying to get what they 
64 Wendt, Social Theory, pp. 314-5 
65 Ibid. 
66 John Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 14 
(3) (1985), p. 245 
67 See Bohman, 'How to Make a Social Science Practical', p. 511 
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want, but trying to sustain the conceptions of Self and Other 
which generate those wants. Agents themselves are on-going 
effects of interaction, both caused and constituted by it.68 
There are several points of note regarding symbolic interactionism which in 
turn speak of three issues; change, change in the W endtian project, and Wendt in the 
wider constructivist canon. Our focus is on all three. Symbolic interactionism is 
effectively taken to be the language of change. As such its utilisation has the potential 
to be susceptible to the common epistemological paradox of speaking across the gaps 
in our knowledge and so widening them. Again, as throughout Wendt's work, the 
focus is on the state. We must work a little harder to discern what might actually be 
possible within this framework for change regarding the admission of human rights 
norms. We must look a little closer at the more fundamental elements of Wendt's 
approach to discern exactly what is subject to change, and what it can also encompass. 
Wendt's preferred ontological approach is 'idealist-holist,' and this is the 
'background and organising axis for [his] treatment.'69 It is not a uniquely formed 
ontology amongst constructivists.70 On the surface, it does seem to be appropriate 
territory for human rights. Both of these elements speak of universality, but with 
different emphases. Idealism is directed universalism which has tended to create an 
untenable situation regarding its reproducibility for admittance to the real 'science' of 
IR. Holism in IR is more often than not presented as the polar opposite of 
individualism, and this seems entirely logical. In building his social theory, Wendt 
concentrates on closing this dualistic gap. This is done by focusing on the relationship 
1Jetween structui:~(s) andag~nt(s). 
68 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 316 
69 Kratochwil, 'Constructing a New Orthodoxy?', pp. 80-81 
70 See Finnemore and Sikkink, 'Taking Stock' 
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Regarding the traditional 'logics' ofholism and individualism, 'the latter 
aggregates upwards from ontologically primitive agents, the former works downward 
from irreducible social structures. ' 71 For Wendt, the difference between the two is a 
result of their particular image of structures in terms of their capabilities and in 
particular how they 'construct' agents. The focus is on a matrix of the causal and 
constitutive effects of structures, and then how they affect the properties and 
behaviour of agents.72 It is the language of what structures 'do' which interests 
Wendt: 'To say that a structure "constrains" actors is to say that it only has 
behavioural effects. To say that a structure "constructs" actors is to say that it has 
property effects.' 73 But the effects spoken of here are those on states, not people. 
Individualism for Wendt represents the failings of neorealism and 
neoliberalism. However, as a representative ofhow the levels of inquiry ofWendt's 
approach must be expanded upon- primarily in terms of its philosophical and 
sociological merit - individualism plays a key role in how normative potential might 
be realised. In Hidemi Suganami's critique, Wendt's 'individualism is ... inadequate 
because it assumes that the agent's properties- or identities and interests- are 
logically or conceptually independent of the social structure. In fact, the identities and 
interests of the agents are not independent of the social structure logically or 
conceptually.' 74 
For Wendt, it is the 'indivisible' nature of the individualist worldview which 
limits the theorising potential it offers to causal and behavioural factors and 
outcomes. There is implicit in this line of argument the belief that holism is more 
71 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 26 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., pp. 26-7 
74 Hidemi Suganami, 'Wendt, IR, and philosophy: a critique', in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander 
(eds.) Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics (Abingdon: 
Routledge,2006),p.65 
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theoretically interesting and valuable than individualism in this respect because it has 
the capacity to explain 'more', at least by a conventionalist analysis. An individualist 
pre-judgement of the role and appearance of structures leads inevitably to an 
incompatibility between how they might be constitutive and the limits of an 
ontologically settled worldview. Indeed, 'the constitutive possibility is the 
distinctively holist hypothesis.' 75 Individualism, however, cannot be cast aside so 
easily. The conventional-critical continuum of constructivism relies on a degree of 
tension regarding relativism if it is not to collapse into one pole or another. 
By sustaining the conceptions of Self and Other which existed prior to any 
specific case or general trend of interaction, structure remains predicated upon a 
firmly statist base (and therefore, it must be noted, one possessing a certain moral 
character) and traditional and familiar categories are maintained which, perhaps above 
all else, allows for more controlled interaction (if the moral-ethical link can be 
legitimately and usefully established). Agents are the effects of interaction, and so are 
not equal partners as the balance shifts in favour of structure, even if the relationship 
is blurred somewhat by their being constituted by it. 
Wendt describes the rationalist/constructivist divide on this point thus; 
the rationalist model is saying that the boundaries of the self 
are not at stake in and therefore do not change in interaction, 
so that in learning states do not come to identify with each 
other. The constructivist model is saying that the boundaries 
of the self are at stake in and therefore may change in 
75 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 27 
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interaction, so that in cooperating states can form a collective 
identity76 (emphasis added). 
If this is so, then normative constructivism has to accommodate an issue - what the 
boundaries of the Self are which contribute to the forming of a state's identity -
which is integral to how the socialisation process works. The wider concern is a). how 
far the Wendtian constructivist approach really does subscribe to its nominal 
principles, rather than those of its rationalist cousins, and b). the extent to which a 
deontological understanding of the Self and Other- as opposed to a process-oriented 
one - illuminates how the mechanics of systemic change exert forces which 
materially alter the well-being of the oppressed. 
Although based largely on the substance of ideas, Wendtian constructivism is 
structuralist, and so must to an extent reflect the tradition of IR structural approaches 
which offer a materialist ontology. In theorising process (and therefore the possibility 
of change) two debates- rationalism/constructivism and materialisrnlideiilism- must 
be reconciled or integrated, and this is to be done, according to Wendt, by adopting an 
'evolutionary' approach. 77 
There are three criteria which must be met in order for a theory to be 
evolutionary in this context, and they are worth noting here. Firstly, 'it must explain 
the movement of a variable over time.' The variable in question is a trait within a 
single 'species' (i.e. the state as opposed to, say, the European Union), which in this 
case takes the form of identities or interests; Secondly, 'it must specify a means for 
generating variation in the dependent variable, and a mechanism for winnowing the 
effects ofthat variation on tJw popu!ation ... , [variati,on] comes from unit-level 
76 Ibid., p. 317 
77 Ibid., p. 319 
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changes in the structure of state-society relations and from the strategic choices of 
foreign policy decision-makers.' Of most interest here is the mechanism for 
'winnowing' the effects of variation- how is this decision made? Thirdly, 'it must 
incorporate inertial tendencies that stabilize these changes in the 
population ... provided by states' commitment to their identities, reinforced by 
institutional structures at the domestic and international level.' 78 
These criteria of evolution suggest the speed at which we might expect 
normative change to happen. A commitment to directional change is the framework 
for Wendt's model. Regarding its constituent parts; 'in nature there is only one 
winnowing mechanism: natural selection. In society a second family of mechanisms 
exists and is usually much more powerful: cultural selection. Natural and cultural 
selection form two causal pathways through which identities may evolve.' 79 
All of this of course depends on the extent to which human rights norms 
represent change. There are two paths of varying complexity which we might take in 
responding to this. The first is, again, an unrealistic option for this thesis as it involves 
an investigation into the 'true nature' ofhuman rights norms, to be compared with the 
'true nature' of the international system- neither of which are likely to be settled in 
the near future. The second is more to the point. The way in which our triangulation 
of approaches can be said to account for values as change, and specifically Wendt in 
this case, depends very much on the characteristics that approach puts into place. Yes, 
we can interpret this content to an extent, but the key to the assessment is the 
ontology of the approach, i.e. is it statist, linguistic, dialogic, etc.? Equally, how 
Wendt characterises his IR competitors tells us just as much about the attitude ofhis 
own approach to values. 
78 See Ibid. 
79 1bid., p. 320 
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Wendt likens neorealists to 'Darwinians' as 'materialists who minimize the 
role of ideas by arguing that cultural forms must be adaptive in a genetic sense. ' 80 
Clearly, Wendt prefers Lamarckism, as followed by institutionalists, with both groups 
being 'idealists who highlight the importance of ideas by pointing to the variability of 
cultural forms under similar material conditions.' 81 Although Lamarckismjars 
somewhat with Darwinism, Wendt is keen to site his evolutionary theory alongside 
the former, which expounds a "'co-evolutionary" model of social evolution (genetic 
and cultural factors working in conjunction) rather than a complete cultural 
reductionism, but it is a model in which cultural selection does most of the 
explanatory work. ' 82 
This suits the via media approach, and perhaps also lends it some extra-
disciplinary intellectual weight. However, it may not have been necessary for Wendt 
to have compartmentalised Darwinism and neorealism as being of a kind apart from 
his approach, as there is arguably some scope for the inventiveness of genetic 
development to correlate with the traditional social terminology of ideas. In other 
words, the varying ethics ofhuman rights norms- in terms of their generation and 
application- must never be taken for granted by normative constructivism if it is to 
follow this model. 
The natural selection logic apparently favoured by realists is dismissed on the 
grounds that it characterises states as self-interested egoists. So far, so familiar, in 
terms of a characterisation of realism. Wendt points out a potential flaw in applying 
evolutionary logic to what are essentially events which are the product of something 
even more complex than the human brain or mind. That is, two or more humans 
involved in the process of making a decision. The problem is revealed by the 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
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application of social identity theory. Specifically, 'the experimental findings 
supporting this theory strongly suggest that states may indeed have a predisposition to 
be self-interested, since the members of human groups almost always show 
favouritism toward each other in dealing with the members of out-groups. ' 83 This, as 
it stands, appears to be an adequate description of a certain kind of conventional 
behaviour. It does not, however, explain Hobbesianism 'since a tendency toward in-
group bias is not the same thing as a tendency toward inter-group aggression. ' 84 
Essentially, aside from the contested nature of intentions (explicit or implicit), 
which sustains the· critical/orthodoxy debate, one type of behaviour is not logically 
corollary to another, nor must it pre-empt it. Wendt's way through this 'meaning of 
behaviour' morass is to point to the reduction throughout the course ofhistory of the 
number of states85 in the international system with the explanation that 'a lot of states 
obviously failed to reproduce, and an inability to play power politics as well as others 
probably had something to do with it' 86 (emphasis added), which seems a little 
strange if only for its lack of conviction relative to other aspects of Wendt's 
rationalist inclinations. 
So natural selection fails to account for the way the international system 
works with respect to the character and longevity of statehood. But what of the 
strange distortion of our perception of the 'state'- as the repository of humans as 
social beings- caused by a reliance on the origin myth of 'Westphalia'? The 
institution of sovereignty maintains even apparently 'weak' states by affording them 
83 Ibid., p. 322 
841bid. 
85 See Ibid., p. 323 
861bid. 
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enough of a buffer- or 'slack' 87 - between how they are perceived, their treatment 
and its consequences. 
This attempt to concretise the passage of time as a process with recognisable 
constituent parts which develop, and not just characterise it as 'change' without 
meaning, points to a pragmatic and practice-oriented undercurrent to Wendt's 
constructivism. But how powerful is it? Is it sufficiently theorised to affect how well 
value-norms are accounted for within IR? The preceding discussion suggests that 
much probing and testing of the intellectual and practical boundaries ofWendt's 
approach still needs to be done. We are indeed struggling to find the account of 
complexities and difference we need in order to have a value-led constructivism based 
on Wendt's template. 
H. The limits of socialisation 
Universalism: the need to represent culture(s) 
There is one distinct advantage of constructivism's basic (and perhaps defining) 
relationship with the state. From Toni Erskine's understanding of institutional moral 
agency, the state is a moral agent by virtue of its decision-making structures. 88 It 
possesses this quality where the international community does not, if we abide by the 
traditional anarchical image of it. The state has 'an identity which is independent of 
the identities of its constitutive members.' 89 But this is almost incidental to Wendt's 
87 Ibid., p. 324 
88 See Toni Erskine, Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents: The Case of States and 
'Quasi-States', in Toni Erskine (ed.) Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency 
and International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 25 
891bid. 
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state which lacks internal foundation. Wendt does broach the subject of society, but in 
a very limited and qualified way, preferring to 'offer some intuitions that could in 
principle be developed into an argurnent,' 90 which suggests that he is, at best, content 
to let others make that argument regarding the key constitutive features of social 
groups that can be simultaneously distinct and overlapping. 
Concerning identity, David Runciman makes a very useful distinction between 
the 'collective' and the 'corporate' character of groups- 'according to this distinction, 
a collective entity is nothing more than the sum of its parts, whereas a corporate entity 
is somehow separate from these, and has an irreducible identity of its own. The 
corporate character of the state is what helps to determine its character as a moral 
agent. ' 91 The argument here, essentially, is that Wendt's forming of the corporate 
identity of statehood does not make sense without a much better understanding of 
how the requirements of moral agency impact upon the state as a whole, an entity 
which consists of defining factors that are at once domestic and international, internal 
and external. 
As a corporate body, the state has a 'representative' duty92 which must be 
considered both plural and singular as, in its most 'pure' or good inception, it acts 
equally in all cases. It is a proper understanding of this representative duty which 
conventional constructivism lacks. In order to 'bring it out' or at least graft it on (not 
too artificially or painfully), we can draw from a concept - culture - which is both 
particular and universal (internal and external), can be understood geographically, and 
which- in its discrete forms - is defined by the values it promotes. 
90 Wendt, S~cia/ Theory, p. 209 
91 David Runciman, 'Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Representing the State', in Erskine, Can 
Institutions Have Responsibilities?, p. 41 
92 See Ibid. 
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The Wendtian approach is concerned with building the culture ofthe state, 
which leaves little or no room for the role of culture(s) within it. As such, Wendt's 
treatment of culture is what might be termed 'second-level', as it rests upon the sparse 
'definitional' approach which characterises the functional necessities of a diplomatic 
view of world politics.93 It is the statesman's realm which is home to Wendt's reading 
of 'micro-level' culture based primarily on a sociological approach, which in tum is 
fed by advances in game-theory.94 Not, then, what most constructivists might think of 
when asked about culture and cultures- that is, the socio-anthropological view. This, 
of course, is only to be expected from the very detailed explanation in Social Theory 
of the socialisation of states, not the socialisation of people. 
We are dealing with a singular 'whole' of culture which has been forcibly split 
by Wendt's focus on one aspect of it. This has left conventional constructivism with a 
divide between what is anthropological (i.e. human and/or social) and political, and 
what is systemic and functional, in a clearly demarcated domestic and international 
dichotomy. In many ways, the problem of culture is the problem of Wendt's 
approach, and of conventionalism generally, when considering the central issue of this 
thesis. Cultures are invested with values. They generate, represent, display and uphold 
them. Of course, cultures are manifest in forms other than the state. But this is 
precisely why a better understanding of them allows for a broader understanding of 
how the ethics ofhuman rights relate to the state and the international, not to mention 
individuals as well. 
This being the case, constructivism (and this thesis) does not have to labour 
under a forced metaphysical conflation of the anthropological and the systemic. 
Culture and cultures, rather, act as a device for grounding what would otherwise be an 
93 See Wendt, Social Theory, p. 158. And, moreover, one which is not 'sociological' enough? See 
Finnemore above. 
94 Ibid., p. 159 
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abstract discussion. Wendt, as we have seen, deals in sweeping abstraction, and the 
need to forge a link to practice is apparent. To do this here, the focus must remain on 
the instrumentality of the articles of the Universal Declaration. 
By drawing the value normative state, we are necessarily pushing against the 
boundaries which define its original form. But in which direction? Naturally, we 
might assume that to be guided by values is to be critical; all that is unorthodox, that 
which perpetually challenges givens, must lead to 'good,' or something along these 
lines, and all that is normatively conventional and behavioural (without this value 
referent) is a caricature of evil. 
The problem with allowing this mode of thinking to prevail is that it leads us 
exactly where we do not wish to be- a place where universalism has been distorted 
and anchored at myriad culturally relativist points. Normative constructivism, as it is 
being drawn here, is not best served by a closed, relativistic view of culture. A much 
broader view is required, wherein the mechanics of human sociality- and the reasons 
it takes the shapes that it does - can contribute to a fuller understanding of the 
international. 
Seyla Benhabib offers one such vision,95 and provides a useful contrast with 
Wendt's own type of 'statebuilding' project. Benhabib bases a non-relativist 
multiculturalist approach largely on an interpretation of sociological constructivism: 
'A social constructivism that considers the interplay between structural and cultural 
imperatives is possible as well as desirable. ' 96 Much ofBenhabib's project lends itself 
more to dialogue-based constructivism which will be discussed in more depth in 
Chapter Five. It is her understanding of the state and institutions which is of most 
interest here. 
95 See Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in a Global Era (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002) 
96 Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, p. 11 
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Of course, before continuing, we must be aware of the caveat that a more 
developed view of culture and cultural practices has the ability to seriously 
problematise the 'human' element of our rights/values project. The human rights 
discourse traditionally abhors certain practices such as female genital mutilation and 
Hinduism's sati, which a relativist perspective might tolerate. The type of analysis 
which Benhabib represents, however, advocates a much deeper reading of these 
activities and practices,97 of the sort which constructivism must engage with if its 
normative ontology is to be sufficiently theorised for meaningful and lasting 
'identities' to take shape. 
How would a differently composed ontology from that ofWendt, yet one still 
based on the primacy of the state, impact upon the relationship of human rights with 
constructivism? Benhabib's approach moves away from the inherent limits of 
'individualism' or relativism. Rather than being tied into the recurring requirement to 
section-off one culture from another, and therefore to maintain a strict collection of 
definitions, constructivism would be better served by adopting a cultural standpoint, 
as 'any view of cultures as clearly delineable wholes is a view from the outside that 
generates coherence for the purposes of understanding and control.' 98 
W endtian or conventional constructivism, in assuming a clear middle-g_round 
position, is arguably condemned to always looking at individualism, and therefore 
pronouncing upon and dismissing it. Equally, though, the holism of which it speaks 
arches over us so intangibly that it is almost impossible to anchor any meaning from 
it. Benhabib's project enables a 'view from the Self which negates neither cause nor 
constitution. And so constructivism would be compelled to extrapolate from one 
setting for identity (domestic) to another (international). 
97 See Ibid., p. 6 
98 Ibid., p. 5 
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This 'deeper' approach shares features in common with the rules-based 
constructivist approach to be discussed in the following chapter, as 'human actions 
and relations are formed through a double hermeneutic: We identify what we do 
through an account of what we do; words and deeds are equiprimorqial, in the sense 
that almost all socially significant human action beyond scratching one's nose is 
identified as a certain type of doing through the accounts the agents and others give of 
that doing. ' 99 This might suggest a point of synthesis, but only if the type of approach 
offered by Benhabib speaks on the same level as Wendt, which is not so apparent. For 
example, Wendt asks the questions; 'what is the mechanism by which culture moves 
a person's body if not through the mind or Self? If an actor is unaware of shared 
knowledge, or does not care about it, how can it explain his actions?' 100 But if an 
actor was not aware of shared knowledge, it would precisely explain her actions (or 
lack of them) if she were to remain clueless as to what she should do in the following 
value-dependant situation: 'Is it right for me to support policies which are ultimately 
harmful to vulnerable peoples? ' 
Ultimately, the specific social examples offered by Wendt do not provide a 
clear way for us to integrate values into the international as part of a wider 
understanding of culture and identity. It is surely a premature dismissal of culture and 
context which inspires the sentiment that 'people move all by themselves, and culture 
cannot explain that behaviour unless it somehow gets inside their heads. ' 101 
Significant mention must be made, though, that individualism is reluctantly 
discarded by Wendt. He states that 'agents exist partly in virtue of their own 
thoughts.' 102 We can look at this sentiment through the lens of a more traditional 
99 . 
Ibid., p. 6 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., p. 181 
102 Ibid., p. 181 
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international theory perspective; 'if Wendt is willing to make this degree of 
concession to individualism, then his effort to undermine neorealism and 
neoliberalism because of their rootedness in individualism begins to lose its edge.' 103 
This is undoubtedly so, as this kind of re-alignment of international theory is Wendt's 
primary focus. However, whatever is promised by this enigmatic statement by Wendt 
is not followed through sufficiently for us to make headway with values. 
Ifthe internal institutional make-up of a state is of, say, 'x' normative quality, 
then it follows that that quality would, if not entirely form, then at least shape the 
external, international identity of that state. Similarly, the upholding ofhuman rights 
norms is still only a part of what a state is and does. Yet the act of doing so must as a 
minimum requirement ask questions of an entrenched institutional structure: 'In the 
allocation of distributive benefits, why not find programs and procedures that foster 
group solidarity across colour, ethnic and raciallines?' 104 
There is another caveat here which asks questions of the objectivity of the 
state as a corporate identity, which Benhabib recognises. 'The constitution of 
collective identities is now subject to bureaucratic and administrative control, 
direction and manipulation.' 105 The point is that when normativity and statehood 
come together- in the question of liberal democracy with Benhabib, but equally 
human rights norms for our purposes - there is a vastly complex layering of 
intentions and pressures which affect the functionality of the good state. Again, it is a 
part of constructivism's role to be equipped to take full account of these factors. 
What constructivism must guard against is any reaction to the one-
dimensional culturalism ofWendt which treats culture as the end in itself, rather than 
an important, directing variable. Within the discourse ofhuman rights which sees 
103 Suganami, 'Wendt, IR, and philosophy', p. 71 
104 Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, p. 76 
105 Ibid., p. 80 
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these norms as 'core' rights, 'there are difficulties with the ahistorical quality of this 
mode of inquiry, and also with its wishful character- suggesting that anyone 
determined to find (or not to find) similarities across cultures will shape the evidence 
to fit the thesis.' 106 
The modernist approach lacks a body of work which interrogates similarity 
and difference across cultures, which suggests that a strong comparison can be made 
with similar (rationalist) approaches within the international theory spectrum on this 
issue. Within the rationalism with which Wendt is often associated, there is no room 
for an argument-centred approach. As such, domestic fora set up with the purpose of 
discussing and reconciling normative issues have no bearing whatsoever on the 
politicking which takes place internationally. Cultural relativism would always be an 
impasse. 107 
Wendt's argument is that 'agents have a role to play in social explanation 
which cannot be reduced to culture. Radical holists conflate acting with a reason with 
acting for a reason, but his does not mean that society is merely an aggregate of 
independently existing idiolects. ' 108 The 'independent idiolect' reading of culture is 
sympathetic to the notion that culture and cultures must be compartmentalised and 
stifled by misguided policies of recognition which leads to a static view of 
development. As might well be expected, the argument does indeed progress beyond 
the limited dimensions of internal 'biological' explanation and into 'a social scientific 
idiom by distinguishing between individuality per se and the social terms of 
106 Vincent, Human Rights, p. 49 
107 See Leo McCarthy, Justice, the State and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 
~.67 
08 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 181 
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individuality,' 109 but the points made by Wendt remain deeply contentious, and only 
for the benefit of the state. 
Wendt speaks of the difficulties ofholism gaining a meaningful foothold in 
theories of the international system as a result of the latter's 'low density [which] 
means that the identities and interests of the states may be more dependent on 
domestic than systemic structures.' 110 The difficulty of using the terminology of 
holism in association with concepts as essentially vague as the international system is 
that it strays into what is frequently perceived as metaphysical territory, somewhere 
far above the certainties of domestic politics. 
For Wendt, the real potential for some kind of breakthrough as far as the 
'acceptability' ofholism is concerned lies in the inability of individualism (under the 
influence of rationalism) to 'acknowledge even in principle any constitutive effects 
that systemic structures might have on states. I believe the structure of the 
international system exerts both kinds of effects on state identities' 111 (emphasis in 
original). Explaining the origins of state identities, as Wendt points out, may be a part 
(but not the entirety) of explaining the nature and effects of international structure, 
which is his aim. 
The utterly entrenched polarity of the individualist-holist debate is 
problematic. Wendt makes use of the poststructuralist position, and the later 
Wittgenstein, in order to convey not only the meaningful source and consequences of 
action into the social realm, but also our thinking about it. This is done, in the most 
simple terms, by broadening the frame of reference which we use to recognise and 
manage behaviour as both a private and public phenomenon. What this does, 
-
effectively, is obviate any kind of causal relationship between agents and culture, as 
1091bid. 
110 Ibid., pp. 27-8 
Ill Ibid., p. 28 
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their relationship is irreducibly constitutive. 112 A focus on cause is, in Wendt's words, 
radical holism, which does not expedite his project. Rather, it is to be defined by a 
synthesis which aims for a moderate holism. 
Radical holism is, in Wendt's critique, limited on two counts; what he labels 
'the intrinsic power of agents' and 'the limits of structural explanations.' 113 Firstly, 
regarding the immanent knowledge of individual behaviour, 'no matter how much the 
meaning of an individual's thought is socially constituted, all that matters for 
explaining his behaviour is how matters seem to him.' 114 At first glance, this would 
seem to be apparent. However, it holds only if the reason for ascertaining the cause of 
certain behaviour is only for the benefit of the individual, as would be the case in a 
psychoanalytic or medical context (the example of Wendt's choice), in which the 
focus is on the perceived primary fact of behaviour- internal experience. In 
(external) reality, though, what matters is the context of what happened. 
It is moderate holism which touches upon the more commonly held 
perceptions of what might constitute a 'universal' property, and is open, inevitably, to 
charges of naturalism. That is to say, inherent to this line of argument is an essential, 
individual (and quite possibly subconscious) motivational force which is projected 
from within. Reconciling this logic to a poststructuralist inspired critique, however, 
throws up a common side-effect. By destroying the privileging of a mode of thought 
or expression thereof (individualism and the ontological primacy it upholds), the 
theorist must necessarily replace it with some other dominant technique or approach. 
The modernist approach reads the individual as if it were a published text. 
This being so, Wendt's treatment of state culture fails to engage properly with the 
human contents of states. The 'drawing out' of the individual into a more holistic 
112 See Ibid., p. 179 
113 Ibid., p. 180 
114 Ibid. 
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arena is certainly a beginning of sorts but, to paraphrase the apocryphal country 
dweller, he probably shouldn't have started from there. Wendt's establishment of a 
constructivist system which neglects change requires an observer who is equally 
happy to accept this system. It does not provide for the speed at which internal cogs 
can affect the external machinations of the outward-facing state, the equal speed with 
which constructivism should react, and the diversity which motivates all of this. 
By establishing this particular systematic approach to theorising the 
international system, Wendt adheres to much of what characterises a 'conventional' 
approach. He also diverges from it in certain key respects. Both these similarities and 
differences are instructive as to what it is that makes Wendt such a key player in the 
diverse approach that is constructivism. Before concluding this chapter, the 
relationship between Wendt and conventional constructivism (broadly conceived) will 
be summarised. 
Wendt and the conventionalists 
The analysis in this chapter has enabled us to now point to some key areas in which 
Wendt differs from the conventionalist classification to which he is usually deemed to 
belong. These differences are the areas of Wendt's approach where we might expect 
him to have something to say about values and human rights over and above other 
conventionalists. It is not an exhaustive list and its content is brief. However, it is this 
kind of crystallisation which provides a firmer base from which to draw conclusions 
about Wendt and the types of constructivism which need to be addressed next. The 
points can be reviewed as part of a sequence. 
1. Appropriation of the scientific method. Both the wider conventionalism and 
Wendt's specific approach are 'scientific', but they use the machinery of science in 
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different ways (which usually originate from Kuhn115), and this has repercussions for 
values in the international system. Most conventionalists use social scientific 
techniques in the measurement and evaluation of their research questions. The 
traditional picture holds that the world exists, and we can know steadily more and 
more about it by applying whatever peer-approved methodologies are deemed 
appropriate in the circumstances. Wendt, arguably (and perhaps even unavoidably), 
has made a more sustained effort to shape this method to a form of his liking, to be 
innovative with it, and challenging also. His interpretation of scientific realism, cause 
and constitution, idealism and holism, and many other supplementary ideas result in 
an end product that provokes much thought on what is orthodox or unorthodox about 
it. Wendt even states, referring to Social Theory, that 'despite the author's training as 
a political scientist ... the book is written from a philosopher's point ofview.' 116 
Creativity, in other words, is at a premium. 
1.1 The development of a 'whole'. Wendt's approach is captured and 
expressed by a lengthy and systematic development of theory. We are left with a 
theory in the singular, as encompassing and controversial as it might be. Wider 
conventionalism's forays are generally less comprehensive theoretical efforts. What 
does this mean? Quality of work is not the issue. Rather, having a broader theoretical 
base suggests that more can be fitted into it. This is a simplistic way of presenting the 
assumption that Wendt's approach, which is at once ranging and detailed (as far as its 
115 This can be promoted either with tacit acc~ptance or a more critical appraisal. For an example of the 
former, see Finnemore and Sikkink, 'Taking Stock', pp. 406-407. For the latter, see Holsti, 'Mirror, 
Mirror on the Wall' 
ll6 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 32 
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subject goes), might be expected to be able to incorporate more about the world than 
other approaches which appear to be limited or more specific in their remit. 117 
1.2 Direction of fit. Expressed most basically, given the credentials ofWendt's 
approach as a theory, rather than just an ad hoc selection of methodologies, the world 
comes to Wendt whereas conventionalists go looking for it. This seems to turn the last 
point made in 1.1 on its head, but on further reflection, this does not have to be the 
case. If conventionalists are more able to set an agenda based on how they perceive 
world events, then that agenda could be more inclusive of factors beyond the state. 
Human rights norms could be analysed from the perspective of humans as 
international actors, and the outcomes would be interesting for this alone. Agendas, 
though, as we have seen, are prevalent in conventional constructivism. Wendt, on the 
other hand, has worked to establish a theory of the state, and all else that happens 
must fit into the state for the theory to make sense. This does not preclude the 
morality, nor necessarily the ethical instrumentality of human rights, as long as the 
end product affects international statehood. This all has an effect on what we might 
expect to see from a positivistic theory of the state compared to other 'scientific' 
approaches. Perhaps the science is the problem. 
1.3. Liberal constructivists. Are wider conventionalist approaches more 
inclined to take up moralistic positions that Wendt? Our review above of Risse, Ropp 
and Sikkink' s approach to human rights norms would seem to bear this out. As much 
as the focus is on human rights, it is also on the way human rights are used for a 
particular purpose. There is a risk here of over-generalisation- saying that 
conventionalists are also liberalists is to tar them with the brush of their research 
questions, which in many cases would be to miss the point. However, that none have 
117 And this holds even when other conventional constructivists explicitly engage with the relationship 
between the international system and human rights. An agenda inevitably comes to the fore at some 
stage. Yet this is still further mired in complexities. See points 1.2 and 1.3 (below). 
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so far broken out of this way of seeing and 'doing' human rights suggests that their 
particular constructivist make-up does not provide the right sort of tools to account for 
the ethically instrumental outlooks, scope, effects, etc. that we associate with the 
human and social elements of human rights norms. The relative 'secularity' of 
Wendt's approach does hold out some hope on this point of applicability. If we have 
to look too hard for it, though, we might begin to suspect that it is not there. 
Conclusions 
Conventional constructivist approaches have engaged with human rights norms. Most 
are concerned with states and how they act, and how they are perceived both by 
themselves and others in the international system. In this sense, they are closely 
related to Wendt's statism which has come to dominate the conventional approach. 
The result of this dominance seems to be a reflexive anarchy which is full of 
identities, all belonging to a confusing species, the members of which think like 
humans but happen to look like states. This literal human embodiment118 is the source 
of much frustration regarding the theorising of the rights and duties of actual, genetic 
people. 
Before focusing on Wendt, though, our discussion of conventional 
constructivism has suggested, and perhaps has even opened pathways, for the analysis 
of human rights using social scientific methods. But this is not without its difficulties, 
and there are at least two key areas of concern. Firstly, we have clearly identified 
problems that conventionalists have with the moral-ethical split which has been 
recognised as key to understanding international human rights norms. This comes to 
the fore when we examine whether or not there is an 'end product' in sight for 
118 Wight's discussion on this point aims to settle whether Wendt's state is fiction, abstraction or, 
indeed, human. See Colin Wight, 'State agency: social action without human activity?', Review of 
International Studies, vol. 30 (2) (2004) 
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conventional approaches. We would expect not, given the constitutive nature of 
constructivism, yet time and again liberal forces shape constructivist outcomes. 
Secondly, to take up 'conventionalism' as a research agenda is on a par with 
assuming that constructivism is a unitary approach. Conventionalism, occupying 
most of the positivist end of the constructivist spectrum of knowledge gathering, is 
just too broad a collection of approaches and theories, expressed in numerous articles 
and monographs. To tie down this branch of constructivism in order to begin to 
understand how positivism answers a postpositivist challenge, seems too diffuse a 
task from which to draw any conclusions. This is another prominent reason for 
having Wendt represent conventionalism whilst standing apart from it in certain key 
respects, as we have seen. 
It is possible to reduce this type of constructivism to a formulation which 
offers more than rationalism does on the matter of the state. Yet in describing how the 
state develops by constitutive mechanisms, it tends to fail to see past the state as 
anything other than an end in itself. Kurt Mills describes how the constitutive position 
at the heart of constructivism means that sovereignty must now be contextualised, and 
disassociated from its original prefix to encompass humans themselves (individually 
and collectively) possessing sovereignty. 'If ... the state exists only for the purpose of 
enabling the individuals who comprise the state to live their lives relatively 
peacefully, and for no other purpose, then one cannot say that sovereignty ultimately 
rests with the state. Rather, it rests with individuals within the state.' 119 Thus 'popular 
sovereignty' (or any similar variant) is not a revolution but a retronym- a reminder 
of the original political purpose of the state. 
119 Kurt Mills, Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order: A New Sovereignty? (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1998), p. 37 
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We can follow the logic further: 'the notion of rights can be upheld at least 
insofar as these rights are seen in opposition to socially created power.' 120 There is a 
fundamental issue here which, again, we must not assume it is the task of 
constructivism to definitively answer, but equally it is one that constructivism should 
not shy away from the complexities of. In Leo McCarthy's words, 'Justice in itself is 
an artificial virtue. Man comes first to understand the ideas of property and right, and 
how they relate to his self-interest. Whatever supports these is called just; whatever 
subverts them is unjust. But justice is understood always in relation to property, or 
right, or obligation; these are prior to the concept of justice.' 121 
This is simply following a thread of normative international thought which 
seeks to properly place the state within an ontology which also admits morals and/or 
ethics: 'Rights should be apportioned at the end of the process of considering what is 
socially just, rather than placing limits on that process from the beginning.' 122 
Similarly, McCarthy sees 'the global securing of basic human rights ... [as] the 
starting-off point for any theory of international justice.' 123 His 'complex 
instrumentalist' rendering of the purpose and properties of statehood begin to pull the 
constructivist mind towards this way of thinking, yet this is no defining, canonical 
text in the same way that many would have Wendt's. Yet summarising the attempted 
extraction of values from Wendt's approach, in the form ofhuman rights norms, 
seems an unnecessarily difficult task. 
Neumann's criticism, above, of Wendt's framing ofWeberian thought- that 
the resultant state is poorer for its lack of contingent forms - indicates the logic which 
follows Wendt through the rest ofhis state building. It is a reduction, minimalist 
120 Ibid., p. 38 
121 McCarthy, Justice, p. 54 
122 Vincent, Human Rights, p. 15 
123 McCarthy, Justice, p. 242 
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even, to the point of missing a whole dimension of its very personality. This is a 
common summary ofWendt's approach. But what specifically might we take from it 
which to inform the next two chapters of the gaps which need filling in 
constructivism's coverage of values? What are the strands which will define our 
triangulation? 
Intersubjectivity, commonly associated with constructivism, is problematic for 
human rights on three related counts. Firstly, it is an inescapably vague concept, the 
complexities of which constructivists, arguably, have not incorporated as part of their 
own theorising. Secondly, do other variants of constructivism share a similar 
perspective on how shared culture is propagated- is it by a measure of 'legitimacy' 
as advanced by Wendt? Indeed, how might we begin to flesh-out Reus-Smit's 
assertion that conventional constructivism has been limited by its failure to engage 
properly (or, indeed, at any worthwhile level) with discursive mechanisms as a means 
of conferring legitimacy upon states relationships with fundamental institutions? 
Thirdly, the edicts of the Universal Declaration ( et al) already exist, and require no 
socialised generation in the minds of a community to have any meaning or effect. 
They are transmitted, not transmuted. So whose subjectivity is constitutive of what, 
exactly? 
How Wendt and modernist constructivists approach the empirical side of their 
research bears comparison with other, language-based variants of constructivism. 
That is, the finer points of gathering knowledge, and then judging its value, is an 
issue worth drawing out for distinguishing between these broadly familial 
approaches. The way in which Finnemore and Sikkink's 'life-cycle' image lacks the 
sort of values embodied by human rights, and the notion of a fixed an accommodating 
structure into which norms 'fit', mirrors both Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's liberalist 
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'spiral-model' and Wendt's own image of what matters- the state as a body fixed in 
space, which exists for ancient purposes, only to engage in a more detailed anarchical 
arrangement presently. 
A clearer picture of how constructivism is a sociological approach is needed. 
Not least because ofFinnemore's conclusion, having surveyed the state of 
constructivism, that sociological institutionalism provides a richer framework for 
theory by way of its substantive content and clearer image of systemic social 
structure. 
Is conventionalism perpetuating a homogenous and misleadingly bland 
international system, one in which working parts have not been reduced far enough? 
Acknowledging that human rights norms exist, and that they are claimed and upheld 
in certain ways requires no great theoretical sophistication if it is assumed that the 
international community of states simply absorbs these momentary quirks, and then 
returns to its established way of functioning. How human rights norms engage with 
the international system is harder to observe than how they work across it. 
How should constructivists theorise change? As process or progress? And 
how far should this be permitted to develop constructivism's own agenda rather than 
knowledge gathering as a secular exercise? 
The notion that human rights matter depends entirely on the assumption that 
humans matter, otherwise the systemic effect of institutionalised norms would have 
no meaning, and would quickly disintegrate without this foundation. How well does 
Wendt theorise the individual? Suganami's critique (only briefly referred to here) 
suggest that it fails to do so in a way that leaves it bereft of the very breadth it 
Pw:RQrts to_ d~liv,er~ F_or.W~ndt, its 'iE-sf}visi~i!ity' is Ql~. pr()blem. So are we left with a 
'rump' individualism, akin to Wendt's characterisation of materialism, which is 
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always there, but in this case stubbornly and unhelpfully so? Benhabib's advocacy of 
a cultural standpoint appears to offer one way out ofthis for constructivism, but is 
Wendt's approach capable, or even interested, in taking it? 
His institutionalised understanding of the individual is at the heart of the 
problem with how statism relates to human rights. However, notwithstanding his own 
defences of this position which are debatable (using an act of war to demonstrate the 
singularity of state personality124) or appear to back-track in the face of Wight's 
forthright statement of 'personhood' (by making qualifying references to 
contemporary philosophical understandings of 'physicalism' 125), how damaging is 
this for a constructivist endeavour to accommodate values? If constructivism is what 
Wendt makes of it- idealism framed by an outward looking state, then not at all. But 
this is not the 'whole' of constructivism, in much the same way as Wendt does not 
offer a vision of the 'whole' of the state. 
Taking humans seriously requires an interest in cultural development and the 
processes by which this occurs. This is indicative of the depth lacking in Social 
Theory. This depth is something which must be striven for if we are interested in the 
full capabilities, and the full potential of constructivism. Conventionalism has 
developed as an approach which is adept at dealing with, and providing fresh insight 
into, concepts which are familiar to the traditional ways of doing IR theory. Human 
rights expose the spaces between these international concepts, and the subsequent 
gaps in our knowledge. Here, it is proposed that the study of how language works in 
the international system is the primary way in which constructivists themselves have 
begun to address their capabilities and the potential of the issue. A number of 
questions have arisen from. this analysis of Wendt which set up the following chapters 
124 Alexander Wendt, 'How not to argue against state personhood: a reply to Lomas', Review of 
International Studies, vol. 31 (2) (2005), p, 359 
125 Wendt, 'The state as a person', pp. 291-292 
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-that is, questions which we might (or even should?) expect theories of language and 
communication to address: How can constructivism be more than a theory of the 
state? How do human rights norms fit and work in this broader conception of the 
international system? Is it possible to move a conclusion about the prospects for 
human rights away from a liberal end? Do constructivist approaches principally 
derived from philosophies of language do for human rights what the critical challenge 
would like them too? 
We have the state as a constructivist constant. What we are lacking are 
substantial, robust variables within constructivist understandings ofhuman interaction 
-which can be extended clearly to human rights norms - which give states and 
individuals meaning beyond anarchy. What else is 'constructivist' which might aid 
the interpretation of values in the international system? 
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4. Rules and Language 
Nicholas Onuf 
Rules and language, as part of a broader linguistic heritage, form the backbone of a 
strong constructivist tradition stemming from roots in social theory. Nicholas Onuf 
and Friedrich Kratochwil's development of linguistic devices allied to a philosophical 
bedrock aims, under the banner of constructivism, to progress international theory 
towards a fuller understanding of how institutions are at once human and structured. 
As a whole, it is the aim of this chapter to ascertain how the value-norms ofhuman 
rights correlate with normativity as expressed by rules specialists. Wendt's 
conventional approach ostensibly lacks a position on language as a constitutive force 
in defining what the state is for. This rules-based linguistic approach works within 
(and against) the limits set by modernity, and so it also accepts the state, but not 
necessarily as a finished product. 
A different view of the historiography of roles, institutions and individuals 
which describes the continuity ofhuman behaviour, and of the paradigmatic outcomes 
of these often entrenched ways of thinking is primarily provided by Onufs seminal 
text World of Our Making (hereafter simply referred to as World). This will be the 
primary reference point for this chapter, which will be divided into three sections. 
The first section will clear some ground. It continues the critique of the state 
which found little purchas-e for values in the preceding chapter dealing with 
conventionalism. This will take the form of a discussion of how the anarchical 
(liberal) orthodoxy of statehood - developed via a particular intellectual heritage- has 
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led to the diminishment of its role as a moral institution. This will be paired with a 
brief dis~ussion of how Onuf characterises our 'hidden' moral tradition. The next 
section 'fill bring to the fore linguistic constructivism at work, with the aim of 
highligh#ng and critically analysing how scholars use language and linguistic tools to 
describetand understand the world in a way which, potentially, is more adaptable to 
the chal~enges posed by human rights norms. We must assume that all of this (the 
ground-~learing and the scholarly inroads made into the space created) constitutes 
only a ~tarting point for rules/language and constructivism. Accordingly, these 
exampl~s will be augmented with a critique of the origin of these tools as they stem 
both from Onuf and wider philosophical thinking. 
These two sections will, effectively, have introduced a constructivist view of 
the world together with examples of how contemporary practitioners are investigating 
that world, as informed by certain key philosophical precedents. 
The final section will take the form of a critical discussion of how this 
approach might be developed most effectively using the conceptual armoury of Onuf 
and his ~ontemporaries. This will involve a closer look at rules and how they relate to 
human rights norms, together with a reflection on the possibility of a language and 
~les-based normative paradigm of values. 
~t no point in World does Onuf explicitly speak of human rights norms. This 
w,ide analytical sweep will scrutinise this seminal text for some direction on the 
matter .of values in the international system. Ostensibly, a rules and language-based 
approach which focuses on the machinery of interaction between humans and states 
should he fertile ground for this thesis. However, the general precis of World in the 
Iq~pdu9fion indicates that the extent to which Onufs approach can accommodate 
vaJues c~mld well conflict with how staunchly it represents constructivism. 
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I. An alternative construction of modernity 
Instituting a 'lack' of morality: the liberal state 
Onuf s contribution to the historical and theoretical discourse of the state develops 
themes of disconnection and the recovery of the normative via a re-reading of our 
philosophical lineage. This ground-clearing is at the heart ofOnufs comprehensive 
approach. In his words, 'we are left with two questions. Why has the connection 
between normative considerations and political society, so evident before the rise of 
the state, become so tenuous and ill-understood? And why has anarchy, defined as the 
absence of society and thus of effective rules, come to be seen as the only alternative 
to the state?' 1 Our generally preferred intellectual heritage, in other words, has been 
written in the dominating languages of liberalism and capitalism which have come to 
define how we manage our states and subsequently our lives. This is the state that 
conventionalism engages with but does not dispute. For Onuf, constructivism has a 
more fundamental task than this. In some ways not dissimilar to postmodernism, it 
first reveals the shroud of rationalist power. Unlike postmodernism, however, Onuf is 
keen to provide something concrete beneath that shroud from which our moral 
political purpose can be re-instituted. This enduring misdirection is contained in how 
the tradition of Hume, Kant and Bentham has been handed down. 
Hume 
'Hume's grounding of political society in conventions affords us a first cause 
explanation ofhow society got started.'2 That is, 'whenever we conceptualize a social 
situation as a two-party interaction, minimally structured at the outset, with additional 
1 Onuf, World, p. 185 
2 Ibid., p. 188 
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structure generated by interaction, we follow after Hume. ' 3 The problem is that this 
'conventionalising' approach allows no room for the constant expressing of difference 
which defines us as political beings. 'Rather than encrusting a simple account of 
human behaviour with qualifications so that it works as a theory of political society, 
Hume's conventionalism eliminates political society as such and thus the need for a 
theory of such. In the place of political society is the aggregate of conventions 
enabling politics, economics and whatever else is social. ' 4 Liberalism, in other words. 
Humean conventions have a cumulative effect which undermines the fabric of 
political society by virtue of their non-contingent generation and purpose. As Onuf 
points out, this is an attractive quality for a metatheorist, but in itself serves little 
purpose in practice. 5 Conventions conflict with the promissory nature of the legal 
underpinnings of society (justice, due process, recognition, representation, etc.). The 
relatively more laborious process of conventions cannot account for the speed at 
which (meaningful) human interaction progresses in terms of language and shared 
understanding. 
Onuf is not so keen to dismiss Hum e. After all, his work was explicitly 
political. Instead, he places this heritage as a common Humean misapplication and 
not primarily 'ofHume', referring to Nietzsche's work on the protracted layering of 
human understanding which has culminated in a platform from which promises and 
cooperation flow easily. 6 Conventionalism is effectively redundant as an explanatory 
tool as it is limited to the beginnings of society. In Onufs words, it is 'deleterious for 
any conception of international relations as a working example of political society.' 7 
3 Ibid., p. 185 
4 Ibid., p. 186 
5 1bid. 
6 See Ibid., p. 187 
7 1bid., p. 188 
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Perhaps this is manifest inHume's notion of how a political society should 
approach new and challenging issues: '[General rules] are artificially invented for a 
certain purpose, and are contrary to the common principles ofhuman nature, which 
accommodate themselves to circumstances, and have no stated invariable method of 
operation.' 8 Perhaps, though, this can be interpreted otherwise- human rights norms 
must be of satisfactorily organic origin for them to be part of a more comprehensive 
constructivist treatment of the international. 
Kant 
Onufs conclusion regarding Kant is that the formulation of the categorical imperative 
- the perpetual struggle for autonomous realisation in a heteronomous world - has 
been largely misunderstood. We are left with a Kantian legacy which characterises 
political society as somehow deficient if it lacks a constitutional backbone allied to 
prudential international action. Onuf prefers to circumscribe the 'whole' of Kant, and 
take from his moral thought a legacy which is already sufficiently unique and 
sufficiently 'worked-out' at the point of this freedom which is always mindful of 
contingency. Taking the 'last step' to public law is again a liberal conceit.9 
Onuf perceives a disconnectedness about Kant. 'Though conceptually 
motivated, Kant's typology of"rules of skill, counsels of prudence, or commands or 
laws of morality" nevertheless appears to exclude prudential maxims from the realm 
of the moral. Many writers have subsequently tended to view prudential maxims as 
concerned only with self-interest and therefore necessarily lacking in moral 
character.' 10 This undervalues the scope and application of a 'prudential' approach, 
most pertinently in relation to morals. Morality itself has only served as a prop for the 
8 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 584 
9 Onuf, World, p. 188 
10 Ibid., p. 189 
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development of more tangible projects, namely political economy. What we have 
been left with lacks moral character. As we have noted, Onufhimself is motivated by 
this need to reclaim the proprietorship ofWestem thinking. 
To this end, the extension of Kant to a realm other than the personal is 
problematic; 'I read Kant to have said that autonomy is the frame of reference to 
investigate morality, but that social reality does not allow for such autonomy.' 11 The 
assumption we are left with from Kant's apparently divisive typology- effectively its 
abiding legacy- is a leap which has been made from a). a fundamental difficulty with 
the moral challenge we face with social reality to b). the institutionalised pariah-status 
of that morality. The Kant/'Kantian' issue in this case boils down to our current 
position where 'the Kantian legacy is the division of political society into the moral 
realm associated with public law in the liberal state, and the prudential (read: amoral) 
realm of anarchy (read: war). Is this what Kant intended?' 12 
Bentham 
The proper functioning of political society as dependent upon the rule of authority-
the maxim of the Benthamite- appears to explain how policies have been shaped and 
have come to dominate in the wake ofKantian dualism. Onuf's reading follows thus: 
'For Bentham public opinion has nothing to do with rights and duties, much less a 
social contract ... By conventionalizing law as dependent on sanctions, Bentham 
removed it from the realm of rights and promising.' 13 Furthermore, 'he thought that 
political society is ultimately dependent on relations of super- and subordination 
which, though coercive, are mitigated. In Machiavelli's case, consideration of virtues 
11 1bid. 
12 1bid., p. 191 
13 Ibid., p. 193 
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as well as prudences mitigate such relations. In Bentham's case depersonalized but 
omnipresent supervision does so.' 14 
So individuals are removed, in a sense, from what is right or wrong, and are 
left instead to observe laws which automate this relationship. Public opinion is 
responsible for maintaining international law in much the same ways as the apparatus 
of coercion does so domestically, but right and rights have been legalised rather than 
politicised. Furthermore, the proper function of the law is as a sanctioning institution, 
and not an enabling one. This, along with the finer points of utility shaped by this 
conventionalising drive, is Bentham's ethical legacy. It is a pessimistic one if public 
opinion has shaped the present world. The triumph ofliberalism strongly suggests that 
it has. Are we then left with shackles of our own, localised intellectual manufacture? 
And if so, does this necessarily require a 'progressive' constructivism to right these 
wrongs? 
Onufs own reading of this back-drop is a reification of pragmatism, but with a bias. It 
is the concept of utility which binds this intellectual lineage, with the very unfortunate 
side-effect that 'normativity is conventionalized out of sight, and largely out of mind.' 
With the triumph of capitalism, 'theory makes the state a legal order, neutral but for 
the content of its rules. Normativity is exactly what people, by making rules, wish it to 
be: The myth of voluntarism complements the myth of neutrality.' 15 This brings us to 
the great contemporary paradox: We are effectively left 'with ever more 
conventionalized liberal notions of economy and law ... we have lost sight of society 
141bid. 
15 1bid., p. 195 
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and its politics. Yet political society, with rules and rule, normative considerations 
and asymmetric relations, is everywhere.' 16 
This reading of liberalism notwithstanding, pragmatism has not yet been 
successfully 'claimed' by any movement within IR. 17 Pragmatism need not be 
deleterious to a normative project focusing on the values of human rights as 
constructivist methodology is still an open question. In Reus-Smit's words, '[the] 
argument that an ontological emphasis on ideas, norms and culture requires a 
distinctive methodology has been challenged more recently by 'methodological 
conventionalists', who claim that their explanations 'do not depend exceptionally 
upon any specialised separate "interpretive methodology".' 18 In other words, the 
methodology continuum does not run directly and exclusively from metatheory to 
empiricism, and there is a location on it for a normative constructivism which 
incorporates values and so is capable of engaging with human rights norms. 
Underlying traditions of political thought 
The theorising of Hume, Kant and Bentham has compartmentalised our knowledge. 
'The result narrows the range of political possibilities to just two: the state or a state 
of nature,' which leads to the constraint wherein 'Hobbes' paradigmatic architecture 
reigns at the expense of the tradition of discourse about political society and even at 
Hobbes' expense as a rights theorist.' 19 There exists, in other words, a detrimental and 
perpetuated division between the moral and the political. This very brief history 
depicts us as 'modems'- the collective product of a dubious 'Westphalian' origin 
bolstered by the Enlightenment and its rationale. It is as if the eminent physicists of 
161bid. 
17 Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas, 'Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study oflntemational 
Institutions', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 31 (3) (2002), p. 583 
18 Reus-S mit, 'Imagining society', p. 496 
191bid. 
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the world actually know what happened before the big bang, but dismiss it as a quaint 
historical irrelevance. 
Onuf s assessment of the modem state system, as we have seen, is that the 
theory does not satisfactorily reflect the practice. In pursuing international social 
history beyond its Westphalian marker, he brings to the fore three traditions of 
thinking about political society- that is, in terms of 'virtues', 'rights' and 'manners'. 
These traditions have been perpetuated because they correlate with fundamental social 
institutions ~ rules - and are brought up to date by their expression in the performance 
of types of speech acts. 20 This is a complex story which Onuf tells, and the place of 
human rights norms in it might well be apparent at first, but we must remain aware 
that World is not a work of critical theory. 
Both rules and speech acts will be dealt with in more detail in the following 
sections, but we must at least offer a general clarification ofterms at this early stage 
before we go on. Speech act theory is the branch oflinguistics 'which yields an 
inclusive set of categories into which all rules can be sorted, ' 21 and rules come in 
three varieties. In the first instance, assertives are important for understanding the 
normative context of any given relationship. They shape, or rather confirm, either 
long-standing or long-assumed power configurations, and so provide both subject and 
constructivist scholar with a guide to contingent (often subconscious) expectations 
and the backdrop against which any counter-claims must take place. They 'are speech 
acts stating a belief, coupled of course to the speaker's wish or intention that the 
hearer accept this belief. Neither intends the regulative consequences their acts jointly 
produce. ' 22 
20 Onuf, World, p. 183 
21 Ibid., p. 66 
22 1bid., p. 87 
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Directives 'present the hearer with a speaker's intention as to some act the 
speaker would like to have performed. Typical directive verbs are: ask, command, 
demand, permit, caution.' Furthermore, 'the intent of all directives and not just 
imperatives is to place a regulative burden on hearers. ' 23 And so the powerful regulate 
the weak - another confirmation of the context which constructivism enters in pursuit 
of normative equanimity. 
Commissives are more or less simply commitments which differ from 
directives by way of their normative content, and Onuf maintains this category of 
commitment-rules in the face of general consensus as it 'is implicit in the language of 
rights and duties, '24 skewing the constitutive-regulative polarity which tends to 
dominate. 
It is how Onuf develops these categories of practice which could serve to add 
a further dimension to the functioning of normative constructivism. By way of 
elaboration on the question of how normativity matters as such, the relationship is 
expressed thus, 
231bid. 
24 1bid., p. 88 
Speech acts are social performances, that is, they have 
direct social consequences. Such acts take the generic form, 
I [verb such as declare, demand, promise] that 
[propositional content]. Because people respond to them 
with their own performances, not always spoken, the 
pattern of speech acts and related performances constitute 
those practices that make the material conditions and 
artifacts of human experience meaningful. More 
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specifically, the pattern of speech acts endows practices 
with normativity; they give rise to rules which, in 
synopsizing that pattern, fix preferences and expectations 
and shape the future against the past. 25 
Notable here is the introduction of a temporal signifier, the shaping of the future 
'against the past' which brings to mind the historical conditions which led to the 
Universal Declaration in 1948. 
As far as the categories of 'virtue,' 'rights' and 'manners' are concerned, 
the virtuous political society depends on directive speech acts, 
which imply the possibility of, and thus the need for restraint 
in, coercion. The righteous political society depends, obviously 
enough, on commissive speech acts, which imply rules for 
deciding conflicting claims of right. Finally, a well-mannered 
political society depends on assertive speech acts, the stream of 
which conveys the wisdom of many voices as to appropriate 
conduct.26 
Each tradition is linked to specific thinkers, to include Machiavelli, Hobbes, 
Locke and Burke. Their contributions cannot be recounted in any depth here,27 and 
they are by no means meant as a sequential description of the evolution of political 
thQught either. Rather they represent philosophical arguments and counter-arguments 
25 Ibid., p. 183 
26 1bid., p. 184 
27 See Ibid., pp. 169-184 
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as they have ebbed and flowed in our intellectual history. It is sufficient for our 
purposes to accept at least that Onuf is satisfied with them as important and relevant 
traditions. 
The existence of these strong normative and intellectual traditions, each a 
discourse on how the original meaning of 'political' is or should be maintained within 
and across states, would suggest that we currently enjoy their legacy- that the 
sovereignty of states is an ethically-derived tool for the best representation of human 
needs and responsibilities. 
But Onuf describes the modern state- and especially the theorising of it- as 
having lost, or at least obscured this history through the dominance ofliberal thinking 
and its categories. It is as if the state, in its enshrined, post-Westphalian guise, was 
(and is) representative of the needs and responsibilities of 'modern man' to the extent 
that its moral purpose has been abrogated in favour of more tangible, rational 
formulae designed to improve the proprietary foundations of progress. 
We can therefore take up the argument that each of these three ways of 
thinking about political society (in terms of virtues, rights and manners) has been 
distorted by liberal thought and substituted in the modern era with utility, law and 
conventions respectively.28 Very briefly, this has had the effect of disassociating the 
polity from its constituent humans and their essential characters, with the result, 
effectively, offormalising systems of government (governance, control, etc.) in 
agreements which no-one can remember agreeing to. This seems to be adding 
psychological (intersubjective?) weight- the weight of dormant collective memory-
to contemporary calls for a return to the 'moral purpose of the state', as Christian 
-
Reus-Smit has called it. But here the conflict between this critical view and Onufs 
28 See Onuf, World, Chapter Five 
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explicitly constructivist aims arise again, which indicates that Onuf is not about to 
embrace the former. 
'The principles of doing no harm, keeping promises and telling the truth 
respectively generalize the normative content of virtues, rights and manners.'29 These 
are together a promising foundation. Yet there is no explicit engagement with the 
norms of human rights in World. The aim of section II is to test the theory which Onuf 
builds from this base in terms of its capacity to account for values. 
II. Constructing values using Onuf's categories 
Human rights as (Onuf's) rules 
In Section I, we have a broad summary ofOnufs own comprehensive reading of 
modernity. Particularly, how a misleading reification of key thinkers has buried social 
life beneath positivity-seeking liberalism. Social meaning for Onuf is derived from the 
constitutive production and development of rules, and so this ongoing practice 
requires a re-statement of how rules are social. Our question, given this starting point, 
is that, without its explicit appearance in the text, what are to make of the gap in 
World where we would like to have human rights? To what extent does Onufs history 
and subsequent categorisations allow for values to be subject to the same foundational 
criteria as other aspects of normativity? Accordingly, this section will begin with a 
brief appraisal of where (more precisely) we might locate human rights in Onufs 
approach, and will then move on to interrogate this further with a closer analysis of 
his categories and their origin. 
29 1bid., p. 184 
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We cannot even assume that there is a 'human rights norms' shaped hole in 
World. To ascertain how comprehensively Onufs categories account for human 
rights, we need to trace how he has developed his own conception of society as a 
product of rules. The intellectual heritage called upon by Onuf to support his telling 
of the history of rules, as they correspond to his categories, is the work of Durkheim 
and Weber. He rejects Talcott Parson's preference for Durkheim, which attributed to 
Durkheim a clearer statement of how individuals relate to normativity (that their 
internalisation is more important than their external effect), which gives priority to 
'externally manifest content' and therefore has 'all behaviour governed by the content 
of rules. ' 30 'The result is not just that the agent is rendered passive and conflicts 
among agents minimized ... (m)ore importantly, society itself disappears. In its place 
is the "social system," which is a brief for methodological collectivism masquerading 
as a description of social reality. ' 31 Ultimately, having Durkheim fill in these blanks 
only results in a theory of action in which 'nothing happens. ' 32 For Onuf, Durkheim's 
is a much more subtle exposition of how rules work, one which prefers to 
differentiate within rule-types rather than have them enveloped, and therefore 
codified, by an overstretched systemic conceit. 
This refines even further Onufs problems with how 'the system' works (or 
rather, how assumptions regarding its prevalence and power shroud the more 
important internal mechanisms of rules and society). It is Weber's second category of 
law which is of particular interest here. Essentially, it 'acknowledges the legal 
character of the pronouncements ofhigh dignitaries ... , even when no particular actor 
is subject to constraint.'33 Furthermore, 'these pronouncements are of course 
30 Ibid., p. 131 
31 1bid. 
321bid. 
33 1bid., p. 135 
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principles, which I define ... as instruction-rules in which some value is articulated. 
They promote general conformity of behaviour by reference to shared values. This is 
done by example, by appeal, and, if necessary, discrimination. ' 34 Here lie human 
rights norms in Onuf s thinking? 
There is one more crystallisation ofDurkheim and Weber's sociology of law 
which supports this view: 'principles are legal when they are enunciated by 
dignitaries of sufficiently high station and on occasions of such solemnity that there 
principled content cannot be impugned without also impugning the source and 
circumstances of their enunciation. ' 35 How much license is needed to propose that 
this applies to the Universal Declaration? At first glance, it seems that we are quite 
close to the mark. 
More to the point, though, how speculative is it to infer this much from Onufs 
approach to rules and society? A good deal more needs to be said about the 
constitution ofOnufs categories of rule to add some weight to this argument. The 
first step is to refine our understanding of the complexity of rule-types. To do this, we 
must follow, and question, Onufs own critique of rule formation which in turn tracks 
Searle and Habermas. From this, the following sections will pursue this line of inquiry 
into the broader theoretical and practical territory of regimes and paradigms which 
constitute the international. First, though, how can values be rules? 
Much of the discussion throughout the following sections hinges on whether 
human rights norms are a belief or a fact. We can begin with the assumption that there 
is a continuum along which different perspectives on the matter have taken root. And 
we can immediately challenge that assumption by applying a constructivist 
perspective which, as we know, is not a static position. The distinction which helps us 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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is between human rights as an idea and human rights norms. Whether or not human 
rights are nonsense (with or without stilts), or imperatives, or somewhere in between, 
the actual norms which have become more firmly attached to them over time- the 
ways of going about being humans and states in the international system- are hardly 
contestable. 
This is precisely why values are a hard case for the middle-ground, and why 
their ethical instrumentality seems to speak more clearly to constructivist tenets than 
the morality which stirs critical theory. Having a prior moral position conflicts with a 
constitutive approach. Is this a forgone conclusion in the case of Onufs rule-making? 
'Human beings are entitled to ... ' is either an assertive speech act, using 
Onufs summary of Searle's categories ('assertives are speech acts stating a belief), 
or a directive (i.e. '[presenting] the hearer with a speaker's intention as to some act 
the speaker would like to have performed').36 But Onufs condensing of Searle's five 
speech acts (assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarative) into three 
rule-types (assertive, directive and commissive) suggests that directives and/or 
commissives are more in keeping with our understanding of how human rights norms 
work. Compare: 'All rules are either assertives of the form, I state that X counts as Y, 
or directives of the form, I state that X person (should, must, may) do Y, or 
commissives of the form, I state that I (can, will, should) do Y' 37 (italics added). 
Onufhimself quickly points out the interaction between each type which takes 
place in the rule-making process. 'While each is a distinctive category, all three play 
on each other in the production of rules. ' 38 To this interplay, we can add a 
troublesome variable- the contested facticity of human rights. Take the following 
36 Ibid., p. 87 
37 Ibid., p. 90 
381bid. 
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example ofOnuf's, to which an alternative reading has been added to suit our 
purposes: 
'I hereby claim that it is my money [human right]. 
Depending on the context, such a statement might have an 
assertive meaning: This money [right] counts as mine. To 
add, because my uncle's will [the Universal Declaration] 
says so, is to try an assertive declaration. A second possibility 
has a directive meaning: I request that I be allowed to have 
what is mine. To add because I am king [human? 
Oppressed?] is to make a directive declaration. ' 39 
The assertives and the directives in this example ('conveyed by the word 
'claim''40) are underpinned by a pre-existing commissive- the promise of the right in 
question. A claim follows a promise, which suggests a logical progression that the 
Universal Declaration is an institutional promise. But who is the promisor? The 
United Nations? The intervening, aid supplying or sympathy extolling entity which 
takes the form of either the state, a non-governmental organisation or even 
cosmopolitan humanity? 
Using this example seems to work, but only up to a point. It is problematic to 
have the claimant of the human right as the issuer of a directive or instruction, as this 
function is normally associated with the expression of some form of power. Which is 
where another layer of complexity is factored in. 'Power' need not have a traditional 
base, and we cannot therefore assume that it works in a particular way, or issues from 
391bid. 
40 Ibid. 
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a particular direction41 - in Onufs words, "'power" refers not to conduct and its 
effects but to the capabilities employed in conduct42 ' which suggests that even the 
oppressed can be invested with 'capabilities'. 
Onuf pushes out from these bare linguistic bones: 'The contingent character of 
the promise in this instance is an invitation for strategic interaction. ' 43 Further, 'as 
Habermas would say, it is not understanding-oriented. It is success-oriented, and it 
deliberately manipulates perlocutionary possibilities to shift the direction of 
illocutionary force from the speaker to the hearer. ' 44 That both parties are success-
oriented suggests that the eventual, 'contractual' outcome is a survival-necessity for 
both rather than a superfluous 'luxury' ofknowledge in the form of understanding. 
Onufs own 'rule of rules' is that 'starting with assertives, directives, and 
commissive speech acts, we have an inclusive classificatory scheme for· all social 
rules. ' 45 Including values? Even human rights norms? What matters is how these 
types ebb and flow in the constitution of society, broadly defined. To have a better 
understanding of human rights as rules, it seems, involves a more accurate description 
of values as either the words which shape the world or vice-versa. 
'Direction of fit' matters because normativity attaches only one way- from 
words-to-world. 46 Onuf reads the development of direction of fit as a dialogue 
between Searle and Habermas. Briefly, Searle has assertives as fitting words to world, 
directives as world to words, and commissives also as world to words. Habermas 
argued, along with Searle, that assertives fit words to world. Directives are divided 
between imperatives and norms, but perhaps most interestingly, 'his treatment of 
41 This is 'direction' in the sense of a trajectory. 
42 Onuf, World, p. 237 
43 Ibid., p. 91. 'Strategic interaction' is the regressive logic of game theory 
44 1bid. 
451bid. 
46 See Ibid., pp. 92-93 
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commissives argues in effect that mere promises fit the world to words. But, in so 
doing, "the speaker binds his will in the sense of normative obligation; ... ". I read 
Habermas to mean that the normativity immanent in commissives reverses their 
apparent fit to the world. '47 
So according to Habermas, assertives are 'normatively inoffensive' and have 
the 'right direction of fit. '48 Following Searle, assertives 'either reflect an existing 
words-to-world fit or propose a new one. They do not endeavour to change an 
existing arrangement. Against Habermas, I do agree with Searle that directives as a 
class fit the world to words'49 (emphasis added). 'Against Searle's position, I believe 
commissives as a class fit words to the world. To commit oneself is to project a 
desired state of affairs and bring it to bear on oneself. ' 50 
What does this mean? That normativity itself is a fundamental institution, 
which stands as an edifice into which the idiosyncrasies of specific norms - exactly 
how they are constituted, the procedures they engender, the values that guide them-
are subsumed? Perhaps, but this is unlikely. It means, rather, that new norms can be 
added to the world without challenging entrenched ontologies. Rationalistic or 
positivistic world views will still not admit values if it cannot be demonstrated that 
they have a lasting, systemic effect. 'Newness' only matters when it directly assaults 
the givens, assumptions and constants of static worldviews. In this sense, specific 
values matter less, and challenge less, than 'values' as a whole to the gains-centric 
world of rationalism. Is this just metaphysics? Not when ethical instrumentality is 
institutionalised as a part of how the international system works. So does Onufs 
approach describe this in sufficient depth so that his 'social rules' incorporate human 
47 Ibid., p. 92. 
48 Ibid., p. 93 
491bid. 
50 Ibid. 
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rights to the end that 'traditional' worldviews might conceivably be challenged by this 
level ofunderstanding? 
'If! am right in this reconstruction of the ways in which 
words and worlds fit, ontological categories match functional 
categories of speech acts and rules. Reassuring as this is, it is 
in one crucial respect a bogus accomplishment. Searle's 
ontological principle, in any version, relies on positivism and 
a representational view oflanguage. The term "fit" 
presupposes the independence of positivities, in this instance 
words and world, about which questions of fit are being 
asked. A constructivist view denies that world and words are 
independent; it sees them as mutually constitutive. If 
categories ofbeing are linguistically constituted, then they 
may be said to have social origins.' 51 
Linguistic constitution only takes place 'out there'- in the world which theory 
describes and in which practice is accurately observed. This is only a beginning, 
though. It is more likely that Onufs descriptions of regimes and paradigms will add 
something sufficiently compelling to the mix and that this will lead us to conclude 
that human rights are either something metaphysically 'more' than a directive-
commissive blend, or that they are, for constructivists, this sum and no more. 
51 Ibid., p. 94 
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Onuf's theory and practice of rules and language 
Despite the range of existing and possible constructivist forays into the world of 
human rights norms, and of normativity in general, there still remains the issue of 
non-compliance by a high number of states. This renders much of this empirical work 
done so far as enclosed, or discrete. It is difficult to generalise in these circumstances. 
But what, exactly, is being (or needs to be) 'generalised'? Is it compliance with the 
exact terms of the Universal Declaration? Or is a broader theoretical approach 
required in order for our social and international theories to better understand different 
attitudes and approaches? How does Onufs constructivism deal with universality, and 
where do human rights fit in this schema? 
In World, Onuf describes our linguistic existence in social terms. Only insofar 
as language can be sensorially perceived by another, and that this auditory or 
graphical representation is the endpoint of various physiological mechanisms, is it a 
human universal. It is not the product of any metaphysical warrant, nor must the 
means by which it connects our subconscious to the objective world be a point of 
general agreement. 
Language matters because of how it instigates, mirrors and records what 
humans do, and that this can then form a picture of the affiliations we share across 
boundaries we currently hold dear. So language matters because of what it does. But 
how might messages or 'ways ofbeing' be spread, to include value-led 
communications? In Onufs words, 'a constructivist interpretation of reasoning 
extends to learning and knowing, not just in the sense of acquiring propositional 
knowledge, but learning and knowing how to use that knowledge, including 
knowledge ofrules.' 52 The liberal 'world that was made' is rejected by Onufs 
52 Ibid., p. 97 
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constructivism. Clearly, though, Onufis not starting anew. What is there within the 
threads of traditional political thinking which might begin the task of reconciling 
sometimes disparate views? 
The traditional IR perspective would expect a rational solution (assuming that 
it was even inclined to address 'normativity' in this sense): 'On empirical grounds, 
there is little doubt that reasoning, like language, is universal. Indeed the capacity to 
reason is a standard criterion for cognitive competence.' 53 Onuffinds that the three 
major categories of reasoning- deductive, inductive and latterly, abductive- are 
inclusive and universal, and are located in speech acts. 
'Deduction, induction, and abduction are human practices, apparently 
universal, antedating their abstract characterization as distinctive realms of cognitive 
activity. Are they natural, in the sense of being genetically mandated or physically 
necessitated?' 54 Inductive reasoning, with its potential for taking full account of 
unlimited parts in the manufacture of a whole with no blueprint is attractive to the 
general principles of constructivism, even if this might trouble occupants of the 
middle ground, to include those who assiduously employ the techniques of 
empiricism within a strictly bounded ontology. Referencing Max Black's use ofthe 
phrase 'its authority' in relation to (the authority of) inductive inference, Onuf points 
out that 'it' is the institution borne of the 'history ofnormativity authors have 
succeeded in bestowing on rules. ' 55 If that authority is social, and normative, does it 
therefore include a meaningful appreciation of how human rights norms are perceived 
and treated? 
Onufs working-out and representation of universality makes use of the 
presumption of constant rule-types to account for difference which, elsewhere, would 
53 Ibid., p. 98 
54 Ibid., p. 100 
55 Ibid., p. 101 
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most probably be labelled 'particularism' or 'relativism'. Onuf seems to avoid the 
negativity usually attached to these charges by explaining difference as complexity 
within a framework. 
This framework is governed by rule-types. The keyword is proportionality, but 
the idea is based on a more rounded notion of inclusivity wherein all polities contain 
something common to any other: 'A proper constructivist view of rules, once they 
have been sorted into the three categories advanced here, would acknowledge the 
likelihood that instruction-, directive-, and commitment-rules are likely to be 
combined in different proportions in historically distinct cultural experiences. ' 56 
Essentially, the proportionate mixing of these rules defines each culture, and so, by 
logical progression, constructivism would account for human rights norms in different 
geographical locations by recognising and reacting to these different cultural mixes. 
By way of example, 57 our own particular Western brand of culture, Onuf 
believes, contains the highest proportion of commitment-rules. The liberal drive for 
individuality necessarily involves a certain amount of balancing in the expression of 
this culture: 'That which makes us individuals - "possessive individuals" in the 
specific liberal sense ... - also creates in us a sense of responsibility, guilt over 
performance failures, and rage at others' wilful disregard of such rules and imperfect 
consciousness that society depends on them. ' 58 
Naturally, it would seem, the rules-mix ofWestem liberal culture is complex, 
yet it remains perceptibly obtainable to the Western Self as it is lived by this 
particular Self and is therefore intuitively known, at least in a pragmatic, working 
sense. Onuf does not venture geographically beyond this, though, and we are left to 
imagine the particular mixes which characterise our chosen Others. With a focus on 
56 Ibid., p. 121 
57 Albeit a limited one. 
58 Onuf, World, p. 121 
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human rights, constructivism- as Onuf recognises- must swiftly overcome any bias 
in order to prevent a Self-Other hierarchy. Interestingly, development is not a step 
beyond these rule classifications, but is instead a change in the mix: 'Since rule-
following does not involve blind habit ... but argumentation, it is through analyzing 
the reasons which are specific to different rule-types that the intersubjective validity 
of norms and thus their "deontic status" can be established'59 (emphasis in original). 
Thus there is no fixed modernity from which (and to which) reference must be made 
when constructing knowledge, but the outcome of that construction may well be 
institutionalised whatever process is followed. 
Any inter-cultural 'projection' of preferred rule types faces the relativistic 
situation wherein: 'Albeit unconsciously, most of us prefer the rule mix that privileges 
us or that we are comfortable with because it is ours. ' 60 There is no removal, in the 
natural or even metaphysical sense, to any intellectual realm which can usefully 
inform or better our lot. To bring in Wendt for a moment- if a state or culture's 
character is malleable, and it is not controversial to assert that certain mixes seem to 
predispose it to hold views about the Other in the world (i.e. sympathy, concern, 
responsibility, etc.), then are we within reach of a configuration which would increase 
an emancipatory identity to the point of affecting the perceptions of others, and 
therefore the functioning of the international system? 
This would be too 'idealistic', to paraphrase Wendt. As Onufpoints out, the 
compound increase of one type of rule - commitment-rules in this case - is by no 
means a guarantee against forging anything other than a dystopia from well-
intentioned but misapplied ideals. Doubters of the worth of such an increase perceive 
within liberal culture, with its 'structure of compliance untoward distributive 
59 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, p. 97 
60 Onuf, World of Our Making, p. 124 
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consequences,'61 the 'exceptionally elusive false consciousness' mentioned above 
which has the effect of deluding that culture 'about who's in control because of its 
depersonalized emphasis on rights and duties, and dire effects on the psychic well-
being of its primary beneficiaries- effects in the form of misdirected anger, anxiety, 
and guilt. ' 62 From this view, waiting for a particular celestial rule-alignment would be 
utterly in vain due to the collective introspection needed to cause any movement in a 
cultural psyche which hitherto has shunned human rights norms. It seems an obvious 
point to make that constructivism must not be drawn into this logic. But how is 
progress achieved otherwise? 
Traditionally, 'learning' in IR has been the preserve of a statist perspective.63 
Even so, Onufs treatment ofleaming is a key part of World and the linguistic 
constructivism it describes. Here again, though, we must be analytically selective, and 
consider learning problematic for the purpose of understanding the relationship of 
human rights to constructivism. Concurring with a theory of how we learn is 
important to constructivism because it details the scope of a legitimate epistemology, 
which in tum validates certain constructivist methods. 'Learning-processes', despite 
the part they play in constructing how 'we' come to recognise rights,64 are, as part of a 
rules-based approach, still an abstract universalism. The intersubjectivity of learning 
rules, in relation to normativity, is presently so nascent that it seems to add too much 
of a speculative burden here. 
Learning and human rights is also controversial, in terms of its implicit 
assumptions regarding power of the sort which usually engages critical theory, for it 
61 Ibid., p. 122 
621bid. 
63 See Richard Falk, 'Recovering Normative Consciousness', International Relations, vol. 19 (1) 
(2005), p. 80 
64 Rainer Forst, 'The Basic Right to Justification: Toward a Constructivist Conception of Human 
Rights', Constellations, vol. 6 (1) (1999), p. 47 
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to have a bearing on how constructivism institutes normativity in the short term. 
Although recognised, for example, as a significant element of how human rights 
pressure can influence state behaviour, 65 there has not yet been a satisfactory 
explanation of how we 'learn' what ought to be the case for a discussion of 'stages of 
learning' to have sufficient relevance here. Scope for learning within linguistic 
constructivism as part of the human rights discourse rests more with 'dialogical 
equality,'66 and will be considered more generally in Chapter Five. 
However, as just mentioned, we can be selective and augment the 
constructivist position by utilising wider linguistic insight. According to Piaget, 'all 
morality consists of a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought 
for in the respect that the individual acquires for these rules. ' 67 Following Piaget, 
Onuf takes the stance that it is correct 'not to infer rules from mere behavioural 
regularities. ' 68 Structures of stages are not sufficient, for Onuf, in describing the type 
of cognitive and moral development which would sustain IR constructivism in its 
assembling of the ideational factors which make our world: 'If constructivism means, 
as I think it must, that the individual actively participates in the construction of his or 
her own social reality, then choices are never just internally created, anymore than 
they are just internalized. Constructivists want to overcome the dualism of self and 
world by denying priority to either. ' 69 There is something fundamentally unsettling 
about the ahistorical, segregationist practice of rule-making with a view to fixing the 
end product as a given. We can make the assumption, then, that observable 
behavioural regularities, rather than cognitive assumptions, can be and are a part of 
65 SeeSonia Cardenas, 'Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights 
Pressure on State Behaviour', International Studies Review, vol. 6 (2) (2004), p. 215 
66 Paul Healy, 'Human rights and intercultural relations: A hermeneutico-dialogical approach', 
Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 32 (4) (2006), p. 523 
67 Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child (London: Kegan, Paul, 1932), p. 11 
68 Onuf, World, p. 114 
69 Ibid. 
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both behaviour- and value- normativity, and therefore human rights norms in 
international relations. 
The problem with the type ofKohlberg-Piagetesque.formalising of rule 
structures that Onuf details is that it holds incontrovertibly that 'rules constitute a 
passive and transparent medium between people and environment.' 70 It must follow 
that rules do not inhabit the same physical plane as the ruled. Yet this logic has no 
foundation- it is simply undermined -if it is taken into consideration that rules 
'perform constitutive and regulative tasks, as revealed in the speech acts they 
employ,' 71 - a basic re-statement ofOnufs argument. 
Human rights as a regime in World of Our Making 
In World, Onuf often discusses the workings of rules under the rubric of the nature 
and functioning of legality. The problem, regarding the transfer of our understanding 
of legality from domestic conceptions to the configurations of the international, and 
ultimately to values, lies with the nature of the participants. Domestic legal 
arrangements rely upon formalised, unitary repositories of authority which, in the 
abstract, provide the symbolic source of the law and, more tangibly, its force. With 
international relations, we have the situation where, 'in effect, roles are relegated to 
the very agents whose conduct is at stake. The result is called a "self-help" system.' 72 
It is a system dominated by sovereignty and the law. 
The crux of the matter is whether those who exist outside the normal 
functioning of the legalistic apparatus of the international system 73 in its form as an 
authoritative, governing body can doubt its legality, and on the strength of this have 
70 Ibid., p. 115 
71 Ibid., p. 116 
72 lbid., p. 140 
73 As distinguished from the intemationallega1 system. 
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good grounds to challenge the order of things. This sort of challenge comes about 
because 'the outsider may doubt the legality of the order because its officers violate 
the rules of some other, allegedly encompassing legal order with their acts.' 74 
Humans will always lose out to states 'if one holds that agents may participate in just 
one legal order at a time, or that all legal orders are nested, so that rules of one are 
granted legality by the rules of a "higher" order.' 75 
Given the position of states in 'the order of things', then human rights norms 
are at a disadvantage. Or it is perhaps more accurate to say that those claiming human 
rights are at a disadvantage- particularly if the claimants are humans, but also to an 
extent if the claimant is a state (as a precursor to an act ofhumanitarian intervention). 
The norm itself is effectively one step removed from this, as it requires input from 
humans or states to become 'active'. Constructivism, to include Onuf, focuses on 
states, but how well is it equipped to engage with (real) people? The challenge to 
Onufregards the 'newness' ofhuman rights, or the change which they represent. If 
they break this recurring pattern which Onuf sees as emblematic of human behaviour, 
then we might see some difficulty for Onufs approach. 
Of course, sovereignty and human rights are not discrete international 
phenomena. 'Treating [them] as separate, mutually contradictory regimes obscures 
the justificatory role that human rights principles have performed in the constitution 
of the modem sovereign order.' 76 Nevertheless, orthodox approaches tend to address 
scenarios where an actor has been wronged (either by perception or in fact), and that 
wrong is itself objectively recognisable. Forms of redress have been standardised by 
what we understand legality to be (formalised, detached due process, etc.). There is, 
74 Onuf, World, p. 141 
751bid. 
76 Christian Reus-S mit, 'Human rights and the social construction of sovereignty', Review of 
International Studies, vol. 27 (4) (2001), p. 520 
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in effect, no need to appeal to any subjective standard in order to mobilise a collective 
response. 
However, human rights norms as laid down in the Universal Declaration have 
become an established part of international law. It is through the law, naturally, that 
they most often 'work' for claimants. For our purposes, the legal question raises the 
issues ofhow the upholding of these rights affects i). The state(s) in question, and ii). 
The extent to which they empower individuals, 77 to the end of creating stronger and 
more affective actors out of individuals or groups as important parts of the 
international system. 
The legal assumption continues that the standardisation of the entire procedure 
(to include recognition of the initial wrong up to and including the execution of the 
appropriate form of redress) has been established in an objective, invariant form. That 
form holds only if its in variance persists over time and space, to include all possible 
actors and what we refer to as their 'rights' within the order of things. The legal 
position holds some promise, then, providing that the legislature remains immune and 
does not defer to the executive. 
In domestic practice, within states possessing a strong legislature (and 
judiciary), this immunity is upheld as the standard rule oflaw. Within the 
international system, anarchy cannot offer the machinery and process of international 
law a constant executive arm with which to align itself in terms of a traditional tri-
partite system of government. There is, in effect, a lacuna between sovereignty and 
anarchy in which any clearly recognisable jurisdiction is lost. What is human rights 
affecting? 
77 Which also depends on how accessible avenues of redress are for claimants. 
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Take the example of sovereignty. In its absolute form it is the curtain of red-
tape which shrouds states' monopoly of organized violence. The curious paradox of 
sovereignty is that it never takes this absolute form. A constant flux of legal 
complexities compete for sovereign attention and codification, leaving logical 
positivists with 'the incoherence of this rules set and the logical inconsistency that 
results.' 78 
Onuf makes the point that 'ordinarily the activities oflawyers and of officers 
are highly complementary. These activities together make the legal order what it is, 
and they cannot be dissociated.' 79 The effective functioning of the system depends on 
this relationship. Yet it remains that sovereignty and law together fail to prevent the 
humanitarian crises which constitute daily existence for the significant part of the 
world's population and which bolster claims based on human rights norms. 
Throughout the (brief) history of international relations as we know or 
recognise them, there has been pressure upon sovereignty from legal complexes -
international regimes - which take various forms and possess varying meaning, and 
which, it would be expected, force conservative powers to reassess the perpetuity of 
sovereignty and the particular view of human rights and normativity which this 
entails. 
There is something of the character of regimes which speaks strongly to both 
the continuity thesis and the change thesis in IR. They are taken to inhabit a 'given' 
area. 
80 As such, there is little or no scope for either their content, or the implications 
their meaning might carry for a wider context, to be transferred across issue areas. 
This is dismissed, derided even, as 'the baldest kind of positivism. ' 81 Following this 
78 Onuf, World, p. 143 
791bid. 
80 See Ibid., pp. 144-145 
81 Ibid., p. 145 
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logic, by obviating external judgement the regimes are closed manufactures, of use 
only to their designers and patrons. 
The usual creation myth, that cognition precedes constitution, is reversed by 
Onuf on the grounds that 'roles come first, because regimes are ruled constructions. 
The rules themselves come from activities, not just the regime's role occupants.' 82 
The point of difference that Onuf is making regarding the constitution and therefore 
the effect of regimes, is that they are 'sets of rules, a substantial number of which 
(especially those giving the regime its scope and cohererwe) are legal rules. ' 83 
Lawyers miss the point because regimes are not entirely legal constructs; IR scholars 
miss the point because they are essentially legal. 
At no point in his brief history of international regimes does Onuf explicitly 
mention human rights norms, but values are certainly present. Constitutive and 
behavioural norms are clearly integral to regimes, and many of these are value-
influenced, if not value-led, in the examples of which Onuf chooses to discuss: 
decolonisation, Apartheid, the law of the sea, collective security, mutual insecurity, 
post-World War Two U.S. economic and trade hegemony and, finally, what Onuf 
refers to as 'administrative' regimes. 
Decolonisation and Apartheid leap out as being 'value-led' as a focus for the 
following discussion, but the other examples do cover ground that is interesting for 
the 'whole' ofnormativity issue also under consideration here. Onuf's broad selection 
for illustrating the prevalence and variety of international regimes focuses largely on 
directive-rules, and this seems to be the most fertile ground for a critique. There is 
some ambiguity still in the nature of regimes that are based primarily on directives, as 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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their constitution has undergone no perceptible change in the brief period since the 
publication of World. 
Human rights regimes have for sixty years positioned and re-positioned 
themselves according to the dictates of values and support which fluctuate (not 
necessarily dramatically) across time and with government policies. Where does 
Onufs constructivist analysis fit into this grand scheme, and if there is no simple fit, 
what can we take from it? Where would human rights potentially sit amongst 'ideal 
types of regimes, defined by reference to the prominence of instruction-, directive-, 
and commitment-rules in their constitution'84? First and foremost, we must work from 
the assumption that the current status of human rights norms must look and act like a 
regime on these terms. 
The decolonisation example belongs to a type of regime labelled 'monitory'. 
Essentially, 'they are constituted around a small number of principles which have 
achieved a high level of formality through plenary forums. ' 85 The pre-eminent 
plenary forum of the contemporary world, the United Nations, has exhaustively 
promoted standards of human rights, and has issued many resolutions as a step 
towards enforcing these standards. They are 'steps toward' a universally acceptable 
level of recognition and conduct, and not the finished product themselves, because 
they take the form of directive-rules - non-arbitrary with specific targets - which 
have little or no effect on those outside of the immediate ruled/ruler relationship. 
With such a wide and affecting agenda, human rights norms would appear to 
similarly benefit from the consequences of generalisation which the principles of 
directive-rules also sanction. Imperialism bowed to the pressure ofboth popular 
public opinion and the conduct of foreign policy over time, granting the process of 
84 1bid., p. 146 
85 Ibid. 
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decolonisation an air of inevitability when observed from our contemporary vantage 
point. 
Also 'monitory' was the anti-Apartheid regime. Although focusing again on 
the condemnation and ending of human wrongs, the anti-Apartheid movement had a 
very specific, singular target against which to focus resources, plan accordingly and 
act. This being the case, it was relatively straightforward to progress from 
disapproving resolutions to a disciplining rule of law 'directing any regime to cease 
complicity' 86 by means of trade or other support. Does this preclude any analogy to 
human rights norms, specifically given their universal character? 
In Onufs words: 
Despite the tendency for directive-rules to seep into monitory 
regimes which have been proven to be weak and ineffective 
systems of support for principles, these rules are unlikely to 
acquire a meaningful degree of formality and institutional 
support. Were this to happen, and furthermore these rules 
substitute for principles in defining a regime's activities, then 
we could say that the regime has changed to a new type. 87 
Comparing decolonisation and the anti-Apartheid movement on the point of directive-
rules suggests that the proclaimed universality of human rights means that, as an 
analogy, it is a better fit for the former rather than the latter. The upshot being that the 
analysis of directive-rules is more likely to provide (apparently) better results if the 
case study is broadly based, as specifics often lead to a result that is difficult to 
86 1bid., p. 147 
87 Ibid., p. 148 
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replicate. That is, of course, if the conventional route of replication is the 
constructivist's aim. 
The clash of sensibilities that occurs when traditionalist sovereignty faces new 
forms of international expression (i.e. through value norms) may be symptomatic of 
the directive-rule approach. There is a deeper element to this thinking, however, 
which draws from the logic of those who wish to substantially redraw the role of the 
state. Briefly: 'Regimes dependent on formal directive-rules for their identity-
executive regimes, we might call them - threaten the fiction that states alone are 
sovereign legal orders. If these regimes do not threaten the fiction of sovereignty, it is 
because they have been incorporated into the ensemble of regimes authorized by the 
state and constituting its government. ' 88 What Onuf seems to be saying is that, 
essentially, directive-ruled 'executive' regimes are simply not permitted to prosper 
beyond an initial stage (be it the procrastination of decolonisation or the anti-
Apartheid sanctions) by significantly more entrenched interests which represent the 
(power holding) status quo. 
The relationship of rules to regimes tells us much about how many of the 
values associated with human rights norms are acceptable or not to already existing 
international actors (whether they are deemed legitimate actors or not89). The usual 
clouding of the universality issue, however, means that directives may have only a 
very localised impact in terms of what they can tell us about change in the 
international system. There is one more avenue ofOnufs in World that we will 
pursue. 
88 Ibid., p. 148-149 
89 The Apartheid regime in South Africa enjoyed significant support in the form of trade from China 
and the Soviet Union. 
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Values as part of a normative paradigm 
As we have seen, Onuf does not attempt to sketch a Utopia, preferring a pragmatic 
view of the nature of man and society as a template for future development. Onufs 
alternative paradigm is German social thought's Herrschaft, 'understood as relations 
of super- and subordination- relations maintained through rules and obtaining in 
rule.' 90 It is used as the opposition to the distorted individualism of liberal thought -
-
'that agents are autonomous and their rights and duties symmetrical.'91 Max Weber's 
insights, however, are not to be applied in their pure form. The reason for this is that 
'Weber failed to see the complex of relations so conceived as constituting a distinct 
and personal pattern of rule and privilege. One measure of the extent to which this 
type of rule goes unnoticed is the lack of a conventional name for it. We find an 
appropriate one, however, in Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy. It is "heteronomy," 
which stands in opposition to autonomy. ' 92 
The prevailing (liberal) logic sustains the situation where apparent 'equality' 
hides real inequality. Acknowledgement of this begins the process of its rejection. 
'Heteronomous relations characterize situations of exchange among apparent equals, 
including those in which agents gauge their actions in anticipation of the actions of 
others doing the same. All such situations so pervade international relations that 
heteronomy is the background condition of rule against which episodes of hegemony 
and hierarchy are set. ' 93 Heteronomy has been characterised as 'interwoven and 
overlapping jurisdictions, moral and political, ' 94 which in itself should not be an 
90 0nuf, World, p. 196. It must be noted that Onuf spends some time considering the correct translation 
of the term- see World, pp. 198-205 
91 Ibid., p. 197 
921bid. 
931bid. 
94 Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together?', p. 872 
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insurmountable challenge. It has something of a web of meaning however, which can 
include uncertainty, or at least the lack of clarity- 'no one or everyone appears to 
rule' 95 -which requires a considered approach. What Herrschaft does, as a way of 
thinking, is posit 'the permanence of asymmetry, and not the elective asymmetry of 
authority relations, as the central problematic of social relations. ' 96 Wholly-normative 
constructivism is thus charged with cutting through this fog oflegitimacy, and is 
aided in this by virtue of a rule-based social and cultural international system. Is this a 
paradigm capable of engaging with the international effects of human rights norms? 
There is an attractiveness inherent to the German approach which seems 
eminently suitable for accounting for (apparent) anomalies, and for normalising 
'atypical' events and practices: 
We [of the English social tradition] acknowledge that 
rules always stand in some discernible arrangement. 
German social thought goes further: the expectations that 
rules engender are always differential, and arrangements 
of rules must always be one of super- and subordination. 
That such structure of rules are foundational, and not 
proximate and expedient, is deeply troubling to English 
speakers, whose view of rules derives from the formal 
symmetry of rights and duties under the common law - a 
formal symmetry nesting the elective asymmetry of 
th . 1" 97 au onty re attons. 
95 Kurt Burch, 'Changing the Rules: Reconceiving Change in the Westphalian System', International 
Studies Review, vol. 2 (2) (2000), p. 190 
96 Onuf, World, p. 202 
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It is this 'elective' aspect of asymmetry which underscores the task facing 
constructivism. This asymmetry is suspended in history because it fits the primacy 
image of powerful states, and is kept in place precisely by the choices these states 
make. A paradigmatic shift is doubly problematic as it faces the great edifice ofthis 
history and then the problem of managing the transition to normative construction, 
the creation of its properties and scope of enquiry. 
The problem with this is that Onufhas chosen a representative paradigm 
which confirms the dualism which, ultimately, finds expression in exploitation. But 
perhaps this is also the mandate of normative constructivism -to acknowledge the 
inherent power in international relations which orders things, and to use these 
weapons against their creator(s). 
Onuftakes Weber's ideal types of rule and offers a variation on them which 
'honors two of his paradigms, dissolves one as a mixed case, and constructs a third 
from material Weber himself provided. This third paradigm addresses the most 
puzzling aspect of rule, its "decentralization" through rules creating rights and 
duties.' 98 The Weberian standards of instruction- and directive-rules have been 
abundantly theorised because their attendant social arrangements are provided for 
with recognisable terminology: Hegemony and hierarchy. In terms of a recognisable 
and transferable arrangement for describing rules that create rights and duties, 'the 
lack of a comparable term for the arrangement of commitment-rules to produce rule is 
evidence of the continuing anonymity of that paradigm ofrule' 99 - and so we find 
heteronomy. 
98 Ibid., p. 209 
99 Ibid. 
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The practical element to run parallel with normative thinking is contained in 
the possibility of demonstrable equality of communication. 'For us, the point is that 
heteronomy describes the actual situation of people relating available means to 
particular ends.' The conscious individual, however, seems to be forever on the verge 
of nullifying any sense of parity, so that 'the social reality of heteronomy begets an 
awareness of behaviour that in tum begets the illusion of autonomy. Heteronomy 
prompts obfuscation of its own social reality.' 100 Onuflooks to liberal political 
economy for a solution to the paradox: '[It] disappears if we make John Harsanyi's 
elementary distinction between objective and subjective rationality- between 
choosing the ''best means" to achieve a given end and "what one thinks to be" the best 
means.' 101 Following on, then, 'we are autonomous when, and only when, this 
distinction does not hold. When it does hold, because of contingency and our inability 
to control outcomes, we can either stay with subjective rationality or objectivize it by 
introducing risk and uncertainty. Either way, rationality is relieved of paradox and 
reduced to prudence.' 102 If this framing of the issue holds then it must be the case that 
equality does not a priori exist but requires construction, which in tum allows to some 
extent a (constructivist) choice of materials. 
For a 'reality' to exist with any meaningful longevity, be it normative or 
otherwise, requires a pervasive element of trust. Promissory notes, Onuf points out, 
are all too easily written without much regard to their being kept. Nonetheless, 'Our 
promises rule us by taking the form of commitment-rules. Commitment-rules 
formalize promises as duties. Corresponding to duties are rights to whatever has been 
promised.' 103 
100 Ibid., p. 213 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., p. 214 
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Although Onufuses the example of property rights to demonstrate the 
workings of commitment-rules, a wider application to human rights norms is clearly 
not too-great a step, as the incidences of control by the bourgeoisie over serfdom 
strike a clear normative chord (and the use of 'property' is not entirely allegorical 
when considering the constitution and procedures of the international system). The 
challenge of constructivism is essentially that 'heteronomous rule is secured through 
commitment rules which massively restrict the material opportunities of subordinates, 
who are endowed, along with their few remaining opportunities, with the properties of 
commodities.' Change 'material' to 'life' and 'commodities' to 'minimally acceptable 
existence', and the human rights discourse is represented by the language of rules. 
For human rights to constitute a significant ontological priority of 
constructivism, then it must correspond with Onuf's own priority- the proper 
founding of action in IR, as approached via Sheldon Wolin's operative paradigms. A 
more fluid conception to keep pace with the scope and changeability of human 
existence, operative paradigms 'are those ensembles of human practice seen by those 
engaging in or observing them to have a coherence setting them apart from other 
practices. Those that are seen as coherent in furthest degree are taken as having a 
natural objective reality.' 104 There is no operative paradigm for IR as there is, for 
example, with physics - or any other similarly established discipline -precisely 
because physics exists in a recognisable form. We know what physics is and does (if 
only in small part), so effectively, 'that this is how people treat the matter makes it 
true for operative purposes.' 105 
It is the sheer breadth and density of the discipline ofiR which even calls into 
question its labelling as such a paradigm. It is divisive and divided and this leads to a 
104 Ibid., p. 14 
105 Ibid., p. 15 
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serious doubt on the part of Onuf as to whether the operative paradigm of 
international relations in the field corresponds sufficie'ntly in terms of matter and 
meaning to IR in the academy, 'heterogeneous, amorphous, elusive' as it is. 106 Where, 
though, would we be most likely to 'lose' this connection between theory and 
practice? Surely it must be more likely in the issuing of singular moral decrees rather 
than the gradual and responsive delivery of a more encompassing ethical outlook. 
Onufs World, it has become clear, is a deeply theoretical work. Before analysing the 
implementation of this theory in practice to gauge whether and how more 
empirically-inclined scholars have developed this branch of constructivism, a 
summary is needed of his underlying theme. 
Onuf's epilogue: the persistence of exploitation 
Perhaps the greatest irony of the character and elements of universalism rendered and 
analysed by Onuf is the outcome that, in establishing the character traits and rules 
common to the span of conscious humanity, the results themselves point ineluctably 
to an embedded logic of privileging some over others. Being the same, in other words, 
does not rest upon 'observable' equality. Some concern is voiced at the contrast 
between the assumed primacy of commitment-rules and their actual 'exceptionally 
elusive false consciousness' over the true nature and seat of cultural strength brought 
about by a depersonalisation of rights and duties. 107 All three rule-types, in sustaining 
this hierarchy, 'do so in characteristically different ways and ... cultures vary 
substantially in how they deal with the mix and who ends up with what kind of 
privilege.' 108 
106 See Ibid., p. 16 
107 See Ibid., p. 122 
108 Ibid. 
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Is this paradoxical that humans manufacture their own oppression, or simply 
beyond our current vocabulary and hence powers of explanation? Privileging and 
equality are, to our obdurate Western minds, strange bedfellows. The seemingly 
human constant of honouring some people over and above others appears to be 
writing our history as a culture of structured levels which prevails and self-sustains, 
all but guaranteeing the kind of longevity which all societies crave. What, here, is the 
role of a normative constructivism? Equality has a much more tangible association 
with the rules and conventions of statehood than it does with individuals. Participants 
in a Lockean international 'state of nature' depend more on their own outlook, and 
less on quantifiable relationships and agreements for their equal stature109 than 
humans, more beset with issues of universalism, can hope to. Constructivism, 
therefore, is encountering a more traditionally liberal paradox. 110 
In the first instance, it must be set-up in such a way as to enable it to engage 
with orthodoxy, rather than assume that its dismissal is a foregone conclusion. It is the 
formulaic rigidness of established (institutionalised) practice which leads, inevitably, 
to the situation where 'because resources include people- oneself and others -
rational conduct necessarily involves the exploitation of people ... If there were no 
pattern to it, I would not be concerned about exploitation. There is a pattern, however, 
a pattern of unequal consequences, which does engage my moral sense.' 111 
Exploitation is of such contingent complexity that it defeats any epochal 
'modes of production' notion ofthe reasons for it based on purely economic or liberal 
reasoning. Thus Onuf negates 'Roemer's progressive criteria for identifying and 
eliminating layers of exploitation. Instead we need a criterion of exploitation that can 
109 See Lee Ward, 'Locke on the Moral Basis of International Relations', American Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 50 (3) (2003), p. 693 
110 See Mark Duffield, 'Development, Territories, and People: Consolidating the External Sovereign 
Frontier', Alternatives, vol. 32 (2) (2007), p. 228 
111 Onuf, World, p. 283 
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be uniformly applied to all the inequalities of all interest and asset patterns.' 112 Our 
image of exploitation must then be holist and accommodating, rather than 
particularist and cause for further segregation. It is to include, presumably, socially 
and culturally derived interests and assets. 
Onuf prefers to think of exploitation in the terms used by political economists; 
'exploitation describes any situation in which rational individuals accrue rents in the 
process of realizing interests.' 113 The potential for the cause and effects of 
exploitation to be limited to the scope normally considered by liberal political 
economy is averted by Onufs assertion that 'the very simplicity of the rent-as-
exploitation criterion means easy application to other interests, insofar as they may be 
thought of as calculable assets.' 114 Taking the latest economic epoch, capitalism, as 
an example, the notion of liberal justice is presumed to be the balancing out and 
distribution of exploitation with an overall 'neutralising' effect. This is problematic, 
though, for the fact of 'the presumption that individuals are proprietors of birthright 
endowments.' 115 
This is precisely where a moral vocabulary begins to speak more directly to 
the language of rules and rule. Specifically, 
from birth on, people participate unequally in social 
arrangements affording opportunities to select and develop 
skills making good on native capacities. That one is skilled 
differently than others means that one has different access to 
resources than others have. In this instance, rent may be 
112 Ibid., p. 285 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., p, 286 
115 Ibid., p. 287 
199 
conceptualized as the difference between native endowment 
and skilful participation in productive activity and ruled access 
to resources. Because these differences are practically 
incalculable, rent is built into the system of productive activity. 
No one has to collect rents for rents to be paid. 116 
Regarding the use and meaning of liberal and capitalist terminology such as 
'alienable and inalienable assets', 'in constructivist terms, all such distinctions are 
misguided.' 117 Following from this is perhaps Onurs prime example of the limits of 
an under-theorised constructivism which simply mimics a social theoretic structure 
and so retains its flaws: 'Redistributing wealth helps to correct exploitation fostered 
by differential access to resources. This is the aim of socialism. Whatever the 
rhetoric, rewards are never adequately used to equalize skills.' 118 This is the bind 
which still ties even at the 'pinnacle' of late modernity- the many still cede to the 
few. If rule equates to exploitation, then the politics of normative constructivism are 
to be played out on a considerable scale. 
For Onuf, the matter is simply unequivocal: 'rule is exploitive. Ifthere are 
three categories of rule, then there are three categories of exploitation. If rule is 
inevitable - a position I think follows from the logic of rules and rule- then so is 
exploitation. The mitigation of exploitation in one form compels or promotes its 
presence in some other form.' 119 Rather discouragingly, perhaps: 'There is no 
solution to the human reality of exploitation.' 120 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid., p. 288 
120 Ibid., p. 289 
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In itself, this is a philosophy for a grander project, of which constructivism 
might have a part to play. Presently, the existence and/or perpetuation of exploitation 
does not have a stifling affect on what knowledge gains might be made by having a 
better understanding of how human rights norms affect the international system and 
its actors. But this is still only the case in theory. Or even, crucially, in metatheory. 
There are no really clear threads emerging here to take forward into the review of 
linguistic constructivism in practice -nothing particularly concrete to link the two. 
This is primarily due to the contained nature ofOnufs subject matter, and his 
expressed intention not to go beyond it into any metaphysical space. His message is 
that there is a world here in need of proper theorising, and wishful thinking has no 
part in it. This is an important point of separation from what Onuf actually says, and 
what would be expected of his approach by more critical scholars. 
But even this is not a simple 'either, or' equation. It has not simply been a 
case of cutting and pasting human rights into Onufs interpretation of modernity. 
There are no new morals in this interpretation - human history is cyclical. An ethical 
approach would seem to be in a prime position to step in here, but exactly how this 
would fit into Onufs complex reading of rules, regimes and paradigms is being lost 
somewhat in the theory of it all. Although the practice of linguistic constructivism 
will reveal key areas in which linguistic tools are beneficial in addressing the issues 
generated by human rights norms, the preliminary conclusion being made here is that 
Onufs theory is not at all amenable to the overtures of a critical-normative drive. 
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III. What to make of this world? Language as a constructivist tool 
In order to engage with the questions asked by this thesis, we need to ascertain how 
(or even whether) scholars inspired by this revisionist world view have expanded it to 
include human rights. How might we conceptualise this 'turn to values'? Rules are 
constituted by shared understandings oflanguage. 121 The 'operation' or action of 
language as the basis for rules (through how it is learned, institutionalised, etc.) is a 
much contested subject. Clearly, we are not adding value to any philosophical debate 
in this thesis, but the discourse that constructivists have developed by both 
problematising and using linguistic tools as part of their own methodologies is 
inextricably interwoven with the philosophical origin of those tools. In other words, to 
use linguistics in the gathering of knowledge is to engage in an ongoing dialogue with 
the nature of concepts such as 'speech acts', 'language games' and 'grammar', which 
this section will reflect. Also, although these concepts are not interchangeable (in 
their strictest philosophical sense), their integration into the broad categories of social 
theory and constructivism has led to studies in which they are not always applied in a 
mutually exclusive manner. Accordingly, the following discussion will not be 
detained by always observing a strict distinction. 
Here, we need to know why these concepts matter for human rights norms. 
First, we will assess empirical examples oflinguistic methodologies to ascertain a). 
How international theory has approached the relationship between language and 
human rights, and b). The extent to which other normative enquiries (i.e. into 
conventions and behaviour) provide a conceptual framework which will allow work 
of a similar level to be done for values, so that we might develop a more coherent and 
121 As discussed above in Chapter One 
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'whole' normative approach. These are interrelated tasks, as the literature will reveal. 
In the next section, these linguistic components (specifically as expressed by Onuf 
and the philosophical origins he himself draws from) will be broken down further to 
see whether we might make more progress with them. 
In World, Onufs exposition of rules is tied to speech act theory, which works as 
follows: Essentially, 'hearers make (correct) inferences as to speakers' intentions by 
noting the illocutionary force as well as the propositional content of (well-formed) 
utterances. Illocutionary force refers to the part of speech constituting an action of 
social consequence,' 122 turning words into deeds, and so the departure from 
positivism is made. Constructivism's use oflinguistic tools such as speech acts is 
widely acknowledged, 123 and has tended to follow Onufs lead. The briefest of 
surveys reveals numerous examples of a linguistic-constructivist approach to issues of 
international relations. These include security and securitisation, 124 interpretivism and 
meaning, 125 the concepts of 'promises' and 'genocide', 126 refugees127 and 
diplomacy. 128 Even sceptical critiques of constructivism are reluctant to detach 
themselves from an association with language. Maja Zehfuss, albeit it with 
reservations, has acknowledged the role oflinguistics in relation to German foreign 
122 1bid., p. 81 
123 For a discussion, see Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Constructing a New Orthodoxy?', p. 74 
124 See, for example, Thomas Diez, 'Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 
'Normative Power Europe', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 33 (3) (2005), p. 628, 
Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello, 'The Information Revolution, Security and international 
Relations: (IR)relevant Theory?' International Political Science Review, vol. 27 (3) (2006), p. 234, and 
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework of Analysis (Boulder: 
Westview, 1998), pp. 32-33 
125 Vincent Pouliot, "'Sobjectivism": Towards a ConStructivist Methodology', International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 51 (2) (2007), p. 365 
126 Karin-Fierke;'Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations', 
Internat!~nal Stuclies Quarterly, vol. 46 (3) (2002), p. 347 
127 Caroima Moulin and Peter Nyers, "'We Live in a Country ofuNHCR"- Refugee Protests and 
Global Political Society', International Political Sociology, vol. 1 (4) (2007) 
128 Iver B. Neumann, 'Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy', Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, vol. 31 (3) (2002) 
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policy: 'The recognition amongst policy-makers that speech acts could be used to 
change the situation was reflected in the significance attributed to changing the 
constitution.' 129 
Cingranelli and Richards focus on a particular human rights subset - 'physical 
integrity rights'- in an empirical study of government attitudes. 130 These rights are 
defined as 'the entitlements individuals have in international law to be free from 
arbitrary physical harm and coercion by their government. Human rights violations in 
this category include extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearances, and political 
imprisonment.' 131 What this scientific approach can substantively claim depends on 
the 'cumulative scaling of standards-based information' as an indicator as to how 
explicitly governments observe these human rights, or not. 
The conclusion, essentially that government respect for rights is measurable, 
certainly speaks to positivist or conventional constructivism. Is it less important for 
linguistic constructivism? Perhaps not, as the positivist/post-positivist divide is not so 
explicit within this article. There may be a baseline that we can take from this type of 
study - that measuring and comparing governments is a useful quantitative exercise. 
But this top-down approach also presents us with a view of human rights norms, and 
the state, as one-dimensional. We have the state, but not as an institution defined by 
its relationship to the international system. We have the individual, but from the 
perspective of government. 
Crossing borders because of or for human rights norms is an area of concern to 
international theory, but is often only examined by proxy. The conventions or 
behavioural norms which attend to humanitarian intervention, for example, arguably 
129 Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics ofReahty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Omversity Press, 2oo2) p. 158 
130 David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, 'Measuring the Level, Pattern and Sequence of 
Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 43 (2) (1999) 
131 Ibid., p. 407 
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use 'human rights' (very much in quotation marks) as something prior, or assumed, 
and by the warrant of which action is taken. This action is then itself a vastly complex 
interaction of norms, institutions, motivations etc. which might tell us something 
regarding the nature of the domestic polities involved, and perhaps also the 
contemporary condition of sovereignty, but the relation of both humans and values to 
the international system are left wanting in terms of theorising. 
Howard's assessment of why, when pursuing the issue of weapons of mass 
destruction, the United States develops different stances with regard to Iraq and North 
Korea, concludes that we can understand these processes better (in a more nuanced 
and therefore more informed way) by utilising a language-based constructivist 
approach. 132 What has this to do with human rights norms? Not a great deal, on the 
face of it. However, there is much norms talk here. Kratochwil's understanding of 
security agreements as rules is used as the basis for constructing a broad-based 
agreement between concerned parties regarding, at least, the terms and expected 
protocol of that engagement. 133 To generalise, we have participant understanding 
facilitated by a shared framework. As proceedings move forward, increasing 
sophistication and depth is achieved through 'negotiated rules about what things are 
and how to play. The rules of the language game create possibilities, make things 
possible, and give meaning to action.' 134 
The rules discussed here are constitutive (how the game is structured and 
eventually decided) and behavioural (how the game is played). What is missing are 
the rules (or the singular rule) which tells us how the players ought to play. Should 
they play fair? And, ultimately, how do we decide what is fair? In games, this is 
132 Peter Howard, 'Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy', 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 48 (4) (2004) 
133 As contained in K.ratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions 
134 Howard, 'Why Not Invade North Korea?', p. 813 
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usually decided by two interrelated factors: Rules which dictate what actions 
constitute foul play, and something less concrete, though hardly esoteric, known as 
the 'spirit' of the game. Players inured to the culture of a game accept the values 
which underpin its successful execution. 
This still suggests the need for a considerable leap, though. Rendering the 
three-fold 'whole' ofnormativity involves completing a jigsaw two parts action 
(conventions, behaviour), one part motivation (values). How might they be 
reconciled? Howard's analysis of threat and security interests has these very orthodox 
international concepts 'constructed through the rules of language, not by raw material 
capability. These capabilities have no intrinsic meaning; they only have meaning 
within a language game.' 135 In other words, meaning is shared. By extension, the 
legitimacy of values depends only upon their being accepted and implemented by a 
minimum of two parties as they interact on any given issue. If so, constructivism must 
have a less abstract task than might otherwise be the case, as the normative gap would 
be bridged. 
It is possible to track linguistic approaches in IR, from studies interested in 
adding new dimensions to traditional concerns, to those which deal with more 
humanist features ofthe discipline and its sub-fields, to the explicitly humanist (that 
is, with a focus on human rights norms), and finally on to those which probe the 
'meta-' edges of theory. 136 An example of the second of these moves this conceptual 
framing exercise forward from the facing-off of power driven states to the issue of 
labour rights. Weisband's study of responses to multilateral monitoring regimes 
135 Ibid., p. 825 
136 See Shane P. Mulligan, 'The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, vol. 34 (2) (2005) 
206 
emphasises the role oflearning as it relates to 'shame' as a way of maintaining core 
international labour standards. 137 
Here, what is constructivist about the approach is characterised as 
'hermeneutic/constructivist' which, alongside statistical and heuristic measures 
constitutes a three-pronged analysis. Onufs rules138 are used to describe the 
functioning of' ILO regime procedures and substantive obligations.' 139 Essentially, 
'compliance and responsiveness are constructions oflanguage, speech, and agency. 
Noncompliance with regime norms, especially when combined with member state 
non-responsiveness to regime remonstrances, leads ... to the application of a regime 
language of shame.' 140 
Shame itself is defined as 'loss of national face, reputation, or honor.' 141 It 
results from being subjected to 'condemnatory language' by UN organisations. 142 We 
can be encouraged by the outcome of this subjection- that states readjust their 
policies and practices to comply with expectations -but can we feel similarly 
optimistic about the role of values in this process? Why do states comply when faced 
with admonishments? Because they acknowledge their moral wrongdoing, or because 
they fear that, on reflection, expressing disrespect for a monitory regime can have 
negative instrumental implications? We do not have to wrestle with the answer here, 
but instead take forward the fact that, in such situations, it is simply not clear where 
the distinction lies. 
Adding the notion that something is 'morally' wrong to a situation in which 
norms of convention or behaviour have already been established is, perhaps, how we 
137 Edward Weisband, 'Discursive Multilateralism: Global Benchmarks, Shame, and Learning in the 
ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 44 (4) (2000) 
138 For more on these, see below 
139 Weisband, 'Discursive Multilateralism', p. 646 
140 Ibid., p. 647 
141 Ibid., p. 648 
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should be conceiving of human rights norms. But is this approach based on anything 
more than intuition? There are problems, for example, with the idea that speech acts 
might be a generic form. Guzzini is reluctant to use the term 'speech act' in relation to 
the concept of power, because of its contested nature. 143 Are human rights norms 
really still too contested? The nuclear question is one such example which occupies 
this 'cross-over' territory between orthodox issues and contemporary value-led 
concerns. 
Bonham et al's analysis describes the role that language plays in nuclear 
testing negotiations. 144 Is it possible to extract motivations (the 'why' questions) from 
the process of these negotiations ('how' questions)? From the evidence provided here, 
the answer must be no, and for the following reason. Although this study describes a 
'typology of pre-understandings,' 145 which informs participants how to go on, any 
pre-understanding itself is something which exists prior to the investigation of 
'concrete knowledge.' 146 Whatever is 'concrete' about knowledge- and the term is 
not defined for us- we cannot safely assume that human rights norms themselves, nor 
the machinery they require, nor the outcomes they produce, are concrete, and so we 
cannot safely assume any correlation. The study, like many of its type (focusing on 
the norms of agreements with ill-defined moral underpinnings)147 has no reference to 
the values which may or may not have been held by the interested parties. 
Moving beyond what has here been labelled the 'orthodoxy' ofiR scholarship 
to issues of contemporary disciplinary concern, such as global health, how are studies 
143 Stefano Guzzini, 'The Concept ofPower: A constructivist analysis', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, vol. 33 (3) (2005), p. 512 
144 G. Matthew Bonham, Victor M. Sergeev and Pavel B. Parshin, 'The Limited Test-Ban Agreement: 
Emergence ofNew Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation', International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 41 (2) (1997) 
145 See Ibid., esp. pp. 217-220 
146 Ibid., p. 217 
147 See, for example, Gavan Duffy, Brian K. Frederlcing and Seth A. Tucker, 'Language Games: 
Dialogical Analysis ofiNF Negotiations', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 42 (2) (1998) 
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utilising linguistics, and can we readily place human rights norms within their 
frameworks? Transmissible diseases, such as HIV I AIDS, compromise the status and 
affect the identities of millions of individuals across the globe, and we might expect 
values to play a part in the theorising of their relevance to IR. One such study148 has 
demonstrated how norms of convention and behaviour can be dramatically changed 
(or 're-created', effectively) by the re-classification of an international issue- a 
pandemic in this case- from a development concern to a security concern. 149 
Although in this particular study, human rights are alluded to in an abstract 
and contingent way, there is a practical element we can glean from it. Securitization is 
the process by which international concerns are spoken of in new and different terms 
by new and different interlocutors. HIV I AIDS, as a securitized issue, is fundamentally 
changed as more powerful actors with more rationalistic interests take over from its 
original proprietors. That is, humanitarian and public health professionals cede ground 
to international organisations, governments and non-governmental organisations, and 
the state-driven politics and machinery which this implies.150 
Human rights norms such as those attending subsistence rights championed by 
Vincent are conceivably 'security issues'. By Elbe's analysis, their securitisation 
would be a negative outcome, with the effect of 'washing out' what is human about 
these rights (as contested as this quality is, of course). They will become 
'negativised', as states- to include those who may have had a less than active interest 
in human rights previously- provide themselves with the license to remove the value 
norms from the democratic process and/or the rule oflaw. 151 Any claims made by 
148 See Stefan Elbe, 'Should HIV I AIDS Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV I AIDS 
and Security', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 50 (1) (2006) 
149 See Ibid., p. 122 
150 Ibid., p. 126 
151 Ibid., p. 127-128 
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individuals to assuage subsistence needs, the argument might run, would then be 
referred to security forces rather than welfare or social security. 
Can constructivist analyses oflanguage and discourse provide us with useful 
generalisations when it comes to norms, or do they go even further and teach us how 
to cope with difference? In Karin Fierke's words, 'language is like making moves in a 
game. The structure of meaning and interaction are dependent on rules· shared with 
others.' 152 Games begin and end by common consent. The linguistic focus here is on 
rules which enable us to 'see' the game, for without them it would seem as if random 
actions were culminating in abrupt and meaningless ends. Fierke's reading of the war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina offers a linguistic perspective of a heavily context-dependent 
norm. Generally, 'a language game is ... dynamic, insofar as it establishes a playing 
field populated by certain types of identities who engage in particular acts, and can 
maneuver in a range of ways.' 153 It is this element of dynamism which has frequently 
been taken to be an encouraging sign that language-games are capable of 
understanding the complexity of most social relationships. However, identities are of 
a 'type', acts are 'particular' and the number of possible actions that might be taken 
are not limitless. The problem is that 'wars' are a genus, whereas 'a war' is a context. 
Analysis ofthe latter 'has to determine the type of context within which one is 
situated and the actions meaningful to it.' 154 
One apparent problem we have in treating human rights norms as part of the 
wider norms discourse is precisely this discretionary impulse. That is, when we 
contextualize, we risk the apparent analytic inevitability of narrow comparison. Fierke 
highlights this with her brief examinations of the 'naming games' played as part of the 
152 Fierke, 'Links Across the Abyss', p. 347 
153 Karin Fierke, 'Multiple Identities, Interfacing Games: The Social Construction of Western Action in 
Bosnia', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 2 (4) (1996), p. 472 
154 Ibid., p. 473 
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ongoing narrative of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The notion that this war could 
have a close familial resemblance to another was utilised by certain key actors as 
some sort of predictive model. That is to say, was this Balkan conflict most like 
World War I, World War II, Vietnam or the GulfWar, or could scenarios be lifted 
from each to augment the impression of a recurrent logic? 155 And what precisely 
would we learn from this? 
If human rights are imagined as analogous to the specific condition of war, 
then what is meaningful about them? The rights themselves, or the particular context 
to which they are applied? Limit human rights to a single game, or a cluster thereof, 
and perhaps a different light is shed by the conventions oflanguage-games. The 
complexity ofthe issue lies within the relationship oflanguage-games to context, and 
how this then affects our treatment of human rights. 
The efficacy of a language game depends largely on its parameters being 
specified at the outset. But even doing this would not define its analytical capabilities 
as a methodology. It is testament to the fundamental nature of language that this 
'whole' is not self-contained, but is governed rather by the broader field of 
'grammar.' So, instead of focusing on particulars of context, actor and so on, we 
should instead embrace the ability of language games 'to create distance from a single 
picture of what is real or rational in this context, and to emphasize instead the 
construction of a changing context.' 156 Fierke also distinguishes between 'thin' and 
'thick' levels of description, 157 with the clear assumption that the latter will lead to a 
better understanding of structure and outcome. It must be clear, though, only if the 
complexity of a thing depends on the exact quality of that complexity being revealed 
to us. In our case this is arguably so, as the appropriateness of a rules or language-
155 1bid., pp. 474-477 
156 Ibid., p. 490 
I 57 Ibid. 
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based approach- channelled here through language-games- depends entirely on how 
best to comprehend and respond to the urgencies of human rights norms. 
If the approach is to be fixed, or at least stable, the details ofhow the word 
relates to the world matter. Veronique Pin-Fat, in a review ofhuman rights-focused 
literature, formulates this as follows: 
The meaning of a word is not the object to which it refers but 
rather the role that the word plays in a chain of signifiers (the 
language game). However, it is important to note that this 
does not suggest that context acts as a fixed foundation. What 
kinds of relation constitute a context at any given moment 
cannot be legislated for in advance because context is not a 
word-object relation, but a word-to-word relation. Context 
cannot therefore be 'anchored' to an object (for example, a 
set of practices in Taiwan) and therefore, delineated by it. 158 
We can again look to Fierke for a constructivist understanding of grammar. 
Essentially, it 'is the range of possible expressions belonging to a category of 
experience,' 159 and 'it provides a point of departure for exploring the possibilities of a 
phenomenon, such as ... a balance of power or terrorism.' 160 The difference between a 
grammatical view of the world, as opposed to a traditional view ofknowledge 
gathering, is that the former 'contrasts with the standard social science approach of 
158 Veronique Pin-Fat, '(Im)possible Universalism: reading human rights in world politics', Review of 
International Studies, vol. 20 (6) (2000), p. 664 
159 Fierke, 'Links Across the Abyss', p. 344 
160 Ibid., p. 345 
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attempting to fix the boundaries of definition before undertaking an analysis.' 161 The 
fixity of definitions is fundamentally contentious for constructivist epistemology: is it 
understanding itself or the means of understanding which is ultimately foundational? 
On grammar, Fierke continues, 'how would we distil the essence of a balance of 
power in such a way that we can capture all instances of it? The alternative is an 
analysis of meaning in use. An investigation into explicitly social practices requires 
an analysis of a grammar as it relates to a form of life.' 162 
From this, we might assume that a broader, more encompassing approach not 
only to linguistics but also to how human rights norms can be captured linguistically, 
would be a more promising step forward. Studies which do explicitly pair human 
rights norms with a linguistic analysis tend to overlook these potential developments, 
and instead characterise the issue as one of argumentation or persuasion. 163 This in 
itself is indicative of a constructivist approach, but arguably a different one to that of 
Onuf. These kinds of conceptualisations will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
Conclusions 
As an outgrowth of critical international theory, it is elementary that constructivism 
should, as a definitional priority, challenge liberal modernity. Wendt's Social Theory 
describes how states interact and thereby constitute a 'social' international system, 
but a challenge to modernity is implicit at best. Onufs World re-states the philosophy 
of the international system but, crucially, does not advocate a critical re-imagining of 
it. The particular legacy of Hume, Kant and Bentham has led to a double 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 See, for example, Darren Hawkins, 'Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and 
Enforceable Human Rights Norms', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 48 (4) (2004) 
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misunderstanding of 'moral purpose': This is morality for whom, and for what 
purpose? 
The Self-perpetuation of liberal modernism has obscured the collective moral 
history of individuals, groups and states with the result of disassociating polities from 
humans. Onuf reveals this enduring moral human history to us, and human rights 
norms would seem to be the contemporary exemplar which supports this need to 
challenge deep-rooted exploitation. Yet, there is a distinct gap between this bedrock 
and the subsequent output oflinguistic constructivists. 
Empirical studies seem to be bound by a top-down and statist perspective 
which only hints at a bigger picture. What, for example, does data regarding 
government attitudes to human rights tell us about the ethics of crossing borders? We 
are left to assume a link between non-compliance and the eventual expression of 
systemic disproval, and then some sort of intervention. Constructivism's principles 
suggest that it should balk at assumptions, however ethically obvious they may seem. 
Rules and language-based studies of individuals in international relations have 
focused on a particular norm which cannot simply be equated to rights. Humanitarian 
intervention, the focus of much constructivist scholarship, is an inconclusive 
conceptual tool to use when asking questions about human rights. It is instructive, but 
it is not the totality of 'human rights in practice'. It tells us much about domestic 
politics (how idiosyncratic or comparable they are) and the nature of sovereignty, but 
not so much about how humans and values are related to the international system. To 
whom did the now emancipated masses address their concerns in the first instance? Is 
there a more consistent way of linking oppression, individuals and the international 
system together, rather than relying on these sporadic incursions for our 
understanding of the issues? 
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With a similar end product to that ofWendt, constructivists have utilised a 
linguistic approach to research which has concluded that states readjust their policies 
and practices to comply with expectations. The concept of state 'shame' is a deeply 
moral one, but how does this translate to ethical practice? How does this filter down 
to the populace in terms of their own experiences and expectations? The role of 
values remains unclear. 
Karin Fierke offers perhaps the most sustained and broad attempt to engage 
with normativity using a linguistic approach. She brings to the fore the problem of 
context, and particularly how it can generally be relied upon to produce narrow and 
comparative outcomes which serve to further compartmentalise how knowledge is 
gathered in IR and how legitimate it is. Language, alternatively, offers better 
processes which may or may not end with ethically compelling outcomes. The 
usefulness of a linguistic approach seems to be in the scope of language itself which 
has a sufficiently broad grammatical base to enable it to construct, and document, 
how contexts change. 
Rule-types, rather than binding the politics of individuals and states in a 
mutually exclusive relationship, are sufficiently amorphous in the way that they 
interact to foster recognition of cultural distinctiveness within the state, based on an 
idiographic mix of rule-types contained in historical cultural experience. But how far 
does this go? Different rule-types suggest different avenues for constructivists when 
making research and methodology decisions. The minimal usefulness of a directive-
rules study seems to lie in a broadly based analytical approach (e.g. focusing on 
decolonisation), but a maximal return may be found in a more specific case study 
(e.g. focusing on apartheid). The degree to which either is achieved depends on how 
the moral-ethical spectrum is interpreted in any given context. 
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There is a clear gap between Onufs re-statement of socio-anthropological history and 
the current empirical body of work which acts in lieu of a more satisfactory legacy. 
Why should this be the case? Onuf simply does not provide rules/language-based 
constructivism with the philosophical grounding in values necessary for human rights 
to be properly accounted for in empirical study. 
The distinction was made above between human rights as an idea and human 
rights as a norm. The preceding chapters, to include this one, have described the 
traditional picture of constructivism's role in the matter. How much of Onuf s 
groundwork in World allows us to expand upon this? We should be able to further 
distinguish between what constructivism is capable of pronouncing upon 
(traditionally, norms) and what critical theory is capable of developing (traditionally, 
ideas). 
Testing the discernible values in World by attempting to fit the statement, 
"Human beings are entitled to ... " into Onufs categories of rule-types does not give 
us a singular and simple answer. To suggest, though, that something as complex as 
values expressed in the international system could be made to fit a single linguistic 
category is perhaps itself simplistic. Directive and/or commissive rules seem to 
adequately cover the possible contexts and meanings of values, with possible 
eventualities and nuances covered by their interaction as part of a wider rule-making 
process. Is this as direct as Onuf s contribution to the issue of human rights and 
values gets? 
The paradigm of commitment-rules- heteronomy- involves individuals in 
the act of creating rights and duties more so than other, traditionally instituted 
paradigms such as hierarchy and hegemony. But it is not an ideal condition in the 
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way that it restricts material opportunities. However, even though Herrschaft posits 
permanent asymmetry, it is not a pessimistic prognosis. It can cope with -
incorporate, even- anomalies that would otherwise be rationally explained away. 
Onufhas vested us with a broader paradigmatic base to work with, which in turn 
would suggest the broadening of constructivism's knowledge gathering capacity. 
There are limits, though, to knowing how we learn what ought to be with a 
strictly linguistic approach of the type offered by Onuf. The detachment between 
theory and practice in this variant of constructivism has clear implications. Onufs 
theory is a rich and complex detailing of how liberalism has managed to hide our own 
human history from us during the period known as modernity. Onuf is advocating a 
deeper understanding of this. The effect this has on the calls for a more (value-) 
normative constructivism, and therefore this thesis, is that the moral/empirical 
ambiguity of human rights norms cannot be settled by this model. Language in use is 
extremely fertile ground for constructivist researchers, but it requires a more 
accommodating theoretical base from which work can begin. 
The problem we have in being able to place human rights norms in Onufs 
approach is that we must make assumptions about their presence over and above the 
assumptions we must make about Wendt and, as we shall see, Linklater. Wendt, of 
course, also lacks explicit reference to human rights in Social Theory, but we are 
arguably able to gain enough from that theory to make a judgement regarding its 
worth on the subject matter of this thesis. It is a theory which also speaks clearly 
about states (albeit in an ultimately unsatisfactory, outward facing way) and is 
systematic about doing so. The weakness that has become more visible through the 
analysis of Onuf is that his explanations of human constancy within a system of 
exploitation are vague on this matter where we would rather hope they were not. 
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Language appears to be a more obvious key to unlocking the complexities of values 
for constructivism, but we are left wondering if Onuf is the key holder. 
The possibilities inherent in a linguistic approach have been demonstrated, if 
only by the ultimate lack of a clear body of empirical research linking values to 
language in use. We have had to work hard to conceive of an image of how values 
can occupy the same analytical space as constitutive and behavioural norms. The 
need for taking a critical turn has become apparent. The language thread needs to be 
subjected to further scrutiny, and opened out towards the more critically-conceived 
concepts and categories which dialogue and communication offer for our 
understanding of human rights norms, in order to fully test constructivism. 
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5. Dialogue and Communication 
Andrew Linklater 
In the previous two chapters we have seen how two dominant modes of 
constructivism have each added their own input to the approach's epistemology and 
ontology in terms of its normative scope and potential. Chapter Three demonstrated 
that statist constructivism may be well-placed to conceptualise human rights as 
forming the identity of a 'good' state, but that this is effectively a purely 
metatheoretical exercise. It is an academic possibility- an abstraction. There is more 
to take from the approach as a whole into our final chapter, but for the purpose of 
setting up what follows, we can move forward with this notion of an incomplete state. 
Chapter Four analysed how an understanding of rules supplements and in 
some ways improves upon this, without linguistic constructivism having forged a 
consistent methodological approach, or a lasting empirical legacy. A great deal of 
conceptual ground has been cleared for constructivists, but the potential for 
developing practical tools for understanding the rich complexity of values using 
language offers a clearer path forward for the analysis of human rights and values in 
the international system than Onufs theoretical position. 
Moving on from this, it is the empirical legacy of this theory/practice dualism 
which holds the most promise for our triangulation. It can share ground, in other 
words, with Linklater' s approach. We can but speculate here as to why this empirical 
lack of progress from Onufs theory baseline should be the case. Secession, 
nationalism, globalisation and securitisation have all blasted the IR landscape since 
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the publication ofOnufs World, which may account in some measure for the limited 
application of rules/language to human rights norms, as constructivism has itself 
developed with this history. Exactly why and how this has happened is not an 
investigation for this thesis. 
What is clear is that knowing more about the relationships between 
international actors (both the traditional and the aspirational, i.e. both states and 
previously marginalised individuals or groups) is a key factor in understanding how 
and why norms work, and the nature of values in the international system. This is in 
keeping with the provisions of the Universal Declaration, which has an abiding 
interest in inclusivity. The present chapter aims to complete this triangulated 
intellectual space with a critical constructivist perspective of how to drive forward 
with a value-led aim, and why this must involve an engagement with, and questioning 
of, a). traditional formulations of state and society, b). the idea that language in use 
can be developed further towards a more clearly methodological outcome and c). the 
abuse ofhuman rights as a recurring, historical problem. 
This chapter will explore these three issues across two broad stages. The first 
section will analyse Linklater's critique of how modernity has developed its own 
often closed and presumptuous categories regarding the relative importance of man 
and the state (that this distortion of values echoes much ofOnufs own grounding of 
constructivism is an important correlative point for the discussion of synthesis in the 
final chapter). This will be followed by a discussion of how Linklater develops his 
theme of trans formative politics through the concepts of dialogue and citizenship, 
with specific reference to the place therein of human rights norms. 
The second section will problematise the notion of dialogic community 
through a critique of how dialogue has been used as a methodological tool by 
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constructivists, and asks the question, are values themselves represented? Then, a 
further question is raised as to whether the next step for constructivism should 
necessarily be in the direction of the Frankfurt School of critical theory- that is, 
should it depend on the communication theses of Jiirgen Habermas? The final part of 
this section suggests that the critical approach of Linklater can offer something 
potentially more valuable than this. Based on the proposition that constructivism 
excels with two-thirds of normativity- constitution and behaviour- and that this is 
due to its historical grasp of these constants of the international system, it will argue 
that there may be a way to similarly anchor values, and in doing so permit human 
rights norms the ontological primacy they arguably merit, but which a strict adherence 
to the liberalism of the Universal Declaration seems to so far have prevented from 
happening. Linklater's development of the concept of 'harm' is the device in question. 
I. A critical construction of modernity 
Re-constituting the moral polity 
According to Linklater the current states-system (stemming from a Westphalian origin 
myth and having assumed a 'generic' form) has served to cloud 'whether different 
forms of world political organisation such as empires and states-systems exhibit 
marked variations in their capacity for widening the boundaries of association and for 
creating communities of discourse which respect the differences of others.' 1 In the 
face of this, there is much current support for 'designing systems of explanation 
which move beyond single-logic accounts of social structure and historical change 
1 Linklater, Transformation., p, 132 
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[see Giddens, Mann, Tilly].'2 Elsewhere, this has been framed as a 'co-evolution' of 
accepted structure which 'establishes regulatory arrangements and vocabularies going 
beyond the ontological and epistemological framework provided by the model of the 
modern nation-state. ' 3 There must, in other words, be a different way of doing things. 
This in turn is based upon a different way of thinking about and doing the normative 
stuff of IR, which must include values and, we might expect, human rights norms. 
This is essentially Linklater's base for setting up his premise of ethical change- are-
drawing of the state. But what are the details of the journey of the modern state to this 
point which we should bear with us in moving forward along critical lines? 
Linklater' s brief history of the process of state-formation in Europe reveals 
certain key threads regarding contemporary normativity.4 Essentially, the compact 
Westphalian state aided the prosecution of war, as the logistics and economics of 
militarism were subject to a much heightened level of control. The new physicality of 
borders - frontiers no more- allowed for a more controllable and defendable space. 
This clearer definition of terms allowed, indeed encouraged, a new and vigorous 
imagination and expression of the domestic as Westphalia appeared to close off the 
domestic/international frontier, 5 but in reality did little to quash movements towards 
what John Gerard Ruggie refers to as 'collective legitimation.'6 The science of 
bureaucracy developed at an alarming rate, and so there followed a consolidation of 
rights and duties, variously located in rapidly changing pre-modern structures (of 
medieval design). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Mathias Albert and Tania Kopp-Malek, 'The Pragmatism of Global and European Governance: 
Emerging Forms oftlfe Political 'Beyond Westphalia", Millemiium: Journal of International Studies, 
vol. 31 (3) (2002), p. 468 
4 See Tr(msformation, pp. 151-153 
5 See, for example, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics oflntemational 
Political Orders', International Organization, vol. 52 (4) (1998), p. 944 
6 Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together?', p. 876 
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As the state progressed, both physically and temporally, so the industrial and 
economic environments developed as they have, with the corollary of a technological 
revolution. Commerce in particular, took on a form which has done much to write our 
subsequent history: 
The spread of capitalism has been a major reason for the 
reproduction of the modern international system of states. As 
a result, the modern system of states may avoid the fate of 
earlier international societies (which was to be absorbed 
within an empire). Conceptions of a universal communication 
community may yet come to make an unprecedented 
impression upon political life. 7 
Linklater finds grounds for optimism in taking a critical-historical perspective 
regarding state origin, with the observation that 'all past states-systems ended in 
empire but, while they survived, their constituent parts had to respond to moral claims 
made on behalf of two wider communities - the international society of states and the 
imagined community of human-kind which no one state could control.' 8 
The process which preceded increased connectivity between the constituents 
of this 'imagined community' - and which demonstrates the historical recurrence of 
dialogic community - was 'the globalisation of capitalist relations of production and 
exchange [which] greatly enlarged the sociological horizon by making modern 
populations aware of their involvement in the lengthy chains of cause and effect 
7 Linklater, Transformation, p. 153 
8 Transformation, p. 137 
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which tied different societies together. ' 9 This type of development, Linklater argues, 
had the effect that 'the extension of sociological horizons encouraged the widening of 
moral horizons, with the result that the idea of universal humanity regained some of 
the importance which it had lost during the seventeenth century.' 10 
But exactly how are sociological horizons connected to moral horizons? This 
is a great leap to make in the complex narrative of the good state. This logic implies 
one-way traffic. That is, dialogic communities by this reasoning are to be imagined 
only as exportable normative 'packages', a concept which would potentially be 
beyond the ability of those whose human rights are compromised to instigate. If so, 
then the West remains dominant by default, and then through whose eyes are these 
twin horizons perceived? Linklater may well be acknowledging the practicalities of 
establishing nascent communities, that a certain impetus is needed from somewhere, 
by some design, and that specific resources (such as the fora of discussion and the 
attendant paraphernalia offered by the U.N. for example) are needed and are best 
provided for those less able to contribute in the short-term. Without a clear way of 
eventually moving beyond this Western model, which must include the Universal 
Declaration notwithstanding its emancipatory intentions, it seems that the traditional, 
entrenched power structures would still be in place. Approaches such as Rorty' s 
'pragmatic ethnocentrism'- a kind of 'hedged' universalism which relies only on self 
perception and appreciation for its legitimacy11 -may be able to overcome this, but 
this is a conflicting dynamic in comparison with Linklater's more proactive stance. 
9 Ibid., p. 155 
10 Ibid., p. 155 
11 See Matthew Festenstein, 'Pragmatism's Boundaries' Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 
vol. 31, No. 3 (2002), pp. 561 - 565 
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What construction must contend with, or perhaps work with, is what Linklater 
labels 'the international state of nature,' 12 which is essentially founded upon 
exclusionary principles and practices. This is an acknowledgement, it seems, ofthe 
depths of entrenched symbolism and practice which characterise the modem state and 
against which normative claims are measured. Despite the official priorities of 
domestic and foreign policy, however, 'the boundaries of the political community 
have not coincided with the boundaries of the moral community, and because duties 
to fellow-citizens have not marked the outer limits of moral obligation.' Furthermore, 
'the vexed question of how the rights of outsiders are best protected has arisen 
because modem societies have problematised their systems of exclusion.' 13 Only at a 
certain evolutionary point are states able to express a moral opinion which can cross 
borders. 
Those who read the state as a problematic institution are tom between a 
'progressivist interpretation' and a 'geopolitical narrative.' 14 Hegel is perhaps the 
most notable proponent of the need to accept the ambiguities of this juxtaposition, and 
to move beyond them nevertheless. Is this choice, in other words, an absolutely 
necessary one to make? Imagining instead a coherent political community offers 
theorists a link back through time to a point in the social evolution of humans when 
'civilisation' became the standard of righteous living, and so the two factors in 
combination are almost formidable. 
Regarding claims for the upholding of human rights, what permits the 
legitimate pursuit of self-fulfilment, arguably, is the sheer density of the state. By this 
it is meant that states are of such a constitution that, given certain optimal conditions, 
th~ physicality of geopolitical machinations occur regularly at one level, whilst the 
12 Linklater, Transformation, p. 155 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. 157 
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calling of the polis is attended to, if not with equal resource, at least 
contemporaneously. 
But what of how human rights norms affect the workings of agents and 
structure in the international system? In its simplest form, the logic follows (or breaks 
down) thus: as an inevitable accompaniment to the expansion of the institution of 
statehood, so the freedoms of choice and self-actualisation grow. If 
intemationalisation can be said to be a further expansion of statehood, then those 
freedoms must exponentially grow. 
The logic has problems if we follow Hegel, who on the subject of European 
international society 'denied that international society could secure perpetual peace, 
and he rejected any notion that its arrangements revealed progress towards the 
eventual reunification of the human race. Violent conflicts arose in the relations 
between sovereign states because there was no shared moral discourse to ensure the 
peaceful resolution of fundamental political differences.' 15 
If we remove this from the context of democratic peace and take from it the 
lack of any internationally shared moral discourse at this level of politicking, it does 
not follow that this lack means ergo that all political differences should be terminal. If 
this were to be the case, the duality of the modem state must surely have already been 
bypassed in favour of geopolitics. Similarly, the notion that a political dispute should 
find a solution because of the existence of a shared moral discourse fails to account 
for the propensity of most states to act in avoidance of an escalation to militarism. 
Alternatively we might prefer to take a route, as Linklater does, which follows 
E.H Carr's reassessment of the story of the modem state, with its restructuring and 
drive towards the possibility of newly configured institutions, which is more in 
15 Ibid., p, 158 
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keeping with the revisionism of dialogic communities. The warfare (and then the 
anticipation and prosecution of it again) which utterly engulfed many governments in 
the first half ofthe twentieth century meant that 'fine balances between the individual 
and the community, economic self-interest and welfare provision, national 
sovereignty and international legal responsibilities were destroyed by the state's 
sudden lurch towards exclusionary practices which were directed against minority 
groups and aliens.' 16 The need for a focused and unshakeable war-footing 
overshadowed even imperialism. The implosion of moral conveyance was to be the 
normative pinnacle of the totalising project. 17 
Yet, the regenerative capacity of the moral-political community still 
confounds obituary writers as it did then. The problem, in Linklater' s words, is that 
despite the attentions of Carr and similarly conceived Marxist theories, 'with few 
exceptions, the mainstream literature in Political Science and International Relations 
has failed to build on these analyses of the diverse ways in which the boundaries of 
communities have been constructed.' 18 Essentially, the reproduction of past forms of 
nationalistic and militaristically conceived states was not an inevitability because the 
monopolising ethos of controlling powers in terms of the allocation of resources was 
no longer legitimate. 19 In terms of analysis, in the case of post-war European 
integration for example, the discipline was left with the traditionalist outcome of 
'neofunctionalists learn[ ing] from the first generation of institutional architects. ' 20 
This of course was a revolution of sorts, but one characterised and limited by a 
bureaucratic stifling of any lofty ideals. Generally (globally), it seems that the 
collapse of empire, with its Herculean officialdom, filtered down to the domestic 
16 1bid., p. 161 
17 See Ibid. 
IS Ibid., p. 162 
19 See Ibid., p. 163 
20 Haas and Haas, 'Pragmatic Constructivism', p. 596 
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infrastructure, leading to institutionalised conservatism. Of course, the modem rebirth 
also took place in states without an imperial history, but this is not the thesis, in terms 
of allocated time and space, for this complex discussion - neither, it must be said, is 
Transformation, but this point is at least acknowledged in some way by Linklater's 
reference to Carr's own justification of promoting equality of men and women and 
not of sovereign states.21 
Remaining with Carr, Linklater observes that . 
the tension between modes oflegitimation which stress the 
freedom and equality of subjects and various asymmetries 
of power and wealth creates the objective possibility of far-
reaching structural change, and the social and political 
movements which organise in the face of such 
contradictions are often in the line of the most recent 
advance. Progressive social movements frequently tum 
modem notions of citizenship which embody strong claims 
about freedom and equality against modes of unjust 
exclusion.22 
In the first case, 'the crux of the matter is that morality is social rather than 
individual, particular rather than universal, diverse rather than uniform, fluid rather 
than constant. ' 23 Is this merely surface-level semantics? 'Although [ communitarians] 
are obliged (albeit imperfectly) to comply with universal moral principles when they 
deal w_ith the rest ofhumankind, they are not under any moral obligation to belong to 
21 See Linklater, Transformation, p. 163 
22 1bid., p. 164 
23 Ibid., p. 51 
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a cosmopolitan political system. ' 24 Crucially, the level of morality expressed- be it to 
fellow citizens or to fellow humans - is the same. What is at stake is not a way of 
existing but a way of functioning- the group politics of communitarian association 
are radically diffused and re-engineered to fit a different, global machine, but, 
stretching the analogy a little, it still runs on the same fuel. 
That it is dominance which remains the primary factor in motivating state 
behaviour is in dispute here, but the thorny issue of moral obligation must still, it 
seems, contend with the sentiments Carr expresses: 'Theories of social morality are 
always the product of a dominant group which identifies itself with the community as 
a whole, and which possesses facilities denied to subordinate groups or individuals 
for imposing its view oflife on the community. Theories of international morality are, 
for the same reason and in virtue of the same process, the product of dominant nations 
or groups of nations. ' 25 Pushing a communitarian-shaped peg through a 
cosmopolitan-shaped hole is not an answer to what is, for Linklater, an unnecessarily 
diverting question. Instead, morality should lead politics forward, and not vice versa, 
and this holds for how constructivism should develop its epistemological and 
methodological approach towards the subject of values. 
With this ordering of continuity in mind, Linklater charts a course from 
Pufendorf s 'harmony of dispositions' to Hegel's Sittlichkeit- the institutional 
definition and validation of our moral selves, and then on to the fundamentally 
important self-determination of Walzer. Linklater chooses to cite a point made by 
Walzer which strikes a significant chord: 'To enjoy self-determination a community 
241bid. 
25 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 74 
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must be at liberty to define the boundaries which must not be crossed and the 
collective rights which must not be violated. '26 
We can follow this reasoning further: Liberty itself is derived from the 
capacity to make a choice. Self-determination is realised at the point ofliberation. For 
each concept to have any meaning, both liberty and self-determination require 
'outsiders' to levy the possibility of encroachment, and for this a clearly defined 
physical space is needed. If we accept that each community is differently constituted, 
for otherwise there would be no plurality, then it must follow that there exists a moral 
standard common to all which allows communities to co-exist harmoniously (based 
on these principles ofliberty and self-determination). 
There are limits, then, which must be imposed for the 'proper' functioning of 
communities. The assumption that all communities are able to make and execute such 
decisions does not go so far as to deny the existence of the oppressed or suppressed 
without a voice, but it does serve to ensure the perpetuity of their collective silence. 
Communitarians of varying hue would themselves deny that this is the logical 
outcome ofliberty defined thus, but it remains that the fluidity of a universal 
conception of human rights norms and values is interrupted. 
The impact of an entrenched logic of exclusion on our understanding of 
universality- of its possibility in the first instance and its qualities thereafter- cannot 
be understated. It has by several methods been undermined, notably by post-
structuralist accounts, but often these techniques reify by another name. 
Deconstruction is itself undermined, if that is the correct term, simply by building to 
different plans, which is building nonetheless. The approach preferred by Linklater is 
to cross theoretical boundaries without stopping to demolish them: 'The import of 
26 Linklater, Transformation, p. 53 
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cosmopolitanism reasoning is that loyalties to the sovereign state or to any other 
political association cannot be absolute; the upshot of the recognition that the 
diversity of cultures and loyalties has considerable value is that duties to humanity as 
a whole do not override all other obligations. ' 27 
Is it fated idealism to expect an unbiased teleology in the development of the 
emancipatory project? Linklater' s summary of positions suggests that there is 
something unsatisfactory about a 'state first' policy (indeed, any privileging 
rationale), and 'what is important. .. is not the order of priority in a hierarchy of duties 
but the tests to which loyalties of any kind ought to be subjected. The crucial measure 
is whether these loyalties are guilty of unjust exclusion. ' 28 The key point, following 
from Charles Beitz, is that cosmopolitanism should be devoid of systematic exclusion. 
Any contemplated action (or omission for that matter) with a moral dimension 
should be considered in light of the possibility of harm to outsiders which might result 
from the action,29 which itself might stem from tradition, habit or formal rules, for 
exarnple.30 The narrative of communitarian thinking in IR, provided predominantly 
by Hegel, is not blind to the notion of cosmopolitan thinking but prefers to 
compartmentalise it as a contribution to order between states, and not as a 'system' by 
its own definition. The institutions of internationalism - international law is perhaps 
the best example- provide adequately as mechanisms of arbitration between 
universality and diversity.31 
There is another flaw, perhaps of even more significance, inherent in a fixation 
on states and their clearly bounded relationship: 'The balance between universality 
27 Ibid., p. 56 
28 Ibid., p. 57 
291bid. 
30 Bjorn Hettne, 'The Fate of Citizenship in Post-Weslphalia', Citizenship Studies, vol. 4 (1) (2000), p. 
39 
31 See Linklater, Transformation, p. 59 
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and difference in the society of states is incomplete because of the large number of 
states in which cultural and political boundaries are not closely aligned. ' 32 In other 
words, the ability of states to pronounce authoritatively upon morally sensitive issues 
across borders is undermined by domestic problems. Cross-border problems, of 
course, also inflame these issues, particularly when boundaries are externally 
manufactured. 33 A more radical, solidarist possibility suggests that the territory of 
minority peoples be endowed with clearer borders in order to validate their 
independence. 34 
The implications for a human rights-focused constructivism run parallel to 
images of the state. Linklater's preference is for a thin rendering ofboth 
communitarianism and cosmopolitanism as separate philosophies, and as a combined 
attack on the prevailing politics of exclusion. This being the case, then the 
universality which we might assume constructivism must account for needs to be 
connected to statehood but without a totalising agenda or continuity thesis. States 
endow and allow, but they also diminish and neglect. That a politically receptive 
cosmopolitanism is better placed to realise its holist principles, and that there is the 
possibility of a re-imagined communitarianism- that is, a philosophy of community 
directed towards new political forms other that the state35 - are concepts which find 
support in Transformation and suggest pathways for how constructivists gather 
knowledge. 
Linklater's approach is sociological, which (if only superficially at this stage) allows 
us to forge an association back across our readings of constructivism firstly to the 
32 Ibid. 
33 See JanNederveen Pieferse, 'Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia 
Compared', International Political Science Review, vol. 18 (1) (1997) 
34 Linklater, Transfonnation, p. 59-60 
35 See Ibid., p. 60 
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complaint of Martha Finn em ore, and then the proposal of Seyla Benhabib, both noted 
in Chapter Three of this thesis. It is post-Marxist in the vein of Weber, Habermas, 
Nelson and Mann, as 'they provide means of realising the emancipatory ambitions of 
the Marxist tradition', the 'main theoretical weakness [of which] was its failure to 
take account of forms of exclusion based on gender, ethnicity and race, and its neglect 
of the role that state-building, geopolitics and war, and moral-cultural developments 
have played in the construction of human societies. ' 36 In other words, the contexts of 
discourse and dialogue need to be drawn broadly in order to accommodate the various 
possible forms ofhuman to human contact. 
Both Nelson and Mann 'have explored lines of sociological inquiry which are 
alert to the historical importance of inter-civilisational and inter-state relations.' These 
explorations culminate, effectively, in a key proposition: 'empires have encouraged 
advances in universality yet simultaneously stood in the way of their further 
development. '37 Imperialism promotes a false unity based, utterly paradoxically, on 
segregationist principles. Political universality, or at least the quest for it, comes at the 
expense of moral universality. Linklater's state, then, is already beginning to resemble 
Onufs in that it is built upon an exploitative base which has been shrouded beneath 
liberal or modernist justifications. 
Linklater's image of Marxism, or rather of a Marxist reality, follows the chief 
omission highlighted by Debray and Walzer, that a logic of differentiation must be 
acknowledged- the real and artificial boundaries of Self/Other, inside/outside, 
domestic and foreign38 - in order for theorists to take a sounder footing in their work. 
The polarity of modernity is an illusion, albeit a safe one for those existing on the 
inside. The mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion, conditions that are 
36 Ibid., p. 111 
37 Ibid., p. Ill 
38 See Ibid., p. 113 
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'ubiquitous features of social life', remain defended by principles which 'vary 
enormously and extend across a range of dialogic and non-dialogic modes of 
legitimation.'39 The point is two-fold: that exclusion is an entrenched feature of 
statehood (bolstered by the doctrines of nationalism) which inevitably remains as a 
template as long as certain types of power dominate, and also that this is how 
constructivism has to visualise statehood if it is to successfully ontologise values in 
the form ofhuman rights norms. 
The evolution of the state has led to a rupturing of the social, political and 
moral dimensions of civil life. Linklater is constructing a well-founded platform for 
the skills-set needed by humanity to close this divide in a normative, emancipatory 
fashion. Sociological analyses of the emergence and interaction of identities have 
generally failed, as a corpus, to assign an appropriate level of importance to 'the role 
played by the rationalisation of the moral code in modem societies. Yet these societies 
have been the site for unique experiments in rationalising the ethical criteria which 
states and their citizens have used to evaluate the legitimacy of the dominant modes of 
. 1 . d 1 . '40 me uston an exc uston. 
So far, we have a vision of the state which allows for an interrogation of the 
relationship between morals and politics in the international system. Key to 
Link:later's development of his transformation thesis is the treatment of citizens within 
it. 
The state, citizenship and human rights 
The Hegelian balance of the at once competing and complementary needs of 
individual and community, so apparently successful as the modem state endured, was 
39 Ibid., p. 114 
40 Ibid., p. 146 
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fatally undermined, as E.H. Carr pointed out, by the dramatic expansion of European 
citizenship in the first half of the twentieth century.41 Linklater develops this, with an 
eye set firmly on a praxeological end, by focusing on the need to 'understand how 
citizenship might come to be separated from the sovereign state and embedded in the 
practices of a more powerful international society. '42 The development of new forms 
of citizenship and community are the primary vehicles for the realisation of this re-
alignment. 
For Linklater, the 'good state' notion explored to some extent by this thesis is 
the modem state as defined by citizenship. The praxeology of his approach gives rise 
to three claims regarding the citizen being the force within the state which demands 
alternative representation: citizenship is the repository of the moral capital 
accumulated over the course of sustained resistance to the duality of modernity 
discussed above; as such, it can be used as a moral tool in the restructuring of 
normative political community; citizens recognise fellow citizens across borders 
which feeds the moral imperative to attend to transnational moral harm.43 
In the fashion of grand narrative, 'it is the important forms of moral-practical 
learning which occurred within the cultural sphere which make the further 
transformation of state structures and progress towards a universal communication 
community possible. This is the key to understanding the progressive dimensions of 
modernity.'44 This type of modernity, however, which 'draws its critical power from 
the tension between political self-description and the observation of the social 
sciences' is full of 'contradictions, dilemmas, and unseen and unintended side-
41 See Ibid., pp. 147-150 
42 Ibid., p. 151 
43 See Ibid., p. 164 
44 1bid., pp. 164- 165 
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effects. ' 45 In language perhaps more familiar to the policy makers who must realise 
these normative aims, 'the recognition that individuals cannot make use of their legal 
and political rights unless they posses sufficient social and economic powers demands 
support for welfare internationalism. '46 
The three 'ideal-type' frameworks of political action seen as an extension of 
Carr's intentions are pluralist, solidarist and post-Westphalian.47 Interestingly, there is 
a lack of a hierarchy in Linklater' s understanding of the forms. Each of them 'widens 
the boundaries of community to ensure due consideration for the interests of others 
[and] moves beyond the supposition that the difference of the other is a good reason 
for privileging the interests of insiders. ' 48 But rather than assuming that each is a 
betterment of the last, all three 'contribute to the creation of a universal 
communication community. '49 
Although each can provide for a certain standard demanded by the logic of 
emancipation, each must necessarily have a different form, which suggests the 
possibility of difference in the trajectories of continuity and change as frameworks 
wax and wane. As examples of frameworks of the good state, each must in turn have 
mechanisms in place which allow for 'movement beyond egocentric social systems 
which deny the rights of outsiders, ' 50 the capacity and will to follow the rule of 
international law, and the ability to overcome the diverting effects that 'the role which 
sovereignty, territoriality and national citizenship has played in obstructing 
international political action to reduce transnational harm.' 51 Indeed, as Reus-Smit 
45 Ulrich Beck, 'Toward a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent', Constellations, vol. 10 (4) 
(2003), p. 467 
46 Linklater, Transformation, p. 165 
47 See Ibid., pp. 166- 167 
48 . Ibid., p. 167 
491bid. 
50 Ibid., p. 168 
51 Ibid. 
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cites and then interprets Carr: ''Political action must be based on a coordination of 
morality and power.' Politics, therefore, not only has at least two dimensions, it must 
be seen as occupying the difficult deliberative and practical space between these, ' 52 
which we would expect to be the proper domain of values-focused constructivism. 
Certainly, the Universal Declaration occupies an uneasy position between morality 
and power on the issue of the rights of outsiders. Reus-Smit's image of political 
action again jars what constructivism is best set up to do against the arena into which 
it is being pitched. We must consider, at the very least, whether these forms are 
themselves sufficiently coherent to enable the vision of a dialogic community. 
Towards the end of Transformation, Linklater notes how the Western 
imagination inclines towards a moral statism. In reality, 'notions of world citizenship 
usually refer to compassion for the rest ofhumanity/3 and not to a revolution of 
government which the term can also suggest- the 'intemationalisation' of this 
normative principle is a widely-supported view. 54 That said, 'ways ofbeing' in the 
maintenance of the political-moral ratio are generally enshrined and inflexible to the 
demands of emancipatory change. Historically, 'the dominant traditions of political 
theory have often criticised efforts to enlist citizenship in support of these aspirations. 
They have argued that the civic ideal of active participation in politics can only be 
realised in the arrangements which bind co-nationals within a common way oflife. ' 55 
International citizenship is bound by the totality of its domestic incarnation. In other 
words, the benefits of citizenship derive from the actual state in question and not from 
52 Reus-Smit, 'Politics and Legal Obligation', p. 607 
53 Linklater, Transformation, p.-f79 - -
54 See, for example, Daniele Archib~gi, 'Principles of, Cosmopqlitan Democr~r;;y' ,_in Daniele 
Archibugi, David Held and M. Kohler (eds.), Re-imagining Political Community (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1998), p. 216, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics', p. 907, 
and Hettne, 'The Fate of Citizenship in Post-Westphalia', p. 44 
55 Linklater, Transformation, p. 179 
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the institution itself, which means that an emphasis on ethics rather than totalising 
morals is the best way of understanding this in normative terms. 
The paradox of contemporary theory- or rather of citizenship in 
contemporary theory- is that dominant strands 'may be sceptical or critical of the 
notion of world citizenship but most argue that citizens have duties to the members of 
other political communities which they have to reconcile with their obligations to one 
another. ' 56 Why is it not possible, Linklater argues, for communities to be built upon 
the principle of parity in dialogue, and for those communities to maintain a strong and 
supportive lineage with states via the institution of citizenship? Is this revolutionary 
or worse, Utopian? 
Using the reserves of moral and political education and purpose accumulated 
in the ongoing historical campaign against exclusion opens the door to the 'possibility 
of more radical trajectories of political development in which higher levels of 
universality and difference unfold simultaneously and the prospects for totalising 
projects are eroded.' 57 So far, so idealstic? 
But citizenship does not only enable, it obligates. This obligation to cooperate 
within the limits of political communication extends across the three types of 
international system mentioned above -pluralist, solidarist and post-Westphalian. 
The latter, most revolutionary form is at the heart of the idea that it is the moral aspect 
of the moral-political nexus which, if pursued, shall fundamentally alter the shapes 
and symbols of institutional power: 'Like-minded states which are exposed to high 
levels of transnational harm have an obligation to replace state monopoly powers over 
56 Ibid., p. 180 
57 Ibid., p. 181 
238 
decisions concerning the distribution of membership, citizenship and global 
responsibilities with bold democratic experiments in transnational rule.' 58 
This is not an easy statement to digest. Firstly, what are 'like-minded' states, 
particularly those grouped as 'Post-Westphalian', when states in this category might 
assume any of a number of experimental forms? At the very base of the complexity of 
this structural arrangement is the notion that weak (or somehow dominated) states and 
those that are oppressively ruled- the states, in other words, not best equipped for 
any kind of administrative upheaval - should somehow reinvent themselves as part of 
a group effort. What is corning to the fore here is the pressure which human rights 
norms place upon states to act as states. It seems that the resolution is to be found in 
the ways in which these states choose to interact with those of pluralist or solidarist 
affiliation. But even this is problematic. 'Pluralists argue that sovereignty is often the 
only protection that weak states have against the strong. ' 59 
Linklater's argument for this kind of responsible Self- and Other- aware 
governance is contained in five sections of Transformation which will be discussed in 
part here. The first two cover ground that has been considered in earlier sections - the 
refinement and overcoming of exclusionary practices, and the legitimacy of the 
sovereign state, and so do not require repetition here. The remaining three parts do 
concern the place of human rights within this kind of critical approach. Therefore, 
before pursuing more direct empirical insights into the relationship between 
citizenship and human rights, we must be sure of the framework which Linklater 
provides. The sections chart Hedley Bull's speculative historical assessment of the 
future ofWestphalian states, the relation of this to Linklater's citizenship thesis, and 
58 Ibid., p. 182 
59 Alex J. Bellamy, 'Pragmatic Solidarism and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention', 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 31 (3) (2002), p. 476 
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finally the current state of affairs regarding the contemporary development of post-
Westphalian states. 
Linklater frames citizenship such as to endow it with radical properties. In 
particular, it 'can be turned against the very political framework within which citizens 
have defined their own rights and duties - the sovereign state which is one of the last 
bastions of exclusion to attract critical scrutiny. ' 60 It seems that the uncertainty-
vagueness even- of universalism begets radicalism, or at least the tendency towards 
it. 
Bull' s "system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty' ... [was a] 
potentially momentous shift in the organisation of European international society 
[which] revolved around two main patterns of change. ' 61 In this 'neo-medievalism', 
briefly, these patterns of change consisted of regional integration which obviated the 
need for a higher transnational power, and, perhaps more interestingly, the idea that 
'minority nations and separatist groups could aim to reduce the power of the nation-
state without aiming for full sovereign status. ' 62 There would be no absolute 
sovereignty. By analogy, there would in effect be several different weight divisions, 
but all participants would still follow the same rules. Perhaps not Queensbury, but 
validated and codified nonetheless. It would be a means to overcome the 'conspiracy 
of silence entered into by governments about the rights and duties of their respective 
citizens. '63 
The abrogation of sovereignty fundamentally challenges everything we have 
come to expect from the Westphalian system. Yet, the argument for a diffusion of 
legal and political authority does not fail on a point of logic. Rather, it will be judged 
60 Linklater, Transformation, p. 193 
61 Ibid., p. 194 
621bid. 
63 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (2nd ed.) (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p. 80 
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on the basis of preference: 'The state's monopoly right to determine the order of 
priority of political allegiances - national before sub-state and transnational - would 
be relinquished within a neo-medievalist international order.' 64 State 'control' of its 
subjects would be unrecognisable, but even though 'images of Europe and the wider 
world which envisage the unravelling of sovereign states and the multiplication of 
human loyalties have gained support from several different strands of social and 
political theory in recent years,' 65 the machinery of society's daily functioning must 
still be attended to. 
At this point, Linklater reminds us of Carr's prompts for a national-
international complimentary connectivity, wherein the sub-national and the 
transnational together constitute 'joint rule'. 66 This type of normative governance 
would work by 'creating the social and economic preconditions of the wider 
communities of discourse which unfold the progressive side of modernity. ' 67 In other 
words, the machinery would mirror the constitution of the citizenry, and would cede 
control to that citizenry, rather than perpetuate the grand tradition of rule. Ultimately, 
'political transformation would involve the divorce of citizenship from the state, just 
as it was uncoupled earlier from the medieval town and the Renaissance city. ' 68 By 
this reasoning, in the history without singular end, citizenship does not replace 
sovereignty as the conclusion to social progress, but it is presently the higher 
principle. 
64 Linklater, Transformation, p. 195 
65 c -Ibid., p. 196 
66 Ibid., p. 197 
671bid. 
681bid. 
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The re-evaluated meaning of Westphalian sovereignty is considered chiefly in 
light of the fabrication of a new Europe.69 Generally, 'what has been established 
within the European Union thus far is a thin conception of citizenship which brings an 
international civil society into existence rather than the thicker conception of 
citizenship which active membership of a political community is normally thought to 
imply.' 70 It is a model which relies on democracy and the democratising of 
institutions which has the contingent effects of standardisation and manageability. It 
seems, therefore, that democracy is the default setting for progress. But this thinness 
is not intended to last: 'The higher normative goal is to ensure that the process of 
uncoupling citizenship from state sovereignty results in a thicker conception of 
citizenship in which societal potentials for increasing human autonomy prevails over 
competing logics of social control.' 71 By this reckoning, citizenship might not be the 
'end', but it is certainly built to endure. 
Identity must be despatched as a controlling force, and broader affiliating 
grounds established: 'inevitably, a sense of humanitarian obligation has to stand in for 
shared nationality or common interest in the case of world citizenship.' 72 The web of 
social, civil and political rights is ultimately self-sustaining as they feed into each 
other, and have the effect of cohering transnational citizenship into a vehicle for the 
benefit of much more than the individual - a stronger normative legal framework 
69 Linklater fails to engage with wider concerns, such as African and Asian unifying initiatives, even at 
a comparative level. At the very least, how both ASEAN and the African Union, and the various 
regional conglomerates address inter-governmental issues would be a foremost requirement for a 
constructivist understanding of the relationship between citizenship, difference and change. Certainly, 
the forms of engagement required and inspired both inter-governmentally with African nations and 
intra-governmentally within the continent speak to the broad inclusivity which we might expect from a 
normative and universally astute approach. See Simon Maxwell anaKariri Cliristiansen, ''Negotiation 
as s4!Iultaneous equation': building a new partnership with Africa', Internatignal Affairs, vol. 78 (3) 
(2M2) 
70 Linklater, Transformation, p. 199 
71 Ibid., p. 200 
72 Ibid., p. 201 
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would result, to the advantage, presumably, of anyone wishing to make a human 
rights claim. 73 
The 'Europe first' image of political change fits largely with the origins of the 
Westphalian state, and Linklater expresses some optimism in that 'Europe may well 
become a model of post-Westphalian political organisation which is emulated by 
regions elsewhere.' 74 The corpus which we can refer to as European must lead, 
though, only by example and not by sermon if the now familiar caveats related to 
power are to be avoided- which apply equally to the subject of this thesis as to the 
'power of democratic agency' 75 which is Benhabib' s particular focus, for example. 
There is also the problematic character and implications of cosmopolitan 
citizenship to consider. The difficulty, broadly stated, is that by the majority of 
traditional accounts, 'cosmopolitan citizenship suggests vague and ultimately 
unenforceable moral responsibilities to the rest of humanity, whereas national 
citizenship entails concrete rights which are guaranteed by the political community.' 76 
The key to understanding the former- this 'woolly notion' -lies with the 
understanding that it does not seek to defend perfect political rights, but rather it 
should react to the outcomes of this universal communication community. What, 
then, comes first? The citizen or the community? 
As far as stating a preference for a 'thick' or 'thin' conception of a world 
citizenry, Linklater clearly supports the latter- it is a vehicle for real change, with 
dismantling capabilities and ability to promote higher levels of autonomy. 77 That is 
not to say that a thick version of cosmopolitan citizenship cannot play a role, as it is a 
73 See lliid.,-p. 202 
741bid., p. 204 
75 Seyla Bellhabib, 'Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking 
Citizenship in Volatile Times', Citizenship Studies, vol. 11 (1) (2007) p. 33 
76 Linklater, Transformation, p. 205 
77 See Ibid., p. 205 
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much more acceptable formulation for an institutionalism that shuns revolution. A 
thick version ties in with at least one branch of sensibilities related to constructivism: 
It is a much firmer statement of intention for the critically inclined to subscribe to. 
Is it possible to gauge the intemationalisation of values by monitoring the 
development of citizenship, as if the constitution of the latter correlates somehow to 
the constitution of the former? Seyla Benhabib, in describing how citizenship rights 
and human rights have become in many cases conflated due to the extension of 
cosmopolitan norms, speaks of 'changes in modalities of political belonging' 78 which 
have left many to suffer institutionalised exclusion. Citizenship, in effect, helps to 
define what non-citizens are not, or do not have, or are not entitled to. 
What citizenship can tell us about human rights seems to depend on the extent 
to which there has been a global change in the traditionally discrete nature of the 
relationship between state and citizen. Shafir and Brysk argue that this is human rights 
pulling very muchfrom citizenship, rather than to some other form of rights 
institution.79 'New' human rights, in other words, are derived from human needs 
previously established within the conventions of citizenship. 
What sets human rights norms apart is essentially their universal character, 
which goes some way towards explaining why they are a relatively new human 
innovation, compared with the origin of citizenship. Of course, the leap from tribal 
loyalties to 'membership' of a city-state was a significant development in the civic 
ordering of peoples in ancient Greece, but human rights, arguably, are still looking for 
their own landing platform. 'The idea of citizenship in the present, as in the past, 
anchors rights in membership in a politically sovereign entity, whereas human rights 
78 Benhabib, 'Twilight of Sovereignty', p. 20 
79 See Gershon Shafrr and Alison Brysk, 'The Globalization of Rights: From Citizenship to Human 
Rights', Citizenship Studies, vol. 10 (3) (2006) 
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are rooted in the individual by virtue of his or her humanity and not due to his or her 
status in the body politic. ' 80 
Ultimately, to say that citizens have citizenship rights because they are citizens 
tells us nothing of any use. Human rights, as we have seen, continue to carry with 
them much the same problem, but without such a consistent and uncontroversial 
means of resolving it. The existence of an enveloping state makes citizenship rights 
'effective', whereas human rights remain 'poignant' - a cavernous distinction. 81 
Human rights are, though, invested with a great deal of potential in terms of their 
possible future reach, which outstrips those rights (civil, political etc.) bound to a 
specific addressee state. 
It follows that one perspective of the future of human rights sees them develop 
as a kind of universal citizenship, the possession of which allows claims to be made to 
the particular state which physically contains the claimant, or to a 'home' state to 
which the claimant 'belongs'. The other perspective is negative- a new imperialism 
of values. This is a point of concern for constructivism, and we shall consider its 
implications further in the sections below. For now though, the proposed route from 
citizenship rights to human rights is of interest. 
Shafir and Brysk speak of citizenship providing 'domestic frames which can 
be bridged as part of a process of globalization to universal human rights, such as 
freedoms and entitlements. ' 82 The notion that a constructivist approach may be able to 
'track' human rights norms in this way- even, perhaps, to a predictive level, is an 
attractive analytical prospect because of the depth of understanding of institutional 
change which it potentially offers. Difficulties arise, however, with an 
underdeveloped notion of 'a process of globalization'. 'Domestic frames' suggests 
80 Ibid., p. 277 
81 See Ibid. 
82 1bid., p. 280 
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that certain human rights emerge by following the precedents set by citizenship 
trends, but how is globalisation defined? 
The limits of using 'globalisation' as the device upon which to hang the future 
development of human rights norms is recognised as being inherently limited: 'Sadly, 
the struggle for the realization of the global human right to sustainable livelihood has 
to promote niche markets, since presently it can reach no further than the individuals 
who think globally, namely, the small number ofthe global citizens oftoday.' 83 
Similarly, in this particular study human rights action in Europe is compared with 
inactivity in much of the rest of the world, save for grey areas which add problems to 
research programs rather than rich complexity: 'The crucial trade-off is between the 
extension ofhuman rights and their enforcement.' 84 Constructivism as defined in this 
thesis, and in the wider literature, must surely be cautious about which of these 
properties of human rights norms are instructive regarding their impact on the 
international system. 
II. The limits of dialogic community 
Dialogue and constructivism 
There are two features of humanism which continue to belie reports of its demise; 
systems of exclusion exist, and contemporary social and political theory persists in 
producing movements primarily concerned with exposing their attendant unjust 
practices. It has become increasingly clear that the human rights norms contained 
wiiliin the Universal Declaration represent the unsatisfactory way in which these 
83 Ibid., p. 284 
84 Ibid., pp. 284-285 
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features have so far been codified. Linklater's own exposition focuses on dialogue not 
only as treatment of symptoms, but as identifier of cause. Critical theoretical 
approaches have in common a 'resistance to unjustified modes of exclusion ... linked 
with a conception of the self and society which values the expansion of the boundaries 
of dialogic forms of life. Dialogue is the preferred means by which subjects should 
decide whether systems of exclusion are justified. ' 85 
How does this become 'community' in a wider, possibly universal sense, and 
to what extent might this border-crossing development a). push the limits of what is 
'critical' for it still to be considered a constructivist path, and b). offer a useful 
understanding ofhow values spread and affect the identity and relationships of 
international actors? 
Linklater offers no sound-bite definition of dialogic community. The concept 
is developed through a series of steps: 
Most communities rest on special ties and harmonies of 
social disposition but they are always vulnerable to the claim 
that they unjustly exclude those who do not share the 
dominant identity. The goal of dialogic relations with the 
members of systematically excluded groups therefore 
emerges as a normative ideal. As in international relations, 
where it is necessary to enlarge the boundaries of the 
community to engage non-nationals as equals in open 
dialogue, membership of wider communication communities 
do not presume that others must have the same cultural 
85 Linklater, Transformation, p. 109 
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orientations or share similar political aspirations. All that has 
to be assumed is that cultural differences are no barrier to 
equal rights of participation within a dialogic community. 
The duty to associate with others as co-legislators within 
wider communities of discourse rests on the fact that there 
are no compelling differences between human beings which 
can legitimate their prima facie exclusion from dialogic 
interaction. ' 86 
This long quotation allows us to see how Linklater constructs the logic of 
dialogic community. Without unnecessary recourse to a Utopian philosophy, it seems 
that a new, more attainable level at which their voices can be legitimately heard is 
what is being offered to the oppressed, the suppressed and the disenfranchised. It is in 
this context that Linklater speaks of a 'willingness to engage wildly different human 
beings qua human beings, in a dialogue which assesses the rationality of the practices 
of exclusion. ' 87 
The justification for dialogic communities rests upon the better argument of 
Linklater's preferred system of universal ethics- 'dialogic cosmopolitanism' as a 
form of discourse ethics. The argument is pitched against the traditional 
ahistoricallhistorical split of natural law and progressivist interpretations. In 
Linklater's words: 'Whereas the natural law perspective argues that only human 
knowledge of permanent truth varies, the progressivist interpretation argues that 
reason itselfhas a history and conceptions of freedom are revised and enlarged over 
86 Ibid., p. 85 
87 Ibid., p. 87 
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time. ' 88 It is clear that Linklater, following Hegel and Rorty, gives credence to reason, 
but only in its ability to span and connect the relationships of humans as they happen 
and develop historically. Does this mean that, working on a cumulative principle, it is 
heading towards an 'end state'? 
In this sense it shares an invidious charge with natural law - ethnocentrism. 89 
Although the Hegelian and Marxist well-spring promoted a primarily intellectual and 
then latterly a social enmity towards 'natural' barriers to the enjoyment of self-
determination, there was no attendant critical reflection on the contemporary subject 
of imperial ambition, which has affected retrospective scrutiny and directed criticism 
to this lack.90 In order to distinguish discourse ethics from the terminal philosophy of 
history, a conscious elevation of the principles of dialogue is needed to fit the schema 
of the emancipatory project (to include values, human rights norms, etc.). Linklater 
begins with the moral-practical learning element ofHabermas's reconstruction of 
historical materialism. Although we shall question the extent to which Habermas adds 
value to the present thesis a little later in this chapter, it will be worthwhile to pursue 
Linklater' s argument here. 
Regarding Habermas's understanding of the three hierarchical stages of moral 
understanding- pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional- it is the latter 
which enables discriminatory participation in society: 'Post-conventional ethical 
reasoning involves levels of critical disengagement from authority patterns or group 
norms and unqualified openness to the perspectives of others. For Habermas discourse 
ethics is the apex of post-conventional moral reasoning: it is the product of complex 
processes of moral learning. ' 91 Reasoned consent governs the validity of norms. With 
88 Ibid., p. 88-89 
89 See Ibid., p. 89 
90 See Ibid. 
91 Ibid., p. 91 
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this in mind, 'it follows that a political community which has a commitment to 
discourse ethics will be deeply concerned about the damaging effects of its actions on 
outsiders.'92 Would it not, though, be the case that the normatively informed 
rationalisation of any action would pre-empt any possibility of that action having 
'damaging effects'? 
Importantly, the design ofHabermas's conception is differentiated from 
Kant's 'fiction of a universal social contract' which meant that 'all human beings and 
not only fellow-citizens had to proceed with regard for the politics of consent,' a 
regard arrived at via 'private ratiocination.'93 Rather, the process is governed by the 
politics of association. Ultimately, it is the force of the better argument which carries 
the day. 
Discourse ethics is about a procedure, and not the sort of singular outcome 
which might have the side-effect of a slide back towards agendas of power contained 
in universalistic positions. Linklater raises the feminist critique of the drive towards a 
universal standpoint- it is 'perpetuating an exclusionary, male ethic. ' 94 Very briefly, 
the solution (if it can be referred to as that) is to start from the position that 'the ethic 
of care and responsibility complements the ethic of justice by bringing finely-tuned 
hermeneutic moral skills and interpersonal sensibilities to bear on the implementation 
of public norms. This formulation depicts the ethics of care and justice as two sides of 
the same moral coin. ' 95 It appears that a focus on the valued principles of sensitivity, 
interpretation and understanding is as doctrinal as the process gets. 
In his own discussion of universalism Linklater is keen to establish a note of 
cautious yet determined optimism. Thus the proper domain of this type of critical 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., p. 93 
95 Ibid., p. 94 
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project, and the purpose of constructivism as defined by this thesis (if it is to follow 
Linklater's approach), is to reflect on the 'powerful moral and cultural trends which 
exist, to some degree, in all contemporary societies. ' 96 By doing so, plans are 
effectively drawn up for the 'radical intensification of the democratic impulses which 
are inherent in modernity but frequently stifled or cancelled by competing logics of 
normalisation and control. '97 
In one sense, these are the underpinnings of the holist sensibilities of 
constructivists. Yet, another sense carries with it a caveat. Talk of' democratic 
impulses' and 'powerful moral and cultural trends' could be construed as the basis of 
a steering agenda, certainly if they are formalised prior to the due academic process of 
analytical investigation (of the type, perhaps, preferred by Onuf). There is a self-
correcting mechanism in the dialogic community- 'no conception of ethics is 
satisfactory if it endorses the systematic exclusion of any individual member of the 
human species, on a priori grounds'98 - but whether this goes far enough to dispel the 
concern just raised is doubtful. 
Placing this in the context of his critique of modernity and the state, Linklater 
speaks of 'restructuring social arrangements' and 'transcending state sovereignty,' 99 
which is not so revolutionary as a traditionalist reading of history might suggest, if it 
is possible to uncover the contexts and agendas of modernity. So it follows that 
'sensitivity to unjust forms of exclusion and the normative attachment to dialogue are 
historical products. Societies which question the moral significance of racial, cultural, 
ethnic and gender differences are the result of complex processes of social change 
which have been influenced by various forms of political struggle and resistance.' As 
96 1bid., p. 100 
97 1bid., p. 101 
981bid. 
99 1bid., p. 109 
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a result, 'critical cultures ... are not the historical norm' and 'no teleology has steered 
them to this point, guarantees their future development or underwrites their long-term 
survival.' 100 
The mechanism of the privileging logic of citizenship is circular: close 
proximity foments obligation, and obligations are discharged more willingly to those 
within political reach. Yet this does not account for the vastly complex question of 
why this is so. Removed from its Western inception, cosmopolitan morality promises 
universal merit for all. Yet 'the state's record as a moral agent ofhumanitarianism is 
very dubious.' 101 Statehood, similarly, is an ideally nurturing condition. Both, though, 
are subject to the charge, levied by anti-foundationalists, of assuming an Archimedean 
point. 
In presenting his case for dialogic communities, Linklater is keen to make it as 
water-tight as possible, and this means engaging with postmodern and (as mentioned 
briefly above) feminist interrogations. Claims of establishing the truth, or at least 
being on the right path towards doing so, must be a cautionary tale for a 
constructivism often accused ofbeing distracted by a grand-theoretical impetus. 
In his particular history of the sociology of emancipation, Linklater's account 
of how postmoderns tend to scrutinise modernity and its underlying power structures 
begins with Marxism, and then also introduces the phraseology of 'incredulity 
towards metanarratives,' 'arbitrary interpretations,' 'artificial realities' and 'new 
instruments of social surveillance and political control.' 102 From the perspective of 
postmodems, 'all modernist claims to possess unrivalled insight into the possibilities 
for the transformation of society- global as well as national - elicit dismay and 
100 Ibid., p. 110 
101 Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention', International Political Science 
Review, vol. 18 (1) (1997), p. 16 
102 See Linklater, Transformation, p. 63 
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suspicion.' 103 Perhaps the most intriguing broad stroke of postmodemism, in view of 
this thesis and Linklater's project, is that universalism 'does not represent a major 
advance in moral consciousness but signifies the emergence of new social systems 
that possess more subtle technologies of control which rely upon the construction and 
marginalisation of difference.' 104 
If universalism is not an advance, then it is not worth expending the 
(unlimited?) material and intellectual resources required to comprehend how it might 
'contain' values. Equally, if quests for its 'truths', whether they be moral or linguistic, 
actually perpetuate that which its idealistic motivation seeks to end- repression, 
exclusion, inequitable control, the general dismissal of human rights norms, etc.-
then it should be actively denounced at the very least. As with the maxim that 
ignorance of the law is no defence, an incomplete comprehension of the dangers of 
universal thinking is no refuge from its outcomes. This might be the postmodem 
position, but where would this place constructivism in Linklater's critique? His 
argument is that the modern sociology of knowledge has the epistemological capacity 
to deflate any features of universalism deemed totalising or imperialistic, without 
necessarily falling back on a postmodem view. The insights that 'all knowledge is 
socially constructed, and the criteria which are used to distinguish truth from 
falsehood change radically over time,' 105 are constructivist foundation stones, and 
would seem to support a constructivist position in the project of delegitimising 
exclusion and promoting values as sources of international knowledge. 
So, contained within Linklater's argument, as long as it is assumed to be more 
than postmodern in its constitution, are indications that all is not lost. Primarily, the 
strategy is to focus on means of developing our understanding of solidarism, and of 
103 Ibid., pp. 63-64 
104 Ibid., p. 64 
105 Ibid. 
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the particular forms it includes and the expanse it covers: 'Historicist thinkers such as 
Meinecke rejected the enlightenment dream of a cosmopolitan society but defended a 
conception of international society in which communities would recognise each 
other's efforts to express cultural potentials in infinitely varied and frequently 
incommensurable ways.' 106 Embrace without proselytising, in other words. Similarly, 
'the claim that the society of states should embrace an elementary cosmopolitanism 
has strong affinities with Rorty's thesis that progress towards a more humane morality 
is centred on the conviction that the differences between groups are ultimately less 
important than the shared experience of 'pain and humiliation'.' 107 
'Humanity' as a finished product which is extended from one to another is an 
outmoded concept. Rather than the widely held conviction that it is a cause in itself, 
we should be more sophisticated in our treatment and application of a 'humanistic 
ethic.' 108 Would this entail a rethinking ofhow, in terms of moral authority, 
humanism is assumed to be hierarchically higher than political cornmunity? 109 And, if 
so, what would the implications be for constructivism? A methodological impasse or 
opportunity? There is no reason to suggest that it couldn't be the latter. 
It is worth considering the following: 'The objection to universalisable ethics 
is that they may obliterate individuality.' 110 This carries with it a presumption of the 
value of individuality. It is a side issue, perhaps, but one worth noting as Linklater 
builds towards the universality of his dialogic communities. The implication is that 
individuals as political units should be sufficiently capable of creating and sustaining 
106 115'-.J~ ~ 65 lu., p. 
107 Ibid., p. 66 
1081bid. 
109 For an interesting and useful discussion of this point, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, 'Cosmopolitan 
Patriots', Critical Inquiry, Vol. 23 (3) (1997) 
110 Linklater, Transformation, p. 67 
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the requirements of a moral-political system without resorting to the collective 
exclusion of others. 
Ultimately it is the complexities of postmodemism, which appear often as 
contradictions, which prevent Linklater from coalescing its main themes with dialogic 
communities. Anti-foundationalism does not have a sufficiently realisable programme 
of research and action to enable emancipatory freedoms in any field other than 
abstract intellectualism: 'The postmodem defence of the ethic of freedom may be an 
ironic and even self-refuting stance: if the aim is to question established meanings, to 
unsettle accepted conventions, to disturb all efforts to speak with a sovereign voice, 
then it is difficult to know why an ethic of freedom should be preferred to an ethic of 
d · · ,Ill ommatton. 
Linklater' s further probing, although broadly supportive of postmodernism' s 
humanistic intent, fails to produce anything concrete to build on, which of course 
should come as no surprise. What is drawn from these varied expositions is again 
support for the triumvirate of pluralist, solidarist and post-Westphalian conceptions of 
international society. It is worth re-citing here, 112 in the specific context of values, 
that although no preference is clearly stated, Linklater is clearly in agreement with the 
'quasi-Hegelian aversion to having to choose between fixed moral absolutes and 
incommensurable social realities [which] abandons the grand metanarratives in which 
the lower cultures fall by the wayside as reason unfolds in history.' 113 
There is an intellectual and moral attractiveness to this balancing which opens 
rather than closes doors on projects- broadly linguistic, or otherwise ethically 
conceived - which still need to work with statism rather than against it. The 
disentanglement of progress from a singular vision becomes a more realistic prospect 
Ill Ibid., p. 71 
112 See Chapter One, above, p. 
113 Ibid., p. 76 
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when 'what is substituted is a thinner notion of progress that refers to the expanding 
circle of human sympathy which ought to be the aim ofthose who identify with the 
liberal community. No claims on any other culture are embedded in this perspective.' 
114 
Very briefly, the aspects offeminism which Linklater chooses to focus on in 
the critique of universality centre on a re-positioned ethic of care, rather than the 
morality of justice. Primarily from Gilligan, the conclusion is drawn that 'a highly 
developed hermeneutic grasp of personal character and social context- the very 
considerations which an abstract morality of justice deliberately ignores- is one of 
the main constitutive features of the ethic of care and responsibility.' 115 The 
traditionally employed language of morality and moral-political association is, in 
other words, rhetoric. It does not actually represent the character and intellect of 
individuals whose ethical priorities emanate from their singular- yet historically 
situated- concerns. Cases such as Kosovo only serve to highlight this. 116 
Ultimately, the superiority of the morality of justice (as upheld by the lineage 
from Kant to Habermas) is found precisely in and because of its universality, 'because 
it requires the individual to take the wider moral point ofview.' 117 If the 'wider moral 
point of view' is to be entrenched, however, it runs the dual risks of standardisation 
and the reification of utilitarian, numerical supremacy. The former has the potential to 
stagnate the process with the potential result of failing the needs of sufferers; the latter 
is open to charges of quantitative justice, akin to the philosophical problems with 
democracy. A, or the, moral point of view, of course, is also associated with the 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., p .. 67-68 
116 See, for example, Christine M. Chinkin, 'Editorial Comments: Nato's Kosovo Intervention', The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 93 (4) (1999) 
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original position philosophy of Rawls which leads to the inevitable interrogation: 
whose justice? 118 
Linklater has theorised dialogic communities in such a way that they seem to share 
many of the component parts of a constructivist view of the world. To what extent is 
this borne out in the application of theory to practice? There is no extensive body of 
research in IR linking dialogue to values which does not have at its base some 
incorporation or critique of Jiirgen Habermas's theory of communicative action. 
Habermas, however, plays only a part in Linklater's approach to communication, and 
how human relations are socially constructed through dialogue. The following section 
will discuss how constructivist research has developed the concept of community 
based on dialogic principles, and the extent to which an understanding of human 
rights norms have played a role in this. Much of this work has been done in a 
'Habermasian' vein. The section will argue that a reliance on the Frankfurt School of 
critical theory itself is limiting the potential ofLinklater's approach, and that perhaps 
an alternative path needs to be sought in order to have an equally weighted 'critical 
constructivism' capable of theorising values. 
On turning to the Franlifurt School 
Perhaps in a similar fashion to the way linguistic constructivism has developed away 
from Nicholas Onufs guiding principles, rather than with them, we are witnessing 
something similar with Linklater's conceptual 'successors.' This section will first 
analyse examples of research to see how communicative action relates to our interest 
118 For a socio-philosophical debate on the matter which is useful for the strands ofiR theory under 
scrutiny here, see Jiirgen Habermas, 'Reconciliation Through the Public use of Reason: Remarks on 
John Rawls's Political Liberalism,' The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 92 (3) (1995) and John Rawls, 
'Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 92 (3) (1995) 
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in normativity. It will then more directly argue that a reliance on Habermasian 
principles is not the most beneficial route for constructivism in engaging with human 
rights norms. This will be done in two interrelated strands - a clarification of 
Linklater's own ground clearing, and a consideration of Axel Honneth's critique of 
Habermas as lacking the kind of practical and historical referents required of 
emancipation-focused critical theory which also, arguably, define constructivism. 
Darren Hawkins 'draw[ s] on recent constructivist theories to suggest that state 
interests are sometimes uncertain and can be formed over time through processes of 
communication and persuasion.' 119 By a constructivist analysis, states communicate 
and by doing so learn how to act like states amongst their own peer group. Actual 
communication is not simply the conveyance of facts or information, so 'in the logic 
of social learning, actors become convinced through arguments and debate is logically 
or normatively superior.' 120 Hawkins defines norms as 'principles establishing 
behavioural "oughts" that are widely accepted by states.' 121 Rather than simply take 
this definition as another example ofhow constructivism tends to account for only 
one or two sides of the normative triad, perhaps there is more that we can take 
forward from this context. There is, arguably, a clearer link between behaviour and 
values when we are considering normativity in the context of dialogue and 
communication. We have a context in which both the purpose of communication is 
clear (to construct state identity and engender systemic belonging) and also the 
parameters of that communication are clear, in that they stipulate the values in 
question. 
This is borne out in Hawkins's study by his subject matter- the case of torture 
conventions and international jurisdiction. Why should states create such costly 
119 Hawkins, 'Explaining Costly International Institutions', p. 780 
120 Ibid., pp. 783-784 
121 Ibid., p. 783 
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institutions to uphold human rights norms for any reason other than it being the 'right' 
thing to do? 'Actors become convinced through arguments and debate that a different 
position is logically or normatively superior. While these two causal mechanisms vary 
in theory, it is difficult to separate them in practice.' 122 Still, however, state pursuit of 
the 'right' line, which we are assuming here correlates with the inherent value of the 
motivation/action in question, is a 'tactical' move, and not a deontological position. 
This kind of context-dependent visualisation of the whole of normativity that 
Hawkins provides is very useful for the subject of this thesis, but there are two points 
of reservation. Firstly, this is very much a state-focused study, concentrating on what 
states do and why they do it. Yes, there is a clearly discernible link between the kind 
of socialisation processes and outcomes favoured by Wendt and the dialogic concerns 
of a critical approach, but there is more to pursue here if we wish to learn more about 
human rights and dialogue. This leads us to the second point, the framing of torture as 
a difficult and ultimately 'costly' subject. That it is the latter is not so disputable- the 
constitutional and behavioural conventions of statehood are being rigorously tested, 
which is not to mention the complexities and contingencies required of the 
jurisprudential angle. Torture, though, is not such a controversial human wrong, in 
that its prevention itself requires very little in the way of investment in resources: 
'even states opposing the torture convention argued that torture was a horrible scourge 
and should be eradicated from the earth. Even if some believed that, ifused correctly, 
torture could save lives by producing information about potential terrorist attacks, no 
one dared voice that argument.' 123 
The concept of persuasion asks an interesting question of the type of 
constructivist approach which we might expect to emerge from a better understanding 
122 Ibid., p. 784 
123 1bid., p. 790 
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of dialogue and communication. From a critical approach, we are building a toolkit 
for a constructivist theory which develops from scepticism of modernity allied to the 
belief that a return to politics properly so called depends on our ability to formulate a 
process-focused dialogic community, accessible by all. Onto this we are imposing an 
image of competing constructivisms which, in terms of dialogue, have in common a 
preference for the communicative technique of bargaining, compared to the rationalist 
approach of arguing. So where might we expect 'persuasion' to fit best along this 
spectrum? 
What can we learn by phrasing the question thus: how much of 'bargaining' is 
an attempt to actually persuade? The persuasion element consists in each party 
accepting the legitimacy of the others terms with which each is prepared to negotiate. 
Substitute 'arguing' for bargaining and ask the same question. Arguing is not so 
conducive to compromise. Surely, then, the answer is that arguing depends more on 
persuasion for the whole process to still be classed as an argument (and not to have 
moved on or 'watered down' to something else such as a bargain or compromise)? 
The reason for introducing this crude logic here is that 'arguing and 
bargaining, at face value, belong to two different social theories -rationalism and 
communicative action theory.' 124 Muller asserts that the logic of appropriateness 
(which governs how constructivists view behaviour and its outcomes) applies equally 
to communicative persuasion. 125 What to make of this apparent contradiction here, 
which would have constructivism conflated with rationalism? 
Muller's own project is one of synthesis which considers the language-based 
ties which (may) bind rationalism and constructivism. This being so, his analytic 
124 Harald Muller, 'Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and 
the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations', European Journal of International Relations, 
vol. 10 (3) (2004), p. 396 
125 Ibid., p. 395 
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focus is not ours. This thesis is also focused on synthesis, but at an intraconstructivist 
level. That two types of constructivism from (apparently) either end of the spectrum 
can be conflated on this point is an interesting marker to take forward into the next 
chapter. But how interesting is this point with regard to the values which underpin the 
reasons for communicating in the first place? 
Muller is not so instructive here, as his study is not focused exclusively on 
human rights norms, and so fails to distinguish between which element of normativity 
is being discussed or exemplified at any given point. He relies on the high level of 
consensus which allows for a view of 'norms as rules' to underpin conclusions such 
as 'even when institutionalization is low, normative arguments are still possible. They 
can be deduced from general principles about human or diplomatic conduct (human 
rights, central notions of justice and equity, diplomatic habits, the Vienna Convention 
on Treaties, etc.).' 126 General principles of which part of the process? What the 
process actually is? How it should be carried out? Or why we should enter into it in 
the first place? Constitutive, behavioural/procedural and value norms need to be 
distinguished if human rights norms are to be subjected to a level of analysis not 
based on assumptions. 
Hawkins and Muller both offer insights into the relationship between 
normativity and communicative action as part of a growing literature on this particular 
aspect of language in use. 127 There can be little doubt that Habermasian concepts and 
categories have been 'brought in' to this area ofiR with the result ofbecoming 
126 1bid., p. 412 
127 See, for example, Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics', 
Iniemational Organisation,-vol. 54 (1) (2000J, Thomas Risse and StephenC. Ropp, 'International 
human rights norms and domest_ic change: conclusions', in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, The Power of 
Human Rights, Michael C. Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International 
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established as something of a permanent fixture. Certainly, this has led to a much 
broader and fuller understanding of normativity in general. But what of values? 
Earlier in this thesis a distinction was made between the ethical instrumentality and 
morality of values within the international system. Both of course play a key role in 
theorising human rights norms, but it is the former aspect which can tell us more 
about how these norms affect the international system, based on the assumption that 
this system itself is a structure and not an intangible ideology. It may indeed be a 
symbol, even an illusion, but from a constructivist perspective, it works because 
norms 'work' in a particular way. Morality informs this position, but only functions as 
a background field. We can base arguments and positions on the assumption that this 
field is in place, without having to labour to establish any moral essence or truth 
before going on. The norms encapsulated in the Universal Declaration have proven 
both useful in both a positive sense (in providing a more concrete image of something 
so essentially abstract as values) and a negative sense (as representative, in the end, of 
the grand human assumptions of modernity). 
How much, then, can a Habermasian approach tell us about the instrumentality 
of human rights- their earthly referent, their historical place, their affect on actual 
lives and actual states - in addition to its theorising of the 'ideal', or as anything more 
than a critical theory of an abstract morality? Linklater, as stated, makes some use of 
but does not rely exclusively upon Habermas. It is arguably the case that this would 
be an impossibility as Habermas lacks a concrete concept of a social reality on which 
to base his critical approach. Before looking at this closer, we need a better 
understanding ofLinklater's dialogic approach and Habermas's role in it. 
Linklater is committed to the notion of a 'triple transformation of political 
community' and it is an appropriate juncture to remind ourselves of what this entails 
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as a way of setting up the discussion which follows. It is a philosophical, sociological 
and praxeological triad: 
Within this division oflabour, philosophical inquiry has the 
task of defending the dialogic imperative and criticising the 
practice of unjustly excluding others from open dialogue. 
Sociological inquiry has the purpose of considering the 
forces which have shaped the origins, reproduction and 
transformation of dialogic communities. Praxeological 
inquiry has the function of commenting on the possibility of 
enlarging the boundaries of communities of discourse and 
institutionalising loyalties to the ideal of a universal 
communication community. 128 
In other words, the critical approach has the task of telling us why dialogic 
community is a good thing, how its history has developed, and how we might push its 
boundaries back so that it can truly be a universally good thing. Does Habermasian 
thought provide for each of these aspects? 
In terms ofLinklater's philosophical criteria, there is no great controversy in 
stating that Habermas follows the generally critical line when considering the legacy 
of modernism (a line to which most variants of constructivism subscribe129). Linklater 
himself is keen to focus more on the sociological and praxeological development of 
dialogic community. Given that the aim of this thesis is to conceptualise the effect of 
human rights norms and not necessarily their origin, we shall mirror this focus here 
128 Linklater, Transformation, p. 110 
129 How Wendt fits into this principled framework will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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also. Ultimately, we wish to ascertain whether the opportunities for praxis offered by 
Habermas's communicative action are able to form a sufficiently meaningful 
relationship with constructivism. 'Meaningful' here refers to the end product being 
recognisably constructivist and not purely critical. We can hypothesise that this will 
require two things of Habermas - a dialogue with the international, and a conception 
of actual human suffering which spans (or cuts through the 'shroud' of) modernity. 
On first inspection, the first of these criteria seems to be beyond Habermas. 
As Linklater writes, 'there is little in Habermas's analysis which deals directly with 
encounters between societies.' 130 This in itselfhas not deterred IR scholars from 
framing international friction, and its possible end, in Habermasian terms. This is 
largely because 'Habermas's project of reconstructing historic materialism ... focuses 
on how human subjects learn more complex means of assessing the legitimacy of 
their political arrangements.' 131 Political arrangements, of course, cross borders. In 
the terms ofthis project, we appear to have arrived suddenly at a theory capable of 
gauging the impact of human rights norms (i.e. how best, or legitimately, should we 
carry on) within the international system (as nothing less than a political 
arrangement). 
But can we make a satisfactory leap to values? In order to break down a 
complicated argument, and to bring to the fore how Linklater utilises Habermas, let 
us look at three statements by Linklater in more detail: 
Habermas's account of the discourse theory of morality 
exalts features of communication which are universal in that 
they arise whenever human beings cooperate to reach an 
130 Linklater, Transformation, p. Ill 
131 Ibid., pp. 118-119 
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understanding. Their universality does not mean that all 
societies are equally committed to discourse as the means of 
establishing legitimate principles of association. 132 
The highest stages of moral-practicallearning claim that rival 
conceptions of the nature of legitimate practices should be 
resolved by a post-conventional ethic which defends the 
prima facie moral responsibility of engaging the whole of 
humanity in open dialogue about matters of common 
interest. 133 
Contra Weber, Habermas argues that important, but flawed 
or incomplete, expressions of the dialogic potential which is 
inherent in communicative action can be glimpsed in the 
processes of liberal-democratic societies. 134 
The first statement captures a thinly universal understanding of morality at 
work. Why might we have difficulty with it here? The logic implies that only 
discourse consisting of communicative action is capable of producing understanding. 
Moreover, these features of communication exist, but can be (and are) frequently 
ignored. But on what 'fact' is understanding capable ofbeing reached? That 
moralities can be reconciled, or that there is only one morality, which simply needs to 
be accepted? That 'acceptance of tradition and authority restricts the opportunities for 
132 Ibid., p. 120 
133 Ibid., p. 121 
1341bid. 
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discourse in the most ostensibly democratic societies' 135 suggests that these traditions 
are in some way inherently limited as vessels for morality, and so it is the latter 
position being taken. This seems altogether too foregone a conclusion for it to 
underpin a constructivist account. 
The second statement endorses a 'post-conventional' ethic which demands 
universal dialogue as a moral responsibility. If this is the apex of moral-practical 
learning, what are we to take from it? Undoubtedly, this is an intertwining of 
Habermas's philosophy and sociology, in the terms defined by Linklater. On the face 
of it then, we might not expect to gather much more from it other than its re-statement 
of how Habermas confirms the critical position on modernity. However, its placement 
in the section entitled 'Social Learning and International Relations' in 
Transformation seems to presume that it tells us more than it actually does. 136 
As a sociological statement it actually states very little. That we should take a 
human rights norm - the subject of which exposes the actual conditions of suffering 
in an individual's or group's existence- and have it rigorously tested against the 
principles of the parties in question, is an ethical preference and not an empirical 
measure of anything in particular. Conflicting principles, institutional design and even 
how states and individuals react to change are all capable of being empirically 
measured, but they require a method of doing so. Linklater's point here about 
Habermas, then, is over-stretching a philosophical/normative sentiment in order to 
make a sociological statement. 
The third statement introduces what it is about Habermas which makes the 
issue of critiquing modernity more complex. All is not lost in the modem West, it has 
just been wrapped in red tape. Weber argued that, in the competition to be the chief 
135 Ibid., p. 120 
136 Ibid., pp. 119-123 
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signifier of the age, the 'ethic of universal brotherhood' lost out to the progress of the 
natural sciences. 137 This had the effect of rendering this ethic as a historical artefact, 
hence the critical approach. But for Habermas, 'the modern West represents a major 
advance in the development of moral-practical rationality, and dialogic potentials are 
embodied in liberal-democratic institutions to an unusual extent.' 138 And immediately 
hereafter Linklater builds a strong argument for following Habermas by persevering 
with the ethical potential within an institutional design that depends on the rule of law 
and capitalism, which in turn allow for the production of 'reflective agents who must 
construct the moral realm for themselves.' 139 
Given the two criteria above for testing Habermas against constructivism, 
Linklater (notwithstanding his endorsement of communicative action) still considers 
the limits ofHabermas to be the limits of the state. This is a key point for Linklater, 
who plainly does not want to have a universal communication community rest upon a 
theory which lacks a clearly articulated vision of the international. And it is therefore 
all the more curious, following this logic, that IR scholars should want to 'construct' 
any aspect of the international by having Habermas cross the very same borders. 
But where does this leave our project? This conclusion is drawn by Linklater, 
but if it is the totality of our own findings, then would this not, in the end, amount to a 
quick and easy conflation of constructivism with critical theory? A 'lack' of 
theorising of the international in Habermas has not prevented constructivists from 
adding to the source material and supposing that this 'leap' can be made, and in a 
valid way. 140 Equally, though, critiques of constructivist progress claim that there is 
137 See Ibid., p. 121 
1381bid. 
139 1bid., p. 122 
140 This holds especially if one subscribes to 'liberal-constructivism'. See Patrick Thaddeus Jackson 
and Daniel H. Nexon, 'Constructivist Realism or Realist-Constructivism?' International Studies 
Review, vol. 6 (2) (2004) 
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not sufficient evidence in Habermas's writing of any leap beyond liberalism. 141 
According to Neta Crawford, '[In Habermas's work] some restrictions on who can 
speak are not well taken into account. Specifically, discourse takes place within 
communities, with those within communities determining group membership. Those 
who are displaced or for some reason defined as outside a community, at least in 
Habermas's formulation, have no right to participate.' 142 
This encampment in liberalism does little to refute the notion that the modem 
West has become used to the legitimacy of settling arguments by persuasion, and not 
by an objective 'better argument' standard, which would confirm the rationalising 
concern discussed above. 143 And this seems to be the crux of the problem we have 
when trying to link constructivism and communicative action on the subject of values. 
The logic of constructivism is left in an ambiguous state: 'Seen from the vantage 
point of the logic of appropriateness, actors are not simply stripped of any moral 
standing when they defend interests and drive a hard bargain; rather, in most cases 
they are expected- and entitled- to do exactly that.' 144 
Presently, we simply cannot say with enough confidence whether the world in 
which Habermasian communicative action takes place is somehow 'too' liberal in 
that it sustains power relations in arguing/debate/bargaining, or that it is just liberal 
enough to carry through an ethic of universal dialogue. It does seem that the former is 
a more convincing position to take, as it captures (for many) the nature ofliberalism, 
whereas the latter case remains (as far as it does) despite liberalism. 
141 Reus-S mit, 'Politics and Legal Obligation', esp. pp. 603-604 
142 Neta C. Crawford, 'Postmodem Ethical Conditions and a Critical Response', Ethics & International 
~!f.airs, vol. 12 (1) (2006), p. 131 
14 See Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Social constructivisms in global and European politics: a review essay', 
Review of International Studies, vol. 30 (2) (2004), p. 240 
144 Muller, 'Arguing, Bargaining and All That', p. 415 
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This line of critique is heading in a 'constructivist' direction, but to say that 
Habermas fails us here because constructivism stands somehow as the opposite of 
liberalism is insufficient grounds for continuing. We are beginning to form a sense of 
what constructivism is not, or rather what has so far failed to work for constructivism 
(and especially human rights norms), as communicative action operates in a field of 
contested values. What we need to do is press forward an attempt to locate what is 
constructivist about Linklater. We can do this now by pointing to a flaw in Habermas 
-a lack- which should in tum allow us to work out Linklater's optimal contribution 
to this thesis. 
A common criticism ofHabermas's communicative action is that his project 
does not live up to its normative billing. 145 Critical theory developed primarily as an 
emancipatory project. Since its inception it has been consistently critiqued, and self-
regulated, with the asking of the defining question - emancipation from what? This is 
especially pertinent when attempts are made to somehow merge the aims and 
methods of critical theory and constructivism. In other words, for a successful merger 
we might expect to find in Habermas a concrete example of human suffering which 
demands critical exposure. Do we find this? 
In Axel Honneth's words, Habermas 
provide[ s] a systematic concept of what is currently 
threatened by the domination of systems. At the place in 
negativistic theoretical models where unclarified premises of 
barely articulated anthropology predominate, in his model we 
find a theory oflanguage that can demonstrate convincingly 
145 See, for example, Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 62 
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that the endangered potential of human beings consists in 
their ability to reach communicative understanding. 146 
The question still remains though as to what the anchor is which grounds this 
approach? Why exactly do we need communicative action? Without this 'pre-
theoretical praxis', 147 the argument runs, communicative action is effectively an 
answer without a question, something which seriously undermines its emancipatory 
credentials. Honneth articulates this well: 'What systematic experiences- indeed, 
what phenomena at all, I would further like to ask - assume in Habermas' s theory the 
role of providing everyday evidence of the cogency of critique prior to all theoretical 
reflection?' And for the denouement, 'I surmise that at this point, a fissure appears in 
the theory of communicative action, one that is not of chance origins but which has a 
systemic character.' 148 
HabeJ)llas's second generation development of critical theory shifted its focus 
from a source of oppression existing in the material world (control of production), to 
a linguistic process which presumes that oppressed peoples will have the inclination 
and means to emancipate themselves generally, as a matter of course in their lives 
and without specific motivation. 'Whereas Horkheimer saw capitalist relations of 
production as setting unjustified limits on the development of the human capacity for 
labor, Habermas sees the social relations of communication as putting unjust 
restrictions on the emancipatory potential of intersubjective understanding.' 149 
But which person (Honneth is essentially challenging), in which field, factory 
or refugee camp, is daily aware of the need to increase their facility for 
146 Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 
2007), p. 68 
147 See Ibid., esp. pp. 69-72 
148 Ibid., p. 69 
149 Ibid., p. 69 
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intersubjective understanding? Who is 'communicating', and how big is the 
assumption that it is done on somebody's behalf, and that it is Good? 
For Habermas, the pre-theoretical resource grounding his 
normative perspective in reality has to be that social process 
by which the linguistic rules of communicative understanding 
are developed. In The Theory of Communicative Action, he 
refers to this process as the communicative rationalization of 
the life-world. However, such a process is typically 
something which could be said- with Marx - to occur 
behind the backs of the subjects involved; its course is 
neither directed by human intentions nor can it be grasped 
within the consciousness of a single individua1. 150 
In Martin Weber's words, 'from the perspective of social and political 
philosophy, the theory of morality conceived through the self-reflective exploration 
of the conditions of communicative action produces a procedural account of 
principles, the Hegelian critique of the 'empty formalism' ofKantian deontological 
reasoning can be brought to bear again on behalf of substantive demands of ethical 
life.' 151 Communicative action is the idealised perfection of a linguistic procedure. 
Regarding the subject of this thesis, the restriction oflinguistic capabilities 
does not equate to the kinds of personal suffering always associated with human 
rights abuses. Of course, we might expect certain freedoms to be defined to an extent 
by their outward expression, i.e. freedom of religion, the right to a fair trial, freedom 
150 Ibid., p. 70 
151 Martin Weber, 'The critical social theory of the Frankfurt School, and the 'social turn' in IR', 
Review of International Studies, vol. 31 (1) (2005), p. 197 
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of assembly and association, etc. But many other human rights are less bound by 
opinion, or the strength of the better argument. This being so, we can presume that 
reifying the specific process by which voices are heard is not a sufficiently 
comprehensive device for encompassing moral experience, and thus its emancipatory 
utility is limited. 
Importantly, the concept of communicative action is not defeated. The 
problem lies in using the linguistic rules of the process as its underlying normative 
presupposition. There is no sociology involved in doing this, no actually occurring 
moral experience which can be tracked historically. In our context, human rights 
norms would not matter because of any notion of essential or instrumental value from 
which we can develop a more comprehensive understanding of roles, interaction and 
change in the international system. Instead they would matter only because they 
consisted of patterns, rules and schema, and so these purely abstract forms would 
themselves be the purpose of inquiry, and the perfection of these forms would be the 
sole reason for persisting with a culture of human rights. 'Human rights' then 
becomes a singular academic fiction, the subject ofmetatheory and nothing else. 
Honneth's own solution is the notion of 'disrespect': 'the normative 
presupposition of all communicative action is to be seen in the acquisition of social 
recognition: subjects encounter each other within the parameters of the reciprocal 
expectation that they be given recognition as moral persons and for their social 
achievements.' 152 Furthermore, 'moral injustice is at hand whenever, contrary to their 
expectations, human subjects are denied the recognition they feel they deserve. I 
would like to refer to such moral experiences as feelings of social disrespect.' 153 
152 Honneth, Disrespect, p. 71 
153 Ibid. 
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Having mo~al experience bound up in the notion of recognition and, here, 
social disrespect, is one way of addressing the pre-theoretical praxis issue. But it is 
not necessarily the preferred outcome for the present thesis. What this deeper foray 
into the heartland ofLinklater's critical disposition has allowed us to develop is a 
clearer sense of two things. Firstly, that a critical aspect pulls constructivism into a 
territory much more focused on emancipation, freedom from dominant modes and the 
history of moral experience, all of which underpin why we might expect human rights 
norms to matter, but which are questionably in keeping with what we know 
constructivism to be. 154 Secondly, that critical theory itselfhas provided us with a 
means of critiquing what is essentially metatheory. We have ventured out to the edges 
of how constructivism might work (i.e. by using the 'tool' of communicative action), 
and have been brought back towards its praxeological centre (by using Honneth here) 
as a timely reminder of the need to have a grounding for values that is properly 
historical- I say 'properly' here meaning that 'values at work' must be identifiable in 
a specific era (as we use human rights norms presently), and across time (evidenced 
by both Onuf and Link:later expressing the need to uncover the normative constants of 
modernity). 
So how do we incorporate this into our constructivist project within the 
parameters of this chapter? Not by pursuing traditional critical theory for its 
conclusions, but by looking instead to Link:later and his development of a historical 
and transnational concept that we might argue corresponds with the contemporary 
example ofhuman rights norms. That is, the concept of harm. 
154 Allowing for its especially wide parameters. 
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Linklater 's historical referent for values: the concept of harm 
We must first clarify the relevance of harm to this project. What questions could it 
answer? Starting with human rights norms, it would be beneficial to this thesis if we 
could draw upon a clearer understanding of how the values encapsulated by these 
norms are a feature ofLinklater's work. Having this would enable a deeper insight 
into how these value norms affect the international system. Moving onto 
constructivism itself, there seems to be, at first glance, a correlation between 
Linklater's harm and Onufs exploitation, even if the former concept has been given 
more sustained attention over time for its working out. An obvious deduction from 
this is that having an intramundane conception of human suffering over time is a 
requirement of constructivism. Where is the reality, in other words? There is much 
here for Linklater's harm to accomplish. Too much, perhaps, ifthis was to be the 
apex of this thesis. Restricting any 'answers' we find to the context of this chapter 
first, and to then let the wider implications possibly run-off from this, is essential. 
Both the protection of individuals and the international order of states - two of 
the issues at the heart of this thesis- are the 'cosmopolitan orientations ... central to 
the sociological approach to harm in world politics' 155 which are of most interest to 
Linklater. If we are to follow these orientations, then 'what is most interesting about 
this point of view is how far different international systems have thought harm to 
individuals a moral problem for the world as a whole- a problem which all states, 
individually and collectively, should labour to solve - and have developed what 
might be called cosmopolitan harm conventions.' 156 
Human rights norms, in other words? The point of taking a sociological 
approach is to try to ascertain how states could collectively arrive at this position: 'to 
155 Andrew Linklater, 'The problem of harm in world politics: implications for the sociology of states-
systems', International Affairs, vol. 78 (2) (2002), p. 320 
156 Ibid. 
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what extent [have] different states-systems ... [drawn] on the idea of a universal 
community ofhumankind'?157 For this thesis, the point of drawing upon Linklater's 
sociological approach to harm is to gauge the extent to which cosmopolitan harm 
conventions (CHCs, to use Linklater's abbreviation)- which we will assume for a 
moment are similar to human rights norms - affect individuals and states, and also the 
extent to which this particular transhistorical approach will aid our understanding of 
constructivism. 
For Linklater, there are five different types ofharm: Deliberate harm in 
relations between independent political communities (e.g. war); deliberate harm 
caused by governments to their own citizens (e.g. human rights violations); deliberate 
harm by non-state actors (e.g. actors such as pirates, transnational economic 
organizations and international terrorist organizations); unintended harm (e.g. 
technological developments associated with globalisation); negligence (e.g. acts of 
moral indifference such as the testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific). 158 
All of these types have some traceable relation to human rights norms, albeit 
by varying degrees of proxy. The second of these, however, makes the most obvious 
connection with how the rest of this thesis has characterised human rights norms, and 
so this shall be our focus here. If we can say, then, that harm in contemporary 
international society is of a particular historical quality, and that it has been responded 
to in an equally historical and also cosmopolitan way, to what extent is it a), affecting 
international society, and b) a recognisably constructivist concern? 
Drawing upon English School interest in how standards of legitimacy change 
over time to outline a qualified progressivist stance, 159 Linklater thus illuminates why 
157 1bid., p. 321 
158 Ibid., pp. 328-331 
159 1bid., p. 334-335 
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the occurrence of violence between governments and citizens matters so much that 
we have developed universal human rights norms. But to what extent does he do this? 
Certainly, more people in more places are at least imagined to be part of this 
universal community. This appears to result, though, in a very restricted notion not of 
who matters, but why they matter. Linklater's brief notes on unintended harm and 
negligence push forward with this: 'The importance of depth has been highlighted by 
those who criticize Western conceptions ofhuman rights for stressing liberal and 
political, as opposed to economic, rights. Their point is that more radical harm 
conventions are needed to address conditions of unspeakable squalor and extreme 
vulnerability to global market forces.' 160 If human rights norms already provide for 
these needs, then they significantly affect the international system. If they do not, then 
they must still only be potentially affective. 
There is a key difference, though, between Linklater's CHCs and universal 
human rights norms. In theory at least, everyone has human rights equally. Also, 
everyone is entitled to claim their human rights. CHCs, on the other hand, can (and 
do) differ from place to place: 'All societies have harm conventions which define 
what is permissible in relations with other human beings, what is obligatory, and what 
is officially proscribed.' 161 This cosmopolitan type of harm convention 162 states no 
preference for insiders over outsiders, whilst still being able to maintain a distinction 
between the two. 
This is an interesting distinction to consider when thinking about how values 
affect the international system. Perhaps the difference is that harm is a reason for 
160 Ibid., p. 337 
161 Andrew Linklater; 'Citizenship, Humanity, and Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions', International 
Political Science Review, vol. 22 (3) (2001), p. 264 
162 Linklater makes a further distinction between these and ordinary harm conventions which are 
entirely inward-looking and are tied to a negative view of the nation, i.e. Nazism, fascism, colonialism. 
See Ibid., p. 264 
163 Ibid., p. 275 
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human rights; human rights cannot logically appear first. If this is so, then CHCs need 
to be embedded in a constant societal form. Although both concepts deal with 
individuals and states, CHCs are a 'state first' conception, whereas with human 
rights, the relationship is balanced (and much more open to contestation, certainly 
regarding their moral origin). Because CHCs are more explicitly about how 
international borders connect and disconnect human lives, the progression to a 'new' 
social form- the universal communication community- is a more natural (and 
theoretically satisfactory) step to make. Universal human rights cut through borders, 
categories and other perceived limitations on the individual, and so cannot call upon 
the state as a clear and unambiguous referent when it comes to deciphering what 
effect they have on international relationships. 
Although Linklater is keen to hedge his progressivism against the distorting 
pull of an 'end' of history or politics, it is clearly discernible nonetheless. 'We do not 
know if modernity will succeed in creating CHCs which are unprecedented in the 
history of forms of world political organization. A moral commitment to new forms 
of domestic and international political community that have this ambition is central to 
a sociology of cosmopolitan harm conventions with an emancipatory intent.' 163 
Two threads here demand attention. Firstly, by having the state as the referent 
(and a foundational one at that) for the relationship between individuals on the matter 
of injustice as represented by harm, the state is essentially washed out of the equation. 
What is meant by this is that CHCs depend on individuals as members of states as 
their reason for being, and so the role of the state is much less of a contentious issue. 
The relationship between human rights norms and the state is more problematic. On 
one hand, 'good' states are the exemplars of how internationally instituted human 
277 
rights work via acquiescent domestic arrangements. On the other, 'rogue' states who 
deny or defy value-norms are subject to international judgement which is rarely 
uniform, and so in tum often leads to controversial uses of force. 
This ties in to the second thread. A contested sovereignty would seem to offer 
more to (and be offered more by) constructivism, rather than a settled view which 
signposts 'progress'. How interested is constructivism in creating an 'unprecedented 
form'? This strong contemporary notion of a 'moral commitment' could be the 
defining moment which provides a largely secular constructivism with its own values. 
But how would this add to our understanding of values in the international system, 
other than to direct us towards an agenda (albeit an emancipatory one)? This, for 
constructivism, is a point of definition, and so is conclusive. Having constructivism 
do the work of critical theory is a conflation oflabour, which begs the question of 
how useful this is for IR theory. 
Conclusions 
This chapter was embarked UP,On in the hope that some of the gaps left by the rules 
and language approach might be filled in. Has this been achieved, or have these gaps 
merely been papered over? Maintaining an even balance of what is 'critical' and what 
is 'constructivist' about the critical constructivism we have assigned to Linklater is a 
crucial element in whether or not this progression works. 
Certainly, Linklater's critique of modernity falls into line with Onufs by 
having an actual human need for human rights, imagined separately from the very 
specific origin of the 'universals' contained within the Universal Declaration. We 
have a transhistorical referent for that need, also, which goes some way to confirming 
that we can legitimately add Linklater to a constructivism-focused thesis. The 
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institution of human rights can be constructed upon an identifiable something, and not 
an abstract supposition. But how? How far can critical constructivism provide a 
methodological impetus to the approach as a whole, of the sort other types lack? 
Language games are particularly adept at analysing events, case studies, 
actions, etc. They tend not to be employed as a means of understanding why humans 
should want to cross borders in the first place. 'Borders' here refers to the myriad 
divisions which separate humans from their 'rights': lines between states; social and 
educational disparities; ethnocentrism; lack of recognition; lack of opportunity- and 
so the list goes on. 
In one sense, then, language in use in IR spans a great philosophical divide: 
Why are we apart? Is a very different question to Why are we not together? Language 
games provide some understanding of the former, whilst the notion of dialogic 
community, we might expect, informs us about the latter. But to what extent does it 
do this? Framing Linklater's contribution as methodological (as in, 'the solution to 
our problems in understanding how constructivism deals with values in the 
international system is to be found in dialogue'), is now a limited, and in future 
limiting, exercise. 
The common charge against dialogic community is that, materially, it tells us 
nothing: How and where can we participate in dialogue to better our lot? The 
farthest it would be reasonable to run with this in concluding remarks (a more in 
depth discussion will take place in the following chapter) is to say that dialogic 
community may be more ideal than substance, but it does appear to pull 
constructivism towards a more committed approach to human rights and values than 
might otherwise be the case. From one perspective, this fact alone illuminates how we 
might best approach and do theory in IR. Yet constructivism's commitment to critical 
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ideals is more than questionable, and is something which forms the significant part of 
the conclusion to this thesis. This view is challenged but not defeated by the fact that 
Linklater's categories, i.e. universal communication, cosmopolitan citizenship, CHCs 
and harm, all mirror very closely what we might expect of human rights norms. These 
categories, after all, are moral at source. These are broad generalisations, and there 
are further issues and questions, which point to the detail in Linklater's critical 
exposition, which are relevant to our consideration of synthesis in the following 
chapter. 
The social and economic expansion witnessed in (relatively) recent times 
revived long dormant connections between Selves and Others. Linklater, not 
unreasonably we might think, caps this progress with the notion of a sustaining moral 
element. Yet this remains a significant leap. How do we connect sociological 
horizons to moral horizons? The implication seems to be that proximity begets amity. 
There is a clear analytical gap here, though, which would seem to be the sort of 
assumption constructivists would be interested in pursuing. It is made all the more 
interesting by the observation that political community does not coincide with moral 
community. 
Linklater's touchstone for much, if not all, of his emancipatory focus is 
citizenship. He asks how citizenship could become detached from the modem 
sovereign state and embedded in international society. This relocation matters 
because of the 'moral repository' notion conferred upon citizens, and also the 
recognition afforded to other citizens across borders. 
Critical constructivism pushes against features of the international system 
which have come to define other types of constructivism. Identity and shared 
interests, for example, break down in their roles as social bonds at the geographical 
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edges of any given community or society. They are deemed not to be a sufficiently 
binding force to foment a meaningful sense ofhumanitarian obligation across 
borders. 
A circumscribed use of Habermas opens another door for us, away from the 
Frankfurt School of critical theory. In terms of the thesis, this shift is affected chiefly 
because Habermas lacks two things. The first, a dialogue with the international, 
comes with the caveat that Habermas is committed to a philosophy of 'political 
arrangements' -a very broad term. The second, a transhistorical conception of actual 
human suffering, is a controversial omission in his work, but it is much more 
identifiable than the international issue. 
Having Linklater complete this chapter (when it could have had a less 
satisfactory Habermasian conclusion) allows us to focus on some features which 
appear in his work and elsewhere within the constructivist approach. The requirement 
of a historical referent for suffering, a conceptualisation of the intramundane, and the 
manifestation of the two in the concept of transnational harm places Linklater firmly 
within the same camp as Onuf. Wendt is a more challenging prospect, which makes 
the final chapter a more interesting exercise. 
The points noted in this conclusion, and in the conclusions to the Wendt and Onuf 
chapters, are not meant to be an exhaustive list to be cross-referenced, collated and 
presented at length in the final chapter. There are bigger, overarching themes at play 
throughout this thesis, of which these points are symptomatic. Both the approach of 
constructivism and the concept of human rights have each constantly reacted to one 
another during the preceding chapters. Is constructivism really suited to the challenge 
laid down by Christian Reus-Smit and others, that it might be capable of some kind of 
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normative theory-practice fusion? How much of the middle ground is common 
ground? Are values, in the end, too ephemeral and elusive? These questions are the 
focus of the final chapter. 
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6o Synthesis? 
Human rights are a normative challenge for constructivism. Not only do they test its 
capacity for theorising values, but they also call into question the elasticity of its 
parameters. It is these two challenges that have underscored this thesis, and they will 
be developed further, and then concluded upon, in this chapter. 
This will be done in two broad sections which will answer two key questions. 
Firstly, to what extent are seminal constructivist statements set up to have the 
(presumably valuable) human rights discourse fit, somehow, into the rather unkempt 
framework they have significantly contributed to? Secondly, what does this mean for 
'constructivism' as a recognisable approach to international theory? Are its 
boundaries pushed too far towards the critical end of the spectrum? To answer these 
questions, this chapter will clarify what constructivism is currently and possibly 
capable of regarding the ethical and moral challenges presented by values. 
The preceding three chapters have analysed the ability of three leading types 
of constructivism to account for how values affect international relations. The 
'synthesis' presented here is not to be misconstrued as a precursor to the development 
of a 'grand theory'. There has been nothing in this thesis so far to prepare the ground 
for such-a claim. Indeed, talkofsynthesis is superficial ifit relates to making a 
'better' or singular constructivism. Whom would it be 'better' for? Parsimonious 
academics, perhaps, or sufferers of human rights abuse the world over with myriad 
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individual circumstances? This theory-of-everything would be densely packed with 
simplistic philosophies and unworkable prescriptions. It would, using the parameters 
set down here, be taking the subject of human rights and moralising on it from a safe 
distance. All that constitutes the 'problem' ofhuman rights would be observable and 
hence conducive to a neat three-level division oflabour between what people need, 
what states need and what the international system needs. 
Instead, the chapter will be a sustained analysis of the capacity of 
'constructivism' as a whole (or at least as represented here) to account for 
international values/human rights. It does so as the natural conclusion to the strands of 
Wendt, Onuf and Linklater so far developed almost wholly in isolation. Inevitably, 
bringing these approaches together demands that the further question of the limits of 
the category of constructivism be asked and then answered. 
The first section assesses how human rights norms test the depth to which 
constructivism can describe and understand the role of values in international 
relations. Very broadly, Wendt's overall focus is on the 'Self-' and 'Other-' driven 
(re-) making of states, Onufs is on the generation and perpetuation of meaning 
through rules, and Linklater's is on the emancipatory potential of dialogic community. 
They are conceptions of the make-up of the world and the most appropriate theorising 
of it, and we are supposing that human rights (can) filter through each ofthem. As 
international norms they point to strengths and weaknesses in each as the potential 
way forward for constructivism as a normative approach. There is no definitive moral 
pronouncement on human rights provided by any of these three key figures, as this 
would be in line with the liberal foundation of modernity to which constructivism is 
generally (see Onuf and Linklater compared to Wendt) averse. 
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What an analysis of each approach does tell us, or at least begins to tell us, is 
how well the signal features of constructivism fare when challenged to account for the 
ethical instrumentality of values. When these incidences of (apparent) success and 
(apparent) failure are added together, they form a picture of the cumulative 
normativity of constructivism, and we can in turn begin to make judgements about 
how well equipped it is to answer to the challenge of those such as Christian Reus-
S mit, for example, who would have it as a practice-savvy critical hybrid. 
Holding different types of constructivism up to account by testing their 
explanatory worth in a comparative exercise has been done before. Maja Zehfuss also 
critiques three types of constructivism (those of Wendt, Onuf and Friedrich 
Kratochwil), using the example of German military involvement abroad to test their 
analytic capabilities. The key difference between Zehfuss's study and this thesis is 
that Zehfuss is taking a historical episode as her constant, whereas here a less 
'traditional' IR subject is the test case. It is the analytical difference between assessing 
the past and asking questions of the future. This places constructivism on a very 
different and dynamic footing by having its critical roots brought to the fore. 
Interestingly, Zehfuss herselfutilises the postmodemism ofDerrida to better expose, 
and then remedy, the flaws she perceives in the three constructivists. She develops 
certain understandings of constructivism which are equally relevant to this thesis, one 
of which allows the second section of this chapter to proceed with a strong precedent. 
These types, despite their definitionaVontological differences, all 'agree on the 
assumption of limited construction.' 1 The types which make up our triangulation, 
substituting Linklater for Kratochwil, all share this feature. This characteristic, and 
how it varies, will provide some of the tension for this chapter. To elaborate a little 
1 Zehfuss, Constructivism, p. 10 
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further as to what this 'limited construction' entails: 'when their constructivist 
analysis starts, some reality has already been made and is taken as given. 
Constructivist work stresses the significance of meaning but assumes, at the same 
time, the existence of an a priori reality. This places it, intentionally or not, in a 
middle-ground position which is problematic but central to constructivism. ' 2 
In other words, how these approaches describe this middle-ground is how they 
describe constructivism. This chapter will conclude its analysis on how their ability to 
account for human rights norms as values constitutes and affects this middle-ground 
position. This will involve two closely related strands of inquiry. Firstly, a 
consideration ofhow well values are represented by each different conception of the 
middle-ground, i.e. what they do to it, and the limits to which they push it so that it 
can still legitimately be constructivism. And, secondly, a consideration of how far the 
incorporation of values permits the middle-ground to encroach upon the poles of 
positivism and postpositivism - which end of the continuum seems to do the better 
job of accounting for the ethical instrumentality of human rights we are interested in 
here. 
In more detail, the chapter will proceed as follows. The first section, focusing on the 
apparently dysfunctional relationship between constructivism and values, will carry 
out its analysis in two interrelated parts, designed to directly test the 'model' 
constructivism which critics would prefer to see. That is, the issues of theory and 
practice. It will in the first instance compare the socio-philosophical histories of each 
type of constructivism (and maintain focus in doing so by discussing the impact of 
three key figures), with the aim of drawing out the extent to which each type of 
2 1bid. 
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constructivism has made it possible for values to be a legitimate concern. In other 
words, is there anything in the way that key intellectual figures have been interpreted 
or emphasised differently which better prepares one variant for the challenge of 
contemporary values over and above the others? Or, do common threads emerge 
which would allow us to draw a conclusion regarding their coherence? The next part 
of this section builds on these foundations to compare empirical approaches -has 
each approach endowed IR with a tool-kit fit for this task, or, even, have experimental 
legacies somehow failed to live up to the promise of the original? How far do we need 
to look beyond what we already have in place? These two analyses will together 
provide concrete answers regarding the questioned values of constructivism. 
The second section will begin to bridge the gap between this analysis of 
constructivism largely on its own terms, and how it also relates to the position and 
argument of critical theorists. It will do this by analysing how each type of 
constructivism relates to modernity- as either a reaction to it (Onuf and Linklater) or 
an expression of it (Wendt). As discussed above, critical theory is driven by the need 
to re-state our modem human history, and the extent to which our chosen aspects of 
constructivism reflect this is crucial in ascertaining whether, as a 'whole' approach, it 
should be more accurately thought of as either moral or ethical in outlook. Again, this 
analysis will provide an answer as to the critical potential of constructivism. 
Together, these two sections form the majority of the chapter in their 
interrogation of the 'constructivism and values' issue. Inevitably, less space is 
available for the 'limits of constructivism' issue, but it is sufficient to allow for the 
exposition of this naturally concluding question. As stated, the third section is 
intended to augment this primary discussion by asking whether, in the end, a 
requirement to account for values of the sort manifested in human rights norms 
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doesn't distort constructivism beyond all recognisable boundaries, so that it 
effectively begins to occupy territory traditionally belonging to other (more 
conservative or more radical) approaches in IR. Is constructivism still constructivism? 
Is there an acknowledged standard, or any criteria, by which this can be judged to be 
or not be the case? The purpose for this is to bring the thesis back round to its original 
concern: constructivism itself. This will tie the previous two sections together with a 
decision on whether constructivism has a 'critical' future. 
Therefore, the 'synthesis' of this chapter works on three complementary 
levels: how well constructivism accounts for human rights/values; how well each 
aspect within our triangulation coheres with the others; and how any resultant notions 
of what constructivism can 'do' fit with notions of what constructivism properly, or 
supposedly, 'is'. Ultimately, do values define or dismantle constructivism? 
I. The problems of capturing values as theory becomes practice 
The three approaches in this thesis are fundamentally interested in gathering 
information so that we might better understand what constitutes the world of 
international relations. Values, we are assuming, are a part of the international system 
and furthermore, as represented in the form of human rights norms, they lay down a 
challenge which has not yet been met by international theory. The manifestation of 
these rights in the Universal Declaration makes this a liberal challenge. Goals have 
been set, and so constructivism must either bend towards this or strike out 
independently. Critics, it would seem, would prefer a best of both worlds-scenario, in 
which constructivism can incorporate normativity into its sociological framework 
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whilst maintaining an agnostic position. Christian Reus-Smit would have a moral 
constructivism sit beneath a 'normative' banner, but ought the business of IR be 
governed by such a pre-conceived plan, or should it be more ethical in outlook, and 
work to be as inclusive as possible? 
The broad philosophical questions that each variant in the triangulation asks 
can be reduced to one singular 'mission statement'. Both Wendt's and Onufs, 
although directed at divergent ontological positions, are essentially the same: 'How 
can we know more about this?' Linklater's, though, is explicitly purposive: 'How can 
we do better than this?' Already, at this fundamental level, the compare and contrast 
exercise has some substantial material to work with. Wendt and Onuf clearly speak to 
each other, whilst Onuf and Linklater share a critique of modernity which Wendt 
finds less persuasive. Less explicit, but no less important, is the notion of change and 
improvement contained within Wendt's thesis of the personality of states which bears 
positive comparison with Linklater's optimism. It is Onufwho seems irredeemably 
pessimistic by confining constructivism within a perpetual cycle of exploitation, yet 
his awareness of analytical limits complements Wendt's similarly circumscribed 
ontology of states. These few examples outline how the theoretical and practical 
elements of each approach are interconnected. More precisely how this is so will be 
discussed below. 
Of the variants under examination here, Linklater's inclusion in this thesis 
seems more and more to be assuming the appearance of what we might expect Reus-
Smit's 'normative ideal type' of constructivism to look like. All three types, though, 
stem from social theory roots and associate themselves with key thinkers in the 
history of this area of thought. How they do this - how they fashion received pillars of 
wisdom to fit their own variations of constructivist thought - tells us a great deal 
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about how and why values matter. This analysis of theoretical roots will make up the 
first part of this section. It will act as a precursor to the second part which analyses the 
tools, techniques and methods that each uses (as far as these categories can be 
employed), and which might indicate how constructivism speaks to itself as well as to 
human rights norms. Thus we have the theory-practice synthesis, so commonly 
perceived as a central aim of constructivism, as a key analytical device. 
Making values possible: the relative importance of Kant, Marx and Weber 
The social theory roots of constructivism have been subject to varying interpretations 
by each of the three types analysed here. Although each necessarily draws upon a 
range of theorists in developing arguments and comparative critiques, three central 
figures have emerged - Kant, Marx and Weber. The weight which Wendt, Onuf and 
Linklater assign to these antecedents provides us with the opportunity to analyse 
constructivism collectively at a theoretical level before moving on to their respective 
empirical features. 
As we have seen, Wendt's state draws its essential character traits from three 
strands of political and sociological thought: Weberian, Pluralist and Marxist. These 
must be thinly conceived in order to combine in a meaningful and lasting way. Wendt 
seems to have aimed for an elegant format for a compact state as the three are 
'organizational, reductive, and structural respectively. ' 3 They are blended into a 
whole by Wendt, but there is a clear demarcation between them which he duly notes: 
'each has a different referent object, only one of which (the Weberian state) is an 
"actor" at all ... But when states interact they do so with their societies conceptually 
3 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 201 
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"in tow," and this calls for supplementing our conceptualization of the state with 
insights from a Marxist or Pluralist analysis. ' 4 
There are four points of note here. First is the idea that societies can be 
conceptualised as being 'in tow' behind (presumably) their leader, the state. The 
second is that the insides of said state are either Marxist or Pluralist. But this choice 
depends on what proof exactly? Third is the notion that everything about the state-
its inhabitants, their voices, the relationships between inhabitants and the bureaucracy, 
the identity of the state as an international actor, etc. - is accounted for in this three-
sided schema. Finally, which we shall come back to presently, there is the assumption 
that this very brief mention of Weber tells us all we need to know ofhis contribution 
to modernist constructivism. 
The first three points are interrelated in forming Wendt's 'back-story' to the 
state- in shaping moral/ethical content that is significantly more prominent in both 
Onuf and Linklater's work. Having such a neat divide between the inside and outside 
of the state begs the hypothesis that this is too simplistic. It may be enough for Wendt, 
and it may well be enough to represent a wider conventional constructivist approach, 
but is it sufficiently broad to encapsulate the values associated with human rights 
norms? Once again the conclusion must be drawn that Wendt's statism is too shallow 
to allow for the complexities of society apparently admitted by a constitutive 
approach. 
Wendt is endowing the state with what we might refer to as a 'broader' 
personality. He does this in order to define it more clearly and to offer up a more 
characterful product. How successful he is with this is another matter, and we can 
question the depth to which it extends. Wendt does recognise that his triumvirate are 
4 1bid. 
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each 'significantly different' 5 and is explicit on the need to meet head on with the 
problems this raises. Again, though, this is done only briefly, 6 and by having the state 
as a common referent object. This means that he is using contested conceptions ofthe 
state to define a contested conception of the state. Should we be clear about where this 
leaves us at all, let alone in relation to human rights? 
Wendt appears almost reluctant to delve into the state- 'it seems impossible 
to define the state apart from "society''.'7 Why should this be so? Because it 
compromises the elegance of a 'theory' of the state? Again, 'states seem to be 
conceptually interdependent in the same way that masters and slaves are, or teachers 
and students' (emphasis added), as if there were any doubt over the matter. The effect 
this has is to convince us that Wendt cares less for a 'whole' state than he does for its 
projection outwards. This is only significant if the domestic politics of states are 
relevant in order to speak meaningfully of their international values. It is usually the 
case that the two are deemed to be associated (perhaps even inextricably), but the 
agnosticism of Wendt's position on the matter rules out any moral role for 
constructivism. There is simply not a deep enough connection here between the 
internal and external politics of the state. Wendtian constructivism has no interest in a 
core of constant values and so must be ethical in its understanding of the good. 
Wendt is required to attach Marxism and Pluralism to the W eberian 'state as 
actor' even though both perspectives reject this role/definition of the state. What is 
our critique of this? Constructivisms of varying hue have no great issue with the 
position that 'Weberians define the state as an organization possessing sovereignty 
and a territorial monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence. ' 8 Indeed, a 
5 Ibid., p. 199 
6 See Ibid., pp. 199-201 
7 1bid., p. 199 
8 Ibid. 
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Weberian view of the state affirms for constructivists a clear referent object against 
which to reconcile certain international activities and institutions -bordering, space, 
intervention, legitimacy etc. Wendt points out that nothing, however, defines the 
Weberian state other than itself. In other words, the state may accommodate a 
capitalist system, but it is not therefore a 'capitalist state' .9 This, we can assume, has 
the effect of fixing an original identity of the state. 
Pluralism rejects the state as a referent object. It is not the sum of its parts, but 
rather a nominal convenience more suited to cartography than politics. Wendt's 
treatment of the 'meaning' of pluralism in this context is confined to a very brief 
exposition in a single paragraph. 10 The universal/plural schism is left to other types of 
constructivism to ponder, and this is a weakness in Wendt's approach, from our 
perspective. 
Wendt uses Marxist state theory to tie these two positions together. It is a 
structural theory, and so seems to link state with society. What are the implications for 
this beyond the Wendtian approach? Constructivists acceptthe state as an 
international fact as much as they accept society as a social fact. Is the 'best' binding 
force for these two entities Marxist structuralism, and can this form of order 
accommodate the internationalisation of values? Human rights norms are not entirely 
ofthe state and, arguably are not entirely of society either, ifwe take the strict 
interpretation that their international origin is the Universal Declaration itself. They 
exist as an institution between and across states and societies as they require both to 
have any meaning. 
We can bring in Onuf and Linklater here. There is some discernible common 
ground between these three approaches as each attempts (in however limited a way) 
9 See Ibid., p. 200 
10 See Ibid. 
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to describe society. That is, the internal or domestic society which props up state 
identity in countless ways. This has the effect of forcing our own critique to make a 
choice based on the options above: are variants of constructivism somehow 'better' or 
'worse' than others if their conception ofhuman rights norms is limited to either a 
statist or a societal bias? And, is this necessarily an artificial stance to have? These are 
hard cases for constructivism. If it is not possible to satisfactorily develop a 
persuasive critique either way, then Wendt's approach is itself the height of 
constructivism's ability to gather and describe knowledge on the subject of 
international values. 
Essentially, we are looking for constructivism's ability to describe an 
international society of values. In particular, this world view must be able to account 
for values expressed through the contemporary (liberal) institutions that are human 
rights norms. In one sense, the conclusions constructivists then make from the 
available data are irrelevant, as long as the data itself is as comprehensively sourced 
and empirically legitimate as possible. 
In World and Transformation Onuf and Linklater, certainly in contrast to the 
very limited exposition in Social Theory, appear to be all about society. The effect 
that this has on human rights norms is to suggest that they can tell us more about how 
values shape the international system if we are looking at them from a socio-centric 
point of view. This may seem to be obvious (this is, after all social constructivism), 
but gauging the weight that constructivists give society, and its characteristics, is 
anything but. 
Having society on an equal footing to the state, and so merging the 
traditionally conceived duality of what is international and what is domestic, requires 
clear parameters. Onuf's project in World is primarily the proper rendering of political 
294 
society as an operative paradigm of IR which incorporates this dualism. How does 
Onur s treatment of these three key thinkers allow for the development of values in 
this paradigm? 
It may be worthwhile to take a brief step back before going on. It does seem 
that Wendt's scant use of Weber means that a comparative exercise with Onuf and 
Linklater is unworkable. Interestingly, Wendt 'presents' Weber to us, or rather, the 
Weberian state, as a fairly compact unit defined by its sovereignty and 
monopolisation of organised violence; 11 which mirrors his (Wendt's) own rendering 
of the state as unfettered by the complexities of society. The most we are left with is 
that 'Weberians emphasize the functions that the state performs for society (internal 
order and external defense), but for Weber the state's nature is not conceptually 
dependent on society.' 12 
Within Wendt's basic framework, Weber plays a significant role in providing 
the precedent for a 'state as actor' formulation. Onufs focus on Weber mirrors this 
somewhat, but to a much greater degree - the framework is more complex and 
Weber's role within it is discussed at length. The development of Herrschafi means 
that Weberian thinking underpins Onurs 'ideal' of political society. But what are 
Herrschaft's values? 
The relationship between Herrschafi and human rights norms does at first 
seem to be a fruitful one. This is particularly the case if we trace its social-theoretical 
development via Hegel, as Onuf does. As a paradigm it is concerned with the framing 
and the terms of power relationships, and what is possible within them: 
11 See Ibid., p. 199 
12 Ibid. 
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Hegel juxtaposed the term "Herrschaft" with 
"Knechtschaft" ... as defining relations of master to slave ... 
Hegel argued that "slaves" learn from their work, while 
"masters" do not, for the latter do not work. What do slaves 
learn? Hegel's interpretation is often admired- slaves 
become self-conscious -but it is equally possible to see it as 
retrograde- they learn their place, they become stoical. 13 
This has implications for the 'purpose' of human rights norms. They can, by 
this reasoning, be considered tools for the oppr~ssed to use against the powerful. 
Which, after all, is what we might expect them to be. This would mean that 
constructivism is not so interested in statist international relations, but rather in 
individual or humanist international relations - or at least, it tips the balance of 
competing interests in their favour. Intuitively, this is a simple enough point for 
constructivism but it has required the following of this intellectual line for it to be 
theoretically legitimate. The knock-on effect for research agendas is to call into 
question the reasons for having human rights norms - i.e. moral reasons - which then 
affect what information should be sought about them, and so on. 
How Onuf expresses the importance of referring to key thinkers seems to have 
had the kind of parsimonious constructivist theorising eventually attempted by Wendt 
a decade later firmly in mind. As Onuf says, 'Marx and Weber are names to be 
invoked, even icons to be admired, but rarely are their puzzles acknowledged, their 
13 Onuf, World, pp. 200-201 
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solutions deployed.' 14 How Onufhimselfworks out these puzzles has implications for 
our triangulation. 
The logic with which we might be able to place human rights norms within 
Onuf's categories is complex and has many stages. Here, the aim is to present this as 
minimally, but as clearly, as possible. Essentially, Weber lacks a robust concept15 of 
the type of rule generated by, or based on the prevalence of commitment-rules. Onuf 
(writing with Frank F. Klink) believes that this can be rectified by substituting in a 
clearer categorisation -heteronomy- which therefore completes the picture of why 
Herrschaft is the most appropriate rendering ofhis paradigm of political society. 
Why does this matter for our triangulation? Wendt's Weberian actor-state, we 
must presume (as minimally theorised as it is), is the embodiment of any one of 
Weber's three types of rule. Human rights norms operate within any one of these 
types. The need for a more thoroughly conceptualised typology of rule is the need for 
constructivism to be able to properly conceptualise what this actually means for the 
agents and structures which operate within it - to include, of course, humans, states 
and human rights norms. When constructivism can do this, we must assume that it is 
then able to recognise, measure and interpret how human rights norms act and impact 
upon the international system using techniques as theoretically sound as possible. 
It has already be surmised previously in Chapter Four that directive-
(instructive) rules might well be the most appropriate way to conceive of how human 
rights norms operate, who they affect, etc., but this cannot be known with any 
certainty, hence the need for more rigorous ways and fields of knowing. Wer~dt's 
'actor state' is Weberian in a relatively sparsely theorised way, and so presumably 
14 Ibid., p. 203 
15 See Ibid., p. 206 
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carries this (posited) flaw with it. The broader conception belongs to Onuf, but must 
this necessarily lead to a clearer conclusion? 
Weber's types of rule (rule by administration, traditional leader or charismatic 
figure) are expounded as three 'pure types', something which Onuf refutes. In the first 
type, rules take the form of 'impersonal orders, or laws in the usual sense'. In the 
second, rules stay 'within the bounds of what traditional practice permits (precedent)'. 
In the third, rules depend 'on oracular pronouncements, each of which is revelatory 
and thus completely original' .16 It is this last type which captures our interest here. Of 
course, human rights norms may or may not be 'oracular pronouncements', 
'revelatory' or 'original', harking back as they do to the exemplar need for pre-
theoretical praxis in the critical project. But the fact that they can and do lean towards 
these characterisations that are troubling for that half of IR that is orthodox or rational 
is sufficient reason for this type of rule to be given serious attention by constructivism 
-after all, it is an approach which has not been, and perhaps will not be, definitively 
separated from this (right) wing ofiR theory. So it must be included here as indicative 
of how constructivism must orient itself if it is to truly adhere to its constitutive remit. 
In Onufs scheme, 'we' (as experienced political animals) can relate to the 
types of rule that are hegemonic or hierarchical (based primarily on directive-rules 
and assertive-rules respectively1\ Where we are less certain, and the area of rule 
'familiarity' or recognition which needs bolstering if a paradigm of 'political society' 
is possible, is the rule of 'heteronomy' of which Onuf speaks, which is based 
primarily on commitment-rules. 
Commitment-rules, or systems of 'heteronomous' rule, are of course not the 
'answer' to anything. They are merely the missing link in the proper working-out of 
16 1bid., p. 207 . 
17 Simplifying prevailing rule-types to this level can be misleading. Gramscian and Weberian scholars 
would disagree on what the exact mix is and how this affects rule. See Ibid., pp. 21 0-211. 
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Weber's 'puzzle paradigms' of rule. As Onufnotes, 'hierarchy is the paradigm of rule 
most closely associated with Weber' 18 due to its bureaucratic arrangement of relations 
of super- and subordination, which would seem to tie-into Wendt's own, relatively 
parsimonious, approach. Without question, this reduces Wendt's approach to the 
terminology ofOnufs own interpretation of Weber, but it does allow us to discern a 
split between the two approaches over the depth of theorising required to account for 
human rights norms in the international system based on this particular intellectual 
lineage. 
Taking this approach allows us to visualise each type of constructivism more 
clearly- to 'see' how the triangulation comes together, and how it remains apart, 
when analysed using a well-established marker of social theory. So, then, what of 
Linklater's use of this lineage, and how does it affect both his project and this thesis? 
Linklater's own discussion in Transformation of the role of Marx in political 
theory's counter-movement against the 'orthodox' view of static political community 
takes the form, essentially, of a dialogue with what Kant has to offer. He relies on the 
interplay of both for the theoretical underpinnings of a universal communication 
community. This is primarily because 'Marx's analysis of the prospects for universal 
emancipation dispensed with Kant's appeal to a system of absolute, universal moral 
truths,' 19 which allows for an instrumental approach. At the same time, though, Kant's 
moral stance provides more comprehensive 'reasons for' this critical drive in the first 
place, by arguing that the nation-state 'should adopt new political responsibilities. '20 
Why does this matter here? It asks questions ofLinklater's motivation, and 
hence how this critical branch of constructivism sees human rights norms - morally or 
ethically- and how this then affects our triangulation of approaches. 
18 . Ibid., p. 211 
19 Linklater, Transformation, p. 37 
20 Ibid., p. 43 
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In keeping with a general tone of critique, Linklater prefers to utilise thinking 
which has developed as Kantian, rather than depend on the primary source. This 
distinction is interesting in itself for this thesis. By employing a Kantian-Marxist 
dialogue in his story of the nation-state, Linklater is clearly endorsing the critical 
theory position of having a broad base of problems and potential solutions to the 
amorality of anarchy. There is no such thing as 'neutrality' in the international 
ordering of states. Standing still endorses all of the negativity associated with the 
continuity of a purely statist approach- all of which is captured beneath the umbrella 
of 'exclusion'. Although both Kant and Marx are credited with the thinking which 
instigated sociological theory, Kant is ultimately given (qualified) preference by 
Linklater for how he has set in motion a much greater breadth of critical thinking.21 
Having Kant and Marx play this ancestral role to the 'good' in politics is more 
complex, by Linklater's understanding, than is the case certainly in Social Theory and 
perhaps even in World. 'Kant and Marx were modernists who believed that critical 
social inquiry could produce a true account of the world which would explain the 
meaning of human history, identify the most important logics of development from an 
emancipatory point of view and sketch the outlines of the first truly free society to 
embrace the entire species. '22 
The transformation which Linklater envisages must overcome the 
postmodemist critique of grand theory. This leaves constructivism, and most notably 
constructivism's relationship with values, in an interesting position. The problem, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, is morality: 'The belief that the transcendental subject can 
uncover a system of objective and universal moral principles which are ultimately 
grounded in human nature or reason has been undermined by the modem sociology of 
21 Ultimately neither is entirely sufficient for critical theory as they fail to specify, or even include, how 
investigations into cultural diversity can be an end in themselves. 
22 Linklater, Transformation, p. 63 
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knowledge. From the latter vantage-point, all knowledge is socially constructed, and 
the criteria which are used to distinguish truth from falsehood change radically over 
time. '23 The dynamics of the modem sociology of knowledge are precisely the 
dynamics of constructivism, or we would at least expect them to be. Accordingly, this 
tests the limits not only of what constructivism can say on the matter of moral 
community, but what we should expect it to say. By this reasoning, morality becomes 
secondary to an ethical instrumental approach. 
Linklater's presentation of postmodem critiques essentially rebounds the 
challenge back to them by suggesting that they themselves are deconstructing a 
presumed 'whole'. That is, the postmodem critique assumes that 
enlightenment/modernist oriented thinkers have only one conception of a 
cosmopolitan ideal. To overcome both this (perhaps caricatured) singular and 
essentially totalising cosmopolitanism, and the postmodem critique of it, Linklater 
focuses on the very basic and inclusive principles of recognition. He points out that 
'historicist thinkers such as Meinecke rejected the enlightenment dream of a 
cosmopolitan society in which communities would recognise each other's efforts to 
express cultural potentials in infinitely varied and frequently incommensurable 
ways. '24 There are two threads we can pick up from this. Firstly, it allows room for 
the re-instatement ofKantian and Marxist thinking without the encumbrance of 
having to implement their exact ideologies. Secondly, it asks questions of human 
rights norms - whether they are thrust upon unconvinced and recalcitrant states by 
different moralities, or whether they are genuinely tools for the use of all. Both 
questions underscore the need for a better understanding of the ethical functioning of 
values in the international system. 
23 Ibid., p. 64 
24 Ibid., p. 65 
301 
Linklater's use ofHabermas to better illustrate the ethical potential within 
modernity is tied into Habermas's own critique of Weber's limits. The rationalisation 
of administration, rather than having the effect of shutting-down communicative 
channels, simply shrouds 'expressions of the dialogic potential which is inherent in 
communicative action [and] can be glimpsed in the practices ofliberal-democratic 
societies.'25 Much ofLinklater's purpose is based on the belief that 'dialogic 
potentials are embodied in liberal-democratic institutions to an unusual extent,'26 and 
tapping into them will be politically transformative. 
This progression marks out Linklater's approach from that ofWendt and 
Onuf. Still, there are interesting comparisons to be drawn which point to how far we 
might neatly 'add up' these constituent elements to make our three constructivism's 
communicate better with each other. Weber's fundamental concern with the 
increasing rationalisation of administrative techniques,27 so emblematic of 
modernism, seems a strange character trait for Wendt's state-person in which has 
been expressed the potential for mutual advancement through mutual understanding 
(i.e. Kantian anarchy). It is not so much that we cannot fashion some logic to connect 
the two, but that it would seem to entail a great deal of effort, given Wendt's sparse 
description of Weber's contribution. Perhaps Wendt and Linklater merge on this 
point, but we cannot, in the end, have too much of any consequence depend on it. 
Any potential in Wendt for the kind of normativity desired by the critical corpus is 
utterly hamstrung by his minimal theorising of the internal aspects of states. His 
description ofWeberian 'self-definition' confirms that, for him, a state may display 
'good' characteristics of a moral or an ethical nature, but it is not therefore a 'good 
25 Ibid., p. 121 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Ibid., p. 120 
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state'. Why not? Perhaps Wendt is being pragmatic about theorising the international. 
Jettisoning the domestic in this way certainly makes for a sharper theory of states-as-
people. Value-normativity, though, is so starkly lacking that we cannot hope to gain 
the encompassing constructivism we need by mining Wendt's social theory roots. 
Onuf seems to trace an ancestry much more conducive to value-norms. The 
notion of Herrschaft is central to this, but focusing values here is problematic, at least 
from a critical perspective. Essentially, the problem is this: In order for Onufs 
political society to engage with a critical sensibility, it really ought to be a conduit 
through which the stuff of morals passes through in the great redevelopment of 
modernity. If we were permitted some room for interpretation, we might just be able 
to make this the case. The basis for this would be Weber's third rule type which 
admits revelatory 'oracular pronouncements' into the toolkit of states. These 
pronouncements, we might presume, are moral and so therefore are integral to the 
critical programme. Onuf, though, simply does not allow for this to happen. These 
'ideal-types' are dismissed for being precisely that. So rather than allow 
constructivism to be swept up on the historical critical tide, he stakes out its ground, 
and urges successors to work within the shadows of modernity and not to create any 
spurious (moral?) state ofbeing with no proper foundation. He is, in other words, die-
casting constructivism as an ethical approach within historically determined limits. 
By having the nation-state underpinned by a Kantian-Marxist dialogue, 
Linklater writes of potential, something which is fundamentally lacking in Wendt and 
Onuf. What we must do here is determine whether this potential is for a moral or an 
ethical transformation of how the business of politics is executed, and therefore 
whether its presence bolsters or undermines constructivism's position regarding 
human rights. The key factor, which may well prove to be decisive as this chapter 
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develops, is his interest in a 'truly free society' advocated by Kant and Marx. That is 
free, and not morally determined. Linklater adds his own layers of complexity to this, 
always mindful of both the call of grand theory and the demands ofliving up to a 
critical tag. Is this 'free society' ethical, then, or moral? Although there are gaps in 
Linklater's transformative blue-print, most notably where we would like to see a 
methodology, there is enough here to suggest that 'free' is compatible with 'ethical', 
and that this branch of constructivism incorporates values in a particularly compelling 
way. Whether it is wholly satisfactory in doing so depends on 'constructivism' the 
label, as we shall see. 
Linklater approaches this history as a means to build an argument for renewal 
more convincingly than Wendt does, whereas Onuf seems happier to state a case as 
more of a precedent for successors to build on themselves. The moral case looms 
again, but as we have seen, this is becoming less of a burden for constructivism to 
carry- a notion which will be pursued in more detail throughout the following 
sections of this chapter. Presently, we turn to the practice element of constructivist IR. 
Bearing in mind how each of our three approaches has utilised a key triumvirate of 
thinkers in setting up the moral and/or ethical parameters of a constitutive approach, 
and have then added their own imprint, how has this been manifested in the ways in 
which hypotheses have been tested? Indeed, are these approaches at all successful in 
permitting a programme of research into human rights norms and their values to 
flourish? 
Subjecting human rights norms to constructivist methods 
When we ask questions of the tools, techniques and methodologies of our 
triangulation, it very quickly becomes clear that there is no consistent pattern to 
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analyse. Values are approached in different ways. Any commitment to human rights 
can appear to be either sparse, fleeting or implicit at best. Alternatively, values may 
appear so comprehensively covered that we risk losing focus. Engaging with this 
range of commitment to human rights provides the opportunity to analyse the values 
of constructivism without any built-in assumption of how best to do this, which may 
have otherwise prejudiced any conclusion. In other words, each aspect of the 
triangulation offers a different perspective on the constitutive nature of the role of 
ethics in the international system, and how we might explain and understand it. 
The processes of gathering knowledge employed by our three types of 
constructivism vary, but to what extent does this affect the outcome we are interested 
in here- their inclination and capacity to account for values? In their role as a more 
tangible (and contemporary) expression of the sort of values which might otherwise 
be a vague proposition, human rights norms as expressed in the Universal 
Declaration provide international theory with what seems an ideal device with which 
to gauge how values affect individuals, societies and states, and of course the 
relationship between all three. How much of this is a metatheoretical ideal, and how 
much of it is realisable through the techniques constructivists use? To what extent, 
even, can we discern 'techniques' in any of our three variants? 
Most clearly, empirical consistency can be found in how constructivists have 
followed Onuf in utilising a language-based approach, from which a linguistic thread 
to Linklater is the most obvious step to make given our protagonists. Wendt's Social 
Theory works differently, as we have seen throughout this thesis, and it will be 
instructive here to re-engage with some broader conventional insights as a useful 
comparative exercise to draw out Wendtian strengths and weaknesses. It is in this 
order- Onuf, Linklater, Wendt- that the analysis will proceed. 
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Onuf 
The importance of language is evident throughout the empirical work of 
constructivists. There is little doubt that the analysis of philosophically-derived 
concepts of language-in-use allows for a broader and more detailed approach to 
content than we would expect to find in traditional or 'orthodox' IR, but where values 
fit into this analysis is still unclear. That it is satisfactory to have speech act theory do 
this work seems to depend on a chain of events: whether or not human rights norms 
are first 'used' in a particular way, and then are 'responded to' in a particular way, 
and so on. 
By way of example, for there to be a situation wherein 'hearers make (correct) 
inferences as to speakers' intentions by noting the illocutionary force as well as the 
propositional content of (well-formed) utterances, ' 28 it seems that human rights norms 
themselves have to be a settled norm in the eyes of all possible 'hearers and speakers', 
which they are patently not. 
On the other hand, relationships in which human rights play a key role (be 
they state/state or state/human) are complex and contingent, and call upon various 
situations and outcomes in order that they might have some 'meaning' to both 
participants and observers, and it is possible to learn much from them by analysing 
them as speech acts. The overall analytical picture, in other words, is anything but 
complete. The assessment of Onuf in this section picks up from that in Chapter Three, 
in that much depends on which values are deemed to 'matter' in international 
relations, and then how scholars go about picking apart contexts and actor 
28 Onuf, World, p. 81 
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contributions. The result is a discourse of values to which human rights norms either 
do or do not belong. 
What are the limits of speech act theory when applied to values? Take, for 
example, the Cingranelli and Richards study which found that government respect for 
rights can be measured, but which then failed to take a further conceptual leap to 
examine how this relates to the origin of those rights, or even the forces at play in the 
internationalisation of those rights. But, the reply might well be, why should it? These 
corollary points (as important as we might think they are) are not on the research 
agenda of the study's authors. Although the central focus of the study is indeed 
human rights, the omission ofhow values are internationally affective reflects how 
they are missing from the broader paradigm to which this study belongs. 
But, and this is at the heart of the constructivism-values nexus we are 
attempting to define, how could they be included? How could these complex 
relationships - state/state, state/human, state/international, human/international - all 
be fairly represented, let alone evaluated, in a single hypothesis? The argument here, 
though, is that not a single strand of this complexity, not one of the four permutations 
mentioned above, is tackled. Is this a problem with the application of speech act 
theory per se? No. If a constructivist research agenda is interested only in moralistic 
motivations and outcomes then this contradicts its own constitutive precepts. A 
dialogue-based approach will always be limited if it is attached to an agenda. If it is 
instead focused on the ethical content of any given scenario, then this seems a more 
'natural' fit. That the above study omits these relationships is not a failing on the part 
of speech act theory. 
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When constitutive and behavioural rules are discussed,29 the 'ought' criterion 
of normativity is lacking. Is this in part (or even, perhaps, on the whole) largely due to 
received notions about the moral question which have ruptured the discourse of 
values? This does seem to be the case. Values are included in constructivist research 
agendas, but predominantly as a moral issue which can only be contingent, rather than 
from a more fluid and accommodating ethical perspective - the instrumentality of 
which can be mapped onto the constitutive and procedural aspects of normativity. Can 
we begin to generalise from this, or are we limited to speculation based on isolated 
cases? 
To begin with a point raised by Peter Howard: Orthodox international 
concepts such as 'threat' and 'security' are only ever 'constructed through the rules of 
language, not by raw material capability. These capabilities have no intrinsic 
meaning; they only have meaning within a language game. ' 30 If they only have 
meaning within a language game, then their outcomes are also played out in a 
language game: 'reality' is therefore shared meaning. 
Some key questions emerge from this. First, are language games somehow 
'accessible' to the oppressed who need to claim their human rights (that is, are the 
often limited lines of communication afforded to those who need their voices to be 
heard 'language games' in the formal sense?), or are they just applicable to the 
machinations of the elite, and at the discretion of researchers? Second, are human 
rights norms understood in the same way by individuals as they are by states (i.e. as a 
means to escaping some form of oppression, or quite differently, as a tool of 
diplomacy)? Third, and related to this second point, can human rights norms be 
29 See Howard, 'Why Not Invade North Korea?', above, pp. 
30 Ibid., p. 825 
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comprehensive in this way, or are they discretely split as and when the situation or 
context dictates? 
The general point underpinning this is that, by this logic, human rights norms 
are constructed through language and so have effect through language, and so the only 
techniques capable of measuring them are linguistic. Weisband's analysis of 'shame' 
as a means of maintaining core labour standards appears analogous to the standards of 
human rights norms. Shame appears to be a useful tool both in the diplomatic 
politicking that takes place between states and in the redress sought by individual 
plaintiffs. In either instance it is used as a way to instigate a change in attitudes which 
is more likely to be evolutionary than revolutionary in terms of a time-scale. But how 
tangible is it? How much more than just an idea is it? 
Arguably, international labour standards, as in Weisband's review, are more 
clearly defined than human rights norms, and so carry with them expectations that are 
easier to meet, at least on paper. To ask of human rights norms, 'What is actually 
being met?' is to expect a single answer, which is a moral position and self-defeating 
because of this (by our constructivist analysis). International Labour Organisation 
provisions, on the other hand, although containing an essential moral ingredient, can 
be re-appropriated by transgressor states without having to consider any fundamental 
issues of this nature. 
Nothing demonstrates the power of language in affecting international 
relations more clearly than the act of reclassification. The status of an issue area 
dictates how it is responded to and with what material means. The analogy which 
linguistic constructivism provides for human rights norms is the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic.31 That such a global issue can be, and has been, securitised could point to a 
31 See Elbe, 'Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized?' discussed in Chapter Four above 
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way in which a similar change of status for human rights norms would substantively 
affect their own status in international relations. The process of securitisation is 
occasioned by a distant concern becoming an immediate threat (to the more powerful 
of international actors, either economically or geopolitically). 
How useful this analogy can be for this thesis rests on the key issue of the 
moral/ethical complexity of the matter in hand. For example, a pandemic can be 
(relatively easily) classified, recognised and even in some cases planned for, whereas 
human rights are fundamentally contested institutions. They can be classified, but not 
without a significant amount of lasting contention. They can be recognised, but only 
sporadically. Can they be planned for? Here the analogy breaks. As contested as 
human rights are, especially in their liberal Universal Declaration form, this is as 
nothing compared to the divergence of opinion over the most appropriate response to 
their breach or abuse. The outcome being that although linguistic tools which come 
under the broad classification of 'speech acts' or 'language games' are useful for 
drawing out 'what really is happening/has happened' in a given situation, they are 
quite limited at defining the parameters of that situation in the first place. 
As was pointed out in Chapter Three, some human rights, such as subsistence 
rights championed by Vincent, do make calls upon domestic policy which would 
require an alteration in their official status when their relief demands a qualitatively 
different approach than currently offered by government. This only serves to highlight 
the complexity of values, which can attach to specific needs in different ways 
depending on cultural and political norms and circumstances. Again, should we 
expect a linguistic approach to be able to deconstruct concrete examples of dialogue 
and leave us with all we need to know about a moral/ethical discourse? No, we should 
not. 
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Linklater 
Linklater's transformative politics depends on a deceptively simple assumption- that 
dialogue and community can combine effectively within the same whole. Our analysis 
of human rights norms and language persists with a particular conclusion; that a 
formal linguistic approach (that is, one utilising philosophy oflanguage techniques) 
offers a greater breadth of understanding- that many more factors impact upon 
international relations than have previously been consistently admitted- but fails to 
engage with the intrinsic depth of the issue. What is meant by 'depth' in this context? 
It is the troublesome 'ought' ofnormativity, and as a concept it matters to this thesis 
in helping to discern whether constructivism is sufficiently well-equipped to deal with 
either a moral or an ethical focus. 
Morality, as has been held throughout the preceding chapters, causes a great 
deal of difficulty for a nominally constitutive approach. So, the first question is, how 
well do Linklater's imagined dialogic communities present the ethical case? 
Before going on, however, now is an appropriate juncture to remind ourselves 
of the simple truth that human rights norms, and their attendant values, are very much 
a key part of the identities of many diffuse cultures, but they are not the entirety of 
them. They are not even necessarily the sole basis of them, either. So by arriving at 
the formula for dialogic community, wrongs will not automatically be righted. It is a 
question of direction of fit. Neither human rights norms, nor dialogic communities, 
are finished products. This is, of course, by design. So neither can be 'fitted' to the 
other. We can, however, more roughly 'map' human rights norms onto the framework 
offered by dialogic community, on the working assumption that the origin of such 
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rights, and recourse to them, will be facilitated by this particular formula for 
egalitarianism. 
The argument runs thus: we can propose that human rights norms matter more 
obviously to humans than they do to states. This is the essence of the Universal 
Declaration. Certainly, they do if we are looking at immediate need. It is more 
straightforward to say that they matter to individuals who are living compromised 
lives and so need to claim these rights to elevate their own particular status. It is more 
difficult to say that they matter on principle. If we take the first line, then to need 
dialogic community, we are assuming that there is a fundamental lack of the type of 
infrastructure and mechanisms which otherwise fosters such living conditions that 
individuals either a). claim their right without undue difficulty, orb). simply have no 
need to do so in the first place. The sorts of arrangements we might expect to see in 
Western states, for example. There are no uncontested standards at the heart ofhuman 
rights. 
So, in sum, for dialogic community to be relevant to the subject of this thesis, 
we can assume that its relationship to human rights norms is ethical rather than moral, 
and that it is also contingent but not entirely dependent: dialogic community is an 
ideal for the airing of grievances/opinions/positions not represented by the Universal 
Declaration just as much as those that are. It offers, in short, no panacea. 
The revisionism of dialogic cosmopolitanism provides Linklater with a form 
of discourse ethics which, it seems, can be universalised with less controversy than 
other formulations. Having nothing set or codified means that this historical and 
progressivist view remains contested, and profitably so. Which begs the question, 
what ofthe institutionalised Universal Declaration? Is it a misleading 'end' of politics 
or even morality? 
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We find a key problem with the historical/ahistorical split which separates 
Linklater from natural law. With the latter, reason is supreme and has already 
prevailed, so that our moral 'end-state' exists and only needs to be tapped into. A 
progressivist view can be interpreted as aiming for this end-state. Even by taking an 
alternate direction, we are progressing towards something. 
With the case of human rights norms, we must assume that they are an 
addition to this discourse and not the product of it. They will matter more or less 
depending on how they are built into Linklater's thesis, following the blueprints he 
has put in place for learning how to conduct dialogic community. Human rights 
themselves, therefore, have at least the potential for a more clearly defined role in 
Linklater's framework than in Onufs or Wendt's. Put in these terms, dialogic 
community seems to be an ideal fit for human rights as an ethical discourse. 
But shouldn't we expect Linklater's to be a moral thesis, given its critical 
underpinnings? That is to say, should it provide the moral angle sought by 
commentators such as Christian Reus-Smit? Perhaps the most unsatisfactory aspect of 
having Linklater fill in the 'moral gap' of constructivism is that, firstly, the notion of a 
'moral gap' within constructivism has become increasingly tenuous throughout this 
thesis, and secondly, his work clears great swathes of ground, but he is reluctant to 
offer anything concrete to build upon it. Instead, it directs a more normative 
constructivism towards the ethical elements which have so far (largely) been missing. 
The articulation of these techniques for engaging in discourse ethics suggests that the 
role of critical constructivism is precisely that- describing an ethical 'how' which can 
be mapped onto existing epistemological notions held by constructivists. Many of the 
techniques that Linklater invests in dialogic community do at first suggest a more 
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ethical approach. How moral his position is will prove to be problematic for 
constructivism (see below). 
The difficulty we have in analysing a methodology, or any empirical tools, of 
Linklater in order to then compare their ability to account for values with our 
triangulation, is that much of his work is given over to the 'why' of the dialogic 
community project rather than the 'how'. Rather than detailing a clear methodology in 
Transformation, Linklater's vision of dialogic community as discourse ethics means 
that the empiricism of dialogic community is found in the working out of 
communicative action. 
So Linklater's theory seems to be tested, but mostly by proxy. How useful is 
this research given our subject of values encapsulated by human rights? As we have 
seen, Hawkins's study of how state interests change over time through a discourse of 
communication and persuasion concludes that 'principles establishing behavioural 
"oughts" ... are widely accepted by states,' 32 and that this is a result of processes of 
social learning. This is a piece of research that could equally be held by Wendt as 
evidence for the socialisation of states. Are there any key differences with this 
application of it? For Linklater, this type of study supports the thesis that 
communication can change a given state of affairs, but (and this is of key importance), 
it does so for a purpose. Wendt, on the other hand, would see change at work which 
could be extrapolated to have wider significance for the international system, but that 
this is not indicative of any deeper moral or even ethical shift. It points to an ethical 
response to a systemic issue, but not with any particular end in mind. To apply this to 
human rights norms, to have them instigate ethical change (or even be the product of 
it) in the international system is either evidence of a deeper ethical purpose (tending 
32 Hawkins, 'Explaining Costly International Institutions', pp. 783-784 
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towards a moral position), or simply the machinations of states which are more 
sophisticated than they might appear. Its 'meaning' in this latter sense is limited to its 
repercussions for the 'international system' as a discrete whole, and not necessarily 
for humans within it. 
It seems therefore, when the topic is methodology, to be a much simpler task 
to offer an evaluation of how these types of constructivism synthesise with each other 
rather than with the subject of values. Of the three, without having to take a closer 
look at Wendt, it is a safe statement that only Onufs World offers any indication of 
how a linguistic project should be implemented. Even with this, though, the empirical 
work which has so far emanated outwards from his original theoretical prompting has 
limited use for the investigation of human rights norms and the values therein. Wendt, 
on the other hand, sketches the appropriate breadth of analysis for the international 
system, supposing that there is more to it than has ever previously been considered in 
a systematic way. Linklater, as expected from a nominally critical approach, is more 
interested in elaborating on the actual form of this 'more' that there is to it. 
The difference offered by Linklater is that, specifically in Transformation, he 
details not only the ingrained unjustness in modem (international) society but draws 
up plans for doing something about it. For Wendt, it may be unjust, but that is just 
another feature of the system. For Onuf, it is unjust, but we are locked in a continuum 
of process as long as we persist with a particular model of rule. How we go about 
unlocking this cycle is tied to the society-wide assimilation of certain rule-types, 
which is not so easily reduced to a method or even a mindset. 
The conclusion reached in Chapter Five regarding the critiques ofLinklater's 
project- that is, a project open to characterisation as 'universalising', or 'grand 
theory' etc. - was that it could side-step postmodern scepticism due to its belief that 
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all knowledge is socially constructed, and therefore undergoing constant change. 
What Linklater arguably does, without making explicit mention of it, is open the 
doors to any methodological tool that progresses dialogue and understanding. The 
process itself is its own self-checking mechanism. Relating this to our thesis, we can 
only assume that this is to include the tools offered by linguistics. 
So this discussion of methodology in relation to Linklater's project is itself 
problematic, as it is short on material from which to draw conclusions, and the 
temptation is to project too much onto Linklater of what he might have intended by 
way of techniques that are recognisably constructivist, making dialogic community 
itself seem a less attractive reference for what constructivism could be capable of. But 
even this would be to define dialogic community using parameters which it patently 
refuses to recognise itself. Pre-determined methods and techniques are the 
preoccupation of positivists. 
Wendt 
Wendt describes no particular methodologies in Social Theory. By failing to do so he 
presents us with a lack that that is not altogether different from Linklater and, to an 
extent, Onuf also. Relatively speaking, and considering the often highly 
metatheoretical nature of their work, neither Onuf nor Linklater provide much in the 
way of clues as to how they might prefer to do the empirical measuring of their 
respective worlds. But there is nevertheless something in each of their particular 
approaches which this project, concerned with international values, can analyse. More 
so, perhaps, in Onuf than Linklater, as we have seen. 
Wendt, on the other hand, theori~es about how socialisation takes place, and it 
is the unpicking of this process from which the impact ofhuman rights norms, and 
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their values, must be gauged. What must be made clear before we go on is that 
anything we can infer about human rights norms will inevitably be a secondary 
concern to Wendt. The analysis in Chapter Three demonstrated how this is 
consistently the case. Applying the values we find (or are assuming are present) in 
human rights norms to a theory of the state cannot be done simply or even in neatly 
progressive stages. We must be broadly systematic, and keep mining for results. 
Wendt's exposition of how both cause and constitution 'make' the 
international system - ranging from a distinction between to a conflation of these 
terms and various complex points in between- is a key part of his theoretical 
approach. In this way, the process is discussed at length throughout Social Theory, 
and so for our analytical purposes, we must take the risk of somewhat reducing it in 
an attempt to extract values from it. The section dealing with 'Constitutive theorizing' 
is instructive as we try to piece together the 'how' and 'why' of values in his system 
and in comparison to our triangulation. 33 
In the case of states, 'internal structures do not cause the properties associated 
with them, in the sense of being antecedent conditions for independently existing 
effects, but rather make those properties possible. ' 34 Human rights norms, of course, 
act across borders as well as within them. Taking the former incidences ofborder 
crossing as the proper realm of IR, then by using the logic above it is humans 
themselves who, by claiming a specifically human right, give rise to an identifiable 
feature of that state (either the willingness and capacity to respond positively to that 
claim, or not) which other states then pick up on and respond to. The original 'home' 
state in this sense subsumes the human rights claim (as it does any other internally 
33 See Wendt, Social Theory, pp. 83-88 
34 Ibid., p. 83 
317 
occurring event or scenario), and then, as we know to be key in Wendt's approach, 
has a distinct outward 'personality' only in the presence of other states. 
Therefore, the effect that human rights norms have on the international system 
is experienced in either a primary or a secondary way, depending on the importance 
allocated to these internal features. That is, either human rights norms matter because · 
they register on the radars of other interested states, or they matter because states 
themselves register them. A fine distinction to make, perhaps, but one which orients 
the international system either towards or subtly away from human rights in and of 
themselves. Wendt himself is vague as to what the precise formulation should be, but 
we can safely infer that a 'state first' policy continues to prevail. 
Searching for and uncovering the constituent elements of states is a reductivist 
activity, one which 'in social science finds its expression in the doctrine of atomism (a 
radical form of individualism), which tries to reduce society to the intrinsic properties 
of individuals ... One need not be an atomist, however, to acknowledge a role for the 
study of internal structures. All that is required is that an entity have an internal 
structure which helps account for its properties . .JS And in Social Theory we are left 
with the barest skeleton of that structure. 
However, Wendt's theorising ofthe state- namely the outward facing state-
forces us to address this aspect of the possible effects ofhuman rights norms on the 
international system. This is something which could be overlooked, given the moral 
urgings which prompted this thesis, and the ethical approach taken thereafter, both of 
which work primarily on the assumption that it is humans that matter most when the 
issue ofhuman rights is raised. But these rights have been institutionalised in the 
Universal Declaration - an address to the entirety of the international system, which 
35 Ibid., p. 84 
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of course (in however two-dimensional a way) includes state-state relationships and 
interaction. Imagining, briefly, that these entities can indeed be analysed on a purely 
third-level basis, what might the outcome be? 
In Wendt's words, 'kinds can be constituted in a second, holist fashion by the 
external structures in which they are embedded,' and furthermore, 'social kinds are 
often constituted in important part by external, discursive structures. In some 
instances these structures place social kinds in relationships of conceptual necessity to 
other social kinds. ' 36 Traditional levels of analysis become disrupted if we follow this 
reasoning. By this, it is meant that this thesis can implement its own 'third' level or 
perspective given the subject at hand: we have been able to consider what effects 
human rights norms have in the international system a). from the perspective of 
humans, and b). from the perspective of states, but this notion of the creation and 
development of 'social kinds' allows us to imagine how these discourses operate c). 
from the perspective of human rights norms themselves, putting norms at the centre of 
the equation. 
What this does is present constructivism with another analytical challenge. 
Moreover, although this appears to be an abstract thread, it is one which does not 
seem to have to be counterweighted by a difficult moral impasse. Why? In the first 
instance, the problems associated with 'personality' would not be present. The 
personhood of humans and of states (in Wendt's terminology) invests in these actors 
an inherent moral sensibility which, regardless of whether it can be circumvented by a 
better ethical argument, remains nonetheless. Human rights norms - especially in 
their codified form in the Universal Declaration, are a different form of actor 
(perhaps agentic or structural, perhaps in some sense a 'power'), but precisely what 
361bid. 
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form is beyond the space allowed in this thesis. It is sufficient to recognise that they 
can be thought of in this way, with their own primacy. 'Non-state actors' do matter to 
·wendt, but they do not matter a great deal to a theory about the relationship between 
states in the international system. This is a simple logic which is hard to refute. 
In Wendt's theory human rights norms matter in the international system 
because of the effect they have on states' personalities. The only way we can probe 
this further, without being entirely circular (a danger that has become increasingly 
more obvious as this analysis has progressed), is to problematise this from a critical 
perspective. How can human rights play a bigger part in all of this? Why are non-
state derived values not so easily integrated into Wendt's model? 
The reason for emphasising Wendt's approach as a systematically developed 
theory is that, in order to make a judgement ofhow it can improve our understanding 
of constructivism and values in international relations through its empirical 
contribution, we need to look at the wider type of constructivism- the 'conventional' 
approach - to which it belongs. 
We can do this most profitably by asking one question that has two parts. We 
know that states are the currency of conventionalists. Therefore, learning about how 
this type of constructivism accounts for values is tied to the response of states to 
human rights norms - to claims made of these rights, perhaps even to their 'nature', 
etc. This assumes that states are taking human rights norms on board, and that their 
relationship will always work this way. It is not for us to decide that it is in the states' 
best interest to do so. The issue is how much effort do states have to expend to accept 
this change, and, secondly, is it worth their while? If it is worth their while, then we 
can begin to infer whether this is due to the ethical implications of undertaking this 
course of action, or not. 
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By gauging how much of a rupture in their usual 'process' this kind of change 
is, we can then gauge the significance of human rights norms for the international 
system from a constructivist perspective. How is such change 'taken on board' by a 
conventional view? Framing an answer will enable us to make a useful comparison 
between Wendt and the approach he is often associated with. 
How is this Wendtian/conventionalist 'process' maintained? For Wendt it is 
through an understanding of social learning. Conventionalist studies such as those by 
Finnemore and Sikkink, and Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, point to the integration and 
functioning of norms in the international system. What are the key concepts at stake 
here? In Wendt's summary, complex learning'(ofthe type which develops identities) 
is an active and reactive process: 'the basic idea is that identities and their 
corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are 
treated by significant Others. ' 37 
The comparison to be drawn is specifically between this and the dividing lines 
which separate 'norm emergence', 'norm cascade' and 'internalization' in Finnemore 
and Sikkink's 'life cycle' model, a format which finds expression in the second and 
third (of five) components of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's 'spiral model'- how and 
why norms are at first denied and then acknowledged. 
Wendt is expressly constructing a 'simple model of complex leaming' 38 which 
is in keeping with his parsimonious approach to social theory, and which begs a very 
obvious question- is it too simple? Certainly, his casting of the relationship between 
two strangers, 'Ego' and 'Alter', is an ideal-type situation- a 'First Encounter. ' 39 
However, Wendt only uses this as a preliminary device to show that the layers of 
complexity added to this come in two forms- material needs and representational 
37 Ibid., p. 327 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., p. 328 
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ideas. The first of these is perhaps a weakness in Wendt's approach. Using his notion 
of personhood, 'material' needs are those required for the body to function 
'biologically', as the metaphor continues.40 
Wendt lists the needs of states as 'physical security, autonomy, economic 
well-being, and collective self-esteem.'41 Only the last of these has the potential to 
include ideas of 'ought' in the construction of national consciousness. Yet self-esteem 
is not 'self-generated', in the way that we might expect a moral regard for human 
rights to be manifested. It depends, rather, on the effects of socialisation- a 
crystallisation of the opinions of others - which in a 'Lockean' world might well take 
the form of "'virtue" and "being a good citizen".'42 
This does suggest an inherent regard for values, which in turn might give us 
some hope for the theorising ofhuman rights norms. Yet in Wendt's formulation, all 
of this is tied to state sovereignty which acts as an ultimately pacifying institution -
providing something of a blanket to cover up thorny political issues, a category to 
which we can assume human rights belong. By this reasoning, even the ethical 
presence of human rights norms cannot be presumed. 
What, then, of 'representational ideas'? 'By assumption Alter and Ego do not 
share representations, but they are still likely to bring with them to their Encounter 
preconceived ideas about who they are that assign tentative roles and form the starting 
point of their interaction. Those ideas were no doubt formed in social interaction with 
other actors prior to the Encounter, but they are exogenous here. ' 43 When Wendt 
speaks of 'exogenous ideas', they have been created externally to the two-party 
40 Not that Wendt's 'personality of states' is a metaphor, of course, but this controversy can be allowed 
to lay' dormant here. 
41 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 328 
42 1bid., p. 237 
43 Ibid., p. 328 
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relationship of the states in question, but they are still ofandfor state relationships 
and not, as a critical mind might suppose, of some other (perhaps moral?) origin. 
Our conclusion about Wendt's place in our triangulation has not significantly 
wavered from our start point. By comparison, then (and so by proxy to Wendt), what 
of the conventionalist studies? In Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's key study, 
there is a striking normative gap between two of their three stages. The term 
'normative' is used here because it is unclear whether this gap is between moral 
positions, or whether it marks out a more ethical shift. To illustrate: in each of the 
three stages of norm dynamics in the international system, three analytical categories 
are used to tell us what is going on- 'Actors', 'Motives' and 'Dominant 
mechanisms' .44 The gap concerns 'motives' and is between Stage 1 and Stage 2 (norm 
emergence and norm cascade). 
In Stage 1, the motives (of norm entrepreneurs) are described in 'moralistic' or 
ethical language, so we have 'altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment.' In Stage 2, 
the language is a little less florid, and perhaps more functional: 'legitimacy, 
reputation, esteem. ' 45 The reason for this difference is spelled out in the 'Actors' 
category. Stage 1 is the province of 'norm entrepreneurs with organizational 
platforms'- activists, movements, groups (humans, essentially)- at work and about 
to break into the international system. Stage 2 contains the institutional forms which 
must bear this impact- 'states, international organisations, networks. ' 46 The split may 
be obvious, but it is worth highlighting. Values are clearly the emotive expressions of 
humans, and they are equally clearly not reasons for state behaviour. Or, if they could 
possibly be conceived to be linked in some way, any connection between what 
humans experience and what states experience is immediately disconnected in a way 
44 See Finnemore and Sikkink, Norm Dynamics, p. 898 
451bid. 
461bid. 
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that is unspecified. If we think in terms of morals and moralistic language, then the 
gap is clear. In terms of ethics, it is less so. This is the issue which underpins much of 
the theoretical inconsistencies and difficulties of constructivist thinking. That the 
issue is not directly broached in an important study such as Finnemore's and 
Sikkink's is symptomatic of this vagueness. 
The problems of having a preconceived political (liberal) 'end' in sight which 
mar the objectivity of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's spiral model have already been 
documented earlier in this thesis. But these problems should not prevent us from 
extracting their essential stance on the moral/ethical question. If anything, they should 
serve to polarise it. 
Phases 2 and 3 of the spiral model are sub-headed 'denial' and 'tactical 
concessions' respectively.47 Much of what is described in these stages illuminates 
constructivism's difficulties with human rights norms, and how conventionalism both 
mirrors and is divergent from Wendt's work. Essentially the process is as follows. In 
'Phase 2', the moral argument regarding the norm violation in question is gathering so 
much international weight that transnational advocacy networks are able to 
successfully transmit this to 'Western states' who then are able to formally notify the 
transgressor state of their wrongdoing. There are two related problems with this, one 
philosophical, the other practical. 
First, the 'handing over' of the morality of the situation from transnational 
advocacy networks to states compromises that morality by framing it as something 
other than an absolute given. It must then be an ethical argument, for which we can 
allow an element of persuasion in its formation and subsequent transmission. But the 
norm violation in the first place is a moral transgression, is it not? And so we can see 
47 Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights, pp. 22-35 
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the moral bind tightening before us. Secondly, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's theorising 
ofthis transmission is extremely brief. The metaphysics-by-numbers above is not 
meant as a definitive statement on the issue, but rather as an illustration that, if there is 
no theory attached to this, then what are we left to suppose regarding the problem 
itself, its transmission, its receipt, etc., etc.? These are not necessarily insurmountable 
theoretical problems, but they do seem to be constructivist problems. 
It is a commonly asked question that, if a state can deny any wrongdoing 
where others perceive a moral transgression, then whither the human rights norm? 
Risse et al recognise that 'transgressor' states do tend to blur the issue as being 
between moral jurisdiction or international jurisdiction, a confusion which will 
eventually betray their need to be part of the international system, evidenced by their 
'denial' of any wrongdoing. This is another point which reveals the fault line between 
morality and ethics. 
As Phase 3 contends, the overcoming ofthe transgressor state's denials is 
effected by their outward expression of appeasement, i.e. releasing prisoners.48 This is 
an instrumental or strategic manoeuvre.49 A key split here, and an insight into the 
nature of the state which is more clearly expressed than in Wendt's theory, is that the 
'behaviour of the state is less important than social mobilisation within the state. In 
effect, humans take over the normative reins. 
This is arguably Risse et al's most penetrating insight for this thesis. And it 
also has repercussions for the theorising of human rights norms, and so for the 
contribution of constructivism to this area. Firstly it suggests that, overall, the 
outcome is a blend of tactical sensibility and moral urgency, which points to the 
understanding of the international human rights discourse being achieved most 
48 Ibid., p. 25 
49 See Ibid. 
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effectively by an ethical instrumental approach, i.e. states act as states do, but for 
reasons underpinned by moral sensibilities. Secondly, we must question whether this 
outcome is best achieved by analysing it in terms of a grand theory, or whether the 
processes that take place across the international system are just too lengthy and 
idiosyncratic to be the subject of anything other than a loosely defined 'approach', 
which the analysis above strongly suggests. 
Although Social Theory lacks a more rounded vision of the state, we would be better 
placed to make a judgement about constructivism if we consider this instructive, 
rather than irredeemably problematic. Thus, the space in our triangulation inhabited 
by Wendt has clearer boundaries than that of either Onuf or Linklater, and this may 
allow for either a human-oriented view of human rights norms or a state-oriented 
view. It is not prepared to pre-empt either, and so, we can argue, remains an ethical 
approach because of this. Although the lack of a clearly defined relationship between 
the domestic and the international aspects of statehood hampers our understanding of 
values in Wendt, it is not possibly to dismiss Social Theory on these grounds alone. If, 
on the other hand, the issue is one of classification as 'constructivist' or not, which 
certainly seems to be the case, and Wendt's theory therefore may or may not have 
repercussions for the essential 'nature' of constructivism, then that is for the final 
section of this chapter to answer. 
Linklater's reluctance to prescribe a method for 'doing' or measuring dialogic 
community is not by any means where we find the seeds of its downfall. It is an. 
utterly pragmatic, ethical, instrumental construct, and so we cannot hope to classify it 
in any truly satisfactory way. Transformation delineates a critical space within our 
triangulation which speaks to both critical theory and constructivism, and which 
326 
allows values to take a place at the heart of constructivism. If this leans too far 
towards critical theory, then that is again a different matter. 
If Onufhimselfhas prescribed the proper limits of constructivist study, can we 
really hope for his empirical successors to be innovative with values? These 
limitations do the job of containing expectations -both of constructivists themselves 
and of what is knowable about the world. Onufis effectively dismissing the 
metaphysics of the 'ought' question from constructivism, and the logic for doing this 
is clear. It cannot be moral. It must be ethical. 
II. Constructivism as a critique of modernity 
Constructivism tends to define itself as a reaction, or even antidote to an abiding 
failure on the part of liberalism to account for human lives other than as cogs in a 
(capitalist) machine. There are important threads to this which will be picked up in the 
second and third sections of this chapter. Presently, this idea of a modernity critique 
will be analysed in terms of how well it sets up the respective constructivisms as 
approaches capable of accounting for values. How well do they perform at what they 
seem to be designed for, given their Third Debate origin? 
In their key texts, both Onuf and Linklater spend .time recounting the 
modernity illusion, exposing it, and then retracing the steps of this entrenched 
morality to begin their explanations of why human relations matter (and why they are 
problematic) in a continuing and diverse international political history. Wendt doesn't 
appear to do this, or at least certainly not in an explicit way. Comparatively, where 
does this leave values? The section will proceed as follows: Firstly, there-visioning of 
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modernity serves a clear analytical purpose. The explicit labelling of human suffering 
provides constructivism with the background 'material reality' required of it if it is to 
be an extension of critical theory, rather than just an off-shoot. Is Onufs 
'exploitation' equivalent to Linklater's 'harm', and does Wendt have a guiding 
conception which is equivalent or similar? 
Secondly, having established what this material reality is for constructivism, 
and having suggested differences, the next logical step is to problematise it further. 
Does Onufs continuum between ground-clearing effort and resultant empirical 
practice breakdown more rapidly than Linklater's? By asking this type of question, 
we will begin to assert some qualitative and quantitative discrepancies in each 
approach's understanding of values. 
Doing critical IR: Pre-theoretical praxis 
The similarity between Onufs format in World and Linklater's in Transformation is 
somewhat striking. Both develop their theses very much from the ground-up. By this 
it is meant that they both take a good deal of time to draw the parameters of the social 
world they are concerned with. They do this with reference to human history (in all of 
its forms -political, philosophical, social, etc.) - a history independent of IR the 
academic discipline. The outcome, in its simplest form, is a practice-based reason for 
continuing with their projects. From this reasoning we can infer why their projects are 
necessary on a number of different levels. Wendt's introductory scene-setting, on the 
other hand, describes four sociologies of international politics which refer to the 
history of IR. So we are offered instead a theory-based reason for continuing, and 
moreover one focused on international theory. This difference is defining and 
instructive. The list of players in Wendt's world- populated by states- already exists 
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within the pages of his key text, Social Theory. Our interest here depends on how this 
interplays with foundation stones laid by Onuf and Linklater. 
Before continuing though, we have a timely opportunity to contextualise this 
issue in terms ofbroader constructivist critique. That the material reality which 
constructivists describe and work from 'already exists' is a fatal flaw in the eyes of 
Maja Zehfuss. 50 The reason being that it is impossible to be critical whilst maintaining 
any presumption of what reality is. 'The rhetoric of reality gives a special status to 
what is being claimed, a status which is unfounded. Moreover, it privileges ways of 
thinking based on the availability of reality as an adjudicator' 51 Arguments based on 
such 'reality' are therefore deemed to be circular and ultimately self-defeating. 
Zehfuss calls them 'insecure, weak and unscientific. ' 52 
But are Onuf and Linklater positing such a concrete reality? Zehfuss's critique 
is based on her analysis of Germany's participation in international military 
operations. Her argument runs that constructivism (even when split into three 
different types) fails to explain enough about key features of this participation for us 
to consider it capable of doing a better job than other approaches to the study of 
international relations. In fact, and much worse than this, it perpetuates myths. 
Essentially, this military participation (as with any empirical example) has produced a 
raft of events and scenarios which constructivism may or may not have the tools to 
interpret. Many 'facts' about the details of these occurrences exist (dates, 
documentation, testimonies, etc.), but the story they tell is an open book. 
Onuf is critiqued on the grounds that his tenets for constructivism simply do 
not add up when pressed. Zehfuss's key contentions are that his distinction between 
50 See Zehfuss, Constructivism, esp. pp. 250-263. 
51 Ibid., p. 259 
52 Ibid. 
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materiality and sociality is unclear, 53 that his rule-types make for an elegant theory but 
jar with 'common-sense' / 4 and that, fundamentally, his understanding of words and 
world has them in permanent communication, but as distinct concepts. 55 
Why do Zehfuss's conclusions matter for this thesis? They do so for two 
reasons. Firstly, this project is served well by a comparison to a more traditional IR 
subject, and secondly, where Zehfuss's own critique falls down is where we find the 
troublesome heart of the 'values' problem. To start with (and hopefully eliminate) the 
second issue, Zehfuss is critiquing Onufs contribution to the problem she has set 
based on her own answers to that problem. This is either merely counter-intuitive of 
critical theory, or it fatally undermines it. How is a theorist critical if she has in mind 
the standards to be met by the interogatee? This ties-in with the first problem noted 
above; Zehfuss is able to offer this type of critique by addressing a subject captured in 
a historical moment. The concept of exploitation that Onuf is generally responding to 
causes havoc with an orthodox understanding of what is historical, or trans historical, 
or ahistorical. Similarly, Linklater's 'harm' principle envelops and makes a complex 
issue not only of 'objective' human suffering, but also our 'subjective' interpretation 
of it. It is amorphous, contingent and contested in a way that the German military 
intervention described by Zehfuss could not be. 
Values as represented by human rights norms may indeed nullify 
constructivism (or 'dismantle' it to repeat the phrase used above), and this would be 
in keeping with Zehfuss's general conclusion. Alternatively, these values may aid our 
understanding of the scope of international theory in ways which are neither black nor 
white. So - are the examples of pre-theoretical praxis called upon by Onuf and 
Linklater realities onto which we might pin constructivist assertions? 
53 See Ibid., p. 191 
54 See Ibid., esp. pp. 192-193 
55 Ibid., p. 193 
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The notion that anything can be socially 'concrete' is fundamentally 
problematic to most constructivists (Wendt, it must be said, offers us a hard case on 
this point). Instead, Onuf speaks of an 'ensemble of practices' 56 which constitute an 
ongoing understanding ofhow the world is made. The three traditions of political 
thought which he describes- 'virtues, rights and manners'- are not hierarchical or 
sequential, but instead reflect the different ways that polities have historically ordered 
and legally bound themselves. The idea is that this is a rich history of order 
characterised by differently constituted civic traits. 
If liberalism has obscured these traditions, and they therefore can prevail once 
more if permitted to do so, then it is within these three categories of political thought, 
and the rule-types which constitute them, where we would expect to find values. Our 
task in locating them should perhaps be made a little easier by using human rights 
norms as their signifier, but if this was the case, then Onufwould surely already have 
made this clearer. The only really satisfactory answer to this is that Onuf has dealt 
with values, but in a way that makes his treatment seem somehow unfinished. In 
World, Onuf's motivation is to reassert the politics ofiR, not to invent it. Elsewhere, 
he describes how international linkages form as the result of communicated common 
ground- the term 'need' is used- but also how this communication can stall amongst 
the plethora of world views we routinely employ to give everyday meaning to our 
lives. 57 
So, these three categories of political society strongly suggest that human 
rights norms should have a place in any of them. They call upon the basic foundation 
of morality in any 'political' system properly so-called. But assuming that this is the 
case, and then deciding which of the three types best accommodates these norms, is a 
56 Ibid. 
57 See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, 'Everyday Ethics in International Relations', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, vol. 27 (3) (1998) 
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step too far. Reducing human rights norms to a 'best fit' within one system subscribes 
to a purely moral argument. This is the same moral argument which we have chosen 
not to pursue explicitly in this thesis, and here the reason for this becomes a little 
clearer. Having virtue, rights and manners played-off in a hierarchical contest 
supposes the existence of a morally superior format. This is not the intention of Onuf 
nor, indeed, of this thesis. Instead, we must take these categories as one whole 
alternative which supports our notion of an ethical initiative. 
Onufs description of political society understood in liberal terms (which 
substitutes utility, law and conventions for virtues, rights and manners respectively) 
poses a problem for us by throwing up an anomaly which is either a quirk or a 
paradox, depending on the weight we allow it. Very briefly, we are concerned with 
human rights norms, and these norms have been laid down by the Universal 
Declaration and subsequent related additions and amendments. They are, technically, 
conventions. So they must sit comfortably in a liberal world system (and arguably 
they do, to the extent that they are compatible with the jurisprudence and machinery 
of international law, notwithstanding their problematic implementation in practice). 
There is much blurring here between the values they represent and the (effectively) 
totalising world of liberalism. In other words, are they at all reconcilable with Onufs 
constructivism? The implications of this - that doubt is cast on the efficacy of 
completely undermining liberalism - would suggest they are more fundamentally 
paradoxical than a mere quirk, and so preclude any confident conclusion about Onufs 
· constructivism and the liberal human rights regime. 
Linklater at first seems to make fewer assumptions about the human history 
which has been knocked off-course by liberalism. Certainly, he is less specific. His 
critique of modernity's values is driven by the belief that some other formulation is 
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possible. Unlike Onuf, this formulation is 'new' in the sense that it is a type of 
political community that has not been explored previously. Liberalism is a stepping-
off point, as flawed as it may be. Linklater finds support for this idea in the first 
instance by mining historical sociological for its intellectual foundations, but it 
remains a possibility and therefore an unrehearsed phenomena. 
This is Linklater's image of 'progress' as opposed to Onufs 'process' of 
human interaction. The two measure themselves against the standard of the good, but 
Linklater's appears more moralistic, Onufs more ethical. Whether this is actually the 
case should allow for a clearer picture of constructivism's relationship with values. 
The metaphysical question underpinning much of this is whether an ethical system 
endures ad infinitum, or whether it is cumulatively working towards an end product. 
Linklater' s history of modernity hinges upon a conception of the Westphalian 
state as a singular and, as it has eventually become, a misapplied institution. It served 
its purpose in bringing order to warring states inclined to pluralism and is largely 
redundant for any purpose other than the nominal ordering of states. The problem 
with liberalism, in Linklater's eyes, is subtly different to that which Onuf sees. Both 
see it as a system which is detrimental to the moral needs of the human condition, to 
include, we can assume, human rights norms. For Onuf, it is fundamentally so, but for 
Linklater it is less insidious, and has merely failed to meet its potential. 
Linklater is taking the faltering ethical steps of modernity and is replacing 
them, or at least is attempting to replace them, with a return to morality. The legacy of 
Marxist thought (and to a limited extent, Marxist 'reality') has been a dichotomous 
ethics of inside/outside, reinforced at every epochal tum by a limited sociological 
approach. A moral sociology has been, apparently, primed by these more or less 
continuous ethical revisions about how best to balance both domestic and 
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international society. Re-interpreting the state allows us to broaden out the potential 
space we have for imagining and then instigating more uniformly legitimate dialogic 
communities. For Linklater, liberalism itself contains the ingredients which bind 
together into something recognisable as 'universal humanity.' As sociological 
horizons broadened out, they did so with a corollary effect- moral horizons were 
similarly stretched. 
So far, bringing together Onuf and Linklater on this issue of the politics of 
modernity has revealed a fissure between the two approaches. Put most bluntly, for 
Onufliberalism is a bad thing. For Linklater, it has the potential to be a very good 
thing. Liberalism is either an impeding shroud, or it is a necessary step on the way to 
fully-realised dialogic community. A socially meaningful and, moreover, useful 
morality is either therefore underlying, or it is the next incremental step in history-
more staging post than 'end'. 
If it is the first of these, Onuf s pessimism, then it would suggest that the 
nature of human morality has already been established, and that any further 
development- such as human rights norms- can only be mapped onto this structure. 
If it is the second, Linklater's optimism, then we are, as a species, capable of 
investing values more deeply, in a better structure, for universal beneficence. How, 
then, to make sense between the two as constructivist propositions?58 
To briefly re-state our position: human rights norms, as we have seen in 
Chapter Two, have been created by endeavours which are both moral and ethical. The 
guiding principle of this thesis demands that it is not to get mired in a moral 
argument. It is instead rather more interested in the ethical implications of these 
institutions, which is much more in accord with the nominally constitutive nature of 
58 The semantics here - of competing constructivisms - will be analysed further in the third section of 
this chapter. 
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the constructivist approach (to do this whilst still maintaining a close eye on the 
morality of it all is its most challenging balancing act). 
So, the ethical impact of human rights norms is really referring to their 
ongoing meaning, development, use, repercussions, etc. which are characteristic of 
their contested nature - something borne out by their chequered international history. 
The point we have reached might well be an impasse or a defining moment for our 
triangulation. Which approach, Onufs or Linklater's, speaks most clearly to the ethics 
of human rights norms, and which is more morally inclined? 
Onuf s recurring historical image sets up a process-oriented approach. 
Arguably, it is not morally bound because of the many different combinations of 
speech acts and associated rule-types which make up each political society. Each one 
is good, but only because it continually develops and shapes itself. Linklater's epochal 
drive, alternatively, is ineluctably progressivist. It sees good where it has not 
previously existed. Process is ethical, progress is moral. The former aims to do the 
best with available materials and under prevailing conditions. This is the nature of 
Onufs exploitation thesis, which itself is the nature of rule, and so is effectively 
perpetual. This being so, we must work to develop the best means ofbalancing-out 
human fortunes within this framework. The latter, on the other hand, aims not to 
change the framework in question but to replace it - to transform it -based on the 
premise that we are morally capable beings (and, moreover, that we can 
praxeologically demonstrate this) without the peremptory superiority of traditional 
rule. 
How we go about doing this- through dialogue- is Linklater's foot in the 
constructivist camp. He has simply shifted the philosophical and sociological plateau 
where all this is to take place. The choice for constructivists (many of which are, 
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importantly, committed to human participation in international affairs) is largely 
crystallized at this point. Within the parameters of this thesis, the logic of this 
argument is more favourable towards Onufs more contained, bordered approach than 
the frontiers offered by Linklater. This all makes for an interesting discussion and 
almost, perhaps, a conclusive one for this aspect of the thesis. Almost, because there 
are three variants of constructivism at play here. In what ways does Wendt add to this 
picture? 
We have established that both Onuf and Linklater are keen to demonstrate 
modernity's shortcomings as a political project. We have also worked from the 
assumption, primarily in Chapter Three, that Wendt is not so concerned with how it is 
detrimental. Rather, within a conventional approach, it is the reporting of it which is 
problematic. This, in tum, has allowed for the critique which sustains many who are 
wary ofWendt's constitutive credentials which are based on the assumption that the 
story of the modem state matters as much, if not more, than its current internal 
structure. 59 
The discussion of Wendt's approach in Chapter Three differs from those in 
Chapters Four and Five because its own narrative is set apart from Onufs 'beginning' 
and Linklater's 'possible end' theses. It is not satisfactory to describe Wendt's 
contribution as simply describing what goes on between these two temporal marker 
points, because for Wendt there is no end as such. Instead, the protagonists of the 
international system are states that exist and endure, and we have no reason to suspect 
that the case may be otherwise any time soon. If it was to be, then what is 
'international' would have to be re-thought. States are so dominant that we might be 
forgiven for thinking that Wendt's is therefore a more limited approach. As much as 
59 For Onufthe story can be forever re-told, but for Linklater we need to add a new volume. 
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Wendt does tell any story of the state, it is only to produce the personhood of it- i.e. 
what its dominant character traits are, and how we can connect its 'personality' to its 
behaviour. We can take from this, for the present discussion, one salient point: 
modernity is a neither a good nor a bad thing, it just is. Wendt neither rails against it 
nor prescribes for its alteration. The sum of this is that human rights norms are played 
out in the territory of states, and we must be secular on this matter. 
Wendt, as would be expected, subscribes to no pre-theoretical praxis. Does 
exploitation or harm (or an equivalent) exist in his theory? From the content of Social 
Theory we can conclude that only if we refer to these conditions in relation to the 
dynamics of states are they an IR problem. And this is where the simplicity of 
Wendt's approach breaks down for this thesis. What, exactly, can be said to affect the 
dynamics or specific behaviour of two or more states? More states? Humans, even? 
What about human rights norms? 
Much of Chapter Three was given over to the challenge of reconciling 
Wendt's approach to what goes on inside states, under the assumption that 
constructivism is constitutive by nature and does not discriminate between what 
happens domestically and externally, and how this affects subsequent knowledge 
claims. Presently, we are interested in each of our three approach's capacity to 
account for the ethical instrumentality of human rights, in the hope that we might 
learn something about values in this branch of international theory. The conclusion 
which begs to be drawn, as seemingly incomplete and blunt as it is, is that we can tum 
to Wendt if the human rights norms in question are being utilised by one state as a 
tool (either positively or negatively) to extract some desired outcome from another 
state. If we want to know more about the human aspect of this relationship, working 
under the assumption that this matters for IR, then we need to look to Onuf and 
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Linklater. This is the dividing line - the very distinct line in the sand- which 
separates these three approaches on this fundamental point. We do not have to cross 
it. It is enough to know that it is there. 
III. The limits of constructivism 
The aim of the first two sections of this chapter has been to develop an argument 
about the challenge of values in constructivism. The conclusions that can be drawn 
from this are dependent on a further consideration which must be addressed, one 
which will place our critique of each type of constructivism in a broader context, and 
which will bring this thesis back to where it started - with a focus on the limits and 
potential of constructivism. Essentially, how do these moral, ethical, theoretical and 
practical questions impact upon constructivism as an approach? 
This final section will answer this question by focusing on two key elements 
of constructivism. Firstly, its capacity and willingness to embrace values as change in 
the international system will be assessed. Secondly, the section will discuss the 
implications ofhaving constructivism do this value-led work on its 'middle ground' 
characterisation. These two threads will be developed to ascertain whether 
'constructivism' as it is generally recognised will still meaningfully exist in the face 
of this critical challenge. 
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Human rights norms and values as 'change' in the international system 
According to Emanuel Adler, 'it may only be a slight exaggeration to say that if 
constructivism is about anything, it is about change. ' 60 The primary reason for this is 
that 
rather than using history as a descriptive method, 
constructivism has history 'built in' as part of theories. 
Historicity, therefore, shows up as part of the contexts that 
make possible social reality, the path-dependent processes 
involving structural and agent change, and the mechanisms 
involved in the explanation of change. Constructivism's 
added value, therefore, is to take change less as the alteration 
in the positions of material things than as the emergence of 
new constitutive rules ... the evolution and transformation of 
new social structures ... and the agent-related origins of social 
processes. 61 
There is a deceptively simple logic which stems from this, and in which is 
embedded all of the complexities which have thus far been discussed: If human rights 
norms represent a change in the status quo, then they must therefore be the natural 
focus of constructivism. This representation of change depends on the particular 
impact human rights norms have on the international system, which in tum depends 
on what the international system looks (or looked) like in the first place. 
60 Adler, 'Constructivism and International Relations', p. 102 
61 Ibid. 
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If human rights norms are change, then they, and values, should not present an 
insurmountable problem to any of our types of constructivism. But they do, as has 
been demonstrated. Human rights norms challenge the constitutive 'nature' of 
constructivism by not simply acting as prescriptions for change, but by complicating 
the picture by demanding that hard cases such as humans, universalism, equality, etc. 
are incorporated into an approach still racked by a series of persistent debates (cause 
versus constitution, agent versus structure, etc. 62), which more consolidated or even 
singular contributions to IR theory have moved on from. 
Where does this leave us here? Briefly, focusing on the ethical rather than 
moral implications ofhuman rights norms carries with it the fundamental requirement 
that the constructivist belief in change must also incorporate at least the notion that 
values are a part of systemic renewa1.63 
For constructivists, society is continuously evolving. How it evolves depends 
on how ideas and ways of being are communicated. In order to pin down the 
relevance ofhuman rights norms to society (both discretely and across borders), 
constructivism must be sufficiently well constituted itself to account for the range of 
ways why and how human rights matter. Approaching this, as we are, from an 
instrumental angle, the 'effects' in question are measured almost entirely by how 
these norms, by degree, change lives, structures and systems. 
Firstly, is it possible to group, or rather pair-up our constructivisms on the 
subject of change? What is their fundamental thinking on the matter? It seems that it 
can be reduced to, on the one hand, a choice between something less purposive and 
more a variation of continuity, or on the other hand, a distinct and discrete moment of 
62 Again, see Adler, pp. 106-109 
63 This is notwithstanding the fact that Onuf in particular, and to an extent Linklater as well, both 
develop their theses with the constancy of the 'good' in politics flrrnly in mind. 
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change: In other words, is it 'process' or 'progress' that each approach describes? For 
Wendt and Onufit is the former, for Linklater the latter. 
The change which Wendt sees is fundamentally a unifying one, so that 'with 
each change the international system has achieved a qualitatively higher capacity for 
collective action. ' 64 And so, assuming that an increase in collective action is a good 
thing, does it necessarily follow that process quickly and simply become progress? 
Would the conclusion inevitably be that Wendt shares ground with Linklater? 
Wendt's image of change- or, in his terms, 'identity formation'- is of an 
evolutionary process. Wendt does specify that state-society relations do matter when 
it comes to assessing the effects of any variation in the identity and interests of the 
state. They matter in a structural sense, and any effect takes the form of 'unit-level 
changes'. 65 
But all of this is state-centric. The society of which Wendt speaks, as we 
know, is the society of states. Incorporating the norms of the Universal Declaration 
into this society would be part of Wendt's evolutionary schema. The 'organic' 
association between institution/convention and state which this would imply is clearly 
favoured by Wendt. Of course, by appropriating this anthropological lexicon 
(following the precedent set by Kenneth Waltz), Wendt is adding layers to his 'state 
as person' thesis- namely, popular elements ofthe natural and human sciences. What 
seems to be missing, however, is a firm acknowledgement that evolution is an 
inherently selfish act. That this is the case only serves to complicate whether and how 
values play a part in this world view. Essentially, it is a confirmation that in Wendt's 
eyes states are as complex as humans, and that their need to evolve - these vast 
umbrella bureaucracies- is equal to that of the millions of individuals who reside 
64 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 314 
65 Ibid., p. 320 
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within them. Simply put, this highlights the lack of human activity in Wendt's 
(human?) model which, for values at least, is vital. 
Wendt cites the 'common Realist assumption that states are by definition, by 
their intrinsic constitution, self-interested,' 66 but prefers instead to think of this 
condition as 'contingent rather than necessary. ' 67 Why, we might reasonably ask, is it 
necessary to ring-fence this quality as a way of defining what constructivism is? In 
Wendt's words, 'one cannot be an egoist all by oneself. ' 68 Is this necessarily the case? 
Is the archetypal 'Robinson Crusoe' character not self-interested? Perhaps, perhaps 
not. The point is that it does not matter a great deal either way. Values, in the form of 
human rights norms, can be assimilated into the workings of an egoist state as ethical 
instrumental institutions. To do so on moral grounds is a different question. 
Unfortunately, with Wendt, we are left with no grounds to suppose that either might 
be possible. 
The position can be argued that states do pick up on social and cultural 
movements, and that domestic politics dictate foreign policy, and so on, until the 
society of states does indeed operate (on a 'Kantian' basis) in the spirit of friendship 
based on shared values. But these inside/outside links are not clear enough in the 
Wendtian approach for such leaps. Without these links, all of the 'ideas', 'cultural 
forms' etc. which constitute the personalities of state and system are gathered up 
somehow from somewhere. We cede to the language of metaphysics too quickly 
when appraising the relationship between Wendt, values and humans for us to say 
much more here. 
However, that this is the case offers up an interesting analytical quandary. 
Arguably, no other type of constructivism, certainly within our triangulation, offers a 
66 Ibid., p. 321 
67 Ibid., p. 322 
68 Ibid. 
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theory of the state in such a 'pure' third-level way. At this level, human rights norms, 
when a part of the discourse between states, can of course play out in the machinery 
of interaction described by Wendt. He goes, effectively, unchallenged on this. Both 
Onuf and Linklater describe the state, but it is a much more layered entity in both 
cases. A comparison is therefore more forced than we might like it to be. 
For Onuf, and rules-based constructivism, the role ofboth modernity and 
modernism is primarily that of the background field against which more important 
actors and events play themselves out. The (almost) inevitable association of 
modernisation with its materially manifest forms- industrial, technological and 
structural - does not properly account for the spaces - intellectual, cultural and 
geographical- in which political behaviour is observable. But the discourse of human 
rights goes beyond what is observable and demands the consideration of what is 
possible. Even an analysis based on what is ethically instrumental about human rights 
(the ways in which they appear to do good by instituting normative practices) must 
acknowledge their being good in the first place. Onuf does not by any means discount 
the doing of good as a part of the international system. Rather, in the end, all values, 
to include those found contemporarily in the Universal Declaration, are tools for 
exposing exploitation, and not some metaphysical, deontological truth. 
In the world described by Onuf, change is manifest in variations of the mix of 
rules which characterise 'historically distinct cultural experiences. ' 69 As we have 
seen, 'our own liberal world'70 contains a greater proportion of commitment-rules. 
But, crucially, the exact mix of rules has no bearing on the inevitability of 
exploitation. Rule will always be exploitative, and so human rights norms can only 
ever play a contingent role in the 'bigger picture' of systemic change. Ultimately, 
69 Onuf, World, p. 121 
70 Ibid 
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there is nothing unique about the values encapsulated in human rights norms, and so 
they will always be part of a narrative about the international system, rather than 
having a direct effect on it. This accounts to some degree for how succeeding 
linguistic constructivists have failed to 'break through' to values in a way we might 
consider compelling, or even sustained. The original blue-print from Onuf appears to 
allow for nothing else. 
Perhaps the most identifiably constructivist trait ofLink:later's work is its 
prescription for change. It contains a reason for change, the potential for it, and an 
idealised end-state in which the result of this change can flourish. As has been noted 
above, a strong theme running throughout Transformation is that the development of 
modernity, in both an intellectual and epochal sense, has fostered the internal growth 
of the machinery of critique. As communication technologies and the exigencies of 
trade bring (or force) human beings together, 'one effect of the totalising project, 
namely the production of estrangement between societies, is resisted by cosmopolitan 
morality.' 71 The pressures on the structure of modernity from many varied yet 
ideologically linked sources - e.g. from minority groups to feminism- have 
cumulatively endorsed the call for a deeper transformation than anything previously 
imagined. 72 
So human rights norms are a part of this movement? Assuming that they are 
indeed, are they the call for the transformation, or signs of the transformation itself? 
This is a similar epistemic point to that just considered in relation to Onuf. Are human 
rights norms contingent to Linklater's world or central to it? The pervasive critical 
element ofhis work would suggest the latter. We can, therefore, be more confident in 
identifying the dynamics of how values affect the international system. If their moral 
71 Linklater, Transformation, p. 25 
72 See Ibid., pp. 25-26 
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nature can be asserted, then they are the central focus of the international system, as 
the transformation of the system depends entirely on there being compelling reasons 
for it. 
If a 'transformation' is not necessary (as is the case with Wendt), or is not 
likely to happen any time soon and so should be a drain on none of our resources (as 
is the case with Onuf), then the ethical instrumentality of these approaches themselves 
comes much more obviously into play, as they are interested the continuing good, but 
without a specific end in sight. The decision to be made is whether there is a 'point' to 
constructivism beyond its creativity as an analytical toolkit. 
Linklater' s fundamental observation regarding change is that the international 
system of states has over-stretched the totalising rationale to breaking point, and the 
current normative infrastructure is not able to provide the necessary conditions to 
realise the potential of universality and difference. The interplay between these two 
factors has opened the door for a re-configuration of the institutions which govern the 
insider/outsider relationship. 
'Critical' constructivism appears to edge constructivism generally towards 
what might be considered a curious state of affairs. All that is going on in Linklater's 
world - the world which requires transformation, but which also must contain the raw 
materials for that transformation, i.e. citizens, transnational communication, 
institutions, etc. - is the stuff of constructivism. Yet the working out of these raw 
materials is for a reason - a cumulative reason which is also a moral reason. But is it 
not the case that constructivism, the constitutive approach to international relations, 
also works on the principle of ethics that only the comprehensive accumulation of 
knowledge can reveal the 'real' world to us? 
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Which world is more real - that which depends on the exposure of 
modernity's deceit (Onufs), or the world which then results from the product of that 
exposure (Linklater's)? In short, when and where do we cap what constructivism is 
capable of? 
Conclusions: Two Paradoxes? Constructivism 'succeeds', constructivism 'fails' 
Earlier in this chapter Maja Zehfuss's work on German military involvement abroad 
was brought in as an example of a triangulated critique of key constructivist figures. 
As dissatisfied as Zehfuss clearly is with the descriptive power of much ofWendt and 
Onuf (and Friedrich Kratochwil), she does capture an essential quality at the heart of 
constructivism - 'the assumption of limited construction'. It is this notion of defining 
or essential qualities which we are interested in here. Ideas about the essential 
character of constructivism clearly exist, and to understand the relationship between 
constructivism and human rights in as full a way as possible we must be able to 
ascertain whether, after such a sustained critique, we still have a 'constructivism' or 
not. 
Being able to draw a conclusion on this matter of characterisation or 'identity' 
will have two outcomes. Firstly, in addition to the preceding chapters, it will provide a 
much more detailed picture of the effects that values have on constructivism - what 
they ask of it as a theoretical approach, and how both this and its methods then stand 
up to a positivist-postpositivist distinction. If it does appear to fall more firmly into 
either camp, what are the implications of this for a 'moral' approach desired by 
critical theorists? Secondly, and related to this, it will indicate more assertively, if 
perhaps not definitively, constructivism's role in international theory. 
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As James Fearon and Alexander Wendt have pointed out, constructivism can 
be seen in at least three ways- as ontological, empirical or analytical.73 However, 
these three categories do not add up as we would expect them to in a 'theory'. 
Holding a view of the world as a continuously 'constructed' entity ensures that this 
will remain the case. The most purchase orthodox political science can hope to secure 
on it is that constructivism contains many theories, without having found a singular 
and defining formula. If there are no limits on who might be doing the constructing or 
how, then there can be no limits to either the richness or the disorganisation of 
constructivism. This conclusion seems to depend entirely on the inclination of the 
practitioner or reviewer. Fearon and Wendt also discriminate between 'pessimistic' 
and 'optimistic' constructivisms/4 and we have found that, arguably, within our 
triangulation. Onufs is a pessimistic view, Linklater's optimistic and Wendt's, we 
might suppose, is a sort of secular middle between the two in this sense. 
Fearon and Wendt's overview is also helpful with setting out our parameters: 
'what generalizations can be made about constructivism? To start with the obvious, 
constructivists are interested in how the objects and practices of social life are 
'constructed', and especially those that societies or researchers take for granted as 
given or natural. ' 75 Naturalization is a problem for constructivism in more ways than 
one. It is one of the stated purposes of constructivism to expose the grain and then to 
go against it in gathering knowledge of the international as a social construct. But 
how far does, and should, constructivism seek out this 'orthodoxy' and then reveal it 
as a misrepresentation? How far is this properly a constructivist pursuit before it falls 
into the jurisdiction of critical theory? 
73 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View' in 
Carlsnaes, et al., Handbook of International Relations, p. 56 
741bid. 
75 Ibid., p. 57 
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These questions are part of a larger inquiry which has been implicit throughout 
this thesis, and which must be addressed, in however limited a way, before we can 
draw any conclusions that may hold some meaning for scholars of international 
theory. Zehfuss's and Fearon and Wendt's characterisations are examples ofhow 
constructivism predominantly sees itself, and is externally perceived to be, a middle-
ground approach. Assuming that a constructivism with the capacity and will to 
systematically and consistently engage with human rights norms would compromise 
this middle ground, is constructivism itself, as a legitimate label, rendered 
meaningless? 
The 'middle ground' occupied by constructivism is usually taken to be that 
between rational choice and postmodernism/6 with their contrastingly 
positivist/postpositivist outlooks. Expressed in its most basic form, the logic 
supporting this demands that constructivism has links to both. As the approach has 
developed, 'researchers have followed up general calls for bridge building with 
increasingly sophisticated conceptual schemas for fitting constructivism better with its 
rivals. These include ideas on how one can integrate the ideational and the material, 
game theory and social constructivism, strategic-choice and cognitive perspectives, 
and other-regarding and self-interested behaviour. ' 77 Using approaches focused on 
conceptual schemas has effectively resulted in the continuous and metatheoretical 
creation and recreation of constructivism which is then thrust upon the world. 
'Opposites' have been assigned to favourite constructivist identifiers in the hope of 
producing more keenly honed analytical positions. The result is that constructivism is 
still many things to many scholars, each depending on assumptions of a dichotomous 
IR. 
76 Jeffrey Checkel, 'Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe', International 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 43 (1) (1999), p. 108 
77 Checkel, 'Social constructivisms', p. 241 
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This thesis goes against this grain by having constructivism face up to a 
pressing contemporary example from the international system which involves 
humans, states and how they relate structurally and as actors. There are no ·set 
opposite forms for constructivism to rebound from, or to collide with and make 
innovative theoretical propositions. Instead, the aim is to have constructivism answer 
to its subject, rather than to itself. 
For such a 'compromise' position, the middle ground is an extremely 
controversial area. It is controversial, of course, because it has no parameters, only 
frontiers, which are not conducive to clear statements, let alone clear theories. It is 
also controversial because many scholars happy to be labelled 'constructivist' do 
work that is always compelled to bear comparison to two very different approaches, 
and this itself does not always make sense. Karin Fierke, for example, states the 
linguist's problem thus: 
conventional constructivists have positioned themselves in a 
"middle ground" between mainstream rationalist approaches 
to international relations and more critical constructivists. In 
doing so, constructivists have distinguished their attention to 
ideas and norms from the poststructural emphasis on the 
linguistic constitution of identity and interests. An 
assumption implicit in this positioning is that language 
should be kept off the agenda. 78 
78 Fierke, 'Links Across the Abyss', p. 331 
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The implication for the present thesis is clear. Using linguistic techniques to 
address normative questions somehow doesn't fit with a constructivist research 
agenda. Constructivism doesn't 'do' language. Or if it does, it is not middle ground. 
And if it is not middle ground, then it is not constructivism. But linguistic techniques 
do add to our knowledge of how the world around us is constituted, and this world 
patently is normative. So we have our first fault line: language is not 'constructivist'. 
The logic behind these problems is so counter-intuitive that it soon collides 
with itself. Without language, Nicholas Onuf would have had a very sparse thesis 
indeed in World, not to mention his coining of the term 'constructivism' for IR in an 
earlier article. The 'scientific' problem with language is that it cannot be 
comprehensively measured: 'those concerned with language- placed in the category 
of poststructuralists - have been distinguished from those who engage in empirical 
research.' 79 
It has been demonstrated here that linguistic constructivism is still 
'constructivism' properly-so-called, and that it is capable of rendering the 
international communication of values in a very usable and reproducible format for 
IR theory. Speech acts, language games, grammar, etc. all package complex linguistic 
exchanges so that they might be analysed more fully, and so accorded a 
commensurate level of importance in the workings of the international system. Where 
linguistic constructivism has failed is in making a successful break from Onuf's 
original intention. Onuf draws a complex picture which has boundaries. In World he 
is delineating a vast area of study which is populated with values but has little or no 
room for ideals. Constructivists have not yet made it clear how the 'frontiers' of 
values correlate with this. It is a retroactive approach to what has happened - learning 
79 1bid., p. 333 
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from experience, which is in keeping with positivist international theory, and so is 
ethical rather than moral, which will not suit critical theorists. 
Wendt's approach, as we have seen, is almost entirely compatible with the 
ethos and methods of conventionalism. It does break from it in some important 
respects, but it still bears comparison with the statement that 'conventional 
constructivists, who many times claim to be studying identity ... do so with theories 
and methods that freeze and reify it.' 80 Social Theory is a document of very contained 
unitary and systemic change. The international system it describes can be 'theorised' 
thanks to its relatively discrete components. It can be analysed 'scientifically' because 
it sets up an empirical review of a process, and not of progress, which would require a 
value judgement (or even many value judgements). 
Its dismissal on the grounds of being statist is a little premature- and, it must 
be said, comes from an entirely postpositivist or critical point of view -because that 
criticism depends on a belief that values must and do cross the many borders which 
make up the international system. They also must originate and not depend otherwise 
on the machinery of the state, which is a wholly problematic position to hold. If any 
'good' prevails here, then, it is ethical. But we can be confident in asserting that it 
matters less within the strictures of this theory than it does for Onuf. 
Linklater's position depends less on it 'representing' the essence of 
constructivism (i.e. 'language' or 'identity') than does Onufs or Wendt's respectively. 
Its very existence as 'critical constructivism' is largely the embodiment of 
constructivism which critical theorists would prefer to see. Largely, but not entirely, 
because it has failed, so far, to offer the kind of empirical tools which mark out the 
attractiveness of constructivism in the first place. So does it distort the middle ground 
8
° Checkel, 'Social constructivisms', p. 233 
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of international theory beyond all (current) recognition? No, it does not, otherwise it 
would simply be critical theory, and it has a foot set too firmly in both camps for it to 
be characterised in this 'either/or' way. 
What, then, does this mean for constructivism? The 'Two paradoxes' logic is 
instructive on this matter. If constructivism, and particularly our triangulation, can be 
said to have either 'succeeded' or 'failed' to account for human rights norms in the 
international system, what is at stake? Are human rights threatened in some way, or is 
it more sensible to presume that constructivism itself may or may not have been 
compromised in some way (perhaps even fatally)? Clearly the latter is the case. But 
only up to a point. 
If constructivism 'succeeds' with values, on the terms expected of it by critical 
theory, then it has become a moral force in international theory and so is too critical 
to be constructivism. If it 'fails' with values, then it does so only on a moral level; it 
still operates ethically, and is still constructivism. Again, what is at stake? It seems 
that our knowledge and understanding of human rights are being compromised by the 
need for international theory to maintain its categories. 
Can we point to success or failure based on the terms governing this thesis? As 
a triangulation, each aspect defines its own space with varying degrees of success. 
Social Theory is a closed shop to much of what has been defined as the value-
normativity ofhuman rights. Yes, it deals with states at a level which communicates 
with the orthodoxy whilst branching out from it and, yes, it can be argued that the 
stuff ofiR (that really matters) is states. But the values issue demands more ofiR than 
this, and Wendt fails to provide even a framework from which to begin, let alone the 
drive to do so. 
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Both Onuf and Linklater are much more successful in having their 
constructivist approaches sit comfortably with human rights norms. Neither is 
particularly specific on the matter, though, which is telling as we pursue a critical 
warrant. Onuf describes what constructivism is for (relating the 'true' narrative of 
modernity, or at least perpetuating the unveiling of the 'false' one), which is 
accompanied with lengthy and complex descriptions of what it should be looking for 
as it goes about its work (rules-mixes). There is no real allowance here for values as 
incorporated in human rights norms. Values, yes, as witnessed by the need to restore 
human history to politics, but not in this more specific, contemporary way of the 
Universal Declaration. It is a conclusion which has perhaps been most tested of the 
three, because so much ofOnufs groundwork, and linguistic legacy, suggests so 
much for the possible future of how constructivism might develop along with the 
human rights discourse. Yet this thesis is testing Onuf, and liberal human rights norms 
are not his province. There is more to be said about language, rules and rights, but 
they are not neatly represented by Onufs constructivism as laid down in World. 
Linklater, as has been said above, is a strong candidate to be constructivism's 
standard bearer on this issue. But that is a hugely simplistic statement. On the one 
hand, his place in the triangulation is where much of the human rights discourse, with 
its contestations and complexities, fits with comparative ease. There are discernible 
links, also, across the three approaches, which might in isolation be taken as adequate 
justification for having them inhabit this type of space. However, where they do cross 
paths (both epistemic and ontological), there is not enough weight in the linkages to 
suggest that constructivism has a unified voice on values. 
This is not too damaging, though, as no assertion has been made that a 
singular, 'whole' constructivism should or could be a possibility. We are, however, 
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interested in similarities. Of these there are many, and linkages can be found across 
any combination of the three. Which leads to the principal conclusion of this thesis: 
Constructivism has been designed, and is currently best suited, to deliver a 
constitutive approach to international relations on ethical matters. It sees good in the 
world as originating and being manifest in a number of different sources, and it is 
interested in pursuing that good, not in prescribing it. If there is a moral element to 
constructivism, it is to be found in its responsibility to inform the world. What the 
world does with this information is another matter. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis began by asking a question about the normative achievements of 
constructivism, and it has ended with an assertion about its future potential as an 
ethical approach. Getting from one to another has involved the tracking of several key 
aspects of constructivism, and has tested them against expectations, both from within 
and without. 
The initial question has its roots in normative inquiry. 'Social' approaches to 
IR are frequently considered to be too discrete in going about their business; the 
English School is not sociological enough, constructivism is not normative enough, 
and so on. The normative 'ought' of values has consistently been a hard case for IR 
generally and constructivism specifically. But whose problem is this? Critically-
inclined scholars lay the issue at the feet of constructivists who otherwise provide 
'ideal' conditions for describing the international human condition. If only they would 
prescribe it, too. 
The introductory chapter added much needed clarification and detail to the 
critical proposition; what, indeed, is this 'value' normativity compared to its 
constitutive and behavioural cousins? What is the nature of human rights norms which 
places special demands on constructivism? How best should we frame constructivism 
in such a way as to envelop the problem as a thinking space? And, after all is said and 
done, of the two possible end products, i.e. receptivity or agnosticism to the norms 
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issue, which has the most distorting effect on the identity of constructivism itself? It 
introduced the triangulation of Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf and Andrew 
Linklater- each measured primarily by their key text- as an analytical device 
capable of opening up the kind of intellectual space needed to assess how a contested 
subject might best fit into a contested approach. 
Chapter One defined constructivism as an apparently problematic approach - a 
verdict based on the assumptions that general internal division, the lack of a unified 
stance on matters deemed central to it, and its seeming inability to draft its own 
theoretical position were fundamentally detrimental characteristics. Values, of course, 
are presumed to require a unitary response. 
But this is part of the general critique of constructivism. More sympathetic 
voices proclaim the constructivist contribution to IR -its challenge to dated 
epistemologies, its view of agents and structures as mutually constitutive international 
constructs, and its moulding of critical approaches towards empirical study. All of 
these innovative features of constructivism have led to calls, most notably led by 
Christian Reus-Smit and Richard Shapcott, for constructivism to become more 
explicit on the matter of normativity in the international system. Specifically, it should 
act as methodological and empirical wing of critical theory. After all, that is where it 
is supposed to have all begun. But the potential of constructivism goes further than 
this, and its rationalist-leanings (most notably led by Alexander Wendt and more 
positivistic scholars) even lay claim to constructivism, and welcome its critical wing, 
as a way of pushing IR theory forward without forgetting orthodox roots. 
This all makes for a picture of constructivism which is at best complex and at 
worst confusing. The 'middle ground' is a compromise representation for many (and 
even this is not welcome in some constructivist circles). The plain occupied by 
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constructivism, overlooked by the opposing strongholds of positivism and 
postpositivism may be a gross oversimplification, but it is a useful analogy for one of 
constructivisms key attributes. That is, its ability to open up intellectual space for 
these debates to take place. 
It was proposed in this first chapter that constructivism occupies an 'ill-
defined' space, and so it has been proved throughout the course of the thesis. Yet this 
is not a weakness but a strength. Defining the spaces of the international leads to 
geographical and disciplinary borders that appear arbitrary, which the 'hybridising' of 
constructivism, it might be hoped, would overcome. What the typologies literature has 
done, and keeps doing (as this thesis adds to this, if only to test the efficacy of it), is to 
have different variants of constructivism separated and held up as more capable of 
accounting for certain phenomenon, by using certain tools, than others. Norms, or 
more specifically value-norms represented by human rights, are more of a challenge 
to these clusters of variants than their usual, more empirical interests. Yes, certain 
constructivists have tackled human rights, and with some success, but only as part of 
larger analyses interested in the formation and perpetuation ofliberal democracy, for 
example. Values- the expression of what 'ought' to be- have not been theorised 
across these constructivist groups. Hence this thesis settling upon a social 'theory' to 
define just how traditionalist constructivism is, and the extent to which this orthodoxy 
is pushing its own boundaries from within as a kind of baseline, and then moving on 
to more linguistically inclined approaches which, it was assumed, would be capable of 
filling in the troublesome gaps left by actual human beings. 
Chapter Two dealt at length with the nature of this complex challenge. In the 
first instance, an important distinction was made between the moral and ethical 
aspects of values. Morality, it was argued, is not the most productive start point for 
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debate. The reason being that constructivism occupies such a large swathe of ground 
in IR theory that leading with a metaphysical agenda would be to give more weight to 
the postpositivists than the positivists, which would compromise the analytical whole 
of the thesis. Constructivism, of whatever variant or hue, is naturally more suited to 
dealing with concepts more concrete than not, and then admitting ideas to the 
equation. Morals would mean leading with ideas which undermines this undertaking 
as a constructivism-focused effort, with all of the viewpoints which that entails. 
Indeed, international theory is fortunate to have a more concrete expression of 
human rights norms at its disposal- in the Universal Declaration -but it is one which 
has so far been under theorised as a direct international concern. Morality inevitably 
underpins much of this, but it cannot be allowed to overpower it. 
Jack Donnelly provides us with an image of the ethical instrumentality of 
human rights, albeit one dependent upon the legality of those rights which in tum 
depends on the due process observed by host governments. Extracted from this was 
the notion that human rights become institutionalised by challenging the orthodoxy 
only to eventually become enshrined within it. Constructivism seems inherently suited 
to account for this kind of 'push-pull' of normativity, as it develops both contra- to 
and in tandem with orthodox understandings of the international system. 
Empirical constructivism was shown to be engaging with concepts, events and 
histories of the international which span the range of normativity. Values were found 
to be present in most studies of constitution and procedure. Yet the importance 
assigned to values varied by degrees. The tools utilised by constructivists in these 
empirical studies appear so encompassing (discourse-led, narrative and text analysis, 
genealogy, ethnography, communicative action and language games) that human 
rights norms as laid down in the Declaration seem ripe for the analyses they offer. 
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They are hampered by two things: the sheer undermining complexity of values, of 
which volumes have been written, and also by rather entrenched views of what 
constructivism is and does reacting to critical pressure. David Dessler is one scholar 
keen to alleviate this pressure (and that from rationalists as well) by obviating the 
need for a 'covering-law theory' and instead extolling the benefits of incremental 
steps. Steps, we might presume, that are considered to be ethical rather than totalising 
and moral. 
A clearer vision of how the universality of human rights can be comprehended 
was needed. It has largely been provided for in the continuum models of Jack 
Donnelly and Bhikhu Parekh. Both are extremely useful, but it is arguably Parekh's 
contribution which is foremost. His 'minimum universalism' allows us to cut through 
the divergence of relativist and monist positions. Problems still persist, of course, and 
take the form of charges of unavoidable ethnocentrism and flawed consensus. But 
rather than simply opening up an intellectual space, which Parekh does, and moreover 
one which speaks to both constructivism generally and the device of our triangulation, 
Parekh fills that space with 'uncoerced cross-cultural dialogue' rather than leaving it 
to collapse in on itself like so many speculative efforts do. We are therefore offered a 
direction which we might take with constructivism. 
First though, what of constructivism as a more 'traditional' approach? Chapter 
Three develops the reasons for including Wendt in the triangulation. The most clear 
theoretical statement of the three is frequently aligned with other similarly 
'modernist' or 'conventional' approaches. It certainly shares familial characteristics; 
for example, an improved but ultimately limited role for ideas, a broader notion of 
agency, a firm belief in 'intersubjectivity' as an analytical device, and an 
epistemology which generally relies on a positivist philosophy of knowledge. All of 
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this is overwhelmingly directed at states and how they function in the international 
system. This is most explicitly the case in Wendt's Social Theory of International 
Politics, and so values, and human rights norms, appear at best to be peripheral to all 
of this. That is to say, the predominant assumption is adhered to that the proper focus 
of the critical challenge (and value-norms) are humans, and not states. Of course, 
'humans' in an IR context means humans and states, so the leap for state-centric 
theories such as Wendt's ought not to be so onerous or challenging. 
Indeed, Wendt differs from conventionalists on precisely this point. His key 
contribution to constructivism is a theory, as far as it can be described as such based 
on socially constitutive factors. It is a sustained and systematically developed 
treatment of how states socialise, and how this impacts upon their identities as 
'people' capable of making and acting upon decisions. Wendt, though, deals primarily 
with states from the surface outwards- how their externally managed relationships 
play out in the international system. His brief use of Weber, although innovatively 
aligned to pluralism and Marxism, does not allow this surface to be penetrated in any 
meaningful way, and so humans (Homo sapiens) lose out in the equation. 
Although it admits ideas, Wendt's version of conventional constructivism is 
still primarily structuralist and so offers a framework for human rights rather than a 
mechanism for recording and critically analysing the origin and effect of those rights 
in the first instance. Of course, this works to an extent with the enshrined content of 
the Universal Declaration, but this content relies upon further interpretation both 
when it is claimed by individuals, and then pronounced upon by international and 
domestic legal systems. The framework itself is a limited construction as it fails to 
account in any meaningful way for the variety and complexity of culture(s) at work in 
the international system. Others, most notably Seyla Benhabib, offer visions of 
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cultural integration which speak to Wendt's approach, but which go further by being 
explicit on the need for non relativist multiculturalism, of the sort which also speaks 
to the minimum universalism of Parekh and more dialogue-based approaches to 
values. 
However, Wendt's approach clearly baulks at the notion of an end-product-
the sort required of a moral perspective on how the international system should look 
and be run. This stakes out a constructivist position of process rather than progress in 
accounting for human rights norms. Taken forward from this chapter is this notion of 
process as an inherently constructivist concept, along with dissatisfaction with a 
purely statist account of the international system, and also good grounds for having 
language tested as a possible path through this. 
In Chapter Four, Nicholas Onufs World is taken to be the key representative 
of this more thorough theorising of the back-story of constructivism, which develops 
a case for language through descriptions of how both rules and rule work 
internationally. How far it develops a case for human rights is not explicitly engaged 
with, and this has repercussions for the limits of constructivism on this subject. 
Onufs ground clearing exercise is expansive, to say the least. Incorporating 
recurrent elements of human history into a critique of modernity, it seems to sit well 
with a fundamental requirement of critical theory- that is, the need for an 
intramundane material reality on which to pin claims that the approach is a valid 
representation of suffering and inj"!lstice. Yet Onuf is explicit in his wish not to join 
the ranks of critical theory. After all, he coins the term 'constructivism' for the 
discipline of IR in a bid to distinguish it from other approaches which happen to share 
a similar intellectual heritage. 
361 
Rather, World is more focused on working with intellectual tools that go 
beyond the conceit of liberalism, but stop short of conjuring anything metaphysical 
that we might wish exists but which does not, and so is folly. The middle ground 
drawn by Onuf is the same middle ground that has existed for generations, and he 
suggests we expend our energy on this alone. This too points to an ethical approach to 
human rights - one which is contained and must work within defined limits, and not 
the pursuit of a moral warrant. Exploitation remains the foe of political organisation. 
Then why, if virtues, rights and manners are strong normative traditions, 
which have only been hidden by the modem rush to liberalism, are we left 
unconvinced by Onufs position regarding human rights? It is because we have given 
values a contemporary identity, rather than having left them to wander, meta 
everything else. Onufs constructivism is so finely honed that human rights norms· 
have a great deal of difficulty fitting in to it. It seems intuitively curious that this 
should be the case, but it is borne out in the empiricism of linguistic constructivism. 
So where does the fault lie? The use of language games addresses value-
normativity in much the same way as conventionalist constructivists do when 
conducting empirical studies. Constitutive and procedural norms are stock-in-trade for 
constructivists whose methodological tool-kits are more suitable for this kind of work. 
Final, totalising decisions are not a part of this. To speak of fault, then, is misleading. 
Onufhas set up a detailed analytical framework for the continual re-appraisal of 
normativity in the international system. His successors are applying it (although 
perhaps not as often as they could) to empirical cases. The one concern for a thesis 
dealing with human rights norms, is that these norms are themselves at risk ofbeing 
downgraded to a contemporary expression of values, which shall be replaced by 
another in several generations to come. Indeed, it affirms suspicions that human rights 
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norms are a liberalist product. Their very statement, their codification, is evidence of 
this. 
Onuf does allow for a critique of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, this is 
where most linguistic forays into humanism lie. It is very apparent why this is the 
case. Intervention upsets the principles of anarchy, and so strikes a blow at the liberal 
project. Yet there are values underpinning intervention- values which tell us about 
the worth of human lives -which are not pursued by rules-based linguists. Human 
rights norms trouble the liberal, or orthodox, international system, and cause us to 
question its institutions such as sovereignty, non-intervention, etc. So, as we speak of 
them now, they are a legitimate focus of constructivism, but we are left with an 
incomplete picture by Onuf. The depth of his approach has not been followed 
through, and so has not been established as a characteristic of constructivism. 
Is dialogue and communication, analysed in Chapter Five, the answer? Yes 
and no, as the paradox of 'success' and 'failure' has demonstrated. Linklater's 
contribution to this triangulation, and the debate it is part of, is constructivist, but it 
stays at the outer limits of constructivism and its rhetoric fails to bring the others 
towards it. Gaps have been identified in Wendt's statist approach where we would 
like to see humans as relevant international actors. These spaces are largely filled by 
Onurs exploitative modernity thesis, but this leaves (arguably more important) gaps 
regarding the crossing of actual, geographical borders, and the questions of what to do 
with this conceptual ground once it has been cleared. How, in the end, can 
constructivism be more critical? 
Linklater's is ultimately an optimistic constructivism compared to Onurs 
pessimism and Wendt's relative agnosticism. Unlike Wendt, Linklater- following 
E.H. Carr - sees great depth and potential for reworking the institutions which 
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currently add up to the modem state. Similarly to Onuf, there is much to be done 
which can only begin when mainstream IR takes a full interest in more diverse ways 
of defining the boundaries of political community. 
The key factor which sets Linklater's linguistic tum apart from Onufs is that 
his movement is clearly 'forward', and as such it is clearly led by morality. The 
framework of normativity, sociology and praxeology is understandably an attractive 
proposition for those looking in on constructivism, which is heavily loaded towards 
the latter two. But constructivism does do normativity, as we have seen time and 
again, and it need not be morally underpinned for it to be legitimately done. 
Without question, citizenship studies hold a great deal of potential for 
constructivists interested in pursuing how human rights affect international 
relationships between people and states, and it is an area arguably underrepresented in 
the approach, despite a burgeoning literature throughout the discipline. That Linklater 
is explicit in endowing citizenship with radical properties is again indicative of how 
he operates at the margins of constructivism. 
Materially, dialogic community is found to be lacking, and it suffers as a 
constructivist proposition because of this. Yet his categories of what should make up 
these communities -universal communication, cosmopolitan citizenship, harm, etc. -
are all generally compatible with the challenges thrown up by the human rights 
discourse. Which in a sense makes Linklater's proposition either the solution or the 
problem, depending on which end of the epistemological spectrum you approach the 
issue of values and human rights from. 
Linklater stands on the cusp of critical theory and constructivism and so 
effectively, in the end, makes our decision for us. Only for the lack of a clear 
methodology is his approach not entirely constructivist, and only for his belief in the 
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redemption of shared moral discourse is his approach not entirely critical. Yet the 
existence of this dominating ethical thread in his work demonstrates that anything that 
crosses this line, and therefore turns these issues into moral concerns, is not 
constructivist, and no matter how niany times the round peg is re-sized, it will still not 
fit into the square hole. 
Separately, each of the three approaches which make up the triangulation 
under scrutiny here point to how each might complement one or more of the others by 
filling in conceptual and theoretical gaps. When the exercise shifted to have them 
face-off more directly, more complexities were revealed, as well as more clarity on 
the key research questions of the thesis. 
Chapter Six dealt with the issue of synthesis- which is clearly a prerequisite 
when answering a question which impacts upon a divided approach- by broadening it 
out from just having the triangulation tested within itself, to having each aspect 
challenged as to how well they account for values when under direct pressure from 
their peers. Key areas emerged which demanded attention: to what extent is the 
relationship between constructivism and values actually dysfunctional? What is the 
benefit to constructivism of having a clear position regarding the problems of 
modernity- how does this apparent conflation with critical theory stand up to the 
challenges posed by values? And what does this all mean for constructivism as a 
category of IR theory? 
The answer to the first question is decisive, and permeates the next two. How 
each type within the triangulation goes about the business of IR is instructive. Both 
Wendt and Onufare primarily interested in knowing more about the world they each 
have described. What, in other words, can possibly fit into their templates? Linklater, 
on the other hand, has a purpose which is based on the idea of improvement achieved 
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through change- and fundamental change at that. The notion that having a particular 
intellectual lineage, which is expressed in a particular way, and that this leads to a 
position which can then see potential for change does not fit with the programme 
offered by either Wendt or Onuf. It could, if the 'potential' in question referred to the 
ability of constructivism to account for all voices and all eventualities in the often 
fractured world where human rights norms are assumed to apply most of all. But this 
is not the meaning employed by Linklater, nor by critically-inclined theorists either. It 
is potential for 'something else', which requires a map for getting there. 
Wendt occupies a much more clearly defined space than Onuf or Linklater on 
the subject of values. Although we cannot take humans into this space, we can take 
ethics from it, as the ethics of statehood are prominent throughout. Linklater opens up 
what could be a very rich space for constructivism and values, yet definitional, 
category-related doubts linger. Onuf's 'space' is less clear, but no less important for 
that. That his framework is utterly contained demands an ethical approach to values, 
and therefore human rights, which is a considerably less 'dysfunctional' road to take 
than the frequently-blind alleys of moral quests. 
Asking questions about how and why constructivists seem to mirror critical 
theory's contempt for liberal modernity reveals much about the challenge to 
constructivism and how it is met. Arguably the most interesting point is that Wendt, 
and conventionalists in general, do not see it as a necessary initiation for producing 
such an attack. The implications for 'constructivism' are perhaps defining, but more 
on this presently. Perhaps there are no particular implications of these charges against 
modernity, other than it confirms constructivism's origins as an off-shoot of the Third 
Debate. Yet this would not be a satisfactory conclusion to draw for this thesis. 
Instead, the most instructive point to take from this is that we have a clear dividing 
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line between, on one hand, Wendt and his preference for defining the international in 
terms of the state, and on the other, Onuf and Linklater who admit humans into the 
equation. There is no concerted pull towards critical theory. 
And this is the essence of how this thesis answers the third question. The 
frontiers of the middle ground are still the subject of some dispute, yet the space itself 
unequivocally exists. Values and human rights norms have forced some hard thinking 
about this space and its frontiers, and how the two define each other. Having these 
three types of constructivism come together, at once representative of a problematic 
whole and also how IR has difficulty in hanging on to its preferred categories, has 
resulted in an 'answer' to the critical challenge that has two parts: If it follows critical 
theory on this issue, then it is critical theory. If it remains apart from critical theory, it 
is still very capable of engaging with human rights, if only for the lack of a specific 
end in sight. 
The implications the findings of this thesis have for future research into the 
area of values and human rights by international theory are at least three-fold. In very 
general terms, i). it is a clearer and more sustained statement of the ethical/moral split 
with regards to constructivism and critical theory than has previously been offered, ii). 
having a political agenda is not a prerequisite for producing compelling research into 
values and human rights norms which can, in fact, go beyond confirming a broadly 
liberal position, and iii). there has emerged throughout the course of this thesis a fine, 
yet telling, distinction between what constructivism is, and what it is capable of. That 
we are less able to state the former than the latter is not a weakness of constructivism, 
just as extolling its virtues is not an end to the issue of internal division. 
: ... ; .. 
Constructivism is an ethical approach to international relations, both by design 
and by execution. As such, it is capable of greatly enhancing our understanding of the 
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role ofhuman rights in the international system. If it takes on a moral charge, then it 
is not constructivism. It is difficult to see who the beneficiaries of this overextension 
would be. 
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